Lealon Johnson v. Aecom Amentum Government Services

FOR IMMEDIATE NEWS RELEASE NEWS RELEASE #056

FROM: CLERK OF SUPREME COURT OF LOUISIANA

The Opinions handed down on the 18th day of December, 2025 are as follows:

BY McCallum, J.:

2025-CC-00171 LEALON JOHNSON VS. AECOM AMENTUM GOVERNMENT

SERVICES

AFFIRMED AND REMANDED. SEE OPINION.

Crain, J., concurs.

Guidry, J., concurs in the result.

SUPREME COURT OF LOUISIANA

No. 2025-CC-00171

LEALON JOHNSON

VS.

AECOM AMENTUM GOVERNMENT SERVICES

On Supervisory Writ to the Office of Workers' Compensation, District 2

McCALLUM, J.

This workers’ compensation case presents purely legal issues concerning the

timeliness of an injured worker’s claim for benefits. We first consider when the

prescriptive period for filing a disputed claim for workers’ compensation begins

where an employer accommodates an injured employee with continued full-time

employment at his full salary and the employee suffers no initial loss of wages. The

resolution of this issue is determined by the provisions of the Louisiana Workers’

Compensation Law (“LWCL”), and more specifically, by La. R.S. 23:1209. Under

this statute, an injured employee is required to file a disputed claim for compensation

within one year from the date of an accident, provided the injury manifests

immediately. In its current form, the LWCL provides no exception to this

prescriptive period for an employee who does not initially suffer a loss of wages

following a work-related accident.

Second, we examine the effect of an employer’s starting and continuing

workers’ compensation payments after the one-year prescriptive period has tolled.

We find our answer to this res nova issue by examining the language of the LWCL,

the desired goal of protecting injured workers, and the application of other civil law

concepts. These considerations lead us to conclude that an employer who engages

in such conduct tacitly renounces the accrued prescription and thereby waives the

right to assert prescription as a defense. This conclusion is consistent with the

principle that, while prescription statutes are to be strictly construed,1 prescription

may nevertheless be renounced either expressly or tacitly, by conduct clearly

indicating an intent to forgo the right to plead it.

Applying these principles to the instant matter, we agree with the Office of

Workers’ Compensation (“OWC”) judge that the claims of the plaintiff, Lealon

Johnson, are not prescribed. Although Mr. Johnson filed his disputed claim for

compensation more than a year after his work-related injury occurred, his employer

began making payments of workers’ compensation benefits long after the

prescriptive period tolled and continued to make payments for two years. Under

these circumstances, we find that his employer renounced prescription. Accordingly,

and as discussed more fully below, the OWC judge properly denied the exception of

prescription in this case. We affirm that ruling and remand this matter to the OWC

for further proceedings.

FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

The facts of this matter are largely undisputed. Lealon Johnson was employed

as a mechanic by AECOM Amentum Government Services (“Amentum”) at Fort

Polk, Louisiana. On June 12, 2020, Mr. Johnson was injured during the course and

scope of his employment when he tripped over the hose of a pressure washer he was

using. As a result of the accident, Mr. Johnson suffered injuries to his back. He began

receiving medical treatment for his injuries and Amentum paid his medical bills. Mr.

Johnson did not initially lose any time from work as Amentum placed him on light-

duty work in the facility’s tool room. He continued to work in the tool room and

receive his regular salary until Amentum eliminated his light-duty position on June

22, 2022 and ceased paying his salary.

1

See Arrant v. Wayne Acree PLS, Inc., 15-0905, pp. 5-6 (La. 1/27/16), 187 So. 3d 417, 421

(“Because prescription triggers the extinction of a claim, prescription statutes are strictly construed

against prescription and in favor of the claim sought to be extinguished by it.”).

2

Thereafter, Amentum began paying Mr. Johnson temporary total disability

benefits2 on a weekly basis. It continued these payments until March 28, 2024, when

Amentum filed a notice of controversion of compensation form with the OWC,

disputing Mr. Johnson’s continued right to indemnity benefits. Its position was that

Mr. Johnson had abandoned medical treatment.

On July 29, 2024, Mr. Johnson filed–for the first time–a Disputed Claim for

Compensation. Amentum responded with several exceptions, including an exception

of prescription. Amentum maintained that the claim, filed more than four years after

the work-related accident took place, had prescribed under Louisiana law. The OWC

judge disagreed, reasoning:

. . . [T]he indemnity benefits paid by Amentum for 21

months after prescription had run without any evidence

that same were paid in error or revoked, along with their

change in policy to accommodate work restrictions

requiring light-duty work after over two years of

accommodating Mr. Johnson’s physical restrictions, were

a clear and direct absolute renunciation of the accrual of

prescription that occurred. While said payments were not

an admission of liability in and of themselves, the

extensive period of time for which they were regularly

paid to Mr. Johnson indicated a new promise by Amentum

that indemnity benefits were owed under the facts of this

claim.

Amentum sought supervisory review of the OWC’s ruling with the court of

appeal, which denied relief. Amentum then filed a writ application with this Court,

which we granted. Johnson v. Aecom Amentum Gov’t Servs., 25-00171 (La. 5/6/25),

408 So. 3d 198.

LAW AND DISCUSSION

Under Louisiana law, the party pleading the peremptory exception of

prescription bears the burden of proving the prescriptive period has elapsed. Talley

2

Under the LWCL, “[c]ompensation shall be paid . . . (a) [f]or any injury producing temporary

total disability of an employee to engage in any self-employment or occupation for wages, . . . [at]

sixty-six and two-thirds percent of wages during the period of such disability.” La. R.S. 23:1221

(1)(a).

3

v. Baum, 22-1329, p. 6 (La. App. 1 Cir. 9/7/23), 371 So. 3d 1114, 1118. This rule

applies to workers’ compensation matters as well. See Duplechain v. Dep’t of

Transp. & Dev., 02-356, p. 2 (La. App. 3 Cir. 10/2/02), 827 So. 2d 567, 568

(“Generally, the party pleading prescription on a workers’ compensation claim bears

the burden of proof on the issue.”). Where prescription is evident from the face of

the pleadings, the burden shifts to the claimant to show that the action has not

prescribed. Feyerabend v. Boomtown Casino, 08-807, p. 5 (La. App. 5 Cir. 2/25/09),

9 So. 3d 228, 231. He may do so by proving prescription was interrupted, suspended

or renounced. Id.

As previously noted, the OWC judge found that Mr. Johnson’s claim was not

prescribed. We review this finding de novo. Talley, 22-1329, p. 6, 371 So. 3d at

1118. See also, Smith v. Acadian Ambulance Serv., Inc., 22-626, p. 3 (La. App. 3

Cir. 3/22/23), 363 So. 3d 564, 567 (“When the pertinent facts are not in dispute and

the decision involves purely legal issues, the matter is reviewed de novo, and the

trial court’s legal conclusions are not entitled to any deference.”).

Louisiana’s workers’ compensation laws, La. R.S. 23:1020.1, et seq., were

enacted for the express purpose of providing timely payment of benefits, including

medical benefits, to a worker injured during the course and scope of his employment,

and returning him back to the workforce. La. R.S. 23:1020.1 B. As this Court

observed in Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Keel, 01-3013, p. 9 (La. 4/3/02), 817 So. 2d 1,

7, workers’ compensation benefits are designed “to compensate employees for loss

of income resulting from work-related injuries in exchange for their employees’

forbearance from suing the employers in tort.” We made clear in Keel that

“[t]emporary total disability benefits replace a portion of the salary an injured

employee could have earned had he not been injured.” Id. (citing La. R.S. 23:1221

(1)(a)). Necessarily, for an injured employee to be eligible for temporary total

4

disability benefits, he must be unable “to engage in any self-employment or

occupation for wages.” See La. R.S. 23:1221 (1)(a).

When an employee continues to work and earn wages after an injury,

however, the LWCL explicitly provides that he is not entitled to benefits. Louisiana

Revised Statute 23:1221 (1)(b) states that “compensation for temporary disability

shall not be awarded if the employee is engaged in any employment or self-

employment regardless of the nature or character of the employment or self-

employment including but not limited to any and all odd-lot employment, sheltered

employment, or employment while working in any pain.”3 (Emphasis added).

The LWCL is silent with respect to circumstances in which an injured

employee continues to be employed and receive wages–albeit for work of a different

nature–until such time as the employee’s position is eliminated or the employee

becomes incapable of performing his duties as a result of the otherwise compensable

injury. Logically, however, in this situation, as long as the employee timely asserts

a claim, he may be entitled to receive workers’ compensation benefits. The problem

arises when the employee does not timely file a claim for benefits because he

continues to receive wages beyond the prescriptive periods established by the

LWCL. This is particularly problematic given that, as long as the employee is

earning wages, La. R.S. 23:1221 (1)(b) precludes his receipt of any temporary total

disability benefits.

3

The requirement that an injured employee may not earn any wages in order to qualify for

temporary total disability benefits is further evidenced by La. R.S. 23:1221 (1)(c), which provides:

. . . whenever the employee is not engaged in any employment or self-employment

as described in Subparagraph (1)(b) of this Paragraph, compensation for temporary

total disability shall be awarded only if the employee proves by clear and

convincing evidence, unaided by any presumption of disability, that the employee

is physically unable to engage in any employment or self-employment, regardless

of the nature or character of the employment or self-employment, including but not

limited to any and all odd-lot employment, sheltered employment, or employment

while working in any pain, notwithstanding the location or availability of any such

employment or self-employment.

5

The LWCL provides three definitive timelines within which an employee

must file a claim to recover workers’ compensation benefits. First, as set forth in La.

R.S. 23:1209 A (1), an employee has one year from the date of an accident to file a

“formal claim,” unless the parties have agreed upon payments to be made. Second,

where “payments have been made . . ., the limitation shall not take effect until the

expiration of one year from the time of making the last payment.” La. R.S. 23:1209

A (2). That is, under subpart A (2), where an injured employee has received benefits

under the LWCL, the prescriptive period for filing a workers’ compensation claim

accrues one year after the last compensation payment rather than one year after the

injury occurred.

The third period for filing a workers’ compensation claim is provided in La.

R.S. 23:1209 A (3). Where an injury does not manifest immediately after an

accident, the employee must file a claim within a year “from the time the injury

develops,” but no more than “three years from the date of the accident.” Id.

These prescriptive periods do not contemplate the situation presented by this

case–where an employee receives his regular salary for more than a year after

sustaining a work-related injury and his employment is then terminated. As he

suffered no loss of wages during the relevant prescriptive period, the employee is

statutorily barred from receiving benefits under the LWCL. See La. R.S. 23:1221

(1)(b), supra; see also, Branch v. New Orleans Saints, 09-910, p. 8 n.5 (La. App. 5

Cir. 2/23/10), 31 So. 3d 627, 632 (employee, an NFL player, was not entitled to

workers’ compensation benefits because he “did not miss any work or compensation

that he would otherwise have received.”).

Furthermore, any attempt by an employee to file a claim for workers’

compensation benefits while the employee is still receiving wages would be met

with an exception of prematurity. Under La. R.S. 23:1314, a petition for workers’

compensation benefits is premature and subject to dismissal unless the employee

6

asserts a basis for a workers’ compensation claim, including the employer’s failure

to pay an employee LWCL benefits it owes.4 None of the bases set forth under this

statute apply to this case.

This Court has previously recognized that:

. . . an injured employee who continues to work, despite a

work-related medical condition which is painful but not

then disabling, should not be penalized for attempting to

remain in the work force in order to support his or her

family or in the hope that the condition will improve. Wex

A. Malone & H. Alston Johnson III, 14 Louisiana Civil

Law Treatise—Workers’ Compensation § 384 (3d ed.

1994). Requiring any injured employee, who is not yet

disabled, to assert his or her claim within one year of the

accident (or one year of the last payment of benefits) in

order to preserve the cause of action would encourage

needless litigation.

Sevin v. Schwegmann Giant Supermarkets, Inc., 94-1859, p. 5 (La. 4/10/95), 652 So.

2d 1323, 1326.

At issue in Sevin was the “developing injury” rule (and a claim for total and

permanent disability, which has identical prescriptive periods as a claim for

temporary total disability). In Sevin, this Court found a workers’ compensation claim

4

La. R.S. 23:1314 provides, in pertinent part, as follows:

A. The presentation and filing of the petition under R.S. 23:1310.3 shall be

premature unless it is alleged in the petition that:

(1) The employee or dependent is not being or has not been paid, and the

employer has refused to pay, the maximum percentage of wages to which

the petitioner is entitled under this Chapter; or

(2) The employee has not been furnished the proper medical attention, or

the employer or insurer has not paid for medical attention furnished; or

(3) The employee has not been furnished copies of the reports of

examination made by the employer’s medical practitioners after written

request therefor has been made under this Chapter; or

(4) The employer or insurer has not paid penalties or attorney’s fees to

which the employee or his dependent is entitled.

B. The petition shall be dismissed when the allegations in Subsection (A) of this

Section are denied by the employer and are shown at a time fixed by the workers'

compensation judge to be without reasonable cause or foundation in fact.

C. The workers' compensation judge shall determine whether the petition is

premature and must be dismissed before proceeding with the hearing of the other

issues involved with the claim.

(Emphasis added).

7

was timely despite being filed twenty months after an accident. The Court noted the

plaintiff was initially treated for a strain. It was not until she discovered her injury

was more serious and required surgery (at which time her doctor ordered her not to

work) that the injury “developed” as contemplated by the LWCL. Her claim was

thus timely filed within the “developing injury” prescriptive period.5

We recognize the quandary presented by the circumstances of this case–an

injured employee who returns to work and suffers no loss of wages during the one-

year prescriptive period is without recourse when he later becomes eligible for

workers’ compensation benefits. Despite the Sevin Court’s recognition of this very

problem in 1995, there have been no responsive amendments to the LWCL to date.

And, this Court is unable to fashion a remedy, as “[c]ourts are not free to rewrite

laws to effect a purpose that is not otherwise expressed.” Luv N’ Care, Ltd. v. Jackel

Int’l Ltd., 19-0749, p. 10 (La. 1/29/20), 347 So. 3d 572, 579. Our jurisprudence

makes clear that “the role of the judiciary [is] to interpret the law, not to make law.

. . . Likewise, ‘it is not the judiciary’s role to fill in gaps left by the legislature.’” In

re Dennis, 55,851, p. 3 (La. App. 2 Cir. 7/17/24), 400 So. 3d 954, 960 (emphasis

supplied; citations omitted).

We are therefore constrained to find that Mr. Johnson’s claim, on its face, is

prescribed. Mr. Johnson’s injury occurred on June 12, 2020. His disputed claim for

5

See also, Bolden v. Georgia Cas. & Sur. Co., 363 So. 2d 419, 422 (La. 1978) (“an employee who

becomes disabled after the prescriptive year (but within two years after the accident) will not be

penalized by the loss of his compensation rights, unless he fails to bring suit to enforce them within

one year after it is manifest, rather than conjectural, that he has a compensable claim.”). Cf.,

Iverstine v. Albemarle Corp., 02-2555, p. 10 (La. App. 1 Cir. 7/2/03), 852 So. 2d 492, 499

(although the claimant’s injuries worsened to the point he underwent surgery, his claim had

prescribed. The appellate court found that the plaintiff knew he suffered a work-related injury and

knew that he could not continue to perform his customary work; thus, his claim, filed more than a

year after a work-related accident, had prescribed.).

Here, even if the “developing injury” rule applied, and Mr. Johnson’s claim was triggered at the

time he was no longer able to work (i.e., when his light-duty job was eliminated), Mr. Johnson’s

claim still would have prescribed. Louisiana Revised Statute 23:1209 A(3) provides that, where

an injury does not manifest immediately, an employee has one year from the time the injury

develops to file a claim, “but in all such cases the claim for payment shall be forever barred unless

the proceedings have been begun within three years from the date of the accident.” (Emphasis

added). Mr. Johnson’s claim was filed more than four years after his accident.

8

compensation was filed on July 29, 2024, more than four years after his injury and

well after the expiration of any prescriptive period set forth in the LWCL. As a result,

it became Mr. Johnson’s burden to prove that prescription was either interrupted,

suspended or renounced. Although there is no dispute that Amentum paid for all of

Mr. Johnson’s medical expenses, La. R.S. 23:1204 clearly states that “[n]either the

furnishing of medical services nor payments by the employer . . . constitute an

admission of liability,” and our jurisprudence reflects that these payments do not

interrupt the prescriptive period. See, e.g., Winford v. Conerly Corp., 04-1278, p. 15

(La. 3/11/05), 897 So. 2d 560, 569; Gilbert v. Willis-Knighton Work Kare Clinic,

43,320, p. 4 (La. App. 2 Cir. 6/4/08), 986 So. 2d 211, 213.

Mr. Johnson does not contend that prescription was interrupted or suspended,

and we agree that nothing occurred that would have interrupted or suspended the

one-year prescriptive period after Mr. Johnson’s accident.6 Mr. Johnson focuses,

instead, on the doctrine of renunciation. He contends that Amentum renounced

prescription when it initiated and continued to make payments of indemnity benefits

after prescription accrued. Based on the record before us, we agree.

“‘Renunciation of prescription’ is the technical term designating the

abandonment of rights derived from an accrual of prescription.” La. C.C. art. 3449,

cmt (c). (Emphasis supplied). It is distinguishable from “an acknowledgment of a

right or obligation, which is made prior to the accrual of prescription and which

6 We recognize that “payment in lieu of wages” interrupts prescription and a claim may be filed

within a year of the final wage payment. See Ortis v. Ortco Contractors, Inc., 00-1460, p. 3 (La.

App. 1 Cir. 9/28/01), 809 So. 2d 300, 301. “‘Wages in lieu of compensation’ are defined as

unearned wages paid to an employee after an injury; if the employee actually earns the wages paid

to him, they are not ‘wages in lieu of compensation’ and do not interrupt prescription for workers’

compensation claims.” O’Quinn v. Trinidad Drilling, LP, 49,372, p. 8 (La. App. 2 Cir. 10/1/14),

150 So. 3d 486, 491. As explained in O’Quinn, “[i]f the employee after his injury continues to

receive wages or checks unspecified as to their purpose and he is not fully earning these wages,

they will be treated as gratuitous payments in lieu of compensation and will interrupt prescription.”

Id. (quoting Wex S. Malone and H. Alston Johnson, 14 Louisiana Civil Law Treatise, Workers’

Compensation Law and Practice, § 384, pp. 371-2 (4th ed. 2010)).

This principle does not apply to this case as the wages Mr. Johnson received following his injury

were earned, even though Mr. Johnson worked in a different capacity than his usual employment.

9

wipes out the time that has run prior to the acknowledgment.” Id. (Emphasis

supplied). Renunciation, on the other hand, takes place “only after [prescription] has

accrued,” as specifically provide by La. C.C. art. 3449. While an acknowledgment

interrupts prescription and erases the time accrued, causing prescription to begin

anew from the date of the interruption, “renunciation obliterates the effect of

prescription that has run.” Lima v. Schmidt, 595 So. 2d 624, 631 (La. 1992); see also,

Coleman v. Ace Prop. & Cas. Ins. Co., 19-305, p. 10 (La. App. 5 Cir. 11/27/19), 284

So. 3d 1262, 1270.

Our jurisprudence is well-settled that renunciation of prescription must be

“clear, direct, and absolute, and it must be manifested by words or actions of the

party in whose favor prescription has run.” Ruffins v. HAZA Foods of Louisiana,

LLC, 21-619, p. 5 (La. App. 5 Cir. 5/25/22), 341 So. 3d 1259, 1263-64 (citing Geiger

v. State ex rel. Dep’t of Health & Hosp., 01-2206, p. 10 (La. 4/12/02), 815 So. 2d

80, 86. According to La. C.C. art. 3450, “[r]enunciation may be tacit or express.”

Tacit renunciation “results from circumstances that give rise to a presumption that

the advantages of prescription have been abandoned.” Id. Renunciation, however,

“does not require any formality.” La. C.C. art. 3449, cmt (d).

A party’s acknowledgement of an obligation after prescription has tolled is

insufficient to constitute the renunciation of prescription; renunciation requires a

new promise to pay the debt. Slaughter v. Arco Chem. Co., 05-0657, pp. 6-7 (La.

App. 4 Cir. 4/26/06), 931 So. 2d 387, 393 (citation omitted). In support of this

principle, the Slaughter court reasoned: “[a] new obligation binding on the debtor is

created when a promise to pay is made after prescription has accrued.” Id. (quoting

Lima, 595 So. 2d at 631 (La. 1992). This Court further explained that renunciation

“must result from a fact which gives a presumption of the relinquishment of the right

acquired by prescription . . . and such fact must be necessarily and strongly

10

connected with the debt which the party intended to revive.” Geiger, 01-2206, p. 10

815 So. 2d at 86 (quoting Courtebray v. Rils, 9 Rob. 511 (La. 1845)).

Case law indicates that, after a claim has prescribed, a defendant may

acknowledge a debt and even make partial payment of it without renouncing

prescription. See In re Benjamin, 14-192, p. 8 (La. App. 5 Cir. 11/25/14), 165 So. 3d

161, 165; Bordelon’s, Inc. v. Littell, 490 So. 2d 779, 781 (La. App. 3 Cir. 1986). In

Benjamin, the court rejected the plaintiff’s contention that the defendants renounced

prescription by initiating settlement discussions, finding that settlement negotiations

do not constitute a “new promise to pay [a] debt” sufficient to renounce prescription.

Id., 14-192, p. 8, 165 So. 3d at 166. Likewise, in Bordelon’s, the court found that a

signed notarized receipt, which made several acknowledgements of the debt, was

not a renunciation of prescription. While the acknowledgment was valid,

interrupting prescription on the unprescribed portion of the debt, it did not renounce

prescription of the debt that had prescribed, as it contained no new promise to pay

that portion of the debt.

Similarly, in Slaughter, the court found a taxpayer’s acceptance of a check

from the Department of Revenue and Taxation more than three years after the

Department’s lawsuit to collect taxes was abandoned for non-prosecution was not a

renunciation of the previously-accrued abandonment. The court observed that

neither the cover letter nor the check contained any language that could be construed

as a new “promise to pay by [the tax payor] or a new promise to litigate.” Slaughter,

05-0657, p. 9, 931 So. 2d at 393.

Conversely, tacit renunciation was found in Weeks v. Louisiana Patient’s

Comp. Fund, 03-469 (La. App. 3 Cir. 11/5/03), 858 So. 2d 851, a medical

malpractice case. In Weeks, the Third Circuit found payment of a physician’s

malpractice insurance policy limits resulted in the renunciation of prescription as to

the Louisiana Patient’s Compensation Fund (“LPCF”). The court reasoned that this

11

payment stipulated the physician’s liability under La. R.S. 40:1299.44 (C)(5)(e),7

and operated “as a declaration or promise” that the LPCF would pay any damages

proved by the plaintiff.” Id., 03-469, p. 4, 858 So. 2d at 854, citing Lima, 595 So. 2d

at 631, for the principle that a “‘promise’ means a declaration which gives to the

person to whom it is made the right to expect or claim the performance of a specified

act.” The Lima Court also defined “promise” as a “pledge to another to do or not to

do something specified. . . .” Id., 595 So. 2d at 632 (citation omitted).

There are few cases involving the renunciation of prescription in the context

of a workers’ compensation claim. In Neese v. Papa John’s Pizza, 10-15 (La. App.

5 Cir. 6/29/10), 44 So. 3d 321, a case on which Amentum relies, a workers’

compensation insurer issued a check to an injured employee more than a year after

its last payment of temporary total disability benefits (its position was that the check

was sent in error). The claimant maintained that this payment amounted to a

renunciation of prescription. In rejecting that argument and finding the employee

ineligible for temporary total disability benefits, the court observed:

There is no evidence in the record that [the workers’

compensation insurer] or [employer] intended the January

2008 check to be a new promise to pay [temporary total

disability] benefits or that [either] clearly and directly

intended to renounce prescription. There is no language in

the check that could be construed as a new promise to pay

Mr. Neese on [the insurer’s or employer’s] part.

Id., 10-15, p. 12, 44 So. 3d at 329.

In the later case of Coleman v. Ace Prop. & Cas. Ins. Co., 19-305, p. 8 (La.

App. 5 Cir. 11/27/19), 284 So. 3d 1262, 1269, three years after the claimant settled

7

At the time, La. R.S. 40:1299.44(C)(5)(e) provided:

In approving a settlement or determining the amount, if any, to be paid from the

patient’s compensation fund, the trier of fact shall consider the liability of the

health care provider as admitted and established where the insurer has paid its

policy limits of one hundred thousand dollars, or where the self-insured health care

provider has paid one hundred thousand dollars.

(Emphasis added).

12

his workers’ compensation claim and his last medical benefit was paid, the insurer

issued a new prescription card. The court rejected the claimant’s argument that this

constituted the renunciation of prescription, finding it was not “a ‘clear, direct,

absolute renunciation of prescription.” Id., 19-305, p. 10, 284 So. 3d at 1270. The

evidence reflected the insurer sent the card in error, as it had been provided incorrect

legal information as to the onset of the prescriptive period, and the card was canceled

before the claimant was able to use it (notably, the claimant’s prior prescription card

had been rejected when he tried to use it shortly after the settlement). See also, Queen

v. W & W Clarklift, Inc., 537 So. 2d 1214, 1216 (La. App. 4 Cir. 1989) (“Defendant

could not form the intent to renounce prescription when it was not only unaware that

prescription had accrued but was specifically led to believe that it had not by

plaintiff’s attorney. . . defendant’s conduct can hardly be considered a new promise

to pay the prescribed debt.”).

The instant matter, however, presents a compelling case for concluding that

prescription was renounced. This case does not involve an isolated payment of

workers’ compensation benefits after prescription accrued. Instead, more than two

years after Mr. Johnson’s work-related accident and injury occurred (and more than

sixteen months after the prescriptive period tolled),8 Amentum initiated payments of

temporary total disability benefits and continued to pay Mr. Johnson benefits on a

weekly basis for approximately two years. We find these weekly payments clearly

and directly evidence a promise to pay Mr. Johnson. Undoubtedly, these

circumstances invoke the “presumption that the advantages of prescription have

been abandoned,” per Article 3450.

8

Prior to that time, Mr. Johnson could not have filed a disputed claim for workers’ compensation

benefits as he continued to receive his salary in full for two years after the accident, suffering no

loss of wages.

13

We are not persuaded by Amentum’s argument that our decision in Gary v.

Camden Fire Ins. Co., 96-0055 (La. 7/2/96), 676 So. 2d 553, supports its position

that the “voluntary payment of workers’ compensation benefits” does not interrupt

prescription. As we have already found, there is no question that Mr. Johnson’s claim

for benefits prescribed and no facts suggest that prescription was interrupted. While

the Gary Court acknowledged that voluntary payments of benefits neither constitute

an admission of liability (consistent with La. R.S. 23:1204) nor interrupt prescription

under La. C.C. art. 3464,9 the issue in Gary was whether these payments interrupted

prescription as to a third party tortfeasor who injured the plaintiff in a car accident.

The Court held that they did not. Notably, the plaintiff in Gary began receiving

workers’ compensation benefits well within the one-year prescription period, and,

in a proper construction of the LWCL, the Court observed that, where benefits have

been paid to an employee, “Section 1209A further provides that the time limit for

filing a claim for benefits does not expire until one year after the last payment.” Id.,

96-0055, p. 6, 676 So. 2d at 557.

Unlike the instant case, Gary did not involve an employer initiating voluntary

payment of benefits after a workers’ compensation claim prescribed. And, unlike

Gary, the present issue concerns the renunciation, rather than the interruption, of

prescription.10

Nor do we agree with Amentum that the language of La. R.S. 23:1209 A (1),

indicating a claim for workers’ compensation is “forever barred” unless either a

formal claim is (timely) filed or the parties agree to future payments to be made

9

Article 3464 states: “Prescription is interrupted when one acknowledges the right of the person

against whom he had commenced to prescribe.”

10

Amentum’s reliance on Migliori v. Willows Apartments, 99-2784 (La. App. 4 Cir. 5/31/00), 765

So. 2d 435, is misplaced. The issue there, too, concerned whether the payments of workers’

compensation benefits and medical expenses interrupted prescription against third parties. The

court found Gary to be indistinguishable and followed Gary to find that the payments did not

interrupt prescription against third-party tortfeasors.

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precludes the application of principles of renunciation, or that the legislature

intended “to preclude renunciation in the context of workers’ compensation.”

First, generally, any claim not timely filed is prescribed and “forever barred.”

More importantly, our jurisprudence indicates that the periods set forth in the LWCL

are prescriptive and not peremptive. See, Smith v. Fruehauf Trailer Operations,

27,864, p. 5 (La. App. 2 Cir. 1/24/96), 666 So. 2d 1246, 1250; see also, Krieg v.

Krieg Bros. Terrazzo Co., Inc., 93-1065, p. 3 (La. App. 3 Cir. 9/28/94), 645 So. 2d

661, 663 (citing Lester v. Rebel Crane & Servs. Co., 393 So. 2d 674 (La.1981))

(“The time period established by [La. R.S. 23:]1209(A) is prescriptive, rather than

peremptive.”). Our case law makes clear that, unlike peremptive periods,

prescriptive periods can be suspended and interrupted. Scott v. Walmart Stores, Inc.,

03-0104, p. 6 (La. App. 4 Cir. 7/2/03), 851 So. 2d 1210, 1214 (“As with any

prescriptive period, prescription on workers’ compensation claims may be

interrupted or suspended.”); see also, Krieg, 93-1065, p. 3, 645 So. 2d at 664; Smith,

27,864, p. 5, 666 So. 2d at 1250. Likewise, whereas peremption cannot be renounced

(See Borel v. Young, 07-0419, p. 8 (La. 11/27/07), 989 So. 2d 42, 48), the Civil Code

expressly permits the renunciation of prescriptive periods under La. C.C. art. 3449.11

It follows, therefore, that the prescriptive periods set forth in the LWCL may be

renounced.

Second, the LWCL does not expressly state that the principle of renunciation

is inapplicable in in workers’ compensation matters. Indeed, as noted herein, several

cases have addressed renunciation generally (even those cited by Amentum). Other

cases have also applied civil code concepts to workers’ compensation matters. See,

e.g., Trahan v. Coca Cola Bottling Co. United, Inc., 04-0100, p. 12 (La. 3/2/05), 894

11

See La. C.C. art. 3461 (“Except as otherwise provided by law, peremption may not be renounced,

interrupted, or suspended.”); Ebinger v. Venus Const. Corp., 10-2516, p. 9 (La. 7/1/11), 65 So. 3d

1279, 1286 (“Peremption differs from prescription in two respects: (1) the expiration of the

peremptive time period destroys the cause of action itself; and (2) nothing may interfere with the

running of a peremptive time period.”).

15

So. 2d 1096, 1104 (“there is no . . . prohibition from applying the provisions of La.

C.C. art. 3071 (defining a ‘transaction or compromise’) to the instant [workers’

compensation] case” to determine whether an agreement was a valid

compromise/settlement agreement); cf., Bracken v. Payne & Keller Co., Inc., 15-

1760, pp. 6-8 (La. App. 1 Cir. 8/10/16), 199 So. 3d 1164, 1168-69 and Duncan v.

Pesnell, 219 So. 2d 846, 848 (La. App. 2 Cir. 1969) (applying Louisiana Code of

Civil Procedure articles on nullity of actions in workers’ compensation cases; the

LWCL contains no provisions for nullifying judgments).12

Last, we find no merit in Amentum’s argument that, because the LWCL in

La. R.S. 23:1204 states the payment of benefits is not an admission of liability,

payments of benefits after a claim has prescribed cannot constitute the tacit

renunciation of the accrued prescription. This statutory provision simply ensures

employers and workers’ compensation insurers can voluntarily pay benefits without

waiving any defenses or admitting liability. One may renounce prescription yet still

deny liability.

In Snelling Pers. Servs. v. Duhon, 00-661, p. 4 (La. App. 3 Cir. 11/2/00), 772

So. 2d 350, 352, the court of appeal recognized that La. R.S. 23:1204 “encourages

voluntary payments by reassuring the employer that voluntary payments do not

constitute an admission of liability” and “fosters the humane policies underlying the

workers’ compensation statutory framework by encouraging voluntarily payments

to a legitimately injured employee.” This interpretation supports both public policy

12

We further find no merit to Amentum’s argument that it “cannot be said to have renounced the

rights obtained through the accrued prescription,” as “[t]here is no evidence in the record that

Amentum (1) knew Mr. Johnson’s claims were already prescribed and (2) despite this made

declaration and new promise to pay – clearly and directly intending to renounce prescription.”

We have already determined that Amentum’s actions constituted the renunciation of prescription.

Although Amentum asserts it was unaware that Mr. Johnson’s claims were prescribed, given that

Amentum was Mr. Johnson’s employer and paid his salary, it unquestionably knew, or should have

known, that no claim was filed by Mr. Johnson during the relevant time period–one year from the

date of Mr. Johnson’s accident–and thus, that his claim had prescribed.

16

and judicial efficiency, ensuring employers are not discouraged from making

voluntary workers’ compensation payments for fear of legal consequences.

Based on the foregoing, we hold that an employer or insurer’s initiation of

regular and consistent workers’ compensation payments to an injured employee after

the prescriptive period has tolled indicates an abandonment of the defense of

prescription and constitutes a tacit renunciation of prescription. The OWC judge in

this case properly denied Amentum’s exception of prescription.13

DECREE

The ruling of the Office of Worker’ Compensation denying the exception of

prescription is affirmed. We remand this matter for further proceedings.

AFFIRMED AND REMANDED.

13

Of course, Amentum may still pursue in the OWC other defenses available to it, including those

raised in its March 28, 2024 notice of controversion of compensation form.

17