The opinion
12/18/2025
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF TENNESSEE
AT NASHVILLE
December 3, 2024 Session
BRYAN HIBDON v. DANIELLE GOYNES
Appeal from the Juvenile Court for Cannon County
No. SUP 464 Matthew D. Cowan, Judge
___________________________________
No. M2024-00290-COA-R3-JV
___________________________________
A father petitioned a Tennessee court to modify its previous parenting plan. The father
lived in Tennessee, but the mother and the child lived in Arkansas. Claiming Tennessee
was an inconvenient forum, the mother moved to transfer the case to Arkansas. The court
denied the transfer request. Later, the court entered a default judgment against the mother
as a sanction for her failure to appear for her deposition. After hearing proof, it adopted
the father’s proposed parenting plan. On appeal, the mother contends that the trial court
lacked subject matter jurisdiction to modify the parenting plan. She also challenges the
court’s denial of her transfer request, its refusal to set aside the default judgment, and the
adoption of a modified plan. We conclude that the court erred in modifying the parenting
plan without conducting a best interest analysis. So we vacate the adoption of a modified
plan and remand for further proceedings on this issue. In all other respects, we affirm.
Tenn. R. App. P. 3 Appeal as of Right; Judgment of the Juvenile Court Affirmed in
Part, Vacated in Part, and Case Remanded
W. NEAL MCBRAYER, J., delivered the opinion of the court, in which ANDY D. BENNETT
and JEFFREY USMAN, JJ., joined.
E. Evan Cope and Katharine Driver, Murfreesboro, Tennessee, for the appellant, Danielle
Goynes.
L. Jeffery Payne and Laurie Y. Young, Murfreesboro, Tennessee, for the appellee, Bryan
Hibdon.
OPINION
I.
Bryan Hibdon (“Father”) and Danielle Goynes (“Mother”) have one child together,
a daughter born in 2010. Shortly after the child was born, the Cannon County Juvenile
Court adopted an agreed parenting plan that gave the unwed parents equal parenting time.
At the parents’ request, the court adopted an agreed modified plan in June 2021.
The modified plan allowed Mother to relocate to Arkansas with the child. After the move,
the child spent most of her time—268 days a year—in Arkansas with Mother. She visited
Father in Tennessee one weekend every month, plus various holidays and school breaks,
and two months in the summer.
Father petitioned to modify the parenting plan about a year later. As grounds, he
alleged that Mother repeatedly violated the visitation schedule in the existing plan.1 She
often arrived late at the exchange point and, sometimes, failed to appear at all. Further, he
claimed that, since the move, Mother had not followed the treatment plan for the child’s
medical condition. Based on conversations with the child, he was also concerned about
exposure to domestic violence. According to Father, Mother moved to Arkansas to escape
domestic violence issues with her boyfriend, whom she had since married. Father proposed
that the court reverse the current custody arrangement and make him the primary residential
parent.
Asserting that Tennessee was an inconvenient forum, Mother asked the court to
decline to exercise jurisdiction over the custody issue and either dismiss Father’s petition
or transfer the proceeding to an appropriate Arkansas court. See Tenn. Code Ann. § 36-6-
222 (2021). She pointed out that the child had now lived in Arkansas for almost a year and
a half. In Mother’s view, most of the evidence concerning the child’s current welfare was
in Arkansas. She attended school and church in that state. Her primary care provider was
in Arkansas as well as multiple family members and friends.
Father countered that the child still visited him on a regular basis in Tennessee. He
did not anticipate a need to subpoena any out-of-state witnesses or evidence to establish
his case. As he saw it, the modification issues could be decided based on the parties’
testimony and other in-state sources. And the Tennessee court was already familiar with
the parties and issues.
After a hearing, the court denied the transfer request. In the court’s view, the
relevant statutory factors favored the continued exercise of jurisdiction in Tennessee.
Given the information presented, it did not find Arkansas to be a more appropriate forum.
1
Father also petitioned to hold Mother in criminal contempt for these violations. Because Father
failed to establish Mother’s guilt beyond a reasonable doubt, the court ultimately dismissed the criminal
contempt portion of his modification petition.
2
But the court advised the parties that if circumstances changed, it would revisit this issue
upon request.
Having resolved the forum issue for now, the parties turned to other matters. The
court entered a scheduling order requiring the parties to appear for depositions at a specified
time and place. Due to some confusion on the part of Mother’s counsel, Mother failed to
appear. Father agreed to reschedule her deposition and served notice of a new date and
time. Despite this notice, Mother never showed.
On the eve of trial, Mother’s counsel moved to withdraw from further
representation. Counsel asked the court to grant Mother “thirty (30) days to secure
representation before this matter proceeds further.” Four days later, Father moved for entry
of a default judgment as a sanction for Mother’s failure to appear for a deposition. See
TENN. R. CIV. P. 37.04; see id. 37.02(C). Both motions were set to be heard three days
before trial.
Mother did not attend the hearing. At the outset, the court granted Mother’s counsel
permission to withdraw. Declining to grant a continuance, the court then heard argument
on Father’s motion for sanctions. Given Mother’s second inexplicable absence, Father
urged the court to enter a default judgment. Although counsel had no explanation for
Mother’s absence, he advocated for a less severe sanction. After hearing both viewpoints,
the court announced its intention to “move forward on a default today.” Mother’s counsel
left the courtroom.
Upon hearing Father’s proof, the court determined that entry of a default judgment
was warranted. In the court’s view, Mother did “not take this Court or its processes
seriously.” Mother failed to appear at her own deposition. She gave no notice of her
change in plans. And she failed to adhere to the visitation schedule in the parenting plan.
The court found that Father’s proposed parenting plan, essentially a mirror image of the
current plan, was in the child’s best interest. It adopted Father’s plan “by default.”
In short order, Mother, through new counsel, filed an emergency motion to set aside
the default. Relying on an affidavit from her former counsel, Mother argued that the default
should be set aside based on lack of notice. Her former counsel declared that he was never
served with Father’s motion. Thus, Mother had no notice that Father was seeking entry of
a default judgment against her. According to counsel, he left the courtroom under the false
impression that the court would not hear Father’s motion that day.
The court refused to set aside the default judgment. It expressly found that the
affidavit from Mother’s former attorney did “not accurately reflect what transpired at the
hearing.” And it reaffirmed its previous decision.
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II.
Mother raises multiple issues on appeal. First, she argues that the court lacked
subject matter jurisdiction to modify its previous custody decision. If that argument fails,
she challenges the court’s denial of her transfer request, its refusal to set aside the default
judgment, and the modification of the parenting plan.
A.
We begin, as we must, with subject matter jurisdiction. See Est. of Brown, 402
S.W.3d 193, 198 (Tenn. 2013). Without subject matter jurisdiction a court lacks the
“power to adjudicate a particular type of controversy,” and the resulting judgment is void.
Dishmon v. Shelby State Cmty. Coll., 15 S.W.3d 477, 480 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1999). Whether
subject matter jurisdiction exists is a question of law, which we review de novo, without a
presumption of correctness. Northland Ins. Co. v. State, 33 S.W.3d 727, 729 (Tenn. 2000).
A Tennessee court has subject matter jurisdiction to modify a previous custody
decision upon proof of a material change in circumstance. Tenn. Code Ann. § 36-6-
101(a)(2)(B) (2021). But if the child no longer resides in Tennessee, subject matter
jurisdiction can be lost. See id. § 36-6-217(a) (2021). The Uniform Child Custody
Jurisdiction and Enforcement Act, or UCCJEA, governs continuing subject matter
jurisdiction in interstate custody disputes. Id. Under that act, a Tennessee court retains
exclusive, continuing jurisdiction to modify a prior child-custody determination unless:
(1) A court of this state determines that neither the child, nor the child and
one (1) parent, nor the child and a person acting as a parent have a significant
connection with this state and that substantial evidence is no longer available
in this state concerning the child’s care, protection, training, and personal
relationships; or
(2) A court of this state or a court of another state determines that the child,
the child’s parents, and any person acting as a parent do not presently reside
in this state.
Id. Because Father resides in Tennessee, we focus on the first subsection.
A Tennessee court does not lose subject matter jurisdiction merely because the child
moves to another state. See id. § 36-6-217 cmt. Something more is required. Continuing
jurisdiction is not lost until the originating court determines that significant connections
and substantial evidence are no longer available in the forum state. Id. § 36-6-217(a)(1).
The official comments to the UCCJEA2 clarify that the proper inquiry is whether “the
2
In any dispute over the meaning of a provision of the UCCJEA, the official comments “shall
4
relationship between the child and the person remaining in the State with exclusive,
continuing jurisdiction [has] become[ ] so attenuated that the court c[an] no longer find
significant connections and substantial evidence.” Id. § 36-6-217 cmt. This is a fact-
sensitive inquiry. Compare Parker v. Parker, No. M2017-01503-COA-R3-CV, 2019 WL
994380, at *5 (Tenn. Ct. App. Mar. 1, 2019) (finding the child still had a significant
connection with Tennessee such that substantial relevant evidence was available in this
state), with Graham v. Graham, No. E2008-00180-COA-R3-CV, 2009 WL 167071, at *9
(Tenn. Ct. App. Jan. 26, 2009) (concluding that the children’s connection to Tennessee was
so attenuated that the Tennessee court lost jurisdiction over custody issues).
Citing an earlier decision of this Court, Graham v. Graham, Mother contends that
the Tennessee court lost jurisdiction over this custody dispute because the sole connection
to Tennessee is the child’s limited visitation with Father. See 2009 WL 167071, at *9. In
Graham, the children had been living in Florida for seven years when their father filed his
modification petition. Id. at *5. They never attended school or participated in any
extracurricular activities in Tennessee. Id. Their schools, physicians, friends, and church
were in Florida. Id. The father even exercised some of his parenting time in Florida. Id.
Given these facts, we found that the children lacked a significant connection to Tennessee
because their only link was “that their father lives there and they visit with him during
holidays and summers.” Id. at *9. Based on this conclusion and our determination that all
the evidence relevant to the allegations in the father’s petition originated in Florida, we
concluded that “the courts of Tennessee no longer ha[d] continuing exclusive jurisdiction
over custody issues regarding these children.” Id.
This case presents markedly different facts. When Father filed his modification
petition, the child had been living in Arkansas for just over a year. She lived the previous
eleven years exclusively in Tennessee. The ties she formed during those eleven years were
not yet lost. She still had family in Tennessee — Father, a stepmother, and a half-sibling.
Father only exercised parenting time in Tennessee. Since the move, the child had spent
two summers in Tennessee as well as multiple weekends and holidays. We find these
ongoing connections with Tennessee to be significant.
We also have no difficulty concluding that substantial evidence is available in
Tennessee relevant to the issues raised in the modification petition. Father alleged that
Mother failed to ensure that the child received necessary medical care and therapies for her
condition. Tennessee doctors diagnosed the child’s medical condition and recommended
a treatment plan. Thus, relevant evidence about the child’s medical condition was locally
available. Father and his wife could testify about their observations of the child’s physical
condition after the move. Father complained that Mother was repeatedly late or absent at
child exchanges. These events occurred in Tennessee. He also raised concerns about
constitute evidence of the purposes and policies underlying such sections.” Tenn. Code Ann. § 36-6-203
(2021).
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domestic violence between Mother and her new husband. A similar issue arose while
Mother and the child were living in Tennessee, prompting the last modification decision.
Certainly, other relevant evidence may originate in Arkansas, but substantial evidence
remains available here.
B.
Even so, Mother contends that the court should have declined to exercise its
continuing jurisdiction because Tennessee was an inconvenient forum. Under the
UCCJEA, a court “may decline to exercise its jurisdiction at any time if it determines that
it is an inconvenient forum under the circumstances and that a court of another state is a
more appropriate forum.” Tenn. Code Ann. § 36-6-222(a). The UCCJEA provides a list
of factors to guide the court’s decision. See id. § 36-6-222(b). Those factors include:
(1) The length of time the child has resided outside this state;
(2) The distance between the court in this state and the court in the state that
would assume jurisdiction;
(3) The relative financial circumstances of the parties;
(4) Any agreement of the parties as to which state should assume jurisdiction;
(5) The nature and location of the evidence required to resolve the pending
litigation, including testimony of the child;
(6) The ability of the court of each state to decide the issue expeditiously and
the procedures necessary to present the evidence;
(7) Whether domestic violence has occurred and is likely to continue in the
future and which state could best protect the parties and the child; and
(8) The familiarity of the court of each state with the facts and issues in the
pending litigation.
Id. After considering these factors, the court decided that, on balance, most factors
weighed in favor of a Tennessee forum.
We will not disturb the lower court’s decision absent an abuse of discretion. See
Busler v. Lee, No. M2011-01893-COA-R3-CV, 2012 WL 1799027, at *2 (Tenn. Ct. App.
May 17, 2012). We do not “second-guess” the decision or “substitute [our] discretion for
the lower court’s.” Lee Med., Inc. v. Beecher, 312 S.W.3d 515, 524 (Tenn. 2010). A trial
court only abuses its discretion if it applies the wrong legal standard, reaches “an illogical
or unreasonable decision,” or bases its decision “on a clearly erroneous assessment of the
evidence.” Id.
Mother’s challenge is a narrow one. She admits that the court applied the correct
law to the information presented by the parties. The pertinent facts are largely undisputed.
Still, Mother insists that the court’s decision was illogical or unreasonable because, in her
view, the applicable factors “logically favor” Arkansas.
6
We conclude that the court made a reasonable decision on these facts. As the court
noted, the child had only lived outside the state for a relatively short time. For the previous
eleven years, she lived exclusively in Tennessee where she still had significant
connections. See Tenn. Code Ann. § 36-6-222(b)(1). True, some relevant evidence was
likely to originate in Arkansas. Still, the court decided that there was more evidence in
Tennessee “at this point in the proceedings.” Id. § 36-6-222(b)(5). The Tennessee court
had presided over multiple custody disputes between these parties, the most recent of which
involved a similar domestic violence issue. So it was more familiar with the relevant facts
and issues than an Arkansas court. Id. § 36-6-222(b)(8). And it was well equipped to
address any new domestic violence concerns. Id. § 36-6-222(b)(7). The court was unaware
of any obstacles that would preclude a prompt resolution of this matter in Tennessee. Id.
§ 36-6-222(b)(6). A transfer meant obtaining new local counsel, which was likely to be a
financial strain on these parties. See id. § 36-6-222(b)(3).
Mother argues that the court failed to give the evidence favoring an Arkansas forum
sufficient weight. She points to the child’s newly formed connections in Arkansas, the
location of the alleged domestic violence, and her travel expenses. Yet the court plainly
considered those facts. It simply determined that other facts favored a Tennessee forum.
See Harmon v. Hickman Cmty. Healthcare Servs., Inc., 594 S.W.3d 297, 306 (Tenn. 2020)
(“[I]f the reviewing court determines that reasonable minds can disagree with the propriety
of the decision, the decision should be affirmed.” (quoting State v. McCaleb, 582 S.W.3d
179, 186 (Tenn. 2019))).
Mother’s remaining arguments are equally unpersuasive. She complains that the
court failed to treat the agreed parenting plan, which allowed her to move to Arkansas, as
evidence of an agreement to litigate custody issues in Arkansas. See Tenn. Code Ann.
§ 36-6-222(b)(4). Yet she concedes that the parties never expressly agreed to litigate in
Arkansas either in the agreed plan or otherwise. She also faults the court for failing to
communicate with the Arkansas court as to which court could resolve this matter more
expeditiously. Id. § 36-6-222(b)(6) & cmt. While such communication may have been
beneficial, it was not required. See id. § 36-6-213(a).
We discern no abuse of discretion here. Faced with a choice between Tennessee
and Arkansas, the court chose Tennessee. In doing so, it applied the correct legal standard
and reached a logical decision based on a reasonable assessment of the evidence. See Lee
Med., Inc., 312 S.W.3d at 524.
C.
Having resolved these jurisdictional concerns, we turn to the court’s denial of
Mother’s motion to set aside the default judgment. We also review this decision for an
abuse of discretion. Youree v. Recovery House of E. Tenn., LLC, 705 S.W.3d 193, 202
7
(Tenn. 2025). Default judgments are “disfavored under Tennessee law.” Id. A court
should set aside a default judgment “if there is reasonable doubt as to the justness of
dismissing the case before it can be heard on its merits.” Henry v. Goins, 104 S.W.3d 475,
481 (Tenn. 2003).
Mother sought relief from the judgment under Tennessee Rule of Civil Procedure
60.02. See TENN. R. CIV. P. 55.01. Because she filed her emergency motion just five days
after entry of the default, the appropriate vehicle for relief is Rule 59.04. See Discover
Bank v. Morgan, 363 S.W.3d 479, 489 (Tenn. 2012). Under either rule, when a party seeks
relief from a default judgment based on excusable neglect, the threshold issue is “whether
the conduct precipitating the default was willful.” Id. at 493-94. On appeal, Mother insists
that her failure to appear at the default hearing was not willful because she lacked notice
of the hearing date. Yet Mother’s absence from the hearing was not the conduct that
precipitated the default. The court entered a default judgment against Mother as a sanction
for failing to appear for her deposition. See TENN. R. CIV. P. 37.04; id. 37.02.3 Mother
offers no excuse for her absence at the deposition. If a record lacks an explanation for a
flagrant violation of the procedural rules, the conduct is “‘willful’ and therefore ineligible
for relief on grounds of ‘excusable neglect.’” Discover Bank, 363 S.W.3d at 495.
As Father points out, Mother did not make an excusable neglect argument in her
emergency motion. Because the default judgment was not yet final, Mother was not
required to do so. See Youree, 705 S.W.3d at 205 (stating that “the grounds for relief from
a non-final default judgment under Rule 59.04 are not limited to those circumstances set
forth in Rule 60.02”). Rule 59.04 may be used to “to correct clear error of law or to prevent
injustice.” In re M.L.D., 182 S.W.3d 890, 895 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2005). In essence, Mother
argued that the judgment was unjust because she lacked notice of the motion for sanctions.
Litigants “are entitled to receive notice of important hearings and other proceedings.”
Bryant v. Edwards, 707 S.W.2d 868, 870 (Tenn. 1986). “[D]ue process requires it.” Id.
The service requirements in the Tennessee Rules of Civil Procedure “are designed
to give every reasonable assurance” that copies of important filings “actually reach
adversary parties through their counsel or directly.” See TENN. R. CIV. P. 5.01 cmt. In
accordance with Rule 5, Father’s motion contained a certificate of service stating that the
motion, including notice of the hearing, was sent to Mother’s counsel at his last known
address via “United States Mail” two weeks before the hearing. See TENN. R. CIV. P. 5.02,
5.03. A certificate of service “is prima facie evidence that the document was served in the
manner described in the certificate and raises a rebuttable presumption that it was received
3
When a party fails to appear for a properly noticed deposition, a court may “make such orders . . .
as are just,” including entry of “a judgment by default against the disobedient party.” Default is a harsh
sanction. Shahrdar v. Glob. Hous., Inc., 983 S.W.2d 230, 236 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1998). But it may be
“appropriate ‘where there has been a clear record of delay or contumacious conduct.’” Id. (quoting In re
Beckman, 78 B.R. 516, 518 (M.D. Tenn. 1987)).
8
by the person to whom it was sent.” Orr v. Orr, No. 01-A-01-9012-CH-00464, 1991 WL
226916, at *4 (Tenn. Ct. App. Nov. 6, 1991); see also TENN. R. CIV. P. 5.03. To rebut this
presumption, Mother had to come forward with “credible evidence of non-receipt.” Bd. of
Pro. Resp. v. Curry, 266 S.W.3d 379, 389 (Tenn. 2008). Mother submitted an affidavit
from her former attorney stating that he “was never served” with Father’s motion for
sanctions and, thus, Mother never received notice.
Mother complains that the court ignored or misunderstood her notice argument. To
the contrary, the court acknowledged her rebuttal evidence. The affidavit created “an issue
of fact for the trial court to decide.” Bd. of Pro. Resp., 266 S.W.3d at 389; U.S. Life Title
Ins. Co. of N.Y. v. Dep’t of Com. & Ins., 770 S.W.2d 537, 542 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1988). And
the court resolved the issue in Father’s favor. It “respectfully disagree[d]” with the
affidavit, finding it did “not accurately reflect what transpired at the hearing on the motion
for sanctions.” The evidence does not preponderate against this finding. There are no
apparent mistakes in the certificate of service. Father’s counsel mailed the motion to the
same address used for all previous filings. While it is certainly possible for mail to go
astray, Mother’s counsel expressed no surprise at the hearing when the court announced
the two pending motions. Nor did he alert the court that he and his client never received
notice of the motion for sanctions. To the contrary, he adamantly opposed entry of such a
severe sanction. Counsel did not exit the courtroom until after the court stated its intention
to hear proof in support of a default judgment.
The trial court did not abuse its discretion when it declined to set aside the default
judgment. Mother did not prove that she was entitled to relief from the judgment based on
lack of notice. See Henry, 104 S.W.3d at 482. Nor did she establish that she was entitled
to relief on another basis.4 See Discover Bank, 363 S.W.3d at 495.
D.
In her final issue, Mother argues that the court abused its discretion when it modified
the parenting plan without conducting a best interest analysis. Our courts apply a two-step
analysis to requests for modification of a permanent parenting plan. See, e.g., In re T.R.Y.,
No. M2012-01343-COA-R3-JV, 2014 WL 586046, at *11-12 (Tenn. Ct. App. Feb. 12,
2014) (primary residential parent modification); In re C.R.D., No. M2005-02376-COA-
R3-JV, 2007 WL 2491821, at *6 (Tenn. Ct. App. Sept. 4, 2007) (parenting time
modification). The threshold issue is whether a material change in circumstance has
occurred since the court adopted the current parenting plan. Tenn. Code Ann. § 36-6-
101(a)(2)(B), (C). If a material change has occurred, the court must then determine
4
We are troubled by the court’s decision to address the motion for sanctions immediately after
allowing Mother’s counsel to withdraw. But Mother did not raise the court’s denial of the request for a
continuance as an issue on appeal or in her emergency motion to set aside the default. And Mother’s
counsel was allowed to present arguments on her behalf despite his withdrawal.
9
whether modifying the parenting plan is in the child’s best interest by examining the
statutory best interest factors. Brunetz v. Brunetz, 573 S.W.3d 173, 179 (Tenn. Ct. App.
2018). This analysis is mandatory even when the court enters a default judgment. See
Lawson v. Stewart, No. M2016-02213-COA-R3-CV, 2017 WL 4331043, at *4 (Tenn. Ct.
App. Sept. 28, 2017).
The “determination[ ] of whether a material change in circumstances has occurred”
is a question of fact. Armbrister v. Armbrister, 414 S.W.3d 685, 692 (Tenn. 2013). The
parent seeking a modification of the permanent parenting plan has the burden of proving a
material change by a preponderance of the evidence. Tenn. Code Ann. § 36-6-
101(a)(2)(B), (C). Although the court did not make an express finding of a material change,
Mother concedes that “such a conclusion is supported by the [r]ecord and likely not an
error.” Father testified that Mother was often late to the exchange point and recently failed
to appear at all. In this context, a parent’s “failure[ ] to adhere to the parenting plan” may
constitute a material change in circumstance. Id. § 36-6-101(a)(2)(B)(i). And the court
found that Mother “continual[ly] violat[ed] the parenting plan.” Given Mother’s
concession, we affirm the court’s implicit finding of a material change.
But this does not end the analysis. Armbrister, 414 S.W.3d at 705. The court must
then determine whether modification is in the child’s best interest. Burnett v. Burnett, No.
M2014-00833-COA-R3-CV, 2015 WL 5157489, at *6 (Tenn. Ct. App. Aug. 31, 2015)
(citing Armbrister, 414 S.W.3d at 705). Although the trial court found that the modified
plan was in the child’s best interest, it gave no indication as to how and why it reached that
conclusion. See Pandey v. Shrivastava, No. W2012-00059-COA-R3-CV, 2013 WL
657799, at *4 (Tenn. Ct. App. Feb. 22, 2013). The best interest analysis is a “particularly
fact-intensive process.” McEvoy v. Brewer, No. M2001-02054-COA-R3-CV, 2003 WL
22794521, at *5 (Tenn. Ct. App. Nov. 25, 2003). Tennessee Code Annotated § 36-6-106(a)
lists sixteen factors that courts may consider in making a best interest determination. See
Tenn. Code Ann. § 36-6-106(a) (Supp. 2022). A court need not “list and discuss each
factor.” Keisling v. Keisling, 196 S.W.3d 703, 723 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2005). But the court’s
findings should demonstrate consideration of the relevant factors. As Father admits, that
is not the case here. So we vacate the court’s adoption of Father’s proposed parenting plan.
III.
The Tennessee court had exclusive, continuing jurisdiction to modify the parenting
plan. We discern no abuse of discretion in the court’s denial of Mother’s request to transfer
this proceeding to an Arkansas court or in its refusal to set aside the default judgment. But
because the court failed to conduct a best interest analysis, we vacate the adoption of a
modified plan and remand for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. On remand,
the court should consider the factors in Tennessee Code Annotated § 36-6-106(a) and
determine whether modification of the parenting plan is in the child’s best interest. The
court may adopt the current parenting plan again or a different one that serves the child’s
10
best interest. In evaluating the child’s best interest, the court may, in its discretion, choose
to hear additional proof of the parties’ current circumstances. Until the court renders its
decision on remand, the current, modified plan will remain in place as a temporary plan.
s/ W. Neal McBrayer
W. NEAL MCBRAYER, JUDGE
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