In re R.V. CA4/1

Filed 12/17/25 In re R.V. CA4/1

NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS

California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for

publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication

or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.

COURT OF APPEAL, FOURTH APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION ONE

STATE OF CALIFORNIA

In re R.V. et al., Persons Coming

Under the Juvenile Court Law.

D086638

SAN DIEGO COUNTY HEALTH

AND HUMAN SERVICES

AGENCY, (Super. Ct. No. EJ4190ABCD)

Plaintiff and Respondent,

v.

T.Q.,

Defendant and Appellant.

APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of San Diego County,

Daniela Reali-Ferrari, Judge. Affirmed in part and conditionally reversed in

part with directions.

Jack A. Love, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant

and Appellant.

David J. Smith, Acting County Counsel, Lisa M. Maldonado, Chief

Deputy County Counsel, Kristen M. Ojeil, Deputy County Counsel, for

Plaintiff and Respondent.

T.Q. (Mother) appeals the juvenile court’s orders terminating her

parental rights as to her four children under Welfare and Institutions Code1

section 366.26. R.V. (V. Father) was undisputedly the biological and

presumed father of R.V. and M.Q., the two older children. The two younger

children, J.Q. and I.Q., were alleged to have a different biological father, T.S.,

who was never found for the proceedings, never appeared, and thus never

sought to elevate his paternity status.

The sole issue on appeal is whether the San Diego County Health and

Human Services Agency (Agency) failed to conduct an adequate section 224.2,

subdivision (b), initial inquiry into the children’s possible status as an

“Indian Child” under the Indian Child Welfare Act (ICWA; § 25 U.S.C. 1902

et seq.). Mother contends that the Agency failed to inquire of V. Father’s

relatives,2 specifically his mother, brothers, and sister. The Agency concedes

it failed to fulfill its duties as to R.V. and M.Q. However, it argues it had no

duty to inquire about J.Q. and I.Q. because the paternal relatives were not

“extended relatives” of these younger minors or “others with an interest in

the child.” We agree. We conditionally reverse as to R.V. and M.Q. We

affirm as to J.Q. and I.Q.

FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

In March 2022, the Agency filed a section 300, subdivision (b) petition

on behalf of R.V. (then six years old), M.Q. (then five years old), J.Q. (then

four years old), and I.Q. (then two years old). The petition alleged that these

children were not provided with a suitable home, shelter, and place of abode

1 All subsequent statutory references are to the Welfare and Institutions

Code unless otherwise indicated.

2 Any reference to “paternal” relatives refers exclusively to V. Father’s

relatives.

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in that the home was infested, had trash piled throughout the residence, and

there was very little food.

The Agency interviewed Mother and V. Father in February 2022, and

both denied having any Native American ancestry. The parents also

confirmed that V. Father was the biological father of the two older children,

R.V. and M.Q.

Mother explained that T.S. was the biological father of J.Q. and I.Q.,

the younger two minors, but T.S. was not in their lives. She denied having

contact information for T.S. V. Father agreed J.Q. and I.Q. were not his

biological children.

V. Father advised the social worker that there were no custody orders,

but he was the primary caretaker of the four children, they resided with him

full time, and Mother was homeless. He and all four children also resided

with his mother Angelica, brother Eddie, and twin brother Alejandro, V.

Father reported that on one occasion, when his brother’s girlfriend Barbara

was watching the children, Mother came to the house and took the children.

At the March 16, 2022 detention hearing, the clerk conducted a search

for and found a voluntary declaration of paternity signed by V. Father as to

R.V., M.Q., and I.Q.3 The matter was continued to the next day.

At the continued detention hearing, V. Father, through counsel, asked

to elevate his paternity status to presumed for R.V. and M.Q., and the Agency

3 The parties do not address this declaration having an impact on

paternity, but the issue is moot for reasons that will be discussed later in the

opinion. (See Cal. Rules of Court, rule 5.635 subd. (c) [an executed and filed

voluntary declaration of paternity establishes presumed parentage under

Family Code section 7611 and has the same force and effect as a judgment of

parentage].)

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submitted on this request.4 The court detained the children out of the home,

ordered visitation between the children and parents, and deferred on ICWA.

At the June 22, 2022 adjudication hearing, the court sustained the

petition, removed the children from the care of the parents, and ordered

reunification services for Mother and V. Father as to R.V. and M.Q.5 As to

J.Q. and I.Q., only Mother received services as they had no recognized

biological or presumed father. The court found without prejudice that ICWA

did not apply.6 As to J.Q. and I.Q., the court also found that reasonable

4 The minute orders for the March 17, 2022 continued detention hearing

do not explicitly state that the court found V. Father presumed for any of the

children. However, subsequent minute orders consistently list V. Father as

“presumed” for both R.V. and M.Q., and the record otherwise supports this

finding. Also, parties do not dispute that he is factually and legally the

father of the older two children.

5 Contrary to Mother’s assertion, the record does not suggest the court

ordered reunification services for V. Father in regard to J.Q. or I.Q. The

social worker’s recommendations for jurisdiction/disposition as to J.Q. and

I.Q. refer to search efforts for the “<alleged father>”, presumably referring to

T.S. The respective recommendations for these minors also state, “The

Health and Human Services Agency is ordered to provide services to the

<mother> consistent with their case plan(s), and the <parents> <are>

ordered to comply with those services.” The recommendations for neither

J.Q. nor I.Q. make any explicit reference to V. Father. They refer to

“<mother>” or “<parents>” interchangeably but mainly refer to “<mother>”

and references Mother by name.

6 The minute orders for J.Q. and I.Q. contain the additional notation that

“[t]here is reason to know that the child is an Indian child, and the agency

must provide/has provided notice of the proceeding to all identified tribes

and/or the Bureau of Indian Affairs as required by law.” The court further

found the child did not meet the definition of an “Indian child” for the

purposes of ICWA.

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search efforts were made to locate and notify the alleged father T.S. of these

proceedings.

At the December 14, 2022 six-month review hearing, the Agency

recommended more reunification services for both Mother and V. Father.

The court adopted the Agency’s recommendations. The court found that the

Agency had conducted adequate ICWA inquiry and ICWA did not apply.

Notice pursuant to ICWA was not required because the court knew each child

was not an Indian child.

At the May 15, 2023 12-month review hearing, the Agency

recommended terminating services for Mother and V. Father. The Agency

reported that on May 1, 2023, “a relative search was completed for the

mother and did not yield any results however, the father [V. Father] did

yield. The Agency is currently mailing and calling the numbers to find a fit

and willing relative.”

At the contested 12-month review hearing on July 10, 2023, the court

found the parents had not complied with their case plans, terminated

reunification services, and set a permanency planning hearing pursuant to

section 366.26.7 It also found that ICWA did not apply.

At some point before January 10, 2024, the social worker spoke with a

paternal aunt, who indicated the paternal grandmother would be willing to

provide a permanent home for the older two children. The report stated a

Spanish speaking social worker attempted to call and was unable to reach

the paternal grandmother.

Generally, V. Father continued to visit the children regularly

throughout the case. Although paternal uncle Alejandro had received

7 The respective minute orders for J.Q. and I.Q. each reflect that the

court terminated reunification services for Mother (not V. Father) and

ordered search efforts for these children’s alleged father T.S.

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permission to attend the March 11, 2025 visit with the children, he did not

attend. V. Father advised this was due to the paternal uncle’s work and that

he told his brother he needs to show up if he commits to coming to a visit.

V. Father continued to have weekly visits.

On April 16, 2025, V. Father told the social worker that he and his

brother were living at the paternal grandmother’s home in San Diego, but

she had a stroke and was currently staying with her daughter in Arizona.

At the July 2, 2025 contested hearing, pursuant to section 366.26, the

court found without prejudice that ICWA did not apply and terminated

parental rights.

The record contains no indication that V. Father (or any other party)

ever asked to elevate his paternity status for J.Q. or I.Q., or that anyone

claimed to be their biological father, or that they had been adopted by

anyone.8

T.S., the allegedly biological father of J.Q. and I.Q., never spoke to a

social worker or appeared for the proceedings. He remained an “alleged”

father and his whereabouts were unknown.

The record shows no Agency efforts to inquire of any paternal relatives

about Native American ancestry. Based on the Agency’s concession, this is

not disputed.

STANDARD OF REVIEW

The court’s finding that there is “no reason to know whether the child is

an Indian child” is reviewed for substantial evidence, as it is a factual

question. (In re E.C. (2022) 85 Cal.App.5th 123, 142 (E.C.).) We do not

reweigh evidence, evaluate witness credibility, or resolve conflicting evidence.

8 In January 2024, V. Father reported to the social worker that the

paternal grandmother had adopted him and his brother.

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We affirm if the trial court’s determinations are supported by substantial

evidence, even if substantial evidence to the contrary exists and the trial

court might have reached a different result had it believed other evidence.

(Ibid.)

When material facts are undisputed, we review de novo whether the

court satisfied ICWA requirements. (E.C., supra, 85 Cal.App.5th at pp. 142–

144.)

Mother asks us to adopt the hybrid standard of review used by some

courts, which, in addition to the standards above, reviews the trial court’s

finding of due diligence and proper inquiry for abuse of discretion. (See In re

K.H. (2022) 84 Cal.App.5th 566, 579.)

Because it is undisputed that the Agency did not inquire about Native

American ancestry of any paternal relatives, we reach the same conclusion

under either standard.

DISCUSSION

Mother contends that the Agency failed to inquire of paternal relatives

that were known to the Agency and readily available, including the paternal

grandmother, two uncles, and an aunt.

The Agency concedes that the record does not contain sufficient

evidence of an adequate initial ICWA inquiry of the paternal relatives related

to the older two children, R.V. and M.Q. However, it asks us to affirm for

J.Q. and I.Q. because the paternal relatives are not “extended family

members” or “others with an interest,” either of which would be required to

trigger ICWA inquiry.

In response, Mother argues that the record as to paternity is both

“conflicting” and indicates that V. Father was ordered reunification services

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as to all four children. By extension, Mother contends, the Agency should

have inquired of paternal relatives for all the children.

When a child is taken into protective custody, the social worker has a

duty to inquire of the “child, parents, legal guardian, Indian custodian,

extended family members, others who have an interest in the child, and the

party reporting child abuse or neglect” of whether the child may have Native

American ancestry. (§ 224.2, subd. (b)(2).) Title 25 of the United States Code

section 1903(9) defines “parent” for ICWA purposes as “any biological parent

or parents of an Indian child or any Indian person who has lawfully adopted

an Indian child (emphasis added).” We have concluded that even if a father

is presumed (for example, via marriage), this does not equate to the requisite

biological or adoptive parent status for the purpose of triggering ICWA notice

on behalf of that parent. (In re C.A. (2018) 24 Cal.App.5th 511, 521 (C.A.).)

“Extended family member” refers to someone who is over the age of 18 and is

the “child’s grandparent, aunt or uncle, brother or sister, brother-in-law or

sister-in-law, niece or nephew, first or second cousin, or stepparent.”

(§ 224.1, subd. (c).) The duty of ICWA inquiry encompasses family members

that are related by adoption. (D.S. v. Superior Court (2023) 88 Cal.App.5th

383, 390–391.)

When the Agency conducts an inadequate initial ICWA inquiry, we

conditionally reverse with directions for the Agency to comply with ICWA

requirements. (In re Dezi C. (2024) 16 Cal.5th 1112, 1136 (Dezi C.).)

We accept the Agency’s concession as to R.V. and M.Q., the

undisputedly biological children of V. Father. The paternal uncles,

grandmother, and aunt are “extended family members” of these older two

children. (See § 224.1, subd. (c) [“extended family member” includes child’s

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grandparent, aunt or uncle]; 25 U.S.C. § 1903(9) [“parent” for ICWA purposes

is a biological or adoptive parent].)

Regarding J.Q. and I.Q., we reject Mother’s claim that the “conflicting”

record suggests V. Father may have been elevated to their presumed father,

therefore the Agency should have inquired of his relatives. Such

requirements would only be triggered if V. Father were either the biological

or adoptive father of J.Q. and I.Q. (See C.A., supra, 24 Cal.App.5th at pp.

520–521.) There is no dispute that V. Father is not the biological father of

either. There is nothing in the record to suggest that he legally adopted any

children. To support the contrary, he stated there were no custody orders.

He was clearly familiar with the concept of adoption, since he disclosed that

the paternal grandmother had adopted him and his brother. Furthermore,

the plain language of title 25 of the United States Code section 1903(9) states

that a qualifying adoptive parent must themselves be an “Indian person.”

Here, V. Father denied any Native American ancestry.

Absent a biological or adoptive tie to J.Q. and I.Q., V. Father’s relatives

do not qualify as “extended relatives.” At best, the paternal relatives might

qualify as “others with an interest in the child,” but the record does not

support this.9

The paternal grandmother was interested in placement of only the

older two minors. (In re D.B. (2022) 87 Cal.App.5th 239, 243–244 [great-

grandparent seeking placement qualifies as “others with an interest”].)

Although the paternal grandmother and two paternal uncles resided in the

home with all four minors and V. Father, there is no information about the

childrearing dynamics in the home, aside from a mention of one of the uncle’s

9 Mother does not expressly argue that the paternal relatives could be

categorized as “others with an interest in the child.” We address the merits,

nonetheless.

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girlfriends watching all the children at one point. (In re Dominick D. (2022)

82 Cal.App.5th 560, 564, 567 [great-grandparent who was the primary

caregiver for at least two months has “an interest in the child”]).10 Paternal

uncle Alejandro asked to visit the children in March 2025, but he did not

make it to the visit. The record offers no explanation or reason why

Alejandro could not have joined V. Father at any of his subsequent weekly

visits throughout the case. Also, the record contains no information about

the paternal aunt’s relationship with the younger children.

DISPOSITION

We conditionally reverse as to R.V. and M.Q. The Agency is to inquire

of all “reasonably available” paternal “extended relatives,” including, but not

necessarily limited to, the paternal grandmother Angelica, paternal uncles

Eddie and Alejandro, and paternal aunt.11 (See Dezi C., supra, 16 Cal.5th at

p. 1140.)

10 We do not suggest that either In re D.B. or In re Dominick D.

establishes a minimum standard for who would be included in “others with

an interest in the child.”

11 The agency conducted a placement search for and reached out to

unspecified paternal relatives but did not inquire about Native American

ancestry. The record does not reveal whether any of these relatives were

reachable or “extended relatives.” Father referred to the paternal

grandmother having a daughter in Arizona, it is unclear if this is the same

aunt with whom the social worker spoke. Also, V. Father reported having an

adult daughter.

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We affirm the orders regarding J.Q. and I.Q.

KELETY, J.

WE CONCUR:

McCONNELL, P. J.

CASTILLO, J.

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