Baldwin

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

MIDDLE DISTRICT OF FLORIDA

TAMPA DIVISION

LEANDER BALDWIN, JR.,

Petitioner,

v. CASE NO. 8:24-cv-903-JLB-CPT

SECRETARY, DEPARTMENT

OF CORRECTIONS,

Respondent.

____________________________/

ORDER

Before the Court is the pro se 28 U.S.C. § 2254 petition for habeas corpus

relief filed by Leander Baldwin, Jr. (Petitioner). Petitioner is a prisoner of the

Florida Department of Corrections serving an 18-year sentence followed by 18

years on probation for burglary with a battery. (Doc. 1). At the Court’s direction

(Doc. 3), Respondent filed a response (Doc. 8), and Petitioner filed a reply. (Doc.

12). Petitioner subsequently filed an amended reply. (Doc. 19).

Upon careful consideration of the pleadings, the state court record, and the

entire file, the Court concludes that Petitioner is not entitled to federal habeas

corpus relief.1

1 Because the Court was able to resolve the petition on the record, an evidentiary

hearing is not warranted. See Schriro v. Landrigan, 550 U.S. 465, 474 (2007).

I. Background and Procedural History

In the early morning hours on February 2, 2018, Baldwin broke into an 85-

year-old’s home and beat him with a metal bar. (Doc. 9-1 at 660–61). A jury

convicted Petitioner of burglary with a battery. (Doc. 9-1 at 648). The trial court

sentenced Petitioner to 18 years in prison, followed by 18 years of probation. (Doc.

9-1 at 653). Florida’s Second District Court of Appeal (Second DCA) affirmed the

conviction and sentence without a written opinion. (Doc. 9-1 at 704).

Thereafter, Petitioner filed a motion, and subsequently, an amended motion,

for postconviction relief under Rule 3.850 of the Florida Rules of Criminal

Procedure (collectively, Rule 3.850 Motion). (Doc. 9-1 at 706–22, at 731–64).

Petitioner moved to voluntarily dismiss both motions (Doc. 9-1 at 766–68), which

the postconviction court granted. (Doc. 9-1 at 770–71). He then filed a Motion to

Correct an Illegal Sentence pursuant to Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.800

(Doc. 9-1 Ex. 15), which the postconviction court denied. (Doc. 9-1 at 786–876).

The Second DCA affirmed without a written opinion. (Doc. 9-1 at 878–919).

Next, Petitioner filed a Florida state petition for writ of habeas corpus

alleging ineffective assistance of appellate counsel. (Doc. 9-1 at 926–50). The

Second DCA denied the petition without a written opinion. (Doc. 9-1 at 952).

Finally, Petitioner filed another Rule 3.850 motion. (Doc. 9-1 at 954–69).

Following a response by the State (Doc. 9-1 at 1010–1107), the postconviction court

denied the motion. (Doc. 9-1 at 1109–78). The Second DCA affirmed without a

written opinion. (Doc. 9-1, at 1199).

Petitioner provided the instant pro se petition for habeas corpus relief to

prison officials on April 11, 2024. (Doc. 1).2

II. Governing Legal Principles

A. The Antiterrorism Effective Death Penalty Act (AEDPA)

Under the AEDPA, federal habeas relief may not be granted with respect to a

claim adjudicated on the merits in state court unless the adjudication of the claim:

(1) resulted in a decision that was contrary to, or involved an

unreasonable application of, clearly established Federal law, as

determined by the Supreme Court of the United States; or

(2) resulted in a decision that was based on an unreasonable

determination of the facts in light of the evidence presented in the

State court proceeding.

28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1)–(2). In this context, “clearly established federal law”

consists of the governing legal principles, and not the dicta, set forth in the

decisions of the United States Supreme Court at the time the state court issued its

decision. White v. Woodall, 572 U.S. 415, 420 (2014); Carey v. Musladin, 549 U.S.

70, 74 (2006) (citing Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 412 (2000)).

A decision is contrary to clearly established federal law if the state court

either: (1) applied a rule that contradicts the governing law set forth by Supreme

Court case law; or (2) reached a different result from the Supreme Court when

2 Generally, the date of a prisoner’s filing is the date the pro se prisoner delivers his

document to the prison official for mailing. Houston v. Lack, 487 U.S. 266, 275 (1988).

faced with materially indistinguishable facts. Ward v. Hall, 592 F.3d 1144, 1155

(11th Cir. 2010); Mitchell v. Esparza, 540 U.S. 12, 16 (2003). A decision involves an

unreasonable application of clearly established law if the state court correctly

identifies the governing legal principle, but applies it to the facts of the petitioner’s

case in an objectively unreasonable manner, Brown v. Payton, 544 U.S. 133, 134

(2005), or “if the state court either unreasonably extends a legal principle from

[Supreme Court] precedent to a new context where it should not apply or

unreasonably refuses to extend that principle to a new context where it should

apply.” Bottoson v. Moore, 234 F.3d 526, 531 (11th Cir. 2000) (quoting Williams,

529 U.S. at 406).

The section 2254(d) standard is both mandatory and difficult to meet. To

demonstrate entitlement to federal habeas relief, the petitioner must show that the

state court’s ruling was “so lacking in justification that there was an error well

understood and comprehended in existing law beyond any possibility for fairminded

disagreement.” White, 572 U.S. at 420 (quoting Harrington v. Richter, 562 U.S. 86,

103 (2011)). Moreover, when reviewing a claim under section 2254(d), a federal

court must presume that any “determination of a factual issue made by a State

court” is correct, and the petitioner bears “the burden of rebutting the presumption

of correctness by clear and convincing evidence.” 28 U.S.C. § 2254(e).

A state court’s summary rejection of a claim, even without explanation,

qualifies as an adjudication on the merits, warranting deference. Ferguson v.

Culliver, 527 F.3d 1144, 1146 (11th Cir. 2008). Generally, in the case of a silent

affirmance, a federal habeas court will “look through” the unreasoned opinion and

presume that the affirmance rests upon the specific reasons given by the last court

to provide a reasoned opinion. See Ylst v. Nunnemaker, 501 U.S. 797, 806 (1991);

Wilson v. Sellers, 138 S. Ct. 1188, 1192 (2018). However, the presumption that the

appellate court relied on the same reasoning as the lower court can be rebutted “by

evidence of, for instance, an alternative ground that was argued [by the state] or

that is clear in the record” showing an alternative likely basis for the silent

affirmance. Sellers, 138 S. Ct. at 1196.

B. Ineffective Assistance of Counsel

In Strickland v. Washington, the Supreme Court established a two-part test

for determining whether a convicted person is entitled to relief on the ground that

his counsel rendered ineffective assistance. 466 U.S. 668, 687–88 (1984). A

petitioner must establish that counsel’s performance was deficient and fell below an

objective standard of reasonableness and that the deficient performance prejudiced

the defense. Id. A showing on only one prong will not support an ineffective

assistance claim. Id. at 687 (“Unless a defendant makes both showings, it cannot

be said that the conviction . . . resulted from a breakdown in the adversary process

that renders the result unreliable.”).

The focus of inquiry under Strickland’s performance prong is “reasonableness

under prevailing professional norms.” Id. at 688. In reviewing counsel’s

performance, a court must adhere to the presumption that “counsel’s conduct falls

within the wide range of reasonable professional assistance[.]” Id. at 689 (citation

omitted). A court must “judge the reasonableness of counsel’s challenged conduct

on the facts of the particular case, viewed as of the time of counsel’s conduct,”

applying a highly deferential level of judicial scrutiny. Roe v. Flores-Ortega, 528

U.S. 470, 477 (2000) (quoting Strickland, 466 U.S. at 690). Proving Strickland

prejudice “requires showing that counsel’s errors were so serious as to deprive the

defendant of a fair trial, a trial whose result is reliable.” Strickland, 466 U.S. at

687.

III. Discussion

In Ground One, the sole claim presented, Petitioner contends that counsel

was ineffective for failing to investigate and present an insanity defense. (Doc. 1 at

20–25). Under Florida law, insanity, an affirmative defense, is shown when:

(a) The defendant had a mental infirmity, disease or defect; and

(b) Because of this condition, the defendant:

1. Did not know what he or she was doing or its consequences; or

2. Although the defendant knew what he or she was doing and its

consequences, the defendant did not know that what he or she was doing was

wrong.

Mental infirmity, disease, or defect does not constitute a defense of insanity

except as provided in this subsection.

Fla. Stat. § 775.027(1). A defendant presenting this affirmative defense bears the

burden of proving insanity by clear and convincing evidence. Id. § 775.027(2).

Petitioner asserts that counsel knew he had mental health issues. He also

contends that: (1) he told counsel he remembered nothing about what happened

during the burglary, nor why he did it; (2) counsel should have investigated and

identified Petitioner’s “associates” who could have supported an insanity defense;

and (3) counsel should have used information in the police reports to request that

the court appoint an expert to examine Petitioner and determine if he were insane

at the time of the burglary. (Id.).

When raised in Petitioner’s second Rule 3.850 Motion, the

postconviction court summarily rejected this claim as follows:

On August 4, 2022, the Court noted locations in the record

indicating that counsel was aware of Defendant’s mental health issues

and did conduct an investigation into them. However, in an abundance

of caution, the Court directed the State to respond.

The State responded with its position that Defendant’s

motion should be summarily denied because the record refutes his

allegations. First, the State points to a pre-trial hearing where it

notified the Court of jail calls where Defendant discussed the night of

the crime and he stated that he was on drugs and does not remember

what happened. (Exhibit A: Sept. 12, 2018, Hr’g Tr. at pp. 4–5.) At

another pre-trial hearing, Defendant discussed drugs being involved in

his crime by stating, “and about the drugs too” while complaining about

his attorney’s representation. (Ex. B: May 15, 2018, Hr’g Tr. at p. 9.)

The State agrees with Defendant that he likely did “consistently inform

his counsel that he did not remember what happened or why he did

what he did.” However, the State argues, and the Court agrees, that

voluntary intoxication is not a defense to any crime, and that

“[e]vidence of a defendant’s voluntary intoxication is not admissible to

show that the defendant lacked the specific intent to commit an offense

and is not admissible to show that the defendant was insane at the

time of the offense ....” § 775.051, Fla. Stat. The State concludes that

Defendant’s argument that counsel was deficient for failing to

investigate an insanity defense and that he was prejudiced is

disingenuous and disputed by the record. The Court agrees with the

State that the record reflects that drugs, and not insanity, are the

reason Defendant does not remember what happened the night of the

crime.

Additionally, the State agrees with the Court that the record

reflects that counsel was aware of and called attention to possible

mental health issues related to the crime, and that counsel did

investigate an insanity defense. The record reflects that Defendant was

adamant on multiple occasions that he did not want to waive his right

to a speedy trial—despite counsel expressing the need and desire to

further prepare by conducting an investigation and gathering

additional information. (See Ex. C: April 13, 2018 Hr’g Tr. at pp. 3, 7-

10; Ex. B: May 15, 2018 Hr’g Tr. at pp. 3–4, 8, 17–21, 24; Ex. D: May 22,

2018 Hr’g Tr. at pp. 4–5, 7–8, 12–13; Ex. E: May 30, 2018 Hr’g Tr. at pp.

8, 12–17, 20–21.) Counsel ultimately waived speedy over Defendant’s

objection for the purpose of conducting depositions and investigating

Defendant’s potential mental [health] issues. (Ex. E: May 30, 2018 Hr’g

Tr. at pp. 14–16, 20–21.) Because of this, counsel was able to conduct

more than fifteen depositions. (Ex. F. July 9, 2018 Pre-trial Hr’g and

Nelson Hr’g Tr. at p. 6.)

The State also points to additional locations in the record

showing that counsel expressed concerns about Defendant’s mental

health multiple times and took steps to investigate it. (Ex. A: Sept. 12,

2018 Hr’g Tr. at pp. 4–5, 26–27; Ex. C: April 13, 2018 Hr’g Tr. at p. 6;

Ex. B: May 15, 2018 Hr’g Tr. at p. 11; Ex. E: May 30, 2018 Hr’g Tr. at

pp. 9, 11.) Counsel even spoke with Defendant’s mother about

Defendant’s mental health, and expressed that Defendant “does have

some pretty lengthy history.” (Ex. B: May 15, 2018 Hr’g Tr. at p. 11.) At

the second pre-trial conference, counsel requested that Dr. Poorman

evaluate Defendant for competency, and she expressed the need to

gather medical records. (Ex. B: May 15, 2018 Hr’g Tr. at pp. 11, 16.)

The next day, counsel filed a “Motion for Examination to Determine

Competency to Proceed Mental Illness” and asserted that Defendant

was lacking in all six criteria. (Ex. G: May 16, 2018, Motion for

Examination to Determine Competency to Proceed Mental Illness.)

Although Dr. Poorman acknowledged Defendant’s history of mental

health issues, she opined that Defendant was competent to proceed as

to all six criteria. (Ex. E: May 30, 2018 Hr’g Tr. at p. 12.) Thus, the

State argues, and the Court agrees, that although insanity and

competency are not equivalents, the record demonstrates that counsel

did in fact conduct a reasonable investigation into potential mental

health issues in pursuit of mental health defenses or competency

issues. For all of these reasons, the Court finds that counsel was not

deficient, and Defendant did not suffer prejudice.

As to Defendant’s claim that, had counsel conducted a

reasonable investigation, she could have discovered the identities of his

“associates at the time of the events” who would have assisted in

developing a viable insanity defense, the State argues the claim should

fail because it is conclusory. When claiming counsel was ineffective for

failing to call witnesses to testify at trial, a defendant must provide 1)

the identity of each prospective witness, 2) the substance of the witness’

testimony, 3) an explanation about how the omission of the testimony

prejudiced the outcome of the trial, and 4) an assertion that the

witnesses were available to testify. Barthel v. State, 882 So. 2d 1054,

1054–55 (Fla. 2d DCA 2004) (citing Nelson v. State, 875 So. 2d 579,

582–83 (Fla. 2004)). Additionally, the defendant must allege that he

advised counsel of such witnesses. Prieto v. State, 708 So. 2d 647, 649

(Fla. 2d DCA 1998). To establish prejudice, the defendant must show,

based on the circumstances of the case, “that there is a likelihood that

the deficient conduct affected the outcome of the court proceedings.”

Nelson, 875 So. 2d at 583 (quoting Smith v. State, 445 So. 2d 323, 325

(Fla. 1983)).

Defendant’s allegations are conclusory and insufficient to

prove that counsel was deficient and that he was prejudiced. The Court

agrees with the State that Defendant’s allegations are wishes that

counsel had gone on a “fishing expedition” to find unnamed and

unknown “associates.” He does not even explain how these “associates”

could have assisted with an insanity defense, and it is unclear how

Defendant could know that these unknown “associates” could be helpful

for this purpose, given his adamant allegations that he does not even

remember the events of that evening. Vague and conclusory allegations

are insufficient to warrant relief. See Griffin v. State, 866 So. 2d 1, 9

(Fla. 2003) (vague and conclusory allegations are insufficient to meet a

defendant’s burden of establishing a prima facie case based on a legally

valid claim).

(Doc. 9-1 at 1111–13) (emphasis in original). The Second DCA affirmed without a

written opinion. (Doc. 9-1 at 1199).

Petitioner has not shown that the state postconviction court unreasonably

denied his claim. First, Petitioner failed to show that counsel was ineffective for

failing to investigate Petitioner’s “associates” to help establish an insanity defense.

As the state court noted, Petitioner failed to identify his “associates” and explain

how they would have assisted in establishing an insanity defense. To show

prejudice resulting from a missing witness, “the petitioner must name the witness,

demonstrate that the witness was available to testify and would have done so, set

out the content of the witness’s proposed testimony, and show that the testimony

would have been favorable to a particular defense.” Bray v. Quarterman, 265 F.

App’x 296, 298 (5th Cir. 2008). See also United States v. Ashimi, 932 F.2d 643, 650

(7th Cir. 1991) (“[E]vidence about the testimony of a putative witness must

generally be presented in the form of actual testimony by the witness or on

affidavit. A defendant cannot simply state that the testimony would have been

favorable; self-serving speculation will not sustain an ineffective assistance claim.”)

(footnotes omitted); United States v. Porter, 924 F.2d 395, 397 (1st Cir. 1991)

(holding that failure to interview witnesses could not constitute ineffective

assistance without a showing that the investigation would have helped the

defendant). Petitioner named no witnesses who allegedly would have offered

helpful testimony, much less detail their specific testimony in affidavits. Thus,

Petitioner failed to show that he was prejudiced by counsel’s failure to investigate

his “associates” to help establish an insanity defense.

Next, to establish prejudice on his claim that counsel was ineffective in

failing to pursue an insanity defense, Petitioner was required to “show a reasonable

probability that a jury would have found by clear and convincing evidence that he

met the insanity standard at the time of the charged offense [].” Hayes v. Sec’y,

Fla. Dep’t of Corr., 10 F.4th 1203, 1211 (11th Cir. 2021). “Under Florida law, clear

and convincing evidence is ‘evidence that is precise, explicit, lacking in confusion,

and of such weight that it produces a firm belief, without hesitation, about the

matter in issue.’” Id. at 1211–12 (quoting Fla. Std. Jury Instr. (Crim.) 3.6(a)).

Petitioner failed to make the required showing. Petitioner asserted that he

had mental health issues at the time of the offense. But he neither specified what

those issues were nor produced any medical records or other evidence to support

them. Moreover, he neglected to show that he had any mental health issues that

rendered him legally insane at the time of the offense. A mental disease or defect

alone is not enough to establish an insanity defense in Florida. Such a condition

must affect the defendant’s cognition in the manner specified in Fla. Stat. §

775.027(1). See Perez v. State, 306 So. 3d 126, 130 n.1 (Fla. 2d DCA 2018)

(“[M]ental illness that does not result in insanity, as defined by section 775.027,

Florida Statutes (2013), is not a defense.” (citing Chestnut v. State, 538 So. 2d 820

(Fla. 1989))). Petitioner presented no evidence that he had a mental illness, and,

even if he did, he did not submit evidence as to how any mental illness rendered

him unable to distinguish right from wrong, or to know what he was doing and its

consequences.

Petitioner next asserts that his inability to recall the incident and his bizarre

behavior immediately before and after the incident are evidence of his insanity at

the time of the incident. But the state postconviction court found that Petitioner

was unable to recall the incident because he was intoxicated and under the

influence of drugs at that time. The finding that Petitioner was under the

influence of drugs at the time of the offense is supported by the record. (See Doc. 9-

1 at 1117–18, 1131).

And Florida law does not recognize insanity caused by voluntary intoxication.

See Gray v. State, 731 So. 2d 816, 818 (Fla. 5th DCA 1999) (noting that Florida does

not recognize a defense of insanity brought on by the voluntary use of drugs near

the time of the offense). Petitioner’s use of drugs on the day of the offense would

have significantly undercut his argument that his inability to recall the offense and

bizarre behavior proved he was legally insane when he committed the offense.

Finally, Petitioner has never presented an expert opinion stating that he was

legally insane at the time of the offense. Although expert testimony is not required

to create a jury issue regarding insanity in Florida, such testimony would have

been highly beneficial in helping the Petitioner establish an insanity defense. See

Hayes, 10 F.4th at 1212 (“In Florida, competent lay testimony . . . can create a jury

issue as to insanity.” (citing State v. Clark, 745 So.2d 1116, 1117 (Fla. 4th DCA

1999); State v. Van Horn, 528 So.2d 529, 530 (Fla. 2d DCA 1988); Powell v. State,

373 So.2d 73, 74 (Fla. 1st DCA 1979))); Johnson v. Wainwright, 806 F.2d 1479,

1486 (11th Cir. 1986) (noting that “Boykins [v. Wainwright, 737 F.2d 1539, 1544

(11th Cir. 1984)] implicitly acknowledges that insanity is a complex question in

which an expert’s testimony is helpful to the jury.”). See also Hayes, 10 F.4th at

1213 (federal habeas petitioner’s claim that trial counsel rendered ineffective

assistance by withdrawing insanity defense was “weake[ned]” by the absence of an

“expert evaluation or opinion on the issue of sanity.”).

At bottom, Petitioner’s trial counsel indeed investigated Petitioner’s mental

health while preparing for trial. Indeed, there is record evidence showing that

Petitioner has some history of mental health issues, and that he exhibited some

bizarre behavior immediately before, during, and after the burglary with a battery.

But that could have also been attributed to his voluntary intoxication. Either way,

Petitioner’s allegation that his trial counsel failed to investigate any mental health

issues is belied by the record. Even more, Petitioner failed to present any evidence

that would have shown he met Florida’s criteria for insanity because mental

illness, by itself, does not equate to an insanity defense under Florida law. See

Perez, 306 So. 3d at 130 n.1 (“[M]ental illness that does not result in insanity, as

defined by section 775.027, Florida Statutes (2013), is not a defense.”).3

Regardless, Petitioner failed to establish a reasonable probability that the

jury would have found by clear and convincing evidence that he was insane when

he committed the offense. Consequently, the postconviction court did not

unreasonably deny the claim. Kight v. Singletary, 50 F.3d 1539, 1546 (11th Cir.

1995) (“In light of Kight’s denial of complicity in the crime and his failure to come

forward with evidence supporting a claim of insanity, we cannot say that his

counsel was ineffective for failing to pursue an insanity defense.”) (citing Presnell v.

Zant, 959 F.2d 1524, 1533 (11th Cir. 1992)). Petitioner is not entitled to relief on

Ground One.

IV. Conclusion

Based on the foregoing, Petitioner is not entitled to habeas relief.

Accordingly, it is ORDERED that:

1. The 28 U.S.C. § 2254 petition (Doc. 1) filed by Leander Baldwin, Jr. is

DENIED.

2. The Clerk is DIRECTED to enter judgment in favor of Respondent and

3 Indeed, it is instructive that Dr. Poorman found Petitioner competent to stand

trial. Although competency to stand trial is different from the evidence necessary

to establish an insanity defense, Petitioner’s trial counsel engaged Dr. Poorman to

examine Petitioner’s mental health, indicating that Petitioner was not deficient in

the first instance. The record demonstrates that counsel conducted a reasonable

investigation into potential mental health issues in pursuit of mental health

defenses or competency issues. (See Doc. 9-1 at 1111–13).

against Petitioner, deny any pending motions as moot, terminate any deadlines,

and close this case.

Certificate of Appealability*

A prisoner seeking a writ of habeas corpus has no absolute entitlement to

appeal a district court’s denial of his petition. 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c)(1). Rather, a

district court or circuit justice or judge must first issue a certificate of appealability

(COA). “A [COA] may issue...only if the applicant has made a substantial showing

of the denial of a constitutional right.” 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c)(2). To make this

substantial showing, a petitioner “must demonstrate that reasonable jurists would

find the district court’s assessment of the constitutional claims debatable or

wrong, Slack v. McDaniel, 529 U.S. 473, 484 (2000), or that “the issues presented

[are] adequate to deserve encouragement to proceed further.” Miller-El v. Cockrell,

537 U.S. 322, 336 (2008).

Upon consideration of the record, the Court declines to issue a COA. Because

Petitioner is not entitled to a COA, he is not entitled to appeal in forma pauperis.

DONE and ORDERED in Tampa, Florida, on December 16, 2025.

JOHN L. BADALAMENTI

UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

4 Pursuant to Rule 11(a) of the Rules Governing Section 2254 Cases in the United

States District Courts, the “district court must issue or deny a certificate of appealability

when it enters a final order adverse to the applicant.”

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