Barnes

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

WESTERN DISTRICT OF LOUISIANA

ALEXANDRIA DIVISION

JACOB BARNES CASE NO. 1:21-CV-00024

VERSUS JUDGE DAVID C. JOSEPH

DRESSER LLC ET AL MAGISTRATE JUDGE PEREZ-MONTES

D&J INVESTMENTS OF CASE NO. 1:23-CV-00508

CENLA LLC JUDGE DAVID C. JOSEPH

VERSUS MAGISTRATE JUDGE PEREZ-MONTES

DRESSER LLC ET AL

RAY ARNOLD CASE NO. 1:23-CV-01795

VERSUS JUDGE DAVID C. JOSEPH

DRESSER LLC ET AL MAGISTRATE JUDGE PEREZ-MONTES

MEMORANDUM RULING

Before the Court are several motions filed in the above-captioned Related

Cases: (1) a MOTION TO DISMISS PURSUANT TO LONE PINE ORDER [Doc. 372] and (2) a

MOTION TO STRIKE UNTIMELY AFFIDAVIT OF DR. STEVEN B. BIRD [Doc. 383], both filed

by the Dresser entities (hereinafter, “Dresser”);1 and (3) a MOTION TO DISMISS

PURSUANT TO THE LONE PINE ORDER [Doc. 373], filed by General Electric Company,

all filed in the Barnes matter; (4) a MOTION TO DISMISS PURSUANT TO LONE PINE

ORDER [Doc. 196]; and (5) a MOTION TO STRIKE UNTIMELY AFFIDAVIT OF DR. STEVEN

B. BIRD [Doc. 199], both filed by the Dresser entities in the D&J matter; and (6) a

1 The Dresser entities are: Dresser, LLC; Dresser RE, LLC; Baker Hughes Company;

Baker Hughes Holdings, LLC; Baker Hughes, Inc. (now known as Baker Hughes Holdings,

LLC); Baker Hughes, a GE Company, LLC (now known as Baker Hughes Holdings, LLC);

Baker Hughes Energy Services, LLC; GE Oil & Gas, LLC (now known as Baker Hughes

Energy Services, LLC); GE Oil & Gas, Inc. (now known as Baker Hughes Energy Services,

LLC); EHHC NewCo, LLC; and CFC Holdings, LLC (collectively, “Dresser”), one or more of

which is named in each of the Related Cases.

MOTION TO DISMISS PURSUANT TO LONE PINE ORDER [110]; and (7) a MOTION TO STRIKE

UNTIMELY AFFIDAVIT OF DR. STEVEN B. BIRD IN SUPPORT OF DEFENDANTS’ MOTION TO

DISMISS PURSUANT TO LONE PINE ORDER [Doc. 112], both filed by the Dresser entities

in the Arnold matter. In all three cases, the MOTIONS TO DISMISS PURSUANT TO LONE

PINE ORDER are identical and request the same relief with respect to different

Plaintiffs, that is, the dismissal of Plaintiffs who Defendants allege have not complied

with the Court’s Lone Pine Order.2 For the reasons set forth below, Dresser’s Motions

to Dismiss are GRANTED IN PART and DENIED IN PART; GE’s Motion to Dismiss

is GRANTED IN PART and DENIED IN PART; and Dresser’s Motions to Strike are

DENIED.

FACTUAL BACKGROUND AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

These matters—among others—arise from the operations of a now-closed pipe

valve manufacturing facility located in Rapides Parish, Louisiana (the “Dresser

Facility”). The Plaintiffs in the Related Cases3 claim that the Dresser Facility

2 All of the Motions, except for the Motions in the Arnold case and GE’s Motion in the

Barnes case, have been fully briefed. In the Barnes matter, the Plaintiffs oppose the Motion

to Dismiss [Doc. 379]; Dresser filed a combined reply to the Plaintiffs’ opposition brief and a

Motion to Strike Dr. Bird’s Affidavit [Doc. 383]; and the Plaintiffs filed a sur-reply brief [Doc.

388]. In the D&J matter, the Plaintiffs oppose the Motion to Dismiss [Doc. 198]; Dresser

filed a combined reply to the Plaintiffs’ opposition brief and a Motion to Strike Dr. Bird’s

Affidavit [Doc. 199]; and the Plaintiffs oppose Dresser’s Motion to Strike [Doc. 202]. Dresser’s

Motions filed in the Arnold case are unopposed, and GE’s Motion in the Barnes case is

unopposed.

3 The following Related Cases have been consolidated for discovery purposes: Cook v.

Dresser, LLC, No. 1:21-cv-00696-DCJ-JPM (W.D. La. March 1, 2021); Barton v. Dresser, LLC,

No. 1:22-cv-00263-DCJ-JPM (W.D. La. Jan. 26, 2022); Barnes v. Dresser, LLC, No. 1:21-cv-

00024-DCJ-JPM (W.D. La. Jan. 6, 2021); Arnold v. Dresser, LLC, No. 1:23-cv-01795-DCJ-

JPM (W.D. La. Dec. 27, 2023); and D&J Investments of Cenla, LLC v. Dresser, LLC, No. 1:23-

cv-00508-DCJ-JPM (W.D. La. Apr. 18, 2023). All Related Cases, except for the Barnes and

improperly disposed of solvents, cutting oils, acids, and caustics, thereby

contaminating the groundwater and soil in the surrounding area. The Plaintiffs

further allege that this contamination migrated onto their nearby properties, causing

both property damage and either present or potential future personal injury due to

their exposure to the toxins.

Relevant here, all Plaintiffs in the Related Cases are subject to a Lone Pine

Order issued by the Court on October 10, 2023 [Doc. 121; Barnes]; [Doc. 48; entered

in D&J on January 25, 2024]; [Doc. 19; entered in Arnold on January 25, 2024]. This

Order required the following compliance: (1) any Plaintiff who had not done so was

required to produce to Defendants a completed Plaintiff Information Sheet;4 and (2)

each Plaintiff claiming a personal injury sustained as a result of exposure to

trichloroethylene (TCE) or tetrachloroethylene (PCE), either to himself or herself, or

on behalf of a minor or decedent, was required to serve on the Defendants a sworn

affidavit from a licensed physician or other qualified expert, or both, as may be

necessary, which sets forth the following for each claimant:

a. A list of all specific injuries, illnesses, or conditions that the

claimant suffered as a result of the alleged exposure to TCE or PCE;

b. The date(s) on which each such injury, illness, or condition was first

suffered by the claimant and the date(s) on which a physician or

other health care professional examined or treated the claimant for

Cook cases, are currently stayed, and some of the cases are in various stages of settlement

negotiations.

4 The Plaintiff Information Sheet requires basic, non-legal information, including

identifying information, address, domestic status, property information, and information

related to any personal injury claims asserted, including illnesses or conditions allegedly

caused by exposure to TCE and/or PCE, symptoms, physicians consulted, and the amount of

medical expenses incurred as a result.

the injury, illness, or condition allegedly caused by exposure to TCE

or PCE;

c. An explanation of the manner of exposure (i.e., ingestion,

inhalation, dermal contact, etc.), the dates of exposure, and the

duration of exposure;

d. The name and address of each physician or other medical care

provider who treated the claimant, a summary of the treatment

provided, and any diagnosis;

e. An opinion, based on a reasonable degree of medical or scientific

probability, that the claimed injury, illness, or medical condition

was caused by the exposure to TCE or PCE; and

f. A descriptive narrative and list of source materials, if any,

providing the scientific and medical basis for any expert’s opinion

that the claimed injury, illness, or medical condition may be caused

by exposure to TCE or PCE.5

[Doc. 121, Barnes]; [Doc. 48, D&J]; [Doc. 19, Arnold].

The central dispute presented in the Motions is whether the evidence provided

by certain Plaintiffs in response to the Court’s Lone Pine Order is sufficient, or

whether the Plaintiffs have failed to comply with the Order and are subject to the

dismissal of some or all of their claims. All issues having been fully briefed, the

Motions are ripe for review.

LAW AND ANALYSIS

Lone Pine orders “are designed to handle the complex issues and potential

burdens on defendants and courts in mass tort litigation,” Acuna v. Brown & Root,

5 In Barnes, Plaintiff Information Sheets were due no later than November 17, 2023,

while medical evidence was due no later than February 9, 2024. In D&J and Arnold, Plaintiff

Information Sheets were due on February 28, 2024, and medical evidence was due on or

before May 25, 2024.

Inc., 200 F.3d 335, 340 (5th Cir.2000), and are “routinely used ... to streamline

litigation in mass tort cases” and to identify and cull potentially meritless claims.

Hamer v. LivaNova Deutschland GmbH, 994 F.3d 173, 178 (3rd Cir. 2021), citing

In re Vioxx Prods. Liab. Litig., 557 F. Supp. 2d 741, 743-44 (E.D. La. 2008), aff’d, 388

F. App’x 391 (5th Cir. 2010) (collecting cases). See Lore v. Lone Pine Corp. 1986

WL 637507, *1-*3 (N.J. Super. Nov. 18, 1986) (court approved a pre-trial order

requiring plaintiffs to provide basic facts in the form of expert reports or run the risk

of having their case dismissed). The Fifth Circuit has recognized the value and

approved the use of Lone Pine orders in mass tort litigation. See Acuna, 200 F.3d at

340 (Fifth Circuit affirmed district court’s dismissal of claims under Lone Pine Order

and held district court was within its discretion to issue a scheduling order that

“essentially required that information that plaintiffs should have had before filing

their claims pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 11(b)(3).”). In Acuna, the Court explained the

nature of Lone Pine evidence as follows:

Each plaintiff should have had at least some information regarding the

nature of his injuries, the circumstances under which he could have been

exposed to harmful substances, and the basis for believing that the

named defendants were responsible for his injuries.

200 F.3d at 340.

Although the Fifth Circuit has approved the use of Lone Pine orders, the court

“has not endorsed an analytical framework for determining whether they are

appropriate in a given case.” Jackson Water Master Case v. City of Jackson,

Mississippi, 2023 WL 8789746, at *5 (S.D. Miss. Dec. 19, 2023) (denying motion to

enter Lone Pine order). And courts have recognized the tension between Lone Pine

orders and the procedural safeguards embedded in the Federal Rules of Civil

Procedure. See Adinolfe v. United Techs. Corp., 768 F.3d 1161, 1168 (11th Cir. 2014)

(cautioning against Lone Pine orders “as platforms for pseudo-summary judgment

motions” inconsistent with both the pleading requirements of Rule 8 and the

summary judgment requirements of FRCP 56); McManaway v. KBR, Inc., 695

F. Supp. 2d 883, 897–98 (S.D. Ind. 2010) (warning that a Lone Pine order “should not

become a surrogate for summary judgment practice”). Lone Pine orders are issued

under the wide discretion afforded federal judges under Rule 16. Matter of AET Inc.

Ltd., 2015 WL 13745436, at *2 (E.D. Tex. Oct. 13, 2015), citing Acuna, 200 F.3d at

340; In re Vioxx Prods. Liab. Litig., 557 F. Supp. 2d at 743-44. Most importantly, in

administering the Lone Pine Order, courts must strike a balance between the

efficiencies such an order is designed to promote and the risk of unfairness that may

result from imposing premature evidentiary burdens. McManaway, 265 F.R.D. at

385 (“In crafting a Lone Pine order, a court should strive to strike a balance between

efficiency and equity.”).

Thus, while the utility and propriety of Lone Pine orders in mass tort litigation

is clear, the standards governing their enforcement is fact-dependent and within the

wide discretion of the presiding Court. Clearly, a district court may dismiss an action

or proceeding if a party fails to obey a pretrial order. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 16(f); see also

Culwell v. City of Fort Worth, 468 F.3d 868, 871 (5th Cir. 2006); Bann v. Ingram

Micro, Inc., 108 F.3d 625, 627 (5th Cir. 1997).6 But although some courts analyze

6 The standard for dismissal under Rule 16(f) is the same standard used when

evaluating dismissal for failure to prosecute under Rule 41(b). Price v. McGlathery, 792 F.2d

Lone Pine orders through the lens of Fed. R. Civ. P. 16, other courts disregard Rule

16 entirely in deciding whether to dismiss claims for failure to comply with such

orders. Courts that enforce Lone Pine orders with dismissal consistently emphasize

that these orders require minimal, foundational proof and not full-blown expert

reports, as well as the inherent power to manage their dockets under FRCP 16. See,

e.g., Lone Pine, 1986 WL 637507 (entire case dismissed with prejudice, in part,

because of plaintiffs’ failure to provide sufficient evidence in response to Lone Pine

order); In re Zostavax (Zoster Vaccine Live) Prods. Liab. Litig., 2024 WL 3423709, at

*3 (3rd Cir. 2024) (Third Circuit affirmed district court’s dismissal of 1,189 cases for

failure to comply with a Lone Pine order, concluding that the district court was not

required to resolve the cases through summary judgment); Acuna, supra.

However, courts that reject dismissals tend to focus on Lone Pine orders that

are issued prematurely without meaningful discovery and without regard to other

procedural safeguards. See, e.g., Adinolfe 768 F.3d at 1169 (explaining why a Lone

Pine order should not be used as a pre-discovery case management tool before a

district court rules on the legal sufficiency of a complaint, and reversing district

court’s dismissal of claims where district court improperly relied, in part, on evidence

in the Lone Pine order in dismissing claims); Simeone v. Girard City Bd. of Edn., 872

N.E.2d 344, 354 (Ohio 2007) (appellate court found that trial court abused its

472, 474 (5th Cir. 1986). In the Fifth Circuit, a district court may dismiss with prejudice for

failure to prosecute only when: (1) the plaintiff's conduct establishes a clear record of delay

or contumacious conduct, and (2) a lesser sanction would not better serve the best interests

of justice. See McNeal v. Papasan, 842 F.2d 787, 790 (5th Cir. 1988); see also Millan v. USAA

Gen. Indem. Co., 546 F.3d 321, 326 (5th Cir. 2008).

discretion in issuing Lone Pine order at a stage in proceedings when there had yet to

be any meaningful discovery, followed by the dismissal of the case with prejudice for

failure to comply); McManaway, supra.

With the foregoing standards in mind, the Court turns its attention to the

Motions.

I. Dresser’s Motions to Dismiss

In its Motions to Dismiss, Dresser seeks the dismissal of the following: (1) the

claims of Plaintiffs who failed to submit complete Plaintiff Information Sheets; (2) the

personal injury claims of Plaintiffs who failed to submit the sworn affidavit required

by the Lone Pine Order; and (3) the personal injury claims of Plaintiffs who submitted

the “Limited Declaration” of Dr. Nachman Brautbar, which fails to comply with the

requirements of the Lone Pine Order.

A. Barnes [Doc. 372]

Dresser seeks dismissal of Barnes Plaintiff Breana Butler for failure to provide

a Plaintiff Information Sheet. See Updated Appendix 1, attached to Dresser’s reply

brief [Doc. 383-2]. But review of the record shows that Ms. Butler did, in fact, produce

an updated Plaintiff Information Sheet to Dresser on November 15, 2023. [Doc. 388-

1]. This production satisfies Ms. Butler’s obligation, and her claim will not be

dismissed on this ground.

Dresser also seeks dismissal of all Barnes Plaintiffs who failed to substantiate

their personal injury claims with “a sworn affidavit from a licensed physician or other

qualified expert” as required by the Lone Pine Order.7 The Barnes Plaintiffs respond

that, rather than provide a separate physician affidavit for each Plaintiff, they

produced a “Limited Declaration” authored by Dr. Nachman Brautbar (the “Barnes

Brautbar Declaration”), and this Declaration satisfies the Lone Pine requirements of

all Barnes Plaintiffs who allege personal injury claims.8 [Doc. 372-6]. First, the

Barnes Plaintiffs argue that Dr. Brautbar’s Declaration provides evidentiary support

for all Barnes Plaintiffs alleging a fear of contracting a disease in the future, because

Dr. Brautbar assesses the risk of TCE exposure and the legitimacy of fear of disease,

7 Dresser argues that there are 123 such Plaintiffs in the above-captioned cases: two

are Arnold Plaintiffs; 58 are Barnes Plaintiffs; and 63 are D&J Plaintiffs. See Updated

Appendix 2, attached to Dresser’s reply brief [Doc. 383-3, Barnes]; [Doc. 199-3, D&J].

Confusingly, Dresser also argues in Section B of its Memorandum that “all 358 Plaintiffs in

the Related Cases” pleaded personal injury claims in their complaints, but that “257 of these

Plaintiffs failed to produce affidavits and thereby violated the Lone Pine Order.” [Doc. 372-

1, p. 15]. To support this argument, Dresser cites to the Complaints in the Barnes, Barton,

Cook, D&J, and Arnold cases. Yet the instant Motion is filed only in the Barnes, D&J, and

Arnold cases, and the Appendices attached to Dresser’s briefing refers only to the Plaintiffs

in these three cases. For their part, the Barnes Plaintiffs argue that there are 131 total

Barnes Plaintiffs and of that total, 15 have not alleged personal injury claims; of the

remaining 116, all of them assert a fear of contracting an illness because of their TCE or PCE

exposure; and 74 of them allege personal injury with specific maladies or symptoms. [Doc.

379-1].

The competing headcounts offered by the parties rest on mismatched classifications that

obscure rather than assist the legal inquiry. Because the precise number of individuals

affected does not control the outcome, the Court declines to reconcile the parties’ figures. The

question before the Court is a legal one, and the Court will resolve it on that basis.

8 Dr. Brautbar is a Nevada physician and medical school professor who practiced for

more than 40 years in the field of occupational medicine. In his Declaration, Dr. Brautbar

states: “Since 1980, I have engaged in the private practice of medicine focusing on internal

medicine, nephrology, occupational medicine and toxicology. In my practice, I examine,

diagnose and treat patients with occupational, nonoccupational, and toxic-related diseases,

as well as occupational and nonoccupational internal medicine disease, kidney diseases and

hypertension diseases.” [Doc. 372-6, Barnes, p. 9]. Dr. Brautbar died in April 2025.

based on a substantial amount of peer-reviewed scientific literature. Second, the

Barnes Plaintiffs contend that Dr. Brautbar’s Declaration provides evidentiary

support for Plaintiffs alleging specific maladies or symptoms, because Dr. Brautbar

identifies each Plaintiff’s “presumed” exposure, reported maladies, and treatment,

including the physicians they consulted.

The Barnes Plaintiffs further argue that cases involving Lone Pine dismissals

are largely limited to those with a clear record of delay by the claimant and the failure

to produce any information. See, e.g., Matter of AET Inc. Ltd., 2015 WL 13745436, at

*3 (E.D. Tex. Oct. 13, 2015). And while the Barnes Plaintiffs acknowledge that Dr.

Brautbar is not able to fully satisfy the requirements of item (e) of the Lone Pine

Order—which requires an opinion on specific causation (i.e., that the claimed “injury,

illness or medical condition was caused by exposure”)—they argue that any delay in

the development of evidence was occasioned by the unusual litigation track of this

case and not delay on the part of the Plaintiffs. Addressing the lack of data for each

Plaintiff with respect to the issues of exposure and dose, Dr. Brautbar states:

At this time, in order to opine on the causal relationship between the

TCE plume and the maladies reported by the Plaintiffs, assumptions

must be made regarding both exposure and dose, because neither the

concentrations nor length of actual exposure are known. While it is

impossible to know with certainty whether anyone was actually exposed

to hazardous substances prior to 2016 and, if so, to what extent, or for

how long, it is also impossible to conclude that individuals living over or

near the TCE plume were not exposed. Given what is known—that a

large TCE plume formed over decades—it is reasonable to assume that

persons living in close proximity to the plume were in fact exposed to

TCE at some concentration for some period of time.”

[Doc. 372-6, ¶¶ 52-53, Barnes]; [Doc. 198-3, ¶¶ 52-53, D&J].

Dresser argues generally that Dr. Brautbar’s Barnes Declaration is generic,

non-specific, and formulaic. Specifically, Dresser argues that Dr. Brautbar’s failure

to identify and discuss the manner, dates, and duration of exposure to TCE or PCE

for each Plaintiff is fatal to their personal injury claims. And Dresser further

contends that Dr. Brautbar’s reason for not providing that information—a lack of

data—is unacceptable given the amount of time the cases have been pending and the

thousands of samples that have been collected from groundwater, soil, soil gas, indoor

air, and ambient air.

The Court reviewed Dr. Brautbar’s Barnes Declaration, a roughly 300-page

document divided into three main sections. The first section is a 150-page

compilation of extensive scientific information discussing TCE and TCE exposure,

including dose response; absorption and metabolism of TCE; minimum risk levels for

exposure to TCE; and genotoxicity and carcinogenicity data for TCE. [Doc. 372-6,

¶¶ 1-244]. The second section is dedicated to the claims of the Barnes Plaintiffs who

allege specific maladies or symptoms as a result of TCE exposure. Id. at ¶¶ 245-541.

For each such Plaintiff, the Declaration tracks the language of the Lone Pine Order

and contains a description of the Plaintiff’s exposure to TCE (which, because of the

aforementioned lack of data, is an assumption that each Plaintiff was exposed to

various levels of TCE and PCE from the Dresser Facility), as well as reported injuries,

illnesses, and conditions, any treatment obtained, and Dr. Brautbar’s opinion that

the Plaintiff’s reported illness “may have been” caused or worsened by exposure to

TCE or PCE from the Dresser Facility. See, e.g., [Doc. 372-6, ¶¶ 385-88]. The third

section of the Declaration is dedicated to the issue of medical monitoring. Id. at

¶¶ 542-635.

Here, Dr. Brautbar’s Declaration contains a comprehensive presentation of

peer-reviewed literature discussing the symptoms associated with acute exposure to

TCE, which appear to be consistent with many of the symptoms experienced by the

Barnes Plaintiffs. While the evidence regarding causation and the precise connection

between exposure and each Plaintiff’s condition may be limited, the Plaintiffs that

are included in the Barnes Brautbar Declaration have mechanically included the

requested categories of information, even though such information is not fully

complete and has not yet been determined to be sufficient under the Daubert

standards for purposes of trial. More specifically, each Barnes Plaintiff in the

Brautbar Declaration has facially supplied sufficient evidence regarding the nature

of their injuries, the circumstances under which they could have been exposed to TCE

and/or PCE, and the basis for believing that Dresser is responsible for their injuries.

In re Vioxx, 557 F. Supp. 2d at 744-45 (requiring plaintiffs to make a minimal showing

consistent with Rule 26 that there is some kind of scientific basis that Vioxx could

cause the alleged injury) (emphasis added). To that extent, these Barnes Plaintiffs

in the Brautbar Declaration satisfy the requirements of the Lone Pine Order and their

personal injury claims will survive the instant Motion. Nevertheless, the Court notes

that the “cut-and-paste” nature of the Barnes Brautbar Declaration and the lack of

more specific evidentiary support—particularly as it pertains to the issue of specific

causation—demonstrates that the claims are likely vulnerable to well-founded

motions for summary judgment.

Thus, to the extent that a Barnes Plaintiff has asserted a personal injury claim

and relies upon the evidence set forth in the Barnes Brautbar Declaration, that

Plaintiff satisfies the Lone Pine Order, and Dresser’s motion to dismiss a Plaintiff’s

personal injury claims for failure to provide a separate physician affidavit will be

denied. To the extent that there is any Barnes Plaintiff who does not appear in the

Barnes Brautbar Declaration or has not otherwise provided responsive Lone Pine

medical evidence, Dresser’s motion to dismiss will be granted and the personal injury

claims of those Plaintiffs will be dismissed.

B. D&J [Doc. 196]

Dresser seeks dismissal of the following D&J Plaintiffs on grounds they did

not provide a Plaintiff Information Sheet: Darwin Oliver Arlington; Barfield

Insurance Agency, LLC; Cayse Collision Repair, LLC; Colfax Banking Company; D&J

Investments of Cenla, LLC; Sandra J. Fountain; Johnny Gilley; Deborah H. Greer;

James W. Greer, Jr.; Inspirational Properties, LLC; Shane Morgan; Rapides

Investments, LLC; Autumn Shirah; Daniel L. Webb; and William R. Woodward, Jr.

See Updated Appendix 1, attached to Dresser’s reply brief. [Doc. 199-2, D&J].

The D&J Plaintiffs identified by Dresser do not dispute that they failed to

provide Plaintiff Information Sheets. Despite clear notice of the obligation to provide

Plaintiff Information Sheets, these D&J Plaintiffs submitted nothing, and their

failure to provide this most basic information constitutes abandonment of their

claims. Dismissal is therefore warranted.

Dresser also seeks dismissal of all D&J Plaintiffs who allege personal injury

claims but who failed to file corresponding physician affidavits. Like the Barnes

Plaintiffs, the D&J Plaintiffs produced a “Limited Declaration” authored by Dr.

Brautbar rather than producing a separate physician affidavit for each Plaintiff (the

“D&J Brautbar Declaration”), and they argue that their submissions similarly satisfy

all requirements of the Lone Pine Order. [Doc. 198-3]. Specifically, the D&J

Plaintiffs argue that Dr. Brautbar opined that their symptoms can be caused by, and

are associated with, exposure to TCE and PCE, which is supported by the scientific

and medical literature cited by Dr. Brautbar. The D&J Plaintiffs argue the

unfairness of the Lone Pine Order and urge this Court to defer consideration of these

evidentiary questions until the Daubert hearings.

However, unlike the Barnes Plaintiffs, Dr. Brautbar’s D&J Declaration

provides a medical summary for only 25 of the 86 D&J Plaintiffs.9 The 61 D&J

Plaintiffs who do not appear in the Declaration have provided this Court with no

medical evidence linking their alleged personal injury claims to exposure, and the

record is devoid of any other form of compliance with the Lone Pine Order. Nor did

9 To the extent the Court’s calculations or headcounts are incorrect, any such errors are

immaterial. Dismissal of particular Plaintiffs is governed by the Court’s legal findings

regarding noncompliance with the Lone Pine Order, rather than by the numerical totals or

identifications assigned by the parties or by the Court.

these Plaintiffs attempt to produce such evidence, albeit untimely, at the time they

opposed the instant Motion.

Consequently, for the same reasons set forth with respect to the Barnes

Plaintiffs, to the extent a D&J Plaintiff has asserted a personal injury claim and

relies upon the evidence set forth in the D&J Brautbar Declaration, Dresser’s Motion

to dismiss these claims will be denied, while Dresser’s Motion will be granted as to

all D&J Plaintiffs who do not appear in the Declaration. By the Court’s estimation,

all of the 15 D&J Plaintiffs who failed to provide a Plaintiff Information Sheet also

failed to provide medical evidence, except for one—William R. Woodward, Jr.—who

will be permitted to provide a Plaintiff Information Sheet or risk dismissal of his

personal injury claims.

C. Arnold [Doc. 110]

Finally, Dresser seeks dismissal of Arnold Plaintiffs Karrie A. Arnold and Ray

A. Arnold on two grounds: (1) failure to provide Plaintiff Information Sheets; and

(2) failure to provide physician affidavits to support their personal injury claims.

Review of the record confirms that these Plaintiffs failed to provide both categories of

requested information. The Arnold Plaintiffs have failed to comply with the Lone

Pine Order, and it is therefore presumed that these Plaintiffs have abandoned their

claims, which are subject to dismissal.

II. GE’s Motion to Dismiss [Doc. 373, Barnes]

In its Motion to Dismiss, GE seeks the same relief as Dresser and adopts and

incorporates the arguments set forth in Dresser’s Motion. However, GE contends

that the Plaintiffs’ Lone Pine deficiencies are even more pronounced as to GE, whose

alleged role in this matter has already been recognized by this Court as limited to its

alleged failure to warn and alleged failure to appropriately remediate for a defined,

limited period in time. But GE’s argument is not persuasive, because the Lone Pine

Order addresses the preliminary proof of Plaintiffs’ damages, not the liability of any

Defendant. Accordingly, GE is entitled only to the same relief as Dresser.

III. Dresser’s Motion to Strike [Doc. 383, Barnes] [Doc. 199, D&J]

Following the death of Dr. Brautbar in April 2025, on October 1, 2025, the

Barnes and D&J Plaintiffs provided a report authored by Dr. Steven B. Bird to

opposing counsel (the “Bird Report”). The Barnes & D&J Plaintiffs argue that the

Bird Report was occasioned by the death of Dr. Brautbar and not the Lone Pine Order,

and that they did not rely on the Bird Report in responding to the instant Motions.

Rather, the Plaintiffs aver that the Bird Report merely adopts the Brautbar

Declarations, updates Dr. Brautbar’s causation opinions, and will not be relied upon

by Plaintiffs until the upcoming motion practice. Possibly because the Barnes and

D&J Plaintiffs attached the Bird Report to their opposition briefs to Dresser’s Motion

to Dismiss, see [Doc. 379-3, Barnes]; [Doc. 198-4, D&J], Dresser now contends that

the Plaintiffs are, in effect, attempting to buttress Dr. Brautbar’s insufficient

Declarations with the Bird Report, and that the attempt to do so is untimely under

the Court’s Lone Pine Order.

After review of the record, it is clear to the Court that the Barnes and D&J

Plaintiffs did not rely on the Bird Report in connection with their responses to

Dresser’s Lone Pine Motions, and, even if they did, the Court did not consider the

Bird Report in adjudicating the instant Motions. Accordingly, it is unnecessary to

strike the Bird Report.

CONCLUSION

Considering the foregoing,

The following Orders are entered:

Barnes, Civil Action No. 1:21-cv-00024

IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that Dresser’s MOTION TO DISMISS PURSUANT

TO LONE PINE ORDER [Doc. 372] is GRANTED with respect to any

personal injury claim not covered in the Barnes Brautbar Declaration;

these claims are DENIED AND DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE. The

Motion is DENIED in all other respects.

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Dresser’s MOTION TO STRIKE

UNTIMELY AFFIDAVIT OF DR. STEVEN B. BIRD [Doc. 383] is DENIED.

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that GE’s MOTION TO DISMISS PURSUANT

TO THE LONE PINE ORDER [Doc. 373] is GRANTED with respect to any

personal injury claim not covered in the Barnes Brautbar Declaration;

these claims are DENIED AND DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE. The

Motion is DENIED in all other respects.

D&J, Civil Action No. 1:23-CV-00508

IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that Dresser’s MOTION TO DISMISS PURSUANT

TO LONE PINE ORDER [Doc. 196] is GRANTED IN PART AND DENIED

IN PART. The claims of the following Plaintiffs are DENIED AND

DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE for failure to provide a Plaintiff

Information Sheet: Darwin Oliver Arlington; Barfield Insurance

Agency, LLC; Cayse Collision Repair, LLC; Colfax Banking Company;

D&J Investments of Cenla, LLC; Sandra J. Fountain; Johnny Gilley;

Deborah H. Greer; James W. Greer, Jr.; Inspirational Properties, LLC;

Shane Morgan; Rapides Investments, LLC; Autumn Shirah; Daniel L.

Webb; and William R. Woodward, Jr. Dresser’s Motion is GRANTED

with respect to any personal injury claim not covered in the D&J

Brautbar Declaration; these claims are DENIED AND DISMISSED

WITH PREJUDICE. The Motion is DENIED in all other respects.

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Dresser’s MOTION TO STRIKE

UNTIMELY AFFIDAVIT OF DR. STEVEN B. BIRD [Doc. 199] is DENIED.

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that, within three (days), D&J Plaintiff

William R. Woodward, Jr. shall provide a Plaintiff Information Sheet to

Dresser. Failure to provide the Plaintiff Information Sheet will result

in denial and dismissal with prejudice of Mr. Woodward’s claims.

Arnold, Civil Action No. 1:23-ev-01795

IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that Dresser’s MOTION TO DISMISS PURSUANT

TO LONE PINE ORDER [Doc. 110] is GRANTED, and the claims of Karrie

A. Arnold and Ray A. Arnold are DENIED AND DISMISSED WITH

PREJUDICE.

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the MOTION TO STRIKE UNTIMELY

AFFIDAVIT OF DR. STEVEN B. BIRD [Doc. 112] is DENIED.

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that, within seven (7) days, the parties

shall jointly file into the record a list of Plaintiffs, organized by case,

whose personal injury claims have been dismissed.

THUS, DONE AND SIGNED in Chambers on this 18% day of December 2025.

Chad C

DAVID C. JOSEPH

UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

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