Hymas

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

EASTERN DISTRICT OF TENNESSEE

KNOXVILLE DIVISION

JAY HYMAS, )

)

Plaintiff, ) 3:23-CV-00336-DCLC-JEM

)

v. )

)

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF )

STATE and UNITED STATES )

DEPARTMENT OF TREASURY, )

Defendants.

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER

Proceeding pro se, Plaintiff brings several claims against Defendants arising from the

Government’s denial of his passport after he failed to pay a debt incurred for an emergency

evacuation flight in March 2020. Defendants moved to dismiss for failure to state a claim under

Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6) [Doc. 34]. Plaintiff failed to respond by his May 9, 2025 deadline.

Plaintiff has also filed a Third Motion for Injunctive Relief [Doc. 33], Motion for Contempt of

Court and Sanctions [Doc. 46], and Second Motion for Recusal [Doc. 48]. The Government

responded in opposition to all three [Docs. 37, 47, 49].

Because the U.S. Department of Treasury is not a proper defendant and Plaintiff otherwise

fails to state a claim upon which relief can be granted, Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss is

GRANTED. Accordingly, Plaintiff’s Third Motion for Injunctive Relief is DENIED AS MOOT.

And because Plaintiff has presented no factual basis to support either motion, Plaintiff’s Motion

for Contempt of Court and Sanctions and Second Motion for Recusal are DENIED.

I. BACKGROUND

In early March 2020, Plaintiff was in South America when the spread of COVID-19 led to

the cancellation of his commercial return flight to the United States. [Doc. 1, pg. 5]. Plaintiff

contacted the U.S. Embassy and, through the U.S. Department of State, scheduled an evacuation

flight for March 27, 2020. [Id.]. Before he boarded this flight, Plaintiff completed and signed a

State Department “Evacuee Manifest and Promissory Note” Form DS-5528. [Id.]. Box 89 of this

form states that:

I understand that:

(a) I will be billed for the cost of my/our transportation no greater than the

amount of a full-fare economy flight, or comparable alternative

transportation, to the designated destination(s) that would have been

charged immediately prior to the events giving rise to the evacuation.

(b) My obligation to repay my loan will not be considered paid in full until

it clears through the account of the Treasurer of the United States.

(c) Until I have paid my loan in full, I and all listed U.S. citizen family

members will only be eligible for a limited validity U.S. passport.

(d) If my loan is in default, I and all listed U.S. citizen family members will

not be eligible for a limited validity U.S. passports.

(e) My loan will be subject to interest, penalties, and other charges for late

payment as directed by law and regulation.

(f) I will be liable to pay any costs for collection.

[Doc. 35-1, pg. 2].

Approximately six months later, Plaintiff received a bill via mail for the flight “for

something like $1,600.” [Doc. 1, pg. 5]. Plaintiff mailed back a response disputing the amount as

greater than a full-fare economy flight, and the Government did not reply. [Id.]. When he attempted

to renew his passport and passport card on August 9, 2023, he was informed that they would not

be issued as there was a hold due to a $2,500 debt with the Treasury that originated from the State

Department. [Id., pgs. 5-6]. Plaintiff attempted to contact both the Treasury Department and State

Department numerous times to dispute the debt, to no avail. [Id.].

Plaintiff filed suit against both the Treasury Department and State Department, bringing

claims for extortion, violation of his constitutional right of his “liberty to travel,” violation of his

constitutional right to due process, and violation of the Administrative Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C. §

551 et seq. [Id., pgs. 4-5]. These motions followed.

II. LEGAL STANDARD

Under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) a party can move to dismiss a complaint

for “failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted.” In considering a motion to dismiss,

the court must construe the allegations in the complaint in the light most favorable to the plaintiff

and accept all factual allegations as true. Meador v. Cabinet for Human Res., 902 F.2d 474, 475

(6th Cir. 1990). “To survive a motion to dismiss, a complaint must contain factual matter, accepted

as true, to ‘state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.’” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678

(2009) (quoting Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007)). “A claim has facial

plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable

inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Id. Factual allegations “must do

more than create speculation or suspicion of a legally cognizable cause of action; they must show

entitlement to relief.” Lambert v. Hartman, 517 F.3d 433, 439 (6th Cir. 2008) (quoting League of

United Latin Am. Citizens v. Bredesen, 500 F.3d 523, 527 (6th Cir. 2007)), and dismissal is

appropriate “if it is clear that no relief could be granted under any set of facts that could be proved

consistent with the allegations.” Hishon v. King & Spalding, 467 U.S. 69, 73 (1984).

III. ANALYSIS

A. Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss [Doc. 34]

Defendants move to dismiss each of Plaintiff’s four causes of action individually and also

seek dismissal of all claims against the U.S. Department of the Treasury on the ground that it is

not a proper party. The Court will address the Treasury issue first, followed by Plaintiff’s individual

claims.

i. Claims Against the U.S. Department of Treasury

Defendants argue that the Treasury Department is an improper party because its role is

limited to collecting or offsetting debts owed to the State Department. Under 31 U.S.C. § 3711(g),

federal agencies are required to transfer debts delinquent for over 180 days to the Treasury

Department for collection. 31 U.S.C. § 3711(g); see also 22 C.F.R. § 34.8(b)(7)(i) (stating that if

the debtor fails to pay or resolve a debt owed to the State Department, it may enforce collection

through a Treasury offset). Once a creditor agency certifies that a debt is eligible for collection

and that all due process protections have been met, the Treasury’s obligation to collect the debt is

mandatory. Samuels v. Fed. Emergency Mgmt. Agency & U.S. Dep't of Treasury, No.

222CV01088CASJCX, 2023 WL 4850734, at *9 (C.D. Cal. July 24, 2023).

It is the routine practice of federal courts to dismiss claims against the Treasury Department

when its only role is collecting debts owed to other federal agencies. See e.g., id.; Chambers v.

Berryhill, No. 3:19-CV-1062-K-BH, 2020 WL 5099829, at *11 (N.D. Tex. Aug. 12, 2020), report

and recommendation adopted sub nom. Chambers v. Soc. Sec., Admin., No. 3:19-CV-1062-K-BH,

2020 WL 5094684 (N.D. Tex. Aug. 29, 2020); cf. Phillips v. Social Sec. Admin., No. 1:18-CV-

324, 2019 WL 1438296, at *4 (N.D. Ind. Mar. 29, 2019) (dismissing claims against the Social

Security Administration when it was not the agency the plaintiff owed a debt to).

The Treasury Department has “no statutory authority over the debt, nor any role in

determining whether or not the debt was valid.” Johnson v. U.S. Dep’t of Treasury, 300 F. App’x

860, 862 (11th Cir. 2008). “If a plaintiff disputes the outstanding debt, he must proceed against the

agency to which he owes the debt.” Chambers, 2020 WL 5099829 at *11. This is because the

obligation to provide due process rests with the creditor agency, not the agency tasked with

disbursing or collecting funds. Johnson, 300 F. App’x at 862–63.

Plaintiff may pursue his claims, if at all, only against the State Department, to which the

debt is owed. Because relief against the Treasury Department would be improper, all claims

against it are DISMISSED WITHOUT PREJUDICE.

ii. Extortion

Plaintiff’s first cause of action is for extortion. He alleges that Defendants are attempting

“to extort over $2,500 for something that should have been around $150” and are refusing to issue

him a passport as “an unforgiving ‘incentive’” to compel payment. [Doc. 1, pg. 5]. Plaintiff has

not cited to any federal or state law under which this cause of action arises.

Extortion is a crime offense, and federal courts have consistently held that the federal

extortion statutes do not create a private cause of action. See Eliahu v. Jewish Agency for Israel,

919 F.3d 709, 713 (2d Cir. 2019) (“With respect to the extortion claim, Plaintiffs have not

identified a private cause of action under either federal or state law, and the Court is not aware of

one.”); Hopson v. Shakes, No. 3:12CV-722-M, 2013 WL 1703862, at *2 (W.D. Ky. Apr. 19, 2013)

(finding no private cause of action for extortion under the Hobbs Act); Abcarian v. Levine, 972

F.3d 1019, 1026 (9th Cir. 2020) (same). The Sixth Circuit has likewise recognized that, absent

express congressional authorization, criminal statutes do not give rise to private civil claims. Am.

Postal Workers Union v. Indep. Postal Sys. Of Am., Inc., 481 F.2d 90, 93 (6th Cir. 1973) (listing

the limited circumstances in which private actions are allowed under criminal statutes). As there

is no federal statute creating a private civil cause of action for extortion, this claim is DISMISSED

WITHOUT PREJUDICE.

iii. Substantive Due Process Violation

Plaintiff’s second cause of action alleges a violation of his constitutional right to travel

based on the denial of both a passport and passport card [Doc. 1, pg. 4]. The State Department has

authority to refuse to issue a passport when an applicant has failed to repay emergency evacuation

expenses. 22 C.F.R. § 51.60(c). The Court will evaluate Plaintiff’s claim under a rational basis

review.

Although the freedom to travel internationally is protected under the Due Process Clause

of the Fifth Amendment, it is not a fundamental right equivalent to the right to interstate travel and

is subject to reasonable governmental regulation. Haig v. Agee, 453 U.S. 280, 306 (1981). Courts

consistently apply rational basis review to restrictions upon international travel. Weinstein v.

Albright, 261 F.3d 127, 140 (2d Cir. 2001); Eunique v. Powell, 302 F.3d 971, 974 (9th Cir. 2002).

Under this deferential standard, government action will be upheld so long as it is rationally related

to a legitimate governmental interest. Doe v. Michigan Dep’t of State Police, 490 F.3d 491, 501

(6th Cir. 2007).

Rational basis review “epitomizes a light judicial touch,” Tiwari v. Friedlander, 26 F.4th

355, 361 (6th Cir. 2022), and statutes fail under this standard “only in rare or exceptional

circumstances.” Am. Exp. Travel Related Servs. Co. v. Kentucky, 641 F.3d 685, 689 (6th Cir.

2011). A plaintiff must negate every conceivable basis that might support the government’s action,

and if any plausible justification exists, the action survives constitutional scrutiny. Id. at 690

(citing Lehnhausen v. Lake Shore Auto Parts Co., 410 U.S. 356, 364 (1973)).

Though other courts have not yet contemplated a substantive due process challenge to the

State Department’s denial of passports due to unpaid evacuation flight fees, courts have upheld,

on rational basis review, passport denials for similar reasons, such as delinquent tax debts and

unpaid child support. See, e.g., Franklin v. United States, 49 F.4th 429, 432 (5th Cir. 2022)

(upholding a passport-revocation scheme for those with delinquent tax debts); Maehr v. United

States Dep’t of State, 5 F.4th 1100, 1122 (10th Cir. 2021) (same, under intermediate scrutiny);

Eunique v. Powell, 302 F.3d 971, 975 (9th Cir. 2002) (upholding a similar passport-revocation

scheme for unpaid child support). In those cases, courts emphasized the government’s legitimate

interest in collecting debts owed to it and the rational use of denying a debtor a passport as an

incentive for repayment. Franklin, 49 F.4th at 438.

The same reasoning applies here. The government has a legitimate interest in recovering

the costs of emergency evacuation flights. This interest is disclosed in advance: before boarding,

passengers execute Form DS-5528, acknowledging their obligation to repay the cost of the flight

and the consequence that failure to do so may result in not being eligible to receive a passport.

Denying a passport to individuals who have not repaid the debt is rationally related to the

government’s interest in recoupment, as it provides a clear incentive for repayment. Because

Defendant’s actions are rationally related to a legitimate governmental interest, they satisfy

substantive due process. Therefore, Plaintiff’s second cause of action is DISMISSED

WITHOUT PREJUDICE.

iv. Procedural Due Process Violation

Plaintiff’s third cause of action alleges that Defendants violated his procedural due process

rights when they failed to hold a hearing prior to denying his passport. Due process “provides that

certain substantive rights—life, liberty, and property—cannot be deprived except pursuant to

constitutionally adequate procedures.” Cleveland Bd. of Educ. v. Loudermill, 470 U.S. 532, 541,

(1985). To prevail on a procedural due process violation, a plaintiff must: (1) identify a protected

liberty or property interest; and (2) demonstrate deprivation of that interest without due process of

law. See Reed v. Goertz, 598 U.S. 230, 236 (2023). The right to international travel is a protected

liberty interest. See Haig v. Agee, 453 U.S. 280, 306 (1981). But Plaintiff fails to demonstrate

that the deprivation of his freedom to travel internationally was done without due process. He

argues that Defendants’ pre-revocation procedures were insufficient because Defendants did not

provide a hearing before denying his passport. [Doc. 1, pg. 4-5 (stating the Constitution requires

“due-process BEFORE depriving a liberty”)].

In many circumstances a pre-revocation hearing is required, but the Due Process Clause

does not require the government provide the same procedural protections for every deprivation of

a property or liberty interest. See Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 334 (1976) (“[D]ue process

is flexible and calls for such procedural protections as the particular situation demands.”) (internal

quotation marks omitted, alteration in original). And the Supreme Court has directly stated that

“the Government is not required to hold a prerevocation hearing” when revoking a citizen’s

passport. Haig v. Agee, 453 U.S. 280, 309 (1981). Rather, the due process required is “a statement

of reasons and an opportunity for a prompt postrevocation hearing.” Id. at 310; see Hadwan v.

United States Dep’t. of State, 139 F.4th 209, 225-26 (2d Cir. 2025) (“The State Department can

formally revoke CRBAs or passports before providing a hearing, and it need only provide notice

of the formal revocation,” and “an ex post hearing.”). There is nothing unconstitutional in the

State Department’s actions in denying Plaintiff’s passport application without holding a hearing

before doing so. Thus, this claim is DISMISSED WITHOUT PREJUDICE.

v. Violation of State Department Regulations and the APA

Plaintiff’s fourth cause of action alleges that the State Department violated the

Administrative Procedures Act (“APA”) by denying his passport in contravention of its own

regulations and by acting in an arbitrary and capricious manner [Doc. 1, pg. 5]. He asserts that

passport denials apply only to loans issued under the Repatriation Loan Program (“RLP”) and not

to evacuation flights, and that passport cards may be denied only to sex offenders—not evacuees.

[Id.]. Defendants argue that the agency action at issue here was merely a hold placed on the

issuance of Plaintiff’s passport and that this is not a final agency action subject to judicial review.

They further contend that the cause of action fails as a matter of law.

The Court need not consider whether the State Department’s actions constitute final agency

action because Plaintiff’s claims fail on the merits. Under the APA, a court may set aside agency

action if it is “arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of discretion, or otherwise not in accordance with

law.” 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(A).

Here, the State Department acted squarely within its regulatory authority. Under 22 C.F.R.

§ 51.60(c)(2),1 the State Department may refuse to issue a passport2 to an applicant who has not

repaid a loan issued under 22 U.S.C. 2671(b)(2)(A) for the evacuation of the applicant. 22 C.F.R.

§ 51.60(c)(2). Plaintiff was evacuated pursuant to 22 U.S.C. 2671(b)(2)(A) and has not repaid the

government for the cost of his flight. Before boarding, he executed Form DS-5528, the Evacuee

Manifest and Promissory Note, which expressly provides that if the loan is in default, the

individual “will not be eligible for a . . . U.S. passport[].” [Doc. 35-1, pg. 2]. Thus, the regulation

1 Under 22 U.S.C. § 211a, the State Department is granted the authority to issue passports

“under such rules as the President shall designate and prescribe.” 22 U.S.C. § 211a. The President

has delegated authority to prescribe rules governing passports to the Secretary of State. See Exec.

Order No. 11295, 31 Fed. Reg. 10603 (Aug. 5, 1966). These rules are outlined in part in 22 C.F.R.

§ 51.60.

2 The term ‘passport’ means “a travel document regardless of format issued under the

authority of the Secretary of State attesting to the identity and nationality of the bearer.” 22 C.F.R.

§ 51.1. This definition encompasses both traditional passport books and passport cards. Though

Plaintiff argues that passport cards can only be denied to sex offenders, this definition confirms

that the State Department may deny both passport books and passport cards under 22 C.F.R. §

51.60(c)(2).

and Plaintiff’s own written agreement establish that the denial of his passport application was

warranted under these circumstances and was not arbitrary or capricious.

While the Complaint only raises an APA cause of action with regards to the Defendant’s

denial of Plaintiff’s passport, Plaintiff also appears to assert a second APA theory regarding the

amount the agency billed him for the evacuation flight. He contends that “the State Department

breached its own contract with Plaintiff by initially seeking approximately $1,600 for what should

have been something closer to $150 as the signed ‘contract.’” [Doc. 1, pg. 2]. Plaintiff contends

the cost should be limited to “reimbursement … for an ‘economy fare.’” [Id. at 5]. Upon a liberal

construction of his pleadings,3 Plaintiff appears to allege that the State Department’s determination

of the amount owed was arbitrary and capricious.

An agency decision is arbitrary and capricious “if the agency has relied on factors which

Congress has not intended it to consider, entirely failed to consider an important aspect of the

problem, offered an explanation for its decision that runs counter to the evidence before the agency,

or” issued a decision that “is so implausible that it could not be ascribed to a difference in view or

the product of agency expertise.” Motor Vehicle Mfrs. Ass'n of the U.S. v. State Farm Mut. Auto.

Ins. Co., 463 U.S. 29, 43 (1983). On review of agency factfinding, judicial review is limited to

the administrative record, see 5 U.S.C. § 706, and the burden is on plaintiffs to prove the particular

manner in which the Service's actions are arbitrary and capricious. City of Olmsted Falls, Ohio v.

FAA, 292 F.3d 261, 271 (D.C. Cir. 2002). Plaintiff has not provided any specific factual

allegations to support his claim other than his personal opinion that $1,600 is more than what an

3 Pro se pleadings must be liberally construed. Bassett v. Nat'l Collegiate Athletic Ass'n, 528

F.3d 426, 437 (6th Cir. 2008); see also Franklin v. Rose, 765 F.2d 82, 85 (6th Cir. 1985) (“[t]he

appropriate liberal construction requires active interpretation in some cases to construe a pro se

petition to encompass any allegation stating federal relief”) (internal quotation marks and citations

omitted).

economy fare would cost. [Doc. 1, pg. 5]. This is insufficient to support an arbitrary and capricious

claim.

As a result, Plaintiff’s APA claims fail as a matter of law and are DISMISSED

WITHOUT PREJUDICE.

B. Third Motion for Injunctive Relief [Doc. 33]

Because the Court has determined that Plaintiff has failed to state a claim for which relief

can be granted, Plaintiff’s motion for injunctive relief is DENIED AS MOOT.

C. Motion for Contempt of Court and Sanctions [Doc. 46]

Plaintiff moves for sanctions against Defendants’ current and former counsel on two

grounds: first, the Court ordered the parties to confer before filing any motions to dismiss and to

complete the magistrate jurisdiction form, and, after failing to confer, Defendants filed a motion

to dismiss; and second, Defendants’ counsel filed or knowingly allowed to be filed documents

containing false information that the parties had conferred. As the Defendants demonstrate in the

exhibits to their response to this motion [Doc. 47], counsel properly conferred with Plaintiff on the

topics ordered by the Court, and neither ground cited by Plaintiff supports sanctions.

On March 14, 2025, the Court ordered the parties to confer and to return the magistrate

judge jurisdiction consent form. Plaintiff had previously stated that he did not consent to magistrate

judge jurisdiction. See Notice of Violations of Court Rules [Doc. 15 at 1] (“Plaintiff has not nor

does he give consent to the use of a magistrate judge in this matter.”). Following the Court’s order,

Defendants made multiple attempts to confirm Plaintiff’s position. [Doc. 47-1 at pgs. 13, 16, 18].

In one response, Plaintiff stated that he would not consent to magistrate judge jurisdiction if

Defendants maintained that the approximately $1,500 evacuation charge was legitimate. [Id. at

16]. Defendants subsequently advised that they believed the charge was supported by evidence

and confirmed that the parties did not agree on magistrate judge jurisdiction. [Id. at 13]. Plaintiff

contends that Defendants falsely represented his position to the Court. The record shows otherwise.

Plaintiff clearly expressed his non-consent, and the Notice of Non-Consent filed by Defendants

accurately reflected that position.

Defendants also conferred on all relevant issues and causes of action in the case prior to

filing the motion to dismiss. The Court ordered the parties to confer to determine whether a motion

to dismiss could be avoided by an amended complaint. [Doc. 3]. On February 21, 2025,

Defendants emailed Plaintiff, informing them of their position on each of his causes of action and

stating that Plaintiff could potentially avoid a motion to dismiss on his fourth claim through an

amended complaint. [Doc. 34-1, pgs. 10-11]. After some back and forth on the relevant laws on

passports, Plaintiff replied, “Very well, understood regarding my claims.” [Id., pg. 1]. Defendants

filed their motion to dismiss on March 13, 2025. [Doc. 34].

Because the record establishes that Defendants complied with the Court’s orders and

Plaintiff has identified no factual basis for sanctions, Plaintiff’s motion is DENIED.

D. Second Motion for Recusal [Doc. 48]

Plaintiff’s second motion for recusal largely reiterates the same grounds for recusal raised

in his first motion—that the Court has not ruled on his motions at the speed he desires. In addition,

Plaintiff now suggests that the undersigned was necessarily biased in ruling on the first motion for

recusal.

As the Court previously explained, “[r]ecusal is mandated . . . only if a reasonable person

with knowledge of all the facts would conclude that the judge’s impartiality might reasonably be

questioned.” Easley v. Univ. of Michigan Bd. of Regents, 853 F.2d 1351, 1356 (6th Cir. 1988)

(citations omitted). Put differently, the facts must “be such as would ‘convince a reasonable man

that a bias exists.’” United States v. Story, 716 F.2d 1088, 1090 (6th Cir. 1983) (quoting United

States v. Thompson, 483 F.2d 527, 528 (3d Cir. 1973)). “A bias sufficient to justify recusal must be

a personal bias ‘as distinguished from a judicial one,’ arising ‘out of the judge’s background and

association’ and not from the ‘judge’s view of the law.’” Id. (quoting Oliver v. Michigan State Bd.

of Ed., 508 F.2d 178, 180 (6th Cir. 1974)).

Further, “[d]elay is not a basis for recusal.” Clinton v. Harrison, No. 2:24-cv-02171, 2025

WL 44145, at *2 (W.D. Tenn. Jan. 7, 2025); see also Qualls v. United States, No. 07-CR-14 (DLI),

2018 WL 1513625 (E.D.N.Y. Mar. 27, 2018) (“Delays in entering judgment or rendering a decision

are not bases for recusal.”). Plaintiff has not explained how the perceived delay in ruling on his

motions demonstrates bias, particularly as Plaintiff’s own failure to properly serve the Defendants

caused a majority of the delay in this case, see Doc. 28 (noting Plaintiff failed to properly serve

the Defendants in February 2025 when his Complaint was filed in September 2023), and the Court

has twice denied his earlier motions for injunctive relief. [Docs. 7, 28].

Moreover, it was proper for the undersigned to rule on the first motion for recusal. The

Sixth Circuit has cautioned that “[t]here is as much obligation upon a judge not to recuse himself

when there is no occasion as there is for him to do so when there is.” Easley, 853 F.2d at 1356

(alteration in original) (citation omitted). “Although a trial judge faced with a section 455(a)

recusal motion may, in her discretion, leave the motion to a different judge, no reported case or

accepted principle of law compels h[im] to do so.” In re United States (Lorenzo Munoz Franco, et

al.), 158 F.3d 26, 34 (1st Cir. 1998) (internal citations omitted); see also Honorable Ord. of

Kentucky Colonels, Inc. v. Kentucky Colonels Int'l, No. 3:20-CV-132-RGJ, 2025 WL 1117428

(W.D. Ky. Apr. 15, 2025) (“It is proper for the challenged judge to rule on the motion for recusal

to determine whether it is legally sufficient.”). Thus, the Court finds the allegations do not support

recusal and this motion is DENIED.

IV. CONCLUSION

For the reasons stated herein, Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss [Doc. 34] is GRANTED.

Plaintiff’s Third Motion for Injunctive Relief [Doc. 33], Motion for Contempt of Court and

Sanctions [Doc. 46], and Second Motion for Recusal [Doc. 48] are DENIED.

A separate judgment shall enter.

SO ORDERED:

s/ Clifton L. Corker

United States District Judge