Lujano

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS

ADAM LUJANO, R44373, )

)

Plaintiff, )

)

vs. )

)

JOHN DOE 1, )

CHRISTINE BROWN, ) Case No. 25-cv-386-DWD

LATOYA HUGHES, )

JOHN BARWICK, )

JANE DOE, )

IDOC, )

WEXFORD, )

)

Defendants. )

MEMORANDUM AND ORDER

DUGAN, District Judge:

Plaintiff Adam Lujano, an inmate of the Illinois Department of Corrections (IDOC)

currently detained at Lawrence Correctional Center, brings this civil rights action

pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for alleged deprivations of his constitutional rights at

Pinckneyville Correctional Center (Pinckneyville). (Doc. 22). Plaintiff alleges that the

defendants have violated his rights by failing to provide treatment for chronic back and

leg pain. The Court found Plaintiff’s complaint and amended complaint insufficient to

state a claim, and Plaintiff’s Second Amended Complaint (Doc. 22) is now before the

Court for preliminary review pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915A. Under Section 1915A, the

Court is required to screen prisoner complaints to filter out non-meritorious claims. See

28 U.S.C. § 1915A(a)-(b). Any portion of a complaint that is legally frivolous, malicious,

fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted, or asks for money damages from

a defendant who by law is immune from such relief must be dismissed. 28 U.S.C. §

1915A(b). At this juncture, the factual allegations of the pro se complaint are to be liberally

construed. Rodriguez v. Plymouth Ambulance Serv., 577 F.3d 816, 821 (7th Cir. 2009).

The Complaints

To best understand this Order, it is helpful to have a bit of background information

about Plaintiff’s previous complaints. This lawsuit concerns care that Plaintiff sought at

Pinckneyville Correctional Center from October 5, 2023, through December 13, 2024,

when he was transferred to Lawrence Correctional Center. Plaintiff’s initial complaint

alleged that John Doe 1 (doctor) and Jane Doe (nurse practitioner) denied him adequate

care for his chronic pain at Pinckneyville when they refused to request medical records

from prior institutions and would not give him adequate medication. The Court found

his claims against John Doe 1 and Jane Doe were insufficient as originally pled because

they did no more than suggest a mere disagreement with the treatment offered, and did

not provide enough insight into the quantity and character of interactions Plaintiff had

with the two providers. In the initial complaint, Plaintiff faulted supervisory defendants

Christine Brown (a healthcare administrator), John Barwick (Warden), and Latoya

Hughes (IDOC Director), for failing to address his complaints and written

correspondence to them about his medical needs and the alleged lack of care. The

complaint was accompanied by documents that showed both Hughes and Barwick were

responsive to his queries, and that Plaintiff did receive care during the time period in

question, even if he disputed the sufficiency of care. The Court dismissed the claims

against these supervisory officials because the allegations were insufficient to

demonstrate they failed to diligently investigate the situation.

In the Amended Complaint, Plaintiff again named the same defendants with the

addition of Wexford Health Sources. As to John Doe 1, Plaintiff indicated he was a doctor

who saw Plaintiff only once or twice, and who provide some medical permits but not all

of the care he desired. The Court found that the allegations against John Doe 1 supported

a medical malpractice or negligence claim at best, but not a deliberated indifference claim.

As to Jane Doe, Plaintiff alleged that she did not provide adequate care, but he had very

little detail about how often he saw her, or what specifically he complained of during

visits. The Court dismissed the claim as insufficient. As to Hughes and Barwick, Plaintiff

did not present any new evidence, and the existing evidence from the original and

amended complaints still demonstrated that Hughes and Barwick were responsive to

Plaintiff’s queries even if he did not get the exact outcome he wanted. Plaintiff again

faulted Defendant Brown, a healthcare administrator, for failing to coordinate adequate

care, but his sole evidence was a single letter he submitted to Brown that was vague about

his condition at best. The Court dismissed Brown and indicated if Plaintiff wished to

replead the claim he should endeavor to provide more details about how often he

communicated with Brown, and what he told her. The claim against Wexford was

dismissed because it relied solely on respondeat superior to implicate Wexford for alleged

misdeeds of individual employees.

In the second amended complaint, Plaintiff’s allegations remain largely

unchanged. He submitted random excerpts of his medical records and discussed them

in association with some of his allegations, but they do not add anything significant when

it comes to the actions of the individual defendants. As for John Doe 1, Plaintiff again

argues that the care he provided was inadequate. He faults John Doe 1 for failing to

physically examine him, for failing to reinstate treatments from prior facilities, and for

allegedly disregarding Plaintiff’s complaints of “extreme” pains. (Doc. 22 at 4). As for

Jane Doe, Plaintiff alleges he saw her several times throughout 2024, though he is unsure

of exact dates. He alleges that every time he saw her he told her he was suffering from

pain in his back and legs that was chronic. He claims Jane Doe reviewed his records and

should have seen that he had documentation of chronic pain, but she did not provide

anything that helped with the pain. From September to December of 2024 Plaintiff was

in segregation, which he claims intensified his pain due to a lack of movement, but when

he told Jane Doe about this days before his transfer to another prison, she did not help.

(Doc. 22 at 6).

As to Hughes and Barwick, Plaintiff complains that he wrote them multiple times

but they did not do an adequate job following up on his letters. He complains that after

Hughes sent Barwick a letter in June of 2024, nothing further was done. As to Brown, he

repeats that he wrote her multiple times, with a second letter being sent in November of

2024. This is the letter he attached to his previous complaints. He alleges that in his

letters he informed her of his chronic conditions, and that the over-the-counter

medications he was taking were not helpful. He alleges that Brown never helped him

and never responded to his letters.

Turning to Wexford, Plaintiff alleges that Wexford’s policies and practices violated

prison directives and the contract for medical care, but they did nothing to provide better

care. He alleges “as a result of Wexford’s direct and proximate action and inaction [his]

pains and suffering was exacerbated resulting in physical and emotional injuries. A

Monell claim.” (Doc. 22 at 9). At most he alleges that Wexford had policies and

procedures under which inmates with serious medical conditions were routinely denied

medical care.

In support of the second amended complaint, Plaintiff provided excerpts of his

medical record, as well as copies of some of the letters he sent to Hughes and Brown. The

attached records show that on October 3, 2023, Plaintiff was issued 60 500mg capsules of

acetaminophen. (Doc. 22 at 20). On October 9, 2023, Plaintiff submitted a healthcare

request about his back pain and was recorded as a no-show by security staff. (Doc. 22 at

46). On October 10, 2023, Plaintiff submitted a healthcare request about back pain and

on October 12, 2023, Plaintiff was seen for law back pain. The nurse noted no visible

signs of distress. (Doc. 22 at 44). The nurse noted that Plaintiff wanted treatment for his

pain as well as permits for a low bunk, low gallery, a cane, hearing aids, a knee brace,

and a heel lift. Plaintiff reported that Tylenol and Motrin do not work for his pain, but

that he previously had tramadol. The nurse noted that Robaxin1 would be reviewed.

On October 19, 2023, a note was made that Plaintiff had been seen twice on nurse

sick call for chronic issue, and that he would be seen a third time for the issue. (Doc. 22

1 Robaxin is a muscle relaxer. See Drugs.com, Robaxin, https://www.drugs.com/robaxin.html, last accessed

December 15, 2025.

at 47). On October 20, 2023, a PA note was made indicating that Plaintiff asked for

renewal of his low bunk low gallery permits, but that the reviewer was unable to find

any indication that Plaintiff met the criteria for the permits. (Doc. 22 at 47). On October

20, 2023, Plaintiff submitted a note to healthcare complaining that he is on the upper

gallery and has back and leg issues. (Doc. 22 at 34). On October 21, 2023, Plaintiff’s note

was reviewed and the nurse indicated that the doctor already addressed the issue,

charted permits, and found that he did not meet criteria for some permits. (Doc. 22 at

33). On October 26, 2023, Plaintiff submitted a note about pain and his permits. (Doc. 22

at 51). On October 27, 2023, a medical progress note indicated that Plaintiff’s Robaxin

and permits were to be renewed. (Doc. 22 at 50). On November 17, 2023, he was provided

a medical permit for a knee brace and shoe insert by Dr. Percy Myers. (Doc. 22 at 32).

On June 8, 2024, Plaintiff submitted a request about back pain, but he was not seen

due to line movement. (Doc. 22 at 43). On June 10, 2024, Plaintiff submitted a healthcare

request about back pain, and he was seen the next day and provided with ibuprofen.

(Doc. 22 at 42). In July of 2024, Plaintiff submitted a note to healthcare asking to be seen,

but it was charted the next day that he was not seen due to chow line movement. (Doc.

22 at 35-36). On August 5, 2024, Plaintiff received a referral to physical therapy for his

back and knee pain. (Doc. 22 at 49). On September 25, 2024, he wrote a note about back

pain and was seen the same day and given acetaminophen2. (Doc. 22 at 37-38). On

2 The medical notes indicate Plaintiff was seen for pain and asked for “APAP.” (Doc. 22 at 37). The chart further

indicates APAP was given. A basic internet search reveals that APAP is common shorthand for acetaminophen.

See MedlinePlus, Acetaminophen, https://medlineplus.gov/druginfo/meds/a681004.html, last accessed December

15, 2025.

December 10, 2024, Plaintiff reported chronic knee and back pain at the MD call line.

(Doc. 22 at 40).

Based on the allegations in the Amended Complaint, the Court will again

designate the following claims:

Claim 1: Eighth Amendment deliberate indifference claim against

Defendants John Doe 1 and Jane Doe for failing to prescribe

adequate pain medications;

Claim 2: Eighth Amendment deliberate indifference claim against

Defendants Hughes, Brown and Barwick for failing to

provide adequate responses to Plaintiff’s grievances and

letters about the lack of care for his chronic pain;

Claim 3: Monell claim against Wexford for maintaining a policy or

practice that deprived Plaintiff of effective medication due

to high cost.

The parties and the Court will use these designations in all future pleadings and orders

unless otherwise directed by a judicial officer of this Court. Any claim that is mentioned

in the Complaint but not addressed in this Order is considered dismissed without

prejudice as inadequately pled under Twombly. See Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S.

544, 570 (2007) (an action fails to state a claim upon which relief can be granted if it does

not plead “enough facts to state a claim that is plausible on its face”).

Analysis

An Eighth Amendment claim arising from the denial of medical care consists of

an objective and a subjective component. Berry v. Peterman, 604 F.3d 435, 439–40 (7th Cir.

2010). A plaintiff must show that he suffered from a serious medical condition (i.e., an

objective standard) and also show that each defendant responded with deliberate

indifference (i.e., a subjective standard). Id. To satisfy the subjective component, a

prisoner must demonstrate that an official knew of and disregarded an excessive risk to

inmate health. Greeno v. Daley, 414 F.3d 645, 653 (7th Cir. 2005). Neither medical

malpractice, nor mere disagreement with a doctor’s medical judgment will amount to

deliberate indifference. Id. Additionally, an inmate is not entitled to demand specific

care, and a medical professional may choose from a range of acceptable courses of care.

Walker v. Wexford Health Sources, Inc., 940 F.3d 954, 965 (7th Cir. 2019).

The Court finds that Plaintiff’s Second Amended Complaint is not sufficient to

proceed against any of the named defendants under any theory. As the Court has already

explained twice in this case, Plaintiff’s allegations are very generic in nature and do little

to explain the individual actions each defendant took that allegedly caused him harm.

For example, Plaintiff admitted in his First Amended Complaint that he only saw the

John Doe doctor once or twice. He does nothing significant to enhance his allegations

against John Doe. As the Court indicated in the previous Order (Doc. 18), it appears that

John Doe is Doctor Percy Meyers, and that Meyers provide at least some of the care

Plaintiff sought in the form of permits for a knee brace and heel lifts. An inmate is not

entitled to demand specific care, so to the extent he indicates he told John Doe that he

needed more or different treatment, this is not a theory sufficient to support deliberate

indifference. The Court remains convinced that the facts alleged against John Doe fall

short of the high standard for deliberate indifference, which requires conduct more

severe than negligence or medical malpractice. This is especially so because Plaintiff

alleges he only saw John Doe once or twice.

As to Jane Doe, Plaintiff alleges he saw her a number of times in 2024, though he

cannot explain how many times or even approximately when the visits took place. While

Plaintiff has not submitted all of his medical records, the excerpts strongly suggest he

was receiving responsive care, even if it was not the care he wanted. There were

numerous occasions when he submitted healthcare request slips and he was seen the next

day. In these instances, he was provided acetaminophen, and a prescription for Robaxin.

Against this backdrop, and without more particularized information about the

interactions with Jane Doe, Plaintiff has not substantiated a deliberate indifference claim

against Jane Doe.

The allegations against Hughes, Brown, and Barwick for their roles in responding

to Plaintiff’s healthcare requests remain unchanged from the previous complaints.

Plaintiff has not supplied any new evidence concerning his correspondence with any of

these defendants. For the reasons explained in detail in the Court’s first two Orders

(Docs. 15, 18) reviewing the adequacy of Plaintiff’s pleadings, Plaintiff’s Second

Amended Complaint remains insufficient to state a claim against Hughes, Brown, and

Barwick.

Plaintiff has also attempted to replead his claim against Wexford, but rather than

giving allegations unique to his situation about Wexford’s policies, practices or customs,

his allegations are largely formulaic legalese. Bare conclusory allegations, unadorned by

unique facts, are not sufficient to state a claim. At most, Plaintiff alleges Wexford had

policies and procedures under which they routinely denied inmates with serious medical

conditions care. But the limited records that Plaintiff submitted with his Second

Amended Complaint do not really support this theory. On most of the occasions when

he submitted a request to healthcare, he was seen the next day. He started out with

acetaminophen, but a few months into his stay he was prescribed Robaxin. He received

medical permits for assistive devices about a month into his time at Pinckneyville, and in

August of 2024 (less than a year into his stay at Pinckneyville) he was referred to physical

therapy. Though the care he received may not have been what he specifically desired,

the evidence he provided defeats the notion that he was routinely denied care. Because

Plaintiff’s allegations against Wexford are conclusory, and the limited medical evidence

he submitted does not suggest his needs were ignored, the Court finds he cannot sustain

a policy or practice claim against Wexford.

Finally, Plaintiff named the Illinois Department of Corrections as a defendant in

the second amended complaint, but the department itself is not a person subject to suit

under § 1983. See e.g., Will v. Michigan Dept. of State Police, 491 U.S. 58, 66 (1989) (Section

1983 does not provide a federal forum for litigants who seek a remedy against a state for

alleged deprivations of civil liberties).

In sum, the Court finds that Plaintiff’s second amended complaint is insufficient

to state a claim against any of the named Defendants for deficient medical care he alleges

he received while at Pinckneyville from October 5, 2023, through December 13, 2024.

Though Plaintiff claims that the Defendants refused adequate care or did not act on his

written pleas for assistance, the evidence he has submitted in support of his pleadings

simply does not support these contentions. See e.g. Atkins v. City of Chicago, 631 F.3d 823,

832 (7th Cir. 2011) (a plaintiff can plead himself out of court by submitting facts that

demonstrate he has no claim); Edwards v. Snyder, 478 F.3d 827, 830-31 (7th Cir. 2008) (an

inmate can plead himself out of court by alleging facts or submitting documents that

defeat an essential element of deliberate indifference). While it is clear that Plaintiff

routinely sought care for his chronic pain, there are insufficient allegations to plausibly

suggest deliberate indifference to Plaintiff’s situation by any one defendant. The records

that Plaintiff submitted showed that he received relatively responsive care when he

lodged medical requests, even if it was not the exact care he desired. Inmates cannot

demand specific care, so the frequent and responsive care defeats his assertion of

deliberate indifference. There are also insufficient allegations to suggest a policy or

practice claim against Wexford.

Given that this is now Plaintiff’s third attempt to file a viable pleading, the Court

finds that it is not necessary to afford further opportunities. See e.g. Zimmerman v. Bornick,

25 F.4th 491, 494 (7th Cir. 2022) (amendment would be futile if plaintiff already had

multiple chances to cure deficiencies); Always Towing & Recovery, Inc. v. City of Milwaukee,

2 F.4th 695, 707 (7th Cir. 2021) (courts may deny leave to amend if an amendment would

be futile); McCree v. Grissom, 657 F.3d 623, 624 (7th Cir. 2011) (leave to amend shall be

granted where justice so requires, but leave to amend need not be given if an amendment

to the complaint would be futile). As such, this case is now dismissed for failure to state

a claim under 28 U.S.C. § 1915A. This dismissal shall count as a strike for purposes of 28

U.S.C. § 1915(g).

DISPOSITION

Plaintiff’s Second Amended Complaint (Doc. 22) is DISMISSED with prejudice

for failure to state a claim under 28 U.S.C. § 1915A. The Clerk of Court shall enter

judgment and CLOSE this case.

Plaintiff’s Motion for Leave to Proceed IFP (Doc. 21) is DENIED as MOOT

because he has already been granted IFP status and is already making payments towards

his initial partial filing fee. Deductions from his account will continue until the full $350

fee has been paid.

If Plaintiff wishes to appeal this Order, he must file a notice of appeal with this

Court within thirty days of the entry of judgment. FED. R. APP. P. 4(a)(1)(A). If Plaintiff

chooses to appeal, he will be liable for the $605.00 filing fee irrespective of the outcome

of the appeal. See FED. R. APP. P. 3(e); 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2); Ammons v. Gerlinger, 547 F.3d

724, 725-56 (7th Cir. 2008). Moreover, if the appeal is found to be nonmeritorious, Plaintiff

may incur another “strike” under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(g). A proper and timely motion filed

pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 59(e) may toll the 30-day appeal deadline.

FED. R. APP. P. 4(a)(4). A Rule 59(e) motion must be filed no later than 28 days after the

entry of judgment, and this 28-day deadline cannot be extended.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: December 17, 2025

/s/ David W. Dugan

__________________________

DAVID W. DUGAN

United States District Judge