Martinez

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE

MIDDLE DISTRICT OF TENNESSEE

NASHVILLE DIVISION

DOUGLAS MARTINEZ, )

)

Plaintiff, )

)

v. ) NO. 3:25-cv-00864

)

SHELBY COUNTY, TENNESSEE, et ) JUDGE RICHARDSON

al., )

)

Defendants. )

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER

On July 30, 2025, Plaintiff Douglas Martinez filed a Complaint for Damages and Injunctive

Relief under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (Doc. No. 1) against the following Defendants: Shelby County,

Tennessee; Shelby County District Attorney Steve Mulroy; the Shelby County Public Defender’s

Office and unidentified individual public defenders; unidentified Shelby County Jail officials

(“John Does 1-9 and Jane Does 1-5”), including one “CERT Sergeant” and multiple “Medical

Personnel”; and Wellpath, LLC, the “private medical contractor providing [] healthcare under state

law” at the Shelby County Jail. (Id. at 1–2.) The Complaint and supporting Memorandum (Doc.

No. 2) allege that Plaintiff was deprived of his constitutional rights because of (1) the conditions

of his detention at the Shelby County Jail, and (2) the manner of his prosecution in Shelby County

criminal court. According to the Complaint, the timeframe for these claimed deprivations was

between April and June 2024. (Doc. No. 1 at 1.) Plaintiff was living in Nashville at the time he

hand-delivered the Complaint to the Clerk’s Office for filing on July 30, 2025. (See Doc. No. 1 at

5.)

I. PAUPER STATUS

The Court denied Plaintiff’s initial application for leave to proceed as a pauper without

prejudice to refiling on a Court-provided form. (Doc. No. 10.) Plaintiff used the provided form to

re-apply for pauper status (Doc. No. 11), but the new application contained no financial

information other than Plaintiff’s negative checking account balance, so the Court again denied

pauper status, noting that Plaintiff failed to indicate any expenses associated with the residential

mailing address he provided. (Doc. No. 13 at 2.) As before, this second denial was also without

prejudice to Plaintiff’s ability to reapply on another Court-provided form. (Id. at 2–3.)

Instead of using the provided form to again reapply for pauper status, Plaintiff filed a

Motion that “requests that the Court reconsider its denial” of pauper status (Doc. No. 16) in light

of his showing that he has “[n]o employment [and] no income,” and that the mailing address he

provided––705 Drexel Street in Nashville––is not a residence but “a day center” for Room In The

Inn. (Id. at 2.) Plaintiff confirms that he is “displaced/unhoused.” (Id. at 6.) The internet confirms

that 705 Drexel Street is the address for Room In The Inn, an organization that provides various

services to individuals experiencing homelessness. https://www.roomintheinn.org/ (last visited

Dec. 15, 2025).

Plaintiff’s Motion (Doc. No. 16), to the extent it requests reconsideration of the Court’s

prior denial of pauper status, is GRANTED. The Court is satisfied that he cannot pay the $405

civil filing fee “without undue hardship.” Foster v. Cuyahoga Dep’t of Health and Human Servs.,

21 F. App’x 239, 240 (6th Cir. 2001). Accordingly, Plaintiff is GRANTED pauper status pursuant

to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a).

II. PENDING MOTIONS

Plaintiff has a pending motion “to retain jurisdiction or, in the alternative, to transfer venue

to the Western District of Tennessee” (Doc. No. 3), as well as pending motions for emergency

injunctive relief. (Doc. Nos. 12, 16.)

As to venue, Wellpath, LLC’s “Corporate Headquarters” is in Franklin, Tennessee,

https://wellpathcare.com/ (last visited Dec. 15, 2025), but no other Defendant appears to have any

connection to the Middle District, nor did the events giving rise to Plaintiff’s claims occur here.

“A civil action may be brought in,” e.g., “a judicial district in which any defendant resides, if all

defendants are residents of the State in which the district is located,” or “a judicial district in which

a substantial part of the events or omissions giving rise to the claim occurred[.]” 28 U.S.C.

§ 1391(b). It does not appear that venue is improper in this District, because all Defendants are

residents of Tennessee and Wellpath, LLC is headquartered here. See id. § 1391(c)(2) (“For all

venue purposes[,] . . . an entity with the capacity to sue and be sued in its common name under

applicable law, whether or not incorporated, shall be deemed to reside, if a defendant, in any

judicial district in which such defendant is subject to the court’s personal jurisdiction with respect

to the civil action in question….”); Maxchief Invs. Ltd. v. Plastic Dev. Grp., LLC, No. 3:16-CV-

63, 2016 WL 7209553, at *3 (E.D. Tenn. Dec. 12, 2016) (applying Michigan law of corporations

in the absence of particular law governing jurisdiction over LLCs; finding that “[b]ecause Plastic

Development [Group, LLC] is headquartered in the Eastern District of Michigan, it is subject to

the District Court for the Eastern District of Michigan’s personal jurisdiction, and venue is

therefore proper in the Eastern District of Michigan, see § 1391(c)(2)”); Brown v. Quince Nursing

& Rehab. Ctr., LLC, No. 2:18-CV-2740, 2020 WL 4873670, at *8 (W.D. Tenn. Aug. 19, 2020)

(applying “case law governing corporations” to analysis of personal jurisdiction over LLC––“a

hybrid of partnerships and corporations” under Tennessee law) (citing, e.g., Hatfield v.

Allenbrooke Nursing & Rehab. Ctr., LLC, No. W2017-00957-COA-R3-CV, 2018 WL 3740565,

at *36–44 (Tenn. Ct. App. Aug. 6, 2018)).

However, the Court in its discretion may still transfer the case in the interest of justice and

for the sake of convenience of parties and witnesses under 28 U.S.C. § 1404(a), “a codification of

the doctrine of forum non conveniens.” Atl. Marine Const. Co. v. U.S. Dist. Court for W. Dist. of

Texas, 571 U.S. 49, 60 (2013). Section 1404(a) permits the transfer of this action “to any other

district or division where it might have been brought” if the convenience of parties and witnesses

and the interest of justice would be better served by such transfer. 28 U.S.C. § 1404(a); see Burnett

v. Caruso, No. 10-cv-10749, 2010 WL 1609256, at *1 (E.D. Mich. Apr. 19, 2010). The decision

to transfer an action pursuant to Section 1404(a) lies within the broad discretion of the district

court. Norwood v. Kirkpatrick, 349 U.S. 29, 32 (1955); see K-Tex, LLC v. Cintas Corp., 693 F.

App’x 406, 408 (6th Cir. 2017). “Although a plaintiff’s choice of forum is generally given

deference, that choice may be defeated, especially in cases when the plaintiff has little or no

connection to the chosen forum.” Burnett, 2010 WL 1609256, at *2.

Given that only Plaintiff and one, business-entity Defendant reside in this District, whereas

the other Defendants appear to reside in Shelby County (which is itself a Defendant), within the

Western District of Tennessee1 where all the events recounted in the Complaint occurred, the Court

in its discretion will deny Plaintiff’s Motion to retain jurisdiction over this case and grant Plaintiff’s

alternative Motion to transfer the matter to the Western District. (Doc. No. 3.)

Regardless of venue, Plaintiff’s emergency motions (Doc. Nos. 12, 16) are subject to denial

because, even if they were procedurally compliant under the rules governing TRO motions (which,

1 See 28 U.S.C. § 123(c)(2) (defining the Western District’s Western Division as “compris[ing] the counties

of Fayette, Lauderdale, Shelby, and Tipton”).

under this Court’s Local Rules, they are not),2 they are directed to conduct not mentioned in the

Complaint. See Colvin v. Caruso, 605 F.3d 282, 300 (6th Cir. 2010) (discussing need for a movant

seeking an injunctive order to “establish a relationship between the injury claimed in the party’s

motion and the conduct asserted in the complaint”; finding that “Colvin had no grounds to seek an

injunction pertaining to allegedly impermissible conduct not mentioned in his original

complaint”). The Complaint is concerned with events that occurred while Plaintiff was “detained

at Shelby County Jail in 2024[,]. . . between April and June 2024” (Doc. No. 1 at 1), including

denial of medications and other medical care, detention in a “bedbug cell,” withholding of hygiene

items, grievance forms, religious materials, recreation, nutritious meals, etc. (Id. at 2–3.) Its few

claims that are not directed to the conditions of Plaintiff’s 2024 confinement in the Shelby County

Jail are related to court proceedings against him during the period of that confinement. (See id. at

3 (claiming that Plaintiff was “coerced” into accepting representation by the public defender’s

office and pleading guilty, but his attorney was powerless to challenge jail conditions and her

ineffectiveness “unconstitutionally prolong[ed] his incarceration”).

Plaintiff’s emergency motions, on the other hand, seek to “protect witnesses and evidence”

during the litigation of this case “and related federal claims under 42 U.S.C. §§ 1981, 1983, 1985,

and 1986” (Doc. No. 12 at 2); “to prevent arrest, extradition, retaliatory detention, and obstruction

of justice” that Plaintiff fears may follow from his planned filing of a challenge to the application

of Tennessee’s sex offender registry law (id. at 4); and to remove barriers to his treatment at area

2 “Each motion for a TRO must be accompanied by a separately filed affidavit or verified written complaint,

a memorandum of law, and a proposed order,” and by written certification of “efforts made to give notice

of the request for a TRO and the reasons why notice should not be required.” M.D. Tenn. L.R. 65.01(b),

(c). Although Plaintiff’s emergency motions (which explicitly seek issuance of a TRO) contain verification

language, the Complaint is not verified, nor are the emergency motions (Doc. Nos. 12, 16) supported by

any separately filed affidavit or certification of reasons why notice to Defendants should not be required.

Indeed, the motions indicate that they were served upon Defendants or their counsel. (Doc. No. 12 at 7;

Doc. No. 16 at 18.)

hospitals for lumbar spinal stenosis that has “now progressed to Cauda Equina Syndrome.” (Doc.

No. 16 at 10.) “Neither a preliminary injunction nor a TRO are appropriate when the movant, as

here, seeks intermediate relief beyond the claims of the complaint.” Truitt v. Bear, No. CIV-19-

581-F, 2019 WL 6833722, at *2 (W.D. Okla. Nov. 20, 2019), report and recommendation adopted,

2019 WL 6829961 (W.D. Okla. Dec. 13, 2019) (citing cases); see also, e.g., Lemay v. Correct

Care Sols., No. 3:19-CV-00683, 2020 WL 4475425, at *6 (M.D. Tenn. Aug. 4, 2020) (denying

motion for injunctive relief because “the bases for [plaintiff’s] Motion for TRO are not related to

the allegations in his Amended Complaint”). These Motions for emergency injunctive relief must

therefore be denied.

III. CONCLUSION

To summarize:

(1) Plaintiff is GRANTED leave to proceed as a pauper.

(2) Plaintiff’s Motion concerning venue (Doc. No. 3) is GRANTED in part and DENIED

in part. The Court DENIES the Motion to the extent that it asks the Court to retain jurisdiction

over this case and GRANTS the Motion to the extent that it alternatively requests that the case be

transferred to the Western District of Tennessee.

(3) Plaintiff’s Consolidated Motion for Emergency Relief, Electronic Filing Access, and

Protective Order (Doc. No. 12) is DENIED. His Motion Responding to Denial of IFP, Urgent

TRO Request, Motion to Reconsider Denial of In Forma Pauperis, and Immediate Hearing on

Emergency Injunctive Relief (Doc. No. 16) is GRANTED to the extent it requests reconsideration

of the Court’s prior denial of pauper status and otherwise DENIED.

(4) The Clerk shall TRANSFER this action to the United States District Court for the

Western District of Tennessee, Western Division. This Court’s file in this matter is closed.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

ELI RICHARDSON

UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE