United States v. Troy M. Hill

USCA11 Case: 23-11756 Document: 75-1 Date Filed: 12/18/2025 Page: 1 of 20

NOT FOR PUBLICATION

In the

United States Court of Appeals

For the Eleventh Circuit

____________________

No. 23-11756

Non-Argument Calendar

____________________

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Plaintiff-Appellee,

versus

TROY M. HILL,

Defendant-Appellant.

____________________

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Northern District of Florida

D.C. Docket No. 4:21-cr-00051-AW-MAF-1

____________________

Before NEWSOM, GRANT, and TJOFLAT, Circuit Judges.

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2 Opinion of the Court 23-11756

PER CURIAM:

Troy M. Hill was convicted of being a felon in possession of

a firearm, in violation of 18 U.S.C. §§ 922(g)(1) and 924(e). The Dis-

trict Court applied a sentence enhancement under the Armed Ca-

reer Criminal Act (ACCA) and sentenced Hill to 300 months’ im-

prisonment followed by five years of supervised release with vari-

ous conditions attached. Hill appeals the application of the en-

hancement and some of the conditions placed on his supervised re-

lease. We affirm in part and reverse and remand in part.

I.

A grand jury indicted Hill on one count of possession with

intent to distribute alpha-Pyrrolidinoisohexanophenone, better

known as “molly,” in violation of 21 U.S.C. §§ 841(a)(1) and

(b)(1)(c); one count of knowingly possessing a firearm in further-

ance of a drug trafficking crime, in violation of 18 U.S.C.

§ 924(a)(1)(A)(i); and one count of possessing a firearm as a con-

victed felon, in violation of 18 U.S.C. §§ 922(g)(1) and 924(e). How-

ever, the grand jury later issued a superseding indictment for one

count of possessing a firearm as a convicted felon, in violation of

18 U.S.C. §§ 922(g)(1) and 924(e). 1 The superseding indictment also

listed Hill’s prior Florida convictions2 and asserted, in a section

1 Section 924(e) is the Armed Career Criminal Act.

2 It listed seven Florida convictions: (1) a 1996 conviction for resisting an officer

with violence, carrying a concealed firearm, and armed trespass; (2) a 2000

conviction for possession of crack cocaine and tampering with physical evi-

dence; (3) a 2002 conviction for felony battery and false imprisonment; (4)

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entitled “Enhanceable Prior Convictions,” that before Hill commit-

ted the instant offense, he “had at least three previous convictions

for a violent felony, a serious drug offense, or both, committed on

occasions different from one another.”

Hill proceeded to trial pro se with the aid of standby counsel.

On the first day, the Government presented Hill with the option to

stipulate that his ACCA predicate offenses occurred on occasions

different from one another. The Court explained to Hill that his

sentencing range would be different if he had three qualifying of-

fenses, that it looked like his predicate offenses were committed

years apart based on what was in the indictment, and that he could

stipulate to having committed the offenses on different occasions.

The conversation continued, an excerpt of which follows:

The Court: Let me ask you this, sir: Do you want to

take the position that a jury ought to determine

whether those were on separate occasions or do you

not take that position? If you don’t take that position –

Hill: You’re saying that if I don’t – if I don’t take that

position, does the law – is there a law that allows –

like, within this circuit that allows, not policy, but law

that allows [the Government] to present evidence for

it to be decided by the jury? That’s –

another 2002 conviction for possession of cocaine; (5) a March 2006 conviction

for sale or possession of cocaine with intent to sell within 1000 feet of a church;

(6) a May 2006 conviction for sale of cocaine and possession of cocaine with

intent to sell or deliver; and (7) a 2016 conviction for possession of a controlled

substance with intent to sell or deliver and sale of a controlled substance.

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The Court: Whether this separate occasions inquiry

is a jury determination is not settled in this circuit. I

can tell you this: If it’s your – if you are asserting that

a jury ought to decide it, then we will have a jury de-

cide it.

Hill: I am not asserting that a jury –

The Court: Okay. Then it sounds like we don’t have

an issue. If you are waiving a right to a jury determi-

nation of whether your prior offenses were commit-

ted on separate occasions, then we are done with this

and it will be addressed at sentencing by the judge if

you are convicted. You can talk to [your standby

counsel] about this, but we need to –

(Pause in proceedings)

Hill: Your Honor?

The Court: Yes, sir.

Hill: I guess I stipulate to it. I don’t want to sign any-

thing, but I stipulate – I don’t – yeah . . .

The Court: You don’t have to sign it on the [issue]. If

you are saying that you don’t want the jury to decide

whether you have three offenses on different occa-

sions, that’s fine. You can just say that.

Hill: I don’t want the jury to decide that.

The Court: Okay. Then that’s something I will decide

at sentencing if you are convicted, whether they were

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on separate occasions, or whether they qualify in the

first place, which would be a legal determination that

the jury wouldn’t have anyway. Okay?

Hill: All right.

That same day, Hill informed the Court that he wanted his

standby counsel to represent him in the trial. Hill was ultimately

found guilty of the indicted offense.

The probation office subsequently filed a draft presentence

investigation report (PSI). The PSI stated that Hill had at least three

prior convictions for violent felonies or serious drug offenses, in-

cluding: (1) a 1996 conviction for resisting an officer with violence,

in violation of Fla. Stat. § 843.01, which Hill was charged with in

1995; (2) a March 2006 conviction for selling or possessing cocaine

with intent to sell within 1000 feet of a church, in violation of Fla.

Stat. § 893.13(1)(E)1, which Hill was charged with on August 10,

2005; (3) a May 2006 conviction for selling or possessing cocaine

with the intent to sell or deliver, in violation of Fla. Stat.

§ 893.13(1)(A)1, which Hill was charged with on August 31, 2005;

and (4) a March 2016 conviction for possessing cocaine with the

intent to sell, manufacture, or deliver and selling a controlled sub-

stance, in violation of Fla. Stat. § 893.13(1)(A)1, which Hill was

charged with in 2012.

Based on these prior offenses and convictions, the draft PSI

stated that Hill was an armed career criminal and subject to an en-

hanced sentence under the ACCA. It calculated a base offense level

of 24 for the instant offense of being a felon in possession of a

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6 Opinion of the Court 23-11756

firearm and ammunition. It added a four-level enhancement for

possessing the firearm and ammunition in connection with another

felony offense,3 a two-level enhancement for creating a substantial

risk of death or serious bodily injury to another, 4 and another four-

level enhancement for being an armed career criminal. Hill’s total

offense level was 34 and his criminal history category was VI, giv-

ing Hill a Guidelines range of 262 to 327 months’ imprisonment

followed by two to five years of supervised release. The draft PSI

also included a section entitled “Recommended Conditions of Su-

pervision,” which stated: “As outlined in the Overview of Proba-

tion and Supervised Release Conditions (available at

www.uscourts.gov) . . . , it is recommended that any term of su-

pervision be under the mandatory and standard conditions adopted

for use in the Northern District of Florida.” It also recommended

six specific “special conditions.” 5

Hill made multiple objections to this draft PSI, two of which

are relevant here. He first objected to the ACCA enhancement

3 The draft PSI stated that Hill possessed the firearm and ammunition in con-

nection with intent to distribute molly.

4 The draft PSI stated that Hill recklessly attempted to flee from law enforce-

ment by running a red light and crossing traffic lines into oncoming traffic,

nearly causing an accident.

5 These included: drug and alcohol testing, substance abuse treatment, mental

health evaluation and treatment as necessary, providing financial information

to the probation officer, cooperation related to child support payments if ap-

plicable, and submitting his person and property to searches by the probation

officer.

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because his Florida cocaine convictions did not amount to serious

drug offenses under the federal ACCA. He argued that, when all of

his cocaine offenses occurred, Florida’s definition of cocaine in-

cluded ioflupane I 123, 6 but the current federal definition of con-

trolled substance, for purposes of identifying serious drug offenses,

does not include ioflupane. He further stated that under the cate-

gorical approach the Court must assume that his cocaine offenses

involved the “least culpable substance,” which was ioflupane. So

his Florida cocaine convictions would not qualify as serious drug

offenses under the federal ACCA and, thus, could not be used as

ACCA predicate offenses.

Hill acknowledged the Eleventh Circuit’s decision in United

States v. Jackson (Jackson II), which stated that precedent required

the Court to look to the federal meaning of controlled substance in

effect when the defendant was convicted of the predicate state

crime. 55 F.4th 846, 855, 857 (11th Cir. 2022), aff’d sub nom. Brown

v. United States, 602 U.S. 101, 144 S. Ct. 1195 (2024). But Hill main-

tained that was wrong and that the previous United States v. Jackson

(Jackson I) correctly stated that there was no precedent binding the

Court on the issue and that the definition in place at the time of the

felon in possession conviction governs. 36 F.4th 1294, 1305 (11th

Cir. 2022), vacated, No. 21-13963, 2022 WL 4959314 (11th Cir. Sept.

8, 2022), and superseded, 55 F.4th 846 (11th Cir. 2022), aff’d sub nom.

6 Ioflupane is a substance “derived from cocaine via ecgonine.” Schedules of

Controlled Substances: Removal of [123 I] Ioflupane from Schedule II of the

Controlled Substances Act, 80 Fed. Reg. 54715, 54715 (Sept. 11, 2015).

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8 Opinion of the Court 23-11756

Brown v. United States, 602 U.S. 101, 144 S. Ct. 1195 (2024). He

“adopt[ed] all arguments raised by the defendant in the Jackson

case.”7

Hill further objected to the ACCA enhancement on the

grounds that a jury was not charged with and did not determine

that his qualifying offenses occurred on three separate occasions.

He also maintained that any waiver of his right to have a jury de-

cide the question was involuntary and uninformed.

The probation office responded that it believed the enhance-

ment was properly applied, and it did not change its recommenda-

tion in the final PSI. The Government then filed judgments, sen-

tences, and charging documents related to the predicate offenses to

show that they occurred on separate occasions.

At sentencing, Hill conceded that the 2006 convictions qual-

ified as ACCA predicate offenses based on Jackson II, but he main-

tained his objection to the 2016 conviction. He argued that io-

flupane was not included in the federal controlled substance defini-

tion in 2016, so Hill’s 2016 conviction did not qualify as an ACCA

predicate offense. The Government responded that while the

Court does look to the federal definition in place at the time of the

conviction, the law that’s in effect at the time of the conviction is

7 Hill later filed a motion to stay his sentencing pending the Supreme Court

granting cert in Jackson II. The District Court denied the motion because wait-

ing could extend the resolution of Hill’s case for a very long time. Jackson II

has since been affirmed sub nom by the Supreme Court in Brown v. United

States, 602 U.S. 101, 144 S. Ct. 1195 (2024).

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23-11756 Opinion of the Court 9

the law that was actually violated, which, here, was the law in 2012.

Thus, the federal definition from 2012 controlled. The Court

agreed with the Government. The Court also noted that such a

finding wouldn’t affect the outcome of sentencing anyway; only

three predicate offenses are required for the ACCA enhancement

and, assuming the other offenses counted, this one was a fourth.

The Court also found that there was no requirement for the

jury to decide the different occasions question and, even if there

were, Hill waived it knowingly and voluntarily. And finally, in de-

ciding the different occasions question itself, the Court found that

the four offenses noted in the PSI did occur on different occasions

based on the documents the Government submitted for them. As

such, the PSI was correct: Hill’s criminal history category was VI, 8

his offense level was 34, and his Guidelines range was 262 to 327

months’ imprisonment followed by two to five years of supervised

release.

The Court sentenced Hill to 300 months’ imprisonment fol-

lowed by five years of supervised release and pronounced that

“[t]he supervised release conditions will be those set out in the

presentence investigation report.” It incorporated the report’s find-

ings into the sentence, and it stated that “[o]n supervised release

[Hill] will be required to comply with the standard and mandatory

8 The Court did agree with Hill that he was not on probation when he com-

mitted the instant offense, which lowered his criminal history score from 21

to 19. However, that did not change that Hill’s criminal history category was

VI as a score of 13 is all that category VI requires.

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10 Opinion of the Court 23-11756

conditions, as well as the specific conditions set out in the presen-

tence investigation report.” When asked if he had any objections,

Hill’s counsel stated, “No, Your Honor. Nothing other than what

was previously stated.” The Court entered a final judgment with

seven items listed under the “Mandatory Conditions” section, thir-

teen listed under the “Standard Conditions of Supervision” section,

and six listed under the “Additional Supervised Release Terms” sec-

tion. The six in the “Additional” section were the six special condi-

tions listed in the PSI. Hill timely appeals.

II.

The ACCA requires any person who violates 18 U.S.C.

§ 922(g) to serve a mandatory minimum prison sentence of fifteen

years when he has three prior convictions for violent felonies or

“serious drug offenses,” or both, that were “committed on occa-

sions different from one another.” 18 U.S.C. § 924(e)(1).

Hill challenges his sentence on multiple grounds: (1) it was

error for the judge, instead of the jury, to decide that Hill’s predi-

cate offenses occurred on different occasions; (2) it was error for

the District Court to find that Hill’s predicate offenses qualified as

serious drug felonies under the ACCA; and (3) it was error for the

District Court to not state all the conditions of Hill’s supervised re-

lease at sentencing. We take each argument in turn.

A.

Hill first argues that it was error for the judge, instead of the

jury, to decide that he had three separate predicate offenses under

the ACCA.

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The Fifth and Sixth Amendments require that a unanimous

jury find beyond a reasonable doubt that the prior convictions were

committed on different occasions for the ACCA enhancement to

apply. Erlinger v. United States, 602 U.S. 821, 834–35, 144 S. Ct. 1840,

1851–52 (2024). The jury must decide the question because it is in-

herently fact intensive and the answer has the effect of increasing

the defendant’s minimum and maximum sentence. Id. But a judge

deciding the question does not amount to a “structural error,” so

we review using a harmless error standard. United States v. Rivers,

134 F.4th 1292, 1305 (11th Cir. 2025). Under harmless error review,

the question is whether it is “clear beyond a reasonable doubt that

a rational jury would have found the defendant guilty absent the

error.” Neder v. United States, 527 U.S. 1, 18, 119 S. Ct. 1827, 1838

(1999).

However, “[i]t is a cardinal rule of appellate review that a

party may not challenge as error a ruling or other trial proceeding

invited by that party.” United States v. Love, 449 F.3d 1154, 1157

(11th Cir. 2006) (internal quotation marks omitted). “The doctrine

of invited error is implicated when a party induces or invites the

district court into making an error,” United States v. Cobb, 842 F.3d

1213, 1222 (11th Cir. 2016), and we cannot review an alleged error

that the party affirmatively encouraged the district court to make.

United States v. Pendergrass, 995 F.3d 858, 881 (11th Cir. 2021).

Though, there is an exception to the invited error doctrine “where

the error invited by a party relied on settled law that changed while

the case was on appeal.” United States v. Duldulao, 87 F.4th 1239,

1255 (11th Cir. 2023) (internal quotation marks omitted). This is

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not a “free-roving change-in-law exception to the rule of invited

error”; it requires “an instructional error . . . flowing directly from

our longstanding and clear precedent and attributable to both par-

ties.” Id. at 1257.

Here, Hill knowingly and voluntarily invited the Court to

decide the different occasions question. During its conversation

with Hill, the Court explained the different occasions requirement

and the implications of the ACCA enhancement. It also explained

that the law in this area was unsettled, that the question would go

to a jury if Hill wanted it to, and that it would go to the sentencing

judge if Hill did not. The Court also gave Hill time to speak with

his standby counsel on the issue. Hill then stated that he “stipu-

late[d]” to the different occasions and that he “[didn’t] want the

jury to decide [it].” Hill was aware of his options and of the effect

that his choice would have, and, with that knowledge, he chose to

have the Court decide the different occasions question.

Further, though the Erlinger Court decided that a jury must

make the different occasions determination while this case was on

appeal, that “change” in the law does not create an exception to the

invited error doctrine. The exception requires a change in settled

law, and the law here, as the District Court told Hill, was unsettled.

The invited error doctrine applies. Hill invited the District Court

to decide the different occasions question, and he cannot argue that

it was error now. 9

9 Within his different occasions argument, Hill claims that his indictment was

insufficient to “inform [him] of any different-occasions allegations.” To the

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B.

Hill next argues that the District Court improperly applied

the ACCA enhancement because the Government did not meet its

burden to prove that the predicate offenses were “serious drug of-

fenses” under the ACCA. He maintains that it is the Government’s

burden to establish that he was subject to the ACCA and that the

Government gave no evidence or argument that the federal and

Florida definitions of cocaine match. He states further that the fed-

eral definition for cocaine includes only two subsets of cocaine’s

stereoisomers—optical isomers and geometric isomers—while

Florida’s definition includes all three stereoisomers—optical iso-

mers, geometric isomers, and nongeometric diastereomers. 10

extent that this does not fall under the invited error doctrine, we find that the

indictment did inform Hill of the allegations. It listed his convictions, along

with their dates; charged that he possessed a firearm “[i]n violation of Title 18,

United States Code, Section[] 924(e),” which is the ACCA; and stated, in the

section entitled “Enhanceable Prior Convictions,” that Hill “had at least three

previous convictions for a violent felony, a serious drug offense, or both, com-

mitted on different occasions from one another.” Further, Hill even acknowl-

edged to the Court that “[s]eparate occasion is what was added” in the super-

seding indictment. He was on notice that different occasions were alleged.

10 “[I]somers are chemical compounds with the same formula but a different

arrangement of atoms in the molecule and different properties. In other

words, they are chemicals made from the same number and type of elements

combined in different ways. Stereoisomers are one set of isomers, those that

differ only in the spatial arrangement of their atoms—all the atoms are linked

in the same order, but each chemical’s 3D shape is slightly different. Stereoi-

somers can be further divided into three categories: optical isomers, geometric

isomers, and nongeometric diastereomers.” Chamu v. U.S. Att’y Gen., 23 F.4th

1325, 1330 (11th Cir. 2022) (internal citations and quotation marks omitted).

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Because Florida’s definition is broader than the federal definition,

Florida cocaine convictions do not necessarily fall under the re-

quirements for the ACCA enhancement. Therefore, the Govern-

ment failed to meet its burden to show that the convictions quali-

fied under the ACCA.

We review de novo whether a prior state conviction quali-

fies as a serious drug offense under the ACCA. Jackson II, 55 F.4th

at 849–50. However, we review unpreserved challenges for plain

error. United States v. Laines, 69 F.4th 1221, 1229 (11th Cir. 2023),

cert. denied, 144 S. Ct. 2611, 219 L. Ed. 2d 1257 (2024). Under plain

error review, the defendant must show “(1) an error; (2) that was

obvious; (3) that affected the defendant’s substantial rights; and (4)

that seriously affected the fairness, integrity, or public reputation

of judicial proceedings.” United States v. Dudley, 5 F.4th 1249, 1255

(11th Cir. 2021).

An issue is unpreserved if the objecting party did not raise

the issue at the district level with enough clarity to make the district

court and the opposing party aware of the specific grounds on

which the objecting party would later seek appellate relief. United

States v. Straub, 508 F.3d 1003, 1011 (11th Cir. 2007). “An issue also

is not preserved when its factual predicates are in the record but

were presented to the district court under a different legal theory.”

United States v. Corbett, 921 F.3d 1032, 1043 (11th Cir. 2019) (internal

quotation marks omitted).

Below, Hill argued that his Florida cocaine convictions did

not qualify as predicate offenses under the ACCA because of

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discrepancies related to the inclusion of ioflupane in the relevant

federal and Florida definitions. Here, he argues that the Govern-

ment failed to meet its burden to show that the ACCA enhance-

ment was warranted because it did not show that the Florida and

federal cocaine definitions match, and he states that the definitions,

in fact, do not match because they include different isomers. These

are different arguments. The first concerns ioflupane and questions

which version of a statute the court is to apply at a given time. The

second concerns isomers and considers what’s required to meet a

burden. Hill did not raise the second issue to the district court

clearly enough to provide notice that he would seek appellate re-

view on that ground. As such, we review the issue now for plain

error. 11

We apply the categorical approach to determine whether a

defendant’s state conviction is a serious drug offense under the

ACCA. Jackson II, 55 F.4th at 850. A state conviction qualifies only

if the state statute under which the conviction occurred defines the

offense in the same way as, or more narrowly than, the ACCA’s

11 Hill did refer to ioflupane in his reply brief on appeal, but, because he did

not raise the argument in his initial brief, we will not consider it. See United

States v. Oakley, 744 F.2d 1553, 1556 (11th Cir. 1984) (“Arguments raised for

the first time in a reply brief are not properly before the reviewing court.”); see

also United States v. Campbell, 26 F.4th 860, 871–72 (11th Cir. 2022) (explaining

that issues not raised in the initial brief on appeal are deemed abandoned and

that this Court does not have to review abandoned issues); Thomas v. Crosby,

371 F.3d 782, 793 (11th Cir. 2004) (Tjoflat, J., concurring) (explaining that

when a petitioner fails to raise an issue on appeal, “the petitioner does not have

the right to demand . . . consideration” of it).

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16 Opinion of the Court 23-11756

definition of a serious drug offense. Id. The Government has the

burden of showing that an enhancement under the ACCA is war-

ranted. United States v. Harris, 941 F.3d 1048, 1051 (11th Cir. 2019).

However, plain error review puts the burden on the defendant to

show that there was an error. Dudley, 5 F.4th at 1255. As such, when

challenging an enhancement on definition grounds under plain er-

ror review, the burden is on the defendant to establish that the state

definition is overbroad compared to the federal one. Laines, 69

F.4th at 1234. To do that, the defendant must show “a realistic

probability, not a theoretical possibility, that the State would apply

its statute to conduct that does not meet the federal standard.”

Chamu v. U.S. Att’y Gen., 23 F.4th 1325, 1330 (11th Cir. 2022).

Where the defendant does not show that, he fails the first prong of

the plain error test and thus loses under plain error review. Laines,

69 F.4th at 1234.

Here, Hill explains that the Florida definition of cocaine in-

cludes nongeometric diastereomers and the federal definition does

not, but he does not show that there actually are nongeometric di-

astereomers of cocaine. He, therefore, does not show that there is

a realistic probability that Florida would apply its statute to con-

duct that would not meet the federal definition. Indeed, this Court

has “seriously doubt[ed]” that there is “any scientific basis” for the

assertion that there exists a “cocaine stereoisomer that falls outside

the federal definition,” Chamu, 23 F.4th at 1332, and there was no

evidence in the record to show as much. We will not hold that

Florida’s law is “broader than its federal counterpart based only on

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the possibility that it might be so.” Id. at 1331. We must have evi-

dence in the record. See id. at 1332.

Hill did not show error here. His argument fails under plain

error review.

C.

Finally, Hill argues that the District Court erred by failing to

orally pronounce at sentencing the thirteen conditions of super-

vised release in the “Standard Conditions of Supervision” section

of his final judgment. 12 He maintains that such error prevented him

from being able to object to the conditions, violating his constitu-

tional rights.

This Court reviews the terms of supervised release for abuse

of discretion, but we review for plain error if the defendant had an

opportunity to object to the terms below and did not do so. United

States v. Hayden, 119 F.4th 832, 837–38 (11th Cir. 2024). Further, we

decide de novo whether the defendant had such opportunity. Id. at

838.

Here, the District Court told Hill at sentencing that the con-

ditions listed in the PSI attached to his supervised release. It asked

Hill if he had any objections, and his counsel stated that he had no

objections beyond what was already stated. He, therefore, had an

opportunity to object to the Court’s failure to specifically describe

12 Hill does not appeal the conditions listed in the “Mandatory Conditions”

section or the “Additional Supervised Release Terms” section of his final judg-

ment.

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18 Opinion of the Court 23-11756

each condition and did not do so. As such, we review for plain er-

ror, see id., which, as above, requires the defendant to show “(1) an

error; (2) that was obvious; (3) that affected the defendant’s sub-

stantial rights; and (4) that seriously affected the fairness, integrity,

or public reputation of judicial proceedings.” Dudley, 5 F.4th at

1255.

A defendant’s due process rights are violated if the court fails

to pronounce his discretionary conditions of supervised release at

sentencing. Hayden, 119 F.4th at 838. But “reference to a written

list of conditions is enough.” Id. “For instance, the court may orally

adopt the conditions of supervised release recommended in the de-

fendant’s [PSI] or in a standing administrative order.” United States

v. Rodriguez, 75 F.4th 1231, 1246 (11th Cir. 2023).

The Court did not do that here. It did twice state that it was

imposing the supervised release conditions recommended in the

PSI, but the thirteen conditions in the “Standard Conditions of Su-

pervision” section of the final judgment were not included in that.

Though the PSI recommended the “standard conditions adopted

for use in the Northern District of Florida,” the Northern District

had not adopted any standard conditions at that time. A PSI recom-

mending non-existent standard conditions is equivalent to it not

recommending any conditions at all. Therefore, the PSI recom-

mended only the six “special conditions” that it specifically listed,

and the Court’s reference to the PSI was a reference to only those

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six conditions. There was no reference to the additional thirteen

conditions that appeared in the final judgment. 13

The Court, therefore, erred by not pronouncing at sentenc-

ing the thirteen discretionary conditions of supervised release that

it imposed in the “Standard Conditions of Supervision” section of

the final judgment. This error was obvious as prior caselaw directly

provided for it. See Hayden, 119 F.4th at 838; see also United States v.

Corbett, 921 F.3d 1032, 1037 (11th Cir. 2019) (“[W]here the explicit

language of a statute or rule does not specifically resolve an issue,

there can be no plain error where there is no precedent from the

Supreme Court or this Court directly resolving it.”). The error af-

fected Hill’s substantial rights, for Hill was denied the opportunity

to be heard on the thirteen discretionary conditions. See United

States v. Rodriguez, 75 F.4th 1231, 1248 (11th Cir. 2023). And the er-

ror affects the fairness, integrity, and public reputation of judicial

13 The Government maintains that the Court did properly reference the thir-

teen conditions because the conditions were listed on www.uscourts.gov,

which was named in the PSI. But the full sentence in the PSI states: “As out-

lined in the Overview of Probation and Supervised Release Conditions (avail-

able at www.uscourts.gov) . . . , it is recommended that any term of supervi-

sion be under the mandatory and standard conditions adopted for use in the

Northern District of Florida.” The structure of this sentence clearly shows that

the PSI recommends the standard conditions adopted by the district. It refer-

ences the website to show that recommending the district’s standard condi-

tions aligns to guidance contained in the Overview of Probation and Super-

vised Release Conditions. It does not actually recommend the conditions that

appear on the website.

USCA11 Case: 23-11756 Document: 75-1 Date Filed: 12/18/2025 Page: 20 of 20

20 Opinion of the Court 23-11756

proceedings. Indeed, the discretionary conditions were imposed

without due process of law. See Hayden, 119 F.4th at 838.

Hill satisfies plain error review with respect to the Court’s

failure to pronounce orally at sentencing the thirteen discretionary

conditions of his supervised release that it later imposed in the

“Standard Conditions of Supervision” section of its final judgment.

We vacate those thirteen conditions and remand for resentencing

as to those conditions.

III.

We affirm the imposition of the ACCA sentencing enhance-

ment. However, we reverse the thirteen discretionary conditions

listed in the “Standard Conditions of Supervision” section in Hill’s

final judgment and remand for resentencing as to those conditions.

AFFIRMED IN PART. REVERSED AND REMANDED IN

PART.