Opinion

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

EASTERN DISTRICT OF LOUISIANA

JAMIE JOHNSON CIVIL ACTION

IN HER CAPACITY AS TUTOR

FOR R.C., A MINOR CHILD

VERSUS No. 24-170

RANDY SMITH, ET AL. SECTION I

ORDER AND REASONS

Before the Court are two motions filed by defendants Randy Smith (“Smith”),

Bill Johnson (“Johnson”), Chris Vado (“Vado”), and John Connolly’s (“Connolly,”

collectively, “defendants”). The first is a motion1 for attorney’s fees and expenses

pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1988 and Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 54(d)(2). The second

is a motion2 for taxation of costs pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1920 and Federal Rule of

Civil Procedure 54(d)(1). Plaintiff Jamie Johnson (“plaintiff”), in her capacity as tutor

for R.C., a minor child, filed a response3 in opposition to both of defendants’ motions.

Defendants filed a reply.4 For the reasons that follow, this Court denies defendants’

motion for attorneys’ fees and dismisses without prejudice its motion for costs.

I. FACTUAL BACKGROUND

This case arises out of an encounter between R.C., a minor child, and

defendants Vado and Connolly, a detective and a deputy with the St. Tammany

1 R. Doc. No. 76.

2 R. Doc. No. 77.

3 R. Doc. No. 79.

4 R. Doc. No. 80.

Parish Sheriff’s Office, respectively.5 On May 23, 2024, plaintiff filed an amended

complaint,6 alleging (1) excessive force pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983; (2) violations of

the Louisiana Constitution; (3) state law battery; (4) state law negligence; (5) failure

to intervene; and (6) respondeat superior pursuant to state law.

On November 8, 2024, defendants jointly moved for summary judgment,

arguing that (1) plaintiff’s claims were barred by Heck v. Humphrey; (2) there were

no statutory or constitutional violations in light of the uncontested material facts; (3)

defendants were entitled to qualified immunity; and (4) plaintiff failed to establish

causation for her alleged injuries.7 On December 6, 2024, this Court granted

defendants’ motion for summary judgment on the basis of qualified immunity,

dismissed plaintiff’s federal claims with prejudice, and dismissed her state law claims

without prejudice.8

On November 5, 2025, the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit

affirmed this Court’s grant of summary judgment and dismissal of plaintiff’s state

law claims.9 On November 19, 2025, defendants filed their motion10 for attorneys’

fees and their motion11 for taxation of costs, arguing that they are entitled to costs as

5 R. Doc. No. 60.

6 R. Doc. No. 8.

7 R. Doc. No. 53.

8 R. Doc. No. 70.

9 R. Doc. No. 78.

10 R. Doc. No. 76.

11 R. Doc. No. 77.

the prevailing party and entitled to attorneys’ fees because plaintiff’s claims are

“frivolous, unreasonable, or groundless.”12

II. STANDARD OF LAW

a. Attorneys’ Fees

“When moving for attorney’s fees, ‘the fee applicant bears the burden of

establishing entitlement to an award . . . .’” Petteway v. Henry, 738 F.3d 132, 137 (5th

Cir. 2013) (quoting Hensley, 461 U.S. at 437). Title 42 United States Code § 1988(b)

provides that in any action to enforce a provision of § 1983, “the court, in its

discretion, may allow the prevailing party . . . a reasonable attorney’s fee as part of

the costs.” It is well settled that, “under 42 U.S.C. § 1988, a prevailing party may also

recover ‘[a]ll reasonable out-of-pocket expenses, including charges for photocopying,

paralegal assistance, travel, and telephone . . . because they are part of the costs

normally charged to a fee-paying client.’” DeLeon v. Abbott, 687 F. App’x 340, 342 (5th

Cir. 2017) (quoting Associated Builders & Contractors of La., Inc. v. Orleans Par. Sch.

Bd., 919 F.2d 374, 380 (5th Cir. 1990)).

The Fifth Circuit has held that while “the discretion afforded district courts to

deny attorney’s fees to prevailing plaintiffs under § 1988 is exceedingly narrow,”

Sanchez v. City of Austin, 774 F.3d 873, 878 (5th Cir. 2014) (quoting Cruz v. Hauck,

762 F.2d 1230, 1233 (5th Cir. 1985)), attorneys’ fees are only available to defendants

when “the plaintiff’s action was frivolous, unreasonable, or without foundation, even

though not brought in subjective bad faith.” Vaughn v. Lewisville Indep. Sch. Dist.,

12 See generally R. Doc. No. 76; R. Doc. No. 77.

62 F.4th 199, 203–04 (5th Cir. 2023) (quoting Christiansburg Garment Co. v. Equal

Emp. Opportunity Comm’n, 434 U.S. 412, 421 (1978)); Doe v. Silsbee Indep. Sch. Dist.,

440 F. App’x 421, 425 (5th Cir. 2011) (“[A]n award of attorney’s fees to a prevailing

defendant under § 1988 is ‘presumptively unavailable’ . . . and is proper only upon a

finding that the plaintiff’s suit is ‘frivolous, unreasonable, or groundless . . .’”)

(quoting Dean v. Riser, 240 F.3d 505, 508 (5th Cir. 2001)).

A claim is “frivolous” when it is “wholly insubstantial,” as for example, when it

is foreclosed by Supreme Court precedent. WickFire, LLC v. Woodruff, 989 F.3d 343,

349 (5th Cir. 2021); Perkins v. Hart, No. 21-879, 2024 WL 3755238, at *11 (E.D. La.

June 28, 2024), report and recommendation adopted, 2024 WL 3742743 (E.D. La. Aug.

7, 2024). A claim is foreclosed by Supreme Court precedent “when the ‘unsoundness’

of the claim ‘so clearly results from the [Supreme Court] decisions . . . as to foreclose

the subject and leave no room for the inference that the questions sought to be raised

can be the subject of controversy.” WickFire, 989 F.3d at 349. Courts award attorneys’

fees to prevailing defendants “where the plaintiff’s civil rights claim lacks a basis in

fact or relies on an undisputably meritless legal theory.” Silsbee Indep. Sch. Dist., 440

F. App’x at 425.

However, “a losing claim is not frivolous if it has legal and factual

undergirding.” Id. When deciding whether a claim is frivolous, “courts may examine

factors such as: (1) whether the plaintiff established a prima facie case; (2) whether

the defendant offered to settle; and (3) whether the court dismissed the case or held

a full trial.” Doe v. Silsbee Indep. Sch. Dist., 440 F. App’x 421, 425 (5th Cir. 2011).

“These factors are, however, guideposts, not hard and fast rules. Determinations

regarding frivolity are to be made on a case-by-case basis.” Id. (quoting E.E.O.C. v.

L.B. Foster Co., 123 F.3d 746, 751 (3d Cir. 1997)). The Supreme Court has stated that

when applying these factors, it is important that a district court “resist the

understandable temptation to engage in post hoc reasoning by concluding that,

because a plaintiff did not ultimately prevail, his action must have been unreasonable

or without foundation.” Offord v. Parker, 456 F. App’x 472, 474 (5th Cir. 2012)

(quoting Christiansburg, 434 U.S. at 421–22). This is because that “kind of hindsight

logic could discourage all but the most airtight claims, for seldom can a prospective

plaintiff be sure of ultimate success.” Silsbee Indep. Sch. Dist., 440 F. App’x at 425

(quoting Christiansburg, 434 U.S. at 422).

“Accordingly, the dismissal of a plaintiff’s claims before they reach the jury is

insufficient by itself to support a finding” that the plaintiff’s claims were frivolous.

Silsbee Indep. Sch. Dist., 440 F. App’x at 425. “Allegations that, upon careful

examination, prove legally insufficient to require a trial are not, for that reason alone,

‘groundless’ or ‘without foundation’ as required by Christiansburg.” Id. (quoting

Hughes v. Rowe, 449 U.S. 5, 15–16 (1980)). “Even when the law or the facts appear

questionable or unfavorable at the outset, a party may have an entirely reasonable

ground for bringing suit.” Id. (quoting Christiansburg, 434 U.S. at 422). “Careful

consideration given to the case by the district court is some indication that the suit

was not frivolous.” Usea v. Manuel, No. , 2022 WL 7037225, at *3 (E.D. La. Oct, 12,

2022) (Milazzo, J.) (cleaned up) (quoting Hawkins v. Coleman, No. 10-152, 2011 WL

3100562, at *2 (W.D. La. July 25, 2011)); see also Jones v. Tex. Tech Univ., 656 F.2d

1137, 1146 (5th Cir. 1981); Hughes, 449 U.S. at 15 (vacating an award of attorney’s

fees from plaintiff to defendant when the plaintiff’s claims received “careful

consideration of both the district court and the court of appeals”).

Pursuant to Local Rule 54.2, if a party seeks attorneys’ fees, “the party must

submit to the court a verified, contemporaneous report reflecting the date, time

involved, and nature of the services performed.” Pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil

Procedure 52(d)(2)(B)(i), a motion for attorneys’ fees must “be filed no later than 14

days after the entry of judgment” unless a statute or court order provides otherwise.

Rule 54(a) defines a “judgment” as “a decree and any order from which an appeal

lies.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 54(a).

To calculate a reasonable attorneys’ fee award, courts begin with the lodestar

method, which is determined by taking the “reasonable number of hours expended on

the litigation and the reasonable hourly rates for the participating lawyers,

multiplying the reasonable hours by the reasonable hourly rates.” Doe v. Fitch, No.

22-60481, 2023 WL 2882717, at *1 (5th Cir. Apr. 11, 2023) (citation modified) (citing

La. Power & Light Co. v. Kellstrom, 50 F.3d 319, 324 (5th Cir. 1995) (“[T]he district

court must multiply the reasonable hours by the reasonable hourly rates.”).

What constitutes a reasonable hourly rate is “computed according to the

prevailing market rates in the relevant legal market.” Alvarez v. McCarthy, No. 20-

50465, 2022 WL 822178, at *3 (5th Cir. Mar. 18, 2022) (quoting Hopwood v. Texas,

236 F.3d 256, 281 (5th Cir. 2000)). “Generally, the reasonable hourly rate for a

particular community is established through affidavits of other attorneys practicing

there.” Hill v. Schilling, No. 07-2020, 2022 WL 1718739, at *18 (N.D. Tex. Nov. 22,

2022) (Lindsay, J.) (quoting Tollett v. City of Kemah, 285 F.3d 357, 368 (5th Cir.

2002)). If the nonmoving party does not oppose the hourly rate, that rate is “prima

facie reasonable.” Cox v. Mignon Faget, Ltd., No. 24-1068, 2025 WL 2022669, at *3

(E.D. La. July 18, 2025) (Africk, J.) (citing Islamic Ctr. of Miss. v. City of Starkville,

876 F.2d 465, 469 (5th Cir. 1989)).

Prevailing parties seeking attorneys’ fees are also “charged with the burden of

showing the reasonableness of the hours billed and . . . proving that they exercised

billing judgment.” Saizan v. Delta Concrete Prod. Co., 448 F.3d 795, 799 (5th Cir.

2006). “The party seeking attorneys’ fees must present adequately documented time

records to the court.” Holmes v. Reddoch, No. 19-12749, 2024 WL 4989454, at *3 (E.D.

La. Dec. 5, 2024) (Africk, J.) (quoting Watkins v. Fordice, 7 F.3d 453, 457 (5th Cir.

1993)). “Using this time as a benchmark, the court should exclude all time that is

excessive, duplicative, or inadequately documented.” Id. “The proper remedy when

there is no evidence of billing judgment is to reduce the hours awarded by a

percentage intended to substitute for the exercise of billing judgment.” Id. (quoting

Walker v. U.S. Dept. of Hous. and Urb. Dev., 99 F.3d 761, 770 (5th Cir. 1996)).

There is a strong presumption that the lodestar amount is reasonable. Saizan,

448 F.3d at 800. However, once the lodestar is calculated, the court may adjust it

upward or downward based upon the twelve factors set forth in Johnson v. Georgia

Highway Express, Inc., 488 F.2d 714 (5th Cir. 1974). Id. These factors are:

(1) the time and labor required to represent the client or clients; (2) the novelty

and difficulty of the issues in the case; (3) the skill required to perform the legal

services properly; (4) the preclusion of other employment by the attorney; (5)

the customary fee charged for those services in the relevant community; (6)

whether the fee is fixed or contingent; (7) the time limitations imposed by the

client or circumstances; (8) the amount involved and the results obtained; (9)

the experience, reputation, and ability of the attorney; (10) the undesirability

of the case; (11) the nature and length of the professional relationship with the

client; and (12) awards in similar cases.

Saizan, 448 F.3d at 800 n.18.

An adjustment based on the Johnson factors is appropriate where the lodestar

“does not adequately take into account a factor that may be properly considered in

determining a reasonable fee.” Perdue v. Kenny A. ex rel. Winn, 559 U.S. 542, 554

(2010). However, “[t]he lodestar may not be adjusted due to a Johnson factor . . . if

the creation of the lodestar amount already took that factor into account; to do so

would be impermissible double counting.” Saizan, 448 F.3d at 800. For example,

“[t]he first factor already is included in the lodestar.” Walker, 99 F.3d at 771.

“‘[N]ovelty [and] complexity of the issues, the special skill and experience of counsel,

the quality of representation, and the results obtained from the litigation are

presumably fully reflected in the lodestar amount, and thus cannot serve as

independent bases for increasing the basic fee award.” In re Pilgrim’s Pride Corp.,

690 F.3d 650, 656 (5th Cir. 2012) (quoting Matter of Fender, 12 F.3d 480, 488 (5th

Cir. 1994)). The Fifth Circuit has also stated that “the contingent nature of the case

cannot serve as a basis for enhancement of attorneys’ fees” and that the preclusion of

other employment will ordinarily be subsumed within the lodestar amount because

it will be reflected in the number of hours billed. Canaski v. MID Miss. Props., No.

15-344, 2017 WL 4531690, at *7 (S.D. Miss. May 17, 2017) (Ozerden, J.) (quoting

Shipes v. Trinity Indus., 987 F.2d 311, 321–23 (5th Cir. 1993)).

However, of the Johnson factors that courts may consider in adjusting the

lodestar, “the most critical factor is the degree of success obtained.” Hensley, 461 U.S.

at 436. When “a plaintiff has achieved only partial or limited success, the product of

hours reasonably expended on the litigation as a whole times a reasonable hourly

rate may be an excessive amount.” Id. “This will be true even where the plaintiff’s

claims were interrelated, nonfrivolous, and raised in good faith.” Id. “The district

court may attempt to identify specific hours that should be eliminated, or it may

simply reduce the award to account for the limited success.” Id. at 436–37.

b. Taxation of Costs

Pursuant to Local Rule 54.3, a prevailing party “[w]ithin 35 days of receiving

notice of entry of judgment . . . must serve on the attorney for the adverse party and

file with the clerk a motion to tax costs.” LR 54.3; Thorton v. Colvin, No. 15-407, 2016

WL 3952040, at *1–2 (E.D. La. July 22, 2016) (Lemelle, J.) (denying the plaintiff’s

motion for taxation of costs when it was filed more than 35 days after entry of

judgment).

III. ANALYSIS

a. Attorneys’ Fees

First, plaintiff argues that defendants’ motion for attorneys’ fees is untimely

because it was not filed within “14 days after the entry of judgment” as required by

Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 54(d)(2)(B)(i).13 Defendants counter that “[t]he

fourteen-day time limit is not jurisdictional” and the “Fifth Circuit has repeatedly

held that a district court may waive the fourteen-day deadline where ‘parties properly

notify their counterparts of their requests for attorneys’ fees’ and therefore fulfill the

purpose of Rule 54(d).”14 Defendants argue that their request for attorneys’ fees in

their answer15 to plaintiff’s amended complaint was sufficient to put plaintiff on

notice of defendants’ request for attorneys’ fees and fulfill the purpose of Rule 54(d)

and, therefore, their motion for attorneys’ fees is not untimely.16

This Court agrees that plaintiff was properly on notice of defendants’ request

for attorneys’ fees such that the purpose of Rule 54(d) is fulfilled. In Cordova, the

defendants requested attorneys’ fees in their response to plaintiff’s Rule 60(b) motion,

filed more than one year after the entry of judgment. 2023 WL 1967893, at *1–3. The

Fifth Circuit affirmed the district court’s award of attorneys’ fees to the defendants,

noting that the defendants’ request for fees in their response to plaintiff’s Rule 60(b)

motion was sufficient to “properly notify” the plaintiff of their requests for attorneys’

fees, that the plaintiff “had notice and the opportunity to respond” to defendants’

13 R. Doc. No. 79 at 8–9.

14 R. Doc. No. 80 at 1 (citing Green v. Adm’rs of Tulane Educ. Fund, 284 F.3d 642, 664

(5th Cir. 2002), as amended on denial of reh’g and reh’g en banc, (5th Cir. 2002)

(overruled on other grounds); Romaguera v. Gegenheimer, 162 F.3d 893, 895 (5th Cir.

1998), clarified on denial of reh’g, 169 F.3d 223 (5th Cir. 1999); Cordova v. La. State

Univ. Agric. & Mech. Coll. Bd. of Supervisors, No. 22-30732, 2023 WL 2967893 (5th

Cir. Apr. 17, 2023), cert. denied, 144 S. Ct. 187 (2023)).

15 R. Doc. No. 61 ¶ XIV (“Plaintiffs’ claims are without merit and [d]efendants are

entitled to be awarded the attorney’s fees and costs incurred in defense of this

matter.”)

16 R. Doc. No. 80 at 1–2.

request for fees, and that the plaintiff did actually respond to defendants’ request for

fees.

Similarly, plaintiff was properly on notice of defendants’ request for attorneys’

fees based on defendants’ inclusion of the request in their answer. Like the plaintiff

in Cordova, plaintiff has had notice and the opportunity to respond to defendants’

request for attorneys’ fees and has in fact responded to defendants’ request.17 2023

WL 2967893, at *3. Defendants’ request for attorneys’ fees in their answer to

plaintiff’s amended complaint is sufficient to fulfill the purposes of Rule 54(d) and

defendants’ motion for attorneys’ fees is not untimely. See id.; see also Romaguera,

162 F.3d at 895–96 (“[T]he district court’s acknowledgment of [plaintiff]’s request [for

attorneys’ fees] served to notify opposing counsel of the request, thereby satisfying

Congress’ intended purpose under Rule 54(d)(2).”).

This Court now turns to the merits of defendants’ motion. Defendants, in their

motion for attorney’s fees, argue that plaintiff’s claims were “frivolous, groundless, or

without foundation.”18 Defendants base their argument on this Court’s Order and

Reasons,19 issued on December 6, 2024, granting defendants’ motion20 for summary

judgment, dismissing with prejudice plaintiff’s federal law claims on the basis of

qualified immunity, and dismissing without prejudice plaintiff’s state law claims.

17 See generally R. Doc. No. 79.

18 R. Doc. No. 76-1 at 5–7.

19 R. Doc. No. 70.

20 R. Doc. No. 53.

Defendants also point to the opinion21 and judgment22 issued by the Fifth Circuit

affirming this Court’s grant of summary judgment and dismissal of plaintiff’s claims.

Defendants argue that because this Court dismissed plaintiff’s claims, plaintiff did

not appeal her failure to intervene claim, and the Fifth Circuit affirmed that

dismissal, plaintiff’s claims “lacked factual support and legal authority” and were

“unreasonable and without foundation, even if not brought in subjective bad faith.”23

Plaintiff, in her opposition24 to defendant’s motion, argues that her claims were

not frivolous. She points out that defendants answered plaintiff’s amended complaint

rather than moving to dismiss it, which she claims was a concession by defendants

that plaintiff had stated a prima facie case. Plaintiff also points to the extent of

discovery conducted in this case, the fact that plaintiff’s claims were dismissed the

month before trial, and the 51-page length of defendants’ motion for summary

judgment to argue that this “raised serious questions about the use of force on a child”

and “had factual and legal grounding.”25 Plaintiff claims that her allegations “were

not exaggerated; they were supported by medical findings, video evidence, and

deposition testimony.”26 She argues that “granting summary judgment on the

demanding ‘clearly established’ prong of qualified immunity does not transform

[p]laintiff’s claims into frivolous ones.”27 Plaintiff also argues that this Court cannot

21 R. Doc. No. 76-2.

22 R. Doc. No. 76-3.

23 R. Doc. No. 76 at 1.

24 R. Doc. No. 79.

25 Id. at 6–7.

26 Id. at 6.

27 Id.

grant defendants’ motion for attorneys’ fees because the motion was not timely filed

and because they did not submit records supporting their claim for attorneys’ fees in

the amount of $90,760.50.28

This Court finds that plaintiff’s claims were not frivolous. It is undisputed that

defendants did not offer to settle this case and this Court dismissed plaintiff’s

claims.29 However, plaintiff’s claims were dismissed because this Court and the Fifth

Circuit agreed that plaintiff could not show that the unlawfulness of defendants’

conducted was “clearly established” such that defendants were not entitled to

qualified immunity—not because plaintiff’s claims were “groundless.”30

Plaintiff’s claims did not lack a basis in fact. It is undisputed that an encounter

between plaintiff’s daughter and law enforcement officers occurred and that the

encounter resulted in injuries to plaintiff’s daughter.31 Courts have denied attorneys’

fees to prevailing defendants in a § 1983 claim even when plaintiffs made factual

allegations that turned out to be false. Bailey v. Normand, No. 12-2795, 2015 WL

1268325 (E.D. La. Mar. 19, 2015) (Milazzo, J.) (“[T]his is not a case where plaintiffs’

claims were manufactured out of whole cloth.”) (denying a prevailing defendant’s

motion for attorney’s fees when the plaintiff’s § 1983 excessive force claim was

dismissed on summary judgment on the basis of qualified immunity and discovery

revealed that many of the allegations in plaintiffs’ complaint were false, but the

28 Id. at 7–9.

29 R. Doc. No. 76 at 7; see generally R. Doc. No. 79.

30 See generally R. Doc. No. 70; R. Doc. No. 76-2.

31 See generally R. Doc. No. 76-1; R. Doc. No. 76-2; R. Doc. No. 79.

record showed that the claims were not groundless). Courts have also denied motions

for attorneys’ fees in § 1983 cases even when the plaintiff’s claims are dismissed at

the pleadings stage pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12. Washington v.

Smith, 639 F.Supp.3d 625, 658 (E.D. La. 2022) (Africk, J.) (“[T]he fact that a

defendant prevails on a motion to dismiss does not establish that the plaintiff’s claims

were frivolous.”); Lewis v. Smith, No. 18-4776, 2019 WL 4521422 (E.D. La. Sept. 19,

2019) (Ashe, J.) (“[A]lthough [defendant] prevailed on his motion to dismiss, the Court

cannot say that [plaintiff]’s principal claims were wholly frivolous.”).

Plaintiff’s claims warranted careful consideration both by this Court and by

the Fifth Circuit.32 This “careful consideration” is strong evidence that plaintiff’s

claims were not frivolous or wholly without merit. Usea, 2022 WL 7037225, at *3

(“[T]he Court carefully considered the merits of the arguments in deciding to grant

summary judgment, further supporting the conclusion that this case was not

frivolous.”); see also Jones, 656 F.2d at 1146 (“[T]he careful consideration given to the

case by the district court is some indication that the suit was not frivolous.”).

As the Fifth Circuit noted, context was critical in connection with plaintiff’s

claims.33 Plaintiff relied on several cases to argue that defendants’ conduct violated

“clearly established” law, and the Fifth Circuit found that plaintiff’s “best case” was

Curran v. Aleshire, 800 F.3d 656 (5th Cir. 2015).34 However, the Fifth Circuit found

32 See generally R. Doc. No. 70 (this Court’s 29-page order and reasons granting

defendant’s motion for summary judgment); R. Doc. No. 76-2 (the Fifth Circuit 15-

page order affirming this Court’s dismissal of plaintiff’s claims).

33 R. Doc. No. 76-2 at 9.

34 Id.

that the facts in this case were “significantly different” from the facts in Curran.35

Although the facts in Curran and this case were different, this Court does not find

that plaintiff’s arguments were frivolous.

Even if plaintiff’s claims were frivolous, defendants have failed to comply with

Local Rule 54.2 by not submitting “a verified, contemporaneous report reflecting the

date, time involved, and nature of the services provided.” LR 54.2; see also Hoffman

v. Bailey, No. 13-5153, 2017 WL 2212503, at *6–9 (E.D. La. May 16, 2017) (denying

plaintiff’s motion for attorneys’ fees when it failed to comply with Local Rule 54.2).

Defendants argue that “[c]ourts in this Circuit . . . consistently hold that Rule 54 does

not require the initial motion to be supported with evidentiary material regarding

fees at the time of filing, but only requires the party requesting attorneys’ fees to

subsequently provide evidence when directed by the court.”36 In support of this

argument, defendants cite two cases, one from the U.S. District Court for the

Northern District of Texas and another from the U.S. District Court for the Southern

District of Texas.37 These cases have no bearing on the Local Rules for the U.S.

35 Id.

36 R. Doc. No. 79 at 4.

37 Id. at 4 n. 18. Defendant cites Ortiz & Assocs. Consulting, LLC v. Vizio, Inc., No.

23-791, 2024 WL 815553 (N.D. Tex. Feb. 27, 2024) (Godbey, C.J.), in which the court

granted the defendant’s motion for attorneys’ fees and ordered the defendant to

submit evidentiary support for the specific fee award it sought without discussing

whether such evidentiary support was required to be submitted at the time of the

defendant’s motion for attorneys’ fees. Ortiz was filed in the U.S. District Court for

the Northern District of Texas and is inapplicable here. Defendant also cites S. Tex.

Elec. Coop. v. Dresser-Rand Co., No. 06-28, 2010 WL 1855959 (S.D. Tex. May 5, 2010)

(Rainey, J.), where the court denied the prevailing plaintiff’s motion for appellate

attorneys’ fees, but noted that Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 54(d)(2)(B)(iii) “only

requires the party requesting attorneys’ fees to provide a ‘fair estimate’ of its fees.”

District Court for the Eastern District of Louisiana, where motions for attorneys’ fees

are required to comply with Local Rule 54.2. See, e.g., Hoffman, 2017 WL 2212503, at

*6–9.

Defendants ask for $90,760.50 in attorneys’ fees without providing

documentation supporting that amount and state that “[i]f the motion is granted,

upon the Court’s request, [d]efendant will submit to the Court redacted invoices and

bills supporting the award of attorney’s fees.”38 This is an attempt to bifurcate their

motion for attorneys’ fees into two separate motions without permission of this Court

and in contravention of Local Rule 54.2. Defendants’ failure to comply with Local Rule

54.2 provides an alternative basis for this Court to decline to award attorneys’ fees to

defendants.

b. Taxation of Costs

Defendants’ motion for taxation of costs is procedurally improper. Local Rule

54.3 states that a prevailing party must file “with the clerk” a motion to tax costs. LR

54.3. Local Rule 54.3.1 further states that the prevailing party must “serve notice of

submission of the matter before the clerk.” LR 54.3.1. The initial determination with

respect to defendants’ request for costs is to be made by the U.S. Clerk of Court, not

this Court.

IV. CONCLUSION

For the reasons stated above,

Again, this case contains no discussion of Local Rule 54.2 as it was filed in a different

district court.

38 R. Doc. No. 76-1 at 9 n. 42.

IT IS ORDERED that defendants’ motion®9 for attorneys’ fees is DENIED.

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that defendants’ motion’? is DISMISSED

WITHOUT PREJUDICE.

New Orleans, Louisiana, December 18, 2025.

LANCH M. AFRICK

UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

39 R. Doc. No. 76.

49 R. Doc. No. 77.

17