Opinion

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SO ORDERED. . ae □□

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SIGNED December 16, 2025. SP ESS

IsTRICT OFS

whe

W. KOLWE

ED STATES BANKRUPTCY JUDGE

UNITED STATES BANKRUPTCY COURT

WESTERN DISTRICT OF LOUISIANA

LAFAYETTE DIVISON

IN RE:

BELL FAMILY TRUST CASE NO. 02-50477

Chapter 7

Debtor

BELL FAMILY TRUST, THROUGH

W. SIMMONS SANDOZ, TRUSTEE,

Plaintiff ADVERSARY PROCEEDING

NO. 02-5045

VERSUS

MARY SUE BELL, SUE BELL

HOLDINGS, L.L.C., and AMERADA

HESS CORPORATION,

Defendants

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER

In the latest chapter of a long running saga, on July 28, 2025, the Plaintiff, the

Bell Family Trust (the “Trust”), filed two motions—a Motion to Reopen Adversary

Case and a Motion to Revive—aimed at reviving an August 1, 2005, Judgment (the

“2005 Judgment”) against Mary Susan Bell (“Ms. Bell”). The Court granted both

motions on August 5, 2025.1

On September 9, 2025, Ms. Bell, one of the defendants and judgment debtor

under the 2005 Judgment, filed a Motion for Sanctions and a Motion for Clarification.

In the sanctions motion, Ms. Bell alleges she was not provided advance notice of the

Motion to Revive Judgment, and she claims that if she had received notice, she could

have shown the Court that the 2005 Judgment had been satisfied. She also claims

the Trustee of the Trust, “without authorization in violation of the Bell Trust

instructions and clause of ‘spendthrift’ and La Spendthrift trust law withheld from

Mary S Bell her protected distributions of $302,756.79 . . .”2 Thus, she seeks to

sanction the Trust, and its Trustee, Greg Mier, for “intentionally falsifying

information to this Court” to support the revival of the Judgment.

By way of the Motion for Clarification, Ms. Bell seeks “confirmation from this

Bankruptcy Court that it does not have authority outside its jurisdiction to prevent

Mary S Bell from filing a lawsuit in the Fifteenth Judicial State Court against

Gregory Mier for all damages caused.”3 The basis for the clarification motion is

uncertain, but it appears to be premised on an order this Court entered in August

2010, during the pendency of the Trust’s Chapter 7 bankruptcy case, that prohibited

Ms. Bell from filing any actions against the Trust, the Trustee or the beneficiaries of

the Trust in any federal or state court.

The Trust filed an opposition to each of Ms. Bell’s motions. The opposition to

the sanctions motion points out that advance notice to a judgment debtor of a motion

1 The Plaintiff also revived the 2005 Judgment in 2015 using the same procedure.

2 Motion for Sanctions, (09/09/2025), ECF # 273, p.2.

3 Motion for Clarification, (09/09/2025), ECF # 275, p.1.

to revive a judgment is not required under applicable law and thus there is no basis

for this Court to award sanctions. With respect to the Motion for Clarification, the

Trust claims it has no knowledge of prior orders that may have prohibited Ms. Bell

from pursuing litigation in state or federal court. And since Ms. Bell did not provide

documentation showing the basis for the Motion for Clarification, they claim the

Motion should be denied for lack of any foundational support.

Ms. Bell, in a reply, filed several documents which she contends show that she

has satisfied the portion of the 2005 Judgment that awarded money damages to the

Trust. She also filed documents that she claims relate to the question of whether an

order is currently in place that would prevent her from filing any litigation against

the Trust or Mr. Mier as Trustee.

The Court held a hearing on these matters on October 7, 2025; Ms. Bell

appeared pro se, and Mr. Mier appeared for the Trust. During the hearing it became

obvious that the ultimate issue facing the court is whether the 2005 Judgment has

been satisfied, and the hearing was not helpful in resolving that question. On the one

hand, Ms. Bell vacillated from asserting that unverified and unauthenticated

accounting records she filed in the record show that she satisfied the 2005 Judgment,

to re-arguing legal and factual issues long ago settled either by the 2005 Judgment

or other judgments and orders rendered in numerous lawsuits between the parties

over the past 20-plus years and in the Trust’s bankruptcy case. On the other hand,

the Trust and Mr. Mier pointed to vague deficiencies in Ms. Bell’s performance of her

obligations under the 2005 Judgment and the fact that the accounting records

referenced by Ms. Bell were not the official accounting records for the Trust.

The Court took the matters under advisement, primarily for the purpose of

determining the remedy, if any, Ms. Bell or the Trust may have in this Court

concerning satisfaction of the 2005 Judgment and to determine whether Ms. Bell’s

access to federal and state courts is currently limited. The Court has now considered

these issues and finds that the Motion for Sanctions should be denied, as the Motion

to Revive and corresponding Judgment of Revival comply with applicable law.

However, the Court also finds that the governing law on revival of judgments

authorizes Ms. Bell to file a contradictory motion in this Court for the sole purpose of

proving that she has satisfied the 2005 Judgment. The Court also concludes that this

court, as the court that rendered the 2005 Judgment, has jurisdiction over such

contradictory motion. Thus, the Court will all Ms. Bell 30 days from the date of this

Memorandum Opinion and Order to file the contradictory motion.

As for the Motion for Clarification, the court finds that this Court’s previous

order that prohibited Ms. Bell from pursuing litigation against the Trust, its Trustee

and beneficiaries in federal or state courts was based on the automatic stay that was

in place under section 362 of the Bankruptcy Code during the pendency of the Trust’s

Chapter 7 bankruptcy case. Since the final decree was entered in the bankruptcy case

over 13 years ago, and the case closed, the stay is no longer in place, and this Court

is not aware of any other restrictions that would prevent Ms. Bell from pursuing

litigation against the Trust and related parties in Louisiana state Courts. However,

the United States District Court for the Western District of Louisiana and the United

States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit have entered orders that prohibit Ms.

Bell from bringing frivolous, vexatious and abusive filings against the Trust and

related parties and attorneys in federal court. Given the litigation history between

the parties, which is outlined below, the Court finds that this restriction must remain

in place, except for the aforementioned contradictory motion, which Ms. Bell is

allowed to pursue in this Court for the sole purpose of showing the 2005 Judgment

has been satisfied.

The Court will explain its reasoning for these decisions below.

BACKGROUND

The parties have a history of litigation that spans nearly 25 years. Since one

of the issues facing the Court is whether there is a sanction or other court order

presently in place that would limit Ms. Bell’s access to this and other courts, this

history is relevant here. Thus, the Court will set forth the basis of the original dispute

between the parties and the history of the litigation between the parties.4

A. Formation of the Bell Family Trust and accompanying property

transfers

Wilfred Bell created the Bell Family Trust in October 1996, naming Ms. Bell

and her five siblings as beneficiaries. Ms. Bell was initially appointed as trustee, but

she long ago ceded the position. In creating the trust, Mr. Bell donated several tracts

of immovable property to the Trust, including a one acre tract on which his home was

located.

Shortly after Mr. Bell donated the Property to the Trust, he signed a

promissory note agreeing to pay $40,000.00 he allegedly owed to Ms. Bell. The debt

was secured by a collateral mortgage in favor of Ms. Bell that encumbered the Trust’s

Property. Mr. Bell signed the promissory note and mortgage on March 12, 1997, and

the mortgage was recorded in the Vermilion Parish records the next day.

On June 19, 2001, Wilfred Bell was interdicted under Louisiana law via

proceedings initiated by Ms. Bell. Up until 2001, Ms. Bell had made distributions to

the beneficiaries, including herself. During the summer of 2001, however, those

distributions stopped, causing inquiries from the other beneficiaries. On July 31,

2001, the attorney for the beneficiaries made a written request to Ms. Bell for

information and a trust accounting. This request was answered by Ms. Bell’s

4 This history is based on the following reported decisions: In re Bell Fam. Tr., 350 B.R. 700 (Bankr.

W.D. La. 2005), subsequently aff'd as modified, 251 F. App'x 864 (5th Cir. 2007) (Original 2005

Judgment); In re Bell Fam. Tr., 251 F. App'x 864 (5th Cir. 2007) (Appeal of 2005 judgment to the 5th

Circuit); Bell v. Bell Fam. Tr., No. CIV.A. 13-0639, 2013 WL 9805802 (W.D. La. Sept. 16, 2013), report

and recommendation adopted, No. CIV.A. 13-0639, 2013 WL 9805803 (W.D. La. Oct. 11, 2013) (Suit to

appeal the jurisdictional basis and set aside the bankruptcy among other frivolous claims); Bell v. Bell

Fam. Tr., No. CIV.A. 13-0639, 2013 WL 9805803 (W.D. La. Oct. 11, 2013) (adoption of the magistrate’s

recommendation); In re Bell Fam. Tr., 575 F. App'x 229 (5th Cir. 2014) (Appeal of frivolous claims to

5th Cir.); Bell v. Bell Fam. Tr., 574 U.S. 1046, 135 S. Ct. 772, 190 L. Ed. 2d 625 (2014) (denial of motion

before the Supreme Court); Bell Fam. Tr. v. Vermilion Par. Clerk of Ct., 2021-573 (La. App. 3 Cir.

4/27/22), 338 So. 3d 537 (Appeal from suit against Ms. Bell in Louisiana state court).

attorney. In the meantime, Ms. Bell started preparing invoices to retroactively bill

the Trust for her services as Trustee, claiming a total indebtedness of $330,151.60.

On August 21, 2001, Ms. Bell formed Sue Bell Holdings, LLC and on August

30, 2001, a dation en paiement (“Dation”) was created between the Trust and Sue

Bell Holdings, LLC. The Dation terminated the Trust as to Ms. Bell and transferred

various Trust assets to the LLC, including the property encumbered by the Trust,

and released the Trust from debt allegedly owed to the LLC, including the $40,000.00

promissory note. The trust assets transferred included 185 of the total 228 acres

originally donated to the Trust; 100% of the mineral rights for all the acreage; and

miscellaneous assets including a $16,000 promissory note from Nedia Bell, the Bell

family home situated on the one acre of land, and several hundred shares of stock in

Kaplan Farmers Co-Op, Inc.

B. The Bell Family Trust files a Chapter 7 Bankruptcy Proceeding and

this Adversary Proceeding Commences

The beneficiaries of the Trust commenced a suit against Ms. Bell as Trustee in

early 2002. In March 2002, Ms. Bell, on behalf of the Trust, filed a voluntary petition

for relief under Chapter 7 of the Bankruptcy Code. The bankruptcy case produced

this adversary proceeding, with the Plaintiff, who was the Chapter 7 Trustee, alleging

five grounds for recovery against Ms. Bell and her holding company, including claims

for multiple breaches of fiduciary duty. The Chapter 7 Trustee further sought to

reverse the property transfers occasioned by the Dation, alleging that they violated

and/or were invalid under federal and Louisiana law.

After a trial, this Court rendered Reasons for Decision on June 21, 2005,

finding Ms. Bell breached her fiduciary duties in numerous manners. Accordingly,

the court awarded the Trust with various sums apparently representing the value of

the property that had been transferred via the Dation, expenses unrelated to the

Trust that had been paid by Ms. Bell, income Ms. Bell had received following the

Dation, and money deposited into the court's registry. Additionally, the Court found

setting aside the Dation and returning the transferred property to the Trust was

proper, stating “[w]ithout question, avoiding the transfer is the only appropriate

method for satisfying the provision of La. R.S. 9:2221 requiring a trustee to redress a

breach of trust.”5 The Court further found the Trust was entitled to avoid the

transfers from the Dation because the Trustee received less than equivalent value,

making them fraudulent under 11 U.S.C. § 548(a)(1)(B).6 The ruling further directed

counsel to submit a proposed judgment in accordance with the ruling.

On August 1, 2005, this court rendered judgment—the 2005 Judgment—in

favor of the Trust and against Ms. Bell, that awarded the Trust with various sums,

together with interest, in conformity with its Reasons for Ruling.7 The judgment also

awarded the Trust with property that was previously transferred from the Trust by

the Dation, which in addition to certain real estate, also included the stock certificates

in the Kaplan Farmers’ Co-Op, Inc. and a promissory note dated August 21, 2001

made by Nedia LeLeux Bell in the principal sum of $16,279.13 and a $40,000.00

promissory note dated March 12, 1997 by Wilfred Bell. The “money judgment” portion

of the 2005 Judgment provides:

1. In favor of the Bell Family Trust, through W. Simmons Sandoz,

Trustee, and against Mary Sue Bell in the principal sum of

$162,214.96 together with prejudgment interest at the state rate

from date of judicial demand to date of judgment and thereafter post

judgment interest at the Federal rate until paid for the breach of

fiduciary duty.

2. In favor of the Bell Family Trust through W. Simmons Sandoz,

Trustee, and against Mary Sue Bell in the principal sum of

$266,468.60 plus prejudgment interest at the state rate from date of

judicial demand to date of judgment and thereafter post judgment

interest at the Federal rate until paid for breach of fiduciary duty.

3. In favor of the Bell Family Trust through W. Simmons Sandoz,

Trustee, and against Mary Sue Bell in the principal sum of

$60,000.00 plus prejudgment interest at the state rate from the date

of judicial demand to date of judgment and thereafter post judgment

5 In re Bell Family Trust, 350 B.R. at 707.

6 Id.

7 See ECF # 144.

interest at the Federal rate until paid representing damages for

breach of fiduciary duty in the amount of sums paid as “retainer”

from the Bell Family Trust to Mary Sue Bell.8

Under Paragraph 10 of the 2005 Judgment, Ms. Bell could satisfy the sum

assessed in Paragraph 2, which is $266,468.60, “upon [her] compliance . . . with item

nos. 7, 8 and 9” of the 2005 Judgment.”9 Those paragraphs provide:

7. In favor of the Bell Family Trust through W. Simmons Sandoz, and

against Mary Susan Bell and Sue Bell Holdings, L.L.C., declaring null

and void and without effect that certain Dation en Paiement executed

effective August 31, 2001, recorded as Act No. 20109735, records,

Vermilion Parish, on September 13, 2001, to be avoided, under 11

USC 548 (a)(1)(B)(i)(II) and (III) and La. R.S. 9:221, and all property

and assets of any kind referenced therein to be delivered and conveyed

to The Bell Family Trust via act translative of title signed and

delivered by Mary Sue Bell and Sue Bell Holdings, L.L.C. and within

twenty (20) days.

8. In favor of the Bell Family Trust, through W. Simmons Sandoz,

Trustee, and against Mary Sue Bell and Sue Bell Holdings, L.L.C.,

declaring null and void and without effect that certain Act of

Exchange dated August 31, 2001, by and between Sue Bell and Sue

Bell Holdings, L.L.C., recorded as Act No. 20109734, Vermilion Parish

records, on September 13, 2001, to be avoided under 11 USC 548

(8)(1)(B)(I)(B) and (ii)(II) and (III) and La. R.S. 9: 2221, and all

property and assets of any kind referred therein to be delivered and

conveyed to The Bell Family Trust via act translative of title signed

and delivered by Mary Sue Bell and Sue Bell Holdings, L.L.C. within

twenty (20) days.

9. In favor of the Bell Family Trust, through W. Simmons Sandoz,

Trustee, and against Mary Sue Bell and Sue Bell Holdings, L.L.C.,

declaring all transfers of all assets via Termination of Trust and

Distribution of Property dated August 31, 2001, by and between Sue

Bell and Sue Bell Holdings, L.L.C., recorded as Act No. 20019733,

Vermilion Parish records, on September 13, 2001, to be avoided under

11 USC 548 (8)(1)(B)(I)(B) and (ii)(II) and (III) and La. R.S. 9: 221,

and all property and assets of any kind referred therein to be

delivered and conveyed to The Bell Family Trust via act translative

8 Id.

9 Id.

of title signed and delivered by Mary Sue Bell and Sue Bell Holdings,

L.L.C. within twenty (20) days.10

Ms. Bell appealed the 2005 Judgment to the United States Court of Appeals

for the Fifth Circuit. In the meantime, on November 9, 2005, the bankruptcy court,

pursuant to a motion filed by the Trust under Federal Rules of Bankruptcy Procedure

7070, rendered a judgment that specifically divested title of the Property from Ms.

Bell and Sue Bell Holdings, LLC and vested title in the Bell Family Trust.

On September 10, 2007, to address Ms. Bell’s concerns on appeal, Charles R.

Fulbruge, III, Clerk of the Fifth Circuit, sent Mr. Jeffrey Ackermann, the attorney

for the Chapter 7 Trustee, a letter asking for clarification regarding Ms. Bell’s claims

of the judgment awarding a double recovery. Mr. Ackermann responded as follows:

I. Mary Sue Bell has not been double charged by the judgment which seeks

return of the trust property and assess a money judgment in the amount

of $266,468.60.

Item 10 of the judgment of the bankruptcy court states: “Upon

compliance by Mary Sue Bell and Sue Bell holdings, LLC with items Nos.

7, 8 and 9 above, the relief under USC 550 for violations of 11 USC 548,

and relief under La. R.S. 9:2221, as assessed in paragraphs 2 and 4

above shall be satisfied. “ Items 7, 8 and 9 are for recovery of the

property transferred via Dation en Paiement, Act of Exchange, and

Termination of Trust. Item 2 assesses the money judgment against

Mary Sue Bell and Sue Bell Holdings, LLC in the amount of

$266,468.60. This was the amount of the alleged debt that supported the

transfer. Accordingly, upon recovery of the trust property, the dollar

amount assessed in item 2 will be “satisfied”. The preferred remedy is

restoration of the trust property and upon the same monetary award of

$266,468.60 is satisfied. As such there seems like there can be no

duplicate recovery or duplicate award.

II. The $60,000.00 award and the $162,214.96 award.

Appellee has reviewed the testimony of plaintiff’s witness Lou Rolfes,

CPA and a copy of the report produced by him in evidence as PE 50.

Appellant’s brief to the District Court was also reviewed. At no time did

Appellant raise this argument at trial or after except for a quick

10 Id.

reference in her brief to this court. Yet my review also shows that the

$162,214.96 does include the $60,000.00 “retainer”. Unlike the

$266,468.60, for which trust property was taken by Mary Sue Bell the

$60,000.00 was paid to Mary Sue Bell in cash prior to the transfer of

trust property and was not part of the $266,468.60. As such it would not

be “recovered” by the trust in the event that the transfer of property is

avoided, like the $266,468.60 would be recovered. Nevertheless it does

appear that the $162,214.96 awarded in item number 1 of the

Bankruptcy Court award was calculated including the $60,000.00 cash

retainer referenced in item 3 of the judgment and to that extent is

duplicative.

Pursuant to FRCP 60 an error in a judgment from an oversight or

omission may be corrected while the appeal is pending. Appellant

contends that to the extent correction is required, the numerical

calculation of $162,214.96 could be reduced by $60,000.000 or down to

$102,214.96 and the award of the $60,000.00 in item number 3 of the

judgment remain. Alternatively the award of $60,000.00 could be

reversed and the $162,214.96 upheld. We do not believe that such calls

for full reversal or remand for retrial.11

On September 19, 2007, The Fifth Circuit affirmed the bankruptcy court’s

judgment, but eliminated paragraph 3 of the 2005 judgment, which awarded the

duplicative $60,000 already included in paragraph 1.12

The Fifth Circuit’s decision on appeal concluded the adversary proceeding. By

this time, fall 2007, all the real estate that was subject to the Dation and other

transfers had been returned to the Trust by virtue of the Judgment rendered by the

Bankruptcy Court on the Plaintiff’s Rule 7070 Motion.

C. The Bankruptcy Court sanctions Ms. Bell and then concludes the Bell

Family Trust’s main bankruptcy case

In 2009, Ms. Bell filed an adversary proceeding in this Court and three

adversary proceedings in the United States District Court for the Western District of

11 Letter from Jeffrey Ackermann to Charles R. Fulbruge, III, Clerk of Court, U.S. Ct. of App. for the

5th Cir. (09/13/07), filed (09/14/07), ECF #273-2 (emphasis in original).

12 The reference to the 2005 Judgment in this opinion means the 2005 Judgment of the Bankruptcy

Court as amended by the Fifth Circuit.

Louisiana.13 Some of these proceedings named not only the Trust as a Defendant, but

also Ms. Bell’s brothers, sisters, nieces, nephew, and the attorneys who represented

the Chapter 7 Trustee in this adversary proceeding. All these matters were

ultimately dismissed because they were attempts by Ms. Bell to relitigate matters

that had already been resolved by the bankruptcy court in this case.

In early 2010, Ms. Bell again began threatening actions against the Trust and

others. Thus, in July 2010 (ECF # 186 in the Trust’s Chapter 7 bankruptcy case, Case

No. 02-50477) the Trust filed a Motion for Contempt, Sanctions and other Relief,

seeking damages for Ms. Bell’s continued violations and threatened violations of the

automatic stay under section 362 of the Code. On August 3, 2010, a minute entry was

entered into the record of the bankruptcy case that states: The “Motion is granted in

part − Sue Bell is prohibited from filing any lawsuit against the trustee or trustee’s

attorneys in state or federal court without first requesting permission from this court.

In default the court will impose attorney fees and sanctions.”14

A final decree was entered in the Bell Family Trust Bankruptcy Case on

February 14, 2012, and thereafter the Chapter 7 bankruptcy case was closed.

D. Ms. Bell attempts to relitigate the Chapter 7 and Adversary

Proceedings

Ms. Bell thereafter sought to reopen the bankruptcy case for the purpose of

filing a motion under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 60 to vacate all prior orders and

dismiss the case for lack of jurisdiction. Ms. Bell argued the Trust was a spendthrift

trust, rather than a business trust eligible for relief under Chapter 7, and that the

Trustee had therefore illegally withheld payment of her distributions. This Court

denied her motion, citing a final June 2002 judgment in the bankruptcy proceeding

13 The 2009 adversary proceeding in this court was assigned case number 09-05001 and captioned as

Bell et al. v. Sandoz; the actions filed in the Western District were identified by case numbers 09-

01980, 09-01984, and 09-01985 all under the caption Bell v. Sandoz et al.

14 Minute Entry, (08/03/2010), ECF #198.

finding the Trust was a business trust rather than a spendthrift trust. Ms. Bell

appealed to the United States District Court for the Western District of Louisiana.

In its September 16, 2013, Report and Recommendation, not only did the

magistrate judge for the district court affirm the bankruptcy court, but it also

recommended Ms. Bell be prohibited from filing further frivolous actions in the

district and bankruptcy courts. On October 11, 2013, the district court adopted the

magistrate judge's Report and Recommendation and ordered Ms. Bell “to refrain from

instituting any further actions against the Defendant herein or its counsel or the

bankruptcy judges based on any matters set forth in her Appeal at bar lest she be

ordered to appear and show cause why she should not be held in contempt of court.”15

The district court’s ruling was affirmed by the United States Court of Appeals

for the Fifth Circuit on July 8, 2014. In affirming, the Fifth Circuit warned Ms. Bell

“that any further frivolous or abusive filings in this Court, the district court, or the

bankruptcy court will invite the imposition of sanctions, including dismissal,

monetary sanctions, and/or restrictions on her ability to file pleadings in this Court

and any court subject to this Court's jurisdiction.”16

On December 8, 2014, the Supreme Court of the United States issued a ruling

which denied a motion “to direct the Clerk to file a petition for writ of certiorari out

of time.”17

E. Ms. Bell reinscribes the previously canceled collateral mortgage

causing state court litigation to ensue

On July 6, 2015, Ms. Bell signed and recorded a Notice of Reinscription for the

original 1997 Collateral Mortgage signed by Mr. Bell in favor of Ms. Bell dated March

13, 1997, which secured the $40,000 promissory note given by Mr. Bell on the same

15 Bell v. Bell Family Trust, 6:13-CV-00639, p. 1 (W.D.La. Oct. 11, 2013), 2013 WL 9805803.

16 In re Bell Fam. Tr., 575 F. App'x 229, 233 (5th Cir. 2014).

17 Bell v. Bell Family Trust, 574 U.S. 1046, 135 S.Ct. 772, 190 L.Ed.2d 625 (2014).

date. This mortgage was cancelled in the 2005 judgment. Thus, there were no grounds

for Ms. Bell to have the mortgage reinscribed.

While the Trustee of the Trust was working to sell all the Trust’s real estate,

the reinscription of the mortgage was discovered. On November 4, 2020, Mr. Mier, as

Trustee acting on behalf of the Trust, sent a certified letter to Ms. Bell advising her

that the Mortgage and Reinscription were no long in effect and requesting her to

cancel those recordings. Ms. Bell received the letter and responded. Following Ms.

Bell's failure to cancel the Mortgage and Reinscription within thirty days of the

Trust's certified letter, the Trust filed a Petition for Cancellation of Mortgage on

December 8, 2020, in the Louisiana 15th Judicial District Court. The petition sought

to cancel the Mortgage and Reinscription, as well as assess costs and attorney fees

against Ms. Bell in accordance with La. Rev. Stat. § 9:5176.

On March 22, 2021, the Louisiana district court judge signed a judgment

directing the clerk of court to cancel the 1997 Mortgage and 2015 Reinscription and

awarding the Trust with costs and attorney fees. On April 27, 2022, the Louisiana

Court of Appeal, Third Circuit, affirmed the judgment of the Louisiana 15th Judicial

District Court.

F. Ms. Bell sues Mr. Mier and the Trust in state court; The Trust reopens

this Adversary Proceeding for the purpose of reviving the 2005

Judgment; Ms. Bell files the Motions for Sanctions and Clarification

In 2024, Ms. Bell retained new counsel, who sent a letter to Mr. Mier on May

24, 2024, inquiring about alleged discrepancies between the Trust’s accounting and

Ms. Bell’s assertions regarding the satisfaction of the 2005 Judgment.18 During the

hearing on Ms. Bell’s Motion for Sanctions, Mr. Mier stated he responded to this

letter, and that there was no further correspondence with Ms. Bell’s lawyer.

Thereafter, Ms. Bell, pro se, filed suit against Mr. Mier and the Trust in

Louisiana state court. The nature of this suit is not clear, but it appears that Ms. Bell

18 Letter from Jena M. Kyle, Allen & Gooch, to Greg Mier, Trustee of the Bell Family Trust,

(05/24/2024), ECF #282-7.

is seeking an accounting from the Trust and the Trustee for distributions she claims

are due to her as a beneficiary of the Trust. It also appears that that she may be

raising some of the same issues that were long ago decided in this case, such as her

assertion that the Trust is a spendthrift trust and that distributions are illegally

being withheld from her. She also appears to be seeking damages from Mr. Mier.

During the pendency of the state court action, the trial judge was made aware

of an order from federal court that may prohibit Ms. Bell from suing the Trust and

Trustee in any state or federal court. The state court’s concern in this regard is

apparently what led Ms. Bell to file her Motion for Clarification in this Court.

On July 28, 2025, Mr. Mier filed an Ex Parte Motion to Reopen Case and a

Motion to Revive Judgment in this court. On August 5, 2025, this Court granted both

motions. On September 9, 2025, Ms. Bell filed her Motions for Sanctions and

Clarification, which are described in the opening paragraphs of this opinion.

LAW AND ANALYSIS

A. Motion for Sanctions

Ms. Bell’s Motion for Sanctions assails this Court’s granting of the Trust’s

Motion to Revive Judgment on two grounds. First, she claims the Judgment of

Revival was improperly granted because she was not given notice of the filing of the

Motion to Revive Judgment. Second, she claims Mr. Mier’s affidavit filed in support

of the motion to revive is misleading because it states that the Judgment remains

unsatisfied. Ms. Bell asserts that the “money judgment” portion of the Judgment has

been satisfied and thus should not have been revived.

1. Reviving federal court money judgments

Before turning to Ms. Bell’s arguments, the Court will first examine the law

and procedure governing revival of judgments in this Court.

Prior to the enactment of the Fed. R. Civ. Proc. 81, the revival of a judgment

in federal court was generally obtained through a writ of scire facias.19 Federal R.

Civ. P. 81(b) “abolished” writs of scire facias and mandamus and provides that

“[r]elief previously available through them may be obtained by appropriate action or

motion under these rules.”20

Federal R. Civ. P. 69(a) is broad enough to cover the revival of judgments in

federal court. It provides:

Money Judgment; Applicable Procedure. A money

judgment is enforced by a writ of execution unless the court

directs otherwise. The procedure on execution−and in

proceedings supplementary to and in aid of

judgment or execution−must accord with the procedure

of the state where the court is located, but a federal

statute governs to the extent it applies.21

Rule 69(a) essentially authorizes federal courts to “borrow the format employed in

the courts of the forum state” for reviving judgments.22 Federal R. Bankr. P. 7069

incorporates Rule 69 into the Bankruptcy Rules. Thus, in actions to revive a judgment

entered by this Court, Louisiana law governs.

In Louisiana, the rules for revival of judgements are found in La. Civ. Code art.

3501 and La. Code Civ. Proc. art. 2031; the Civil Code article provides the substantive

parameters of the revival process, while the Code of Civil Procedure provides the

means of execution. Civil Code article 3501 provides:

A money judgment rendered by a trial court of this state is

prescribed by the lapse of ten years from its signing if no

appeal has been taken, or, if an appeal has been taken, it

is prescribed by the lapse of ten years from the time the

judgment becomes final.

19 Securities Investor Protective Corp. v. Institutional Securities of Colorado, Inc., 37 Fed. App’x 423,

425 (10th Cir. 2002) (“The relief formerly obtained through scire facias included revival of

judgments.”).

20 Fed. R. Civ. P. 81(b).

21 Fed. R. Civ. Proc. 69(a) (emphasis added).

22 Resolution Trust Corp. v. Ruggiero, 994 F.2d 1221, 1226 (7th Cir. 1993).

An action to enforce a money judgment rendered by

a court of another state or a possession of the United

States, or of a foreign country, is barred by the lapse

of ten years from its rendition; but such a judgment

is not enforceable in this state if it is prescribed,

barred by the statute of limitations, or is otherwise

unenforceable under the laws of the jurisdiction in

which it was rendered.

Any party having an interest in a money judgment may

have it revived before it prescribes, as provided in Article

2031 of the Code of Civil Procedure. A judgment so revived

is subject to the prescription provided by the first

paragraph of this Article. An interested party may have a

money judgment rendered by a court of this state revived

as often as he may desire.23

Article 3501 establishes the prescriptive period on money judgments as 10

years and then directs parties to La. Code Civ. Proc. art. 2031 for the process to revive

a judgment. That article provides:

A. A money judgment may be revived at any time before it

prescribes by an interested party by the filing of an ex

parte motion brought in the court and suit in which

the judgment was rendered. The filing of the motion to

revive interrupts the prescriptive period applicable to the

judgment. The motion to revive judgment shall be

accompanied by an affidavit of the holder and owner

of the judgment, stating that the original judgment

has not been satisfied. A judgment shall thereupon be

rendered reviving the original judgment. No citation or

service of process of the motion to revive shall be

required. The court may order the judgment debtor to pay

additional court costs and reasonable attorney fees in

connection with the judgment revival action. Notice of

signing of the judgment of revival shall be mailed by the

clerk of court to the judgment debtor at his last known

address as reflected in the suit record.

B. At any time after the signing of the judgment of revival, the

judgment debtor may, by contradictory motion, have the

judgment of revival annulled, upon showing that the

23 LA. CIV. CODE ANN. art. 3501 (2025) (emphasis added).

judgment which has been revived was in fact satisfied prior

to the signing of the judgment of revival. If the judgment

debtor proves that the judgment has been satisfied prior to

the filing of the motion to revive the judgment, the holder

or owner of the judgment shall pay all court costs, fees, and

attorney fees incurred by the judgment debtor in opposing

the ex parte order of revival and the cancellation of the

judgment from the mortgage records.24

Article 2031 sets forth a simple, straight-forward procedure for reviving a

money judgment. All that is required is a motion accompanied by an affidavit from

the holder or owner of the judgment stating that the judgment remains unsatisfied.

The motion to revive may be filed ex parte, and citation or service of process of the

motion is not required. If this procedure is followed, an order reviving the judgment

will ordinarily be entered, and the clerk of court will provide notice of the signing by

mail to the judgment debtor’s last known address.

Although Louisiana’s judgment revival procedure requires notice of the signing

of the judgment of revival to be sent to the judgment debtor, it does not require notice

of the filing of the motion to revive judgment. But a judgment debtor is not without a

remedy if the motion to revive judgment is improvidently granted. Louisiana Code

Civ. Proc. art. 2031B authorizes the judgment debtor to seek annulment of the

judgment of revival if the judgment debtor can show “the judgment which has been

revived was in fact satisfied prior to the signing of the judgment of revival.”25 The

judgment debtor’s right to bring such motion does not arise until after the judgment

of revival has been signed. If the judgment debtor is successful in proving that the

revived judgment was satisfied prior to the signing of the judgment of revival, the

judgment debtor is entitled to court costs, fees and attorney’s fees incurred in

contesting the ex parte motion to revive judgment.

Under Article 2031B, the judgment debtor’s rights are limited to showing that

the revived judgment was satisfied. Defenses to the original action cannot be asserted

24 LA. CODE CIV. PROC. ANN. art. 2031 (2025) (emphasis added).

25 LA. CODE CIV. PROC. art. 2301B (emphasis added).

as a basis for contesting the judgment of revival.26 Put another way, if a judgment

debtor files a contradictory motion seeking to annul a judgment of revival, the court

will only consider evidence and arguments that may prove the judgment was satisfied

prior to the signing of the judgment of revival.

The Court will now turn to Ms. Bell’s arguments.

a. Ms. Bell’s right to notice of the Motion to Revive Judgment

Ms. Bell’s argument, that she was entitled to notice of the filing of the motion

to revive judgment prior to its granting, is meritless. As noted above, Louisiana law

allows a revival motion to be filed ex parte. There is no requirement of notice, citation,

or service of process. The only requirement is that the motion for revival be

accompanied by an affidavit from the holder of the original judgment stating the

money judgment remains unsatisfied. Such an affidavit was filed with the Motion

here. Additionally, Ms. Bell was provided with notice of the signing of the Judgment

of Revival. Thus, the revival motion was properly filed, and the Court’s Order

granting revival complies with Louisiana law.

b. Ms. Bell’s claim that the judgment has been satisfied

Ms. Bell’s sanction motion also seeks damages against Mr. Mier for filing an

allegedly false affidavit in support of the motion to revive judgment. Ms. Bell contends

that she satisfied the judgment prior to Mier’s filing of the motion to revive judgment.

Thus, she claims Mr. Mier’s affidavit filed in support of revival is untrue. In support

of her contention, Ms. Bell attached an accounting prepared by the Trust’s

26 See Louisiana Mach. Co. v. Passman, 158 So. 2d 419 (La. Ct. App. 1963) (applying affirmative

defenses to the enforcement of the judgment due to discharge in bankruptcy, not a defense concerning

the validity of the original judgment); Gegenheimer v. Galan, 182 F.3d 915 (5th Cir. 1999) (“Early case

law establishes that the only acceptable defense that qualifies as a good cause [for opposing the revival

of a judgment] is an absolute nullity of the original judgment.”) (see citing McCutchen v. Askew, 34 La.

Ann. 340 (1882)); Mansfield Truck Sales & Serv., Inc. v. Fortney, 2009 WL 1610847 at *1 (Ohio App.);

see also, In re Beery, 2007 WL 1521140, at *1 (D.N.M.) (overruling arguments against revival that had

been made and rejected before the original judgment was entered).

accountant, apparently provided to Ms. Bell by Mr. Mier, and shows that she still

owes more than $300,000 on the original Judgment. She also attached what she

describes as a corrected accounting, which she claims was also prepared by the

Trust’s accountant, but apparently without Mr. Mier’s knowledge. According to Ms.

Bell, the corrected accounting gives credit for the property she returned to the Trust,

which under Paragraph 10 of the 2005 Judgment, would reduce the amount of the

money judgment owed by her by $266,468.60.

Ms. Bell also asserted in her written Motion for Sanctions and during the

hearing that Mr. Mier had improperly retained her distributions from the Trust in

violation of the spendthrift provisions of the Trust and Louisiana law.

During the hearing on this matter Mr. Mier disputed that Ms. Bell had

returned all the property to the Trust, and even if it had been returned, he claimed

Ms. Bell’s performance was defective. In particular, he claimed the promissory notes

and Co-Op stock certificates had been canceled by Ms. Bell prior to returning them,

making them worthless. Thus, in Mr. Mier’s assessment, Ms. Bell did not fully comply

with Paragraph 10 of the Judgment. Mr. Mier also asserted that Ms. Bell’s motion

was nothing more than a rehash of the matters already litigated and decided between

the parties, particularly her claims that distributions are being improperly withheld

based on Ms. Bell’s renewed assertion that the Trust is a spendthrift trust.

Given the conflicting positions of the parties regarding what was returned to

the Trust by Ms. Bell and the lack of any competent documentary evidence to show

what was delivered to the Trust by Ms. Bell, and when, in satisfaction of the

$266,468.60 awarded in Paragraph 2 of the 2005 Judgment, the Court is unable to

determine whether Mr. Mier’s affidavit is materially incorrect. Regardless, a Motion

for Sanctions is not the appropriate method for raising that issue. Louisiana Code

Civ. Proc. art. 2031B requires the filing of a contradictory motion asserting the

judgment has been satisfied and such motion must be accompanied by competent

proof showing satisfaction. Only if Ms. Bell can show the 2005 Judgment was satisfied

will she be entitled to sanctions, and by statute, the sanctions would be limited to

attorney’s fees and costs.

Accordingly, the Court will also deny Ms. Bell’s motion for sanctions to the

extent it is based on her assertion that Mr. Mier’s affidavit is misleading. However,

the Court will allow Ms. Bell 30 days from the date of this Memorandum Opinion and

Order to file a contradictory motion in accordance with Article 2031B. Such motion

should clearly and succinctly set forth how and when all aspects of the 2005 Judgment

were satisfied.

The Court cautions Ms. Bell that she will be limited to presenting evidence and

arguments that may show the 2005 Judgment was satisfied by actions that took place

after the date of the 2005 Judgment—i.e., Ms. Bell is not allowed to relitigate any of

the matters decided in the 2005 Judgment or other litigation between the parties,

and the Court will not entertain any arguments that the Trust is a spendthrift trust,

or that the 2005 Judgment is not valid. Below, in the “Motion for Clarification” section

of this opinion, the Court will outline any additional restrictions on Ms. Bell’s access

to this and other courts.

B. Motion for Clarification

The Motion for Clarification asks this Court to review a “Protective Order”

which Ms. Bell contends was entered by the Bankruptcy Court on or about June 19,

2003. According to Ms. Bell, this order prohibited her from suing the Trust or the

Trustee in state or federal court. Again, there was much confusion during the hearing

on this matter, as Ms. Bell did not provide a copy of the protective order, and the

Court was unable to locate it. Since the hearing, the Court has verified that a motion

for protective order was filed in the adversary proceeding by a potential witness or

deponent in 2003, but the motion was denied. Thus, the protective order referenced

by Ms. Bell does not appear to exist.

During the hearing on the Motion for Clarification, Mr. Mier provided the

Court with a copy of an August 3, 2010, minute entry from the Trust’s bankruptcy

case, Case No. 02-50477.27 Under this Order, Ms. Bell was barred from filing any

action against the Trust, Trustee, or any counsel for such in any state or federal court.

This order essentially confirmed the existence of the automatic stay under section

362 of the Bankruptcy Code (which was the legal basis for the Motion for Contempt

and Sanctions) and warned Ms. Bell not to violate the stay in the future. Of course,

the Trust’s Chapter 7 bankruptcy case was closed over 13 years ago, and thus there

is no automatic stay protecting the Trust or Trustee from the filing of lawsuits at this

time.

The history of the litigation between the parties, however, reveals that the

Federal District Court for the Western District of Louisiana and the Federal Fifth

Circuit Court of Appeals entered orders in certain litigation between the parties that

prohibited Ms. Bell from filing vexatious and frivolous actions against the Trust and

other parties. As noted above, on October 11, 2013, the District Court ordered Ms.

Bell “to refrain from instituting any further actions against the Defendant herein or

its counsel or the bankruptcy judges based on any matters set forth in her Appeal at

bar lest she be ordered to appear and show cause why she should not be held in

contempt of court.”28 In affirming, the Fifth Circuit warned Ms. Bell in 2014, “that

any further frivolous or abusive filings in this Court, the district court, or the

bankruptcy court will invite the imposition of sanctions, including dismissal,

monetary sanctions, and/or restrictions on her ability to file pleadings in this Court

and any court subject to this Court's jurisdiction.”29

These rulings by the District Court and the Fifth Circuit essentially enjoin Ms.

Bell from making frivolous or abusive filings in federal courts against the Trust, its

Trustee, and the other beneficiaries.30 The fact that Ms. Bell is now proceeding pro se

does not shield her from these requirements, as “[p]ro se status is no aegis.”31

27 Minute Entry, (08/03/2010), ECF #186.

28 Bell v. Bell Family Trust, 6:13-CV-00639, p. 1 (W.D.La. Oct. 11, 2013), 2013 WL 9805803.

29 In re Bell Fam. Tr., 575 F. App'x 229, 233 (5th Cir. 2014).

30 See Nix v. Major League Baseball, 62 F.4th 920 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 144 S. Ct. 165, 217 L. Ed. 2d

62 (2023).

31 Id. at 937 (citing Farguson v. MBank Hous., N.A., 808 F.2d 358, 360 (5th Cir. 1986)).

However, this Court is cognizant that the injunction must not effectively deny Ms.

Bell access to the courts.32

Because of Ms. Bell’s extensive and prolonged abuse of the judicial process in

this Court and other courts within the United States’ Fifth Circuit, the previous bar

on frivolous and vexatious litigation in the United States Bankruptcy and District

Courts for the Western District of Louisiana will remain in place. Based on the court’s

review of the prior litigation between the parties, the court finds the following

matters are classified as frivolous, abusive and/or vexatious claims or tactics: all

filings by Ms. Bell raising (1) claims that the Bankruptcy Court lacks jurisdiction

over the Trust’s bankruptcy, (2) claims that the Trust is a spendthrift trust and that

her distributions are protected by the spendthrift designation, (3) claims by Ms. Bell

for reimbursement of expenses she allegedly incurred while acting as trustee for the

trust, and (4) any matter put forth and litigated in any of the prior cases and matters

between Ms. Bell and the Trust. Ms. Bell is on notice that any filing in this Court in

pursuance of the contradictory motion discussed above that falls within the category

of frivolous, abusive and/or vexatious is subject to being stricken from the record, and

Ms. Bell may face possible monetary sanctions and dismissal of the contradictory

motion if she attempts to pursue such claims in the contradictory motion.

The category of nonfrivolous filings in federal court include the contradictory

motion discussed in this opinion. Both the list of frivolous and list of non-frivolous

matters are not exhaustive and are provided as examples only.

Ms. Bell’s Motion for Clarification also raises the extent to which she may be

barred from filing litigation against the Trust, Trustee and beneficiaries in Louisiana

state court. As noted above, the previous prohibition was based on the automatic stay

in place while the Trust’s bankruptcy proceeding was pending. That stay is no longer

32 Id. at 937 (citing Farguson (“Such injunctions must be tailored to protect the courts and innocent

parties while also protecting the right of the enjoined party to file non-frivolous lawsuits.”)).

in place, and thus there does not appear to be any prohibitions on Ms. Bell pursuing

litigation in state court.

The Court also notes that Ms. Bell was previously a defendant in a matter filed

by the Bell Family Trust in the Fifteenth Judicial District Court, Parish of Vermilion

which she appealed to the Louisiana Court of Appeal, Third Circuit.33 The Louisiana

Third Circuit discussed the previous bars for vexatious litigation in the federal courts

and made no mention of an extension of that bar within their jurisdiction.34 Thus, in

this Court’s view, there does not appear to be any prohibitions in place that would

prevent Ms. Bell from pursuing nonfrivolous litigation against the Trust in state

court. Nor is the Court aware of any authority that would allow a bankruptcy court,

outside of the automatic stay in a pending bankruptcy case, to impose such

restrictions.

JURISDICTIONAL STATEMENT

Finally, the Court must consider the extent of its jurisdiction over the

contradictory motion that may be filed by Ms. Bell. The court finds it has jurisdiction

to revive the judgment and over any motion seeking to annul the judgment of revival

under Fed. R. Bank. P. 7069, which incorporates Louisiana law on these matters.

Louisiana law requires the motion to revive to be brought in the court and suit in

which the judgment was rendered. Since this court rendered the 2005 Judgment, it

has exclusive jurisdiction to revive the judgment. The same Louisiana law provides

that this court, as the court granting the judgment of revival, has jurisdiction over

any contradictory motion seeking to annul the judgment of revival. The court’s

jurisdiction, however, ends with the contradictory motion.

ORDER

33 Bell Fam. Tr. v. Vermilion Par. Clerk of Ct., 2021-573 (La. App. 3 Cir. 4/27/22), 338 So. 3d 537.

34 Id. at 542-43 (discussing the United States District Court for the Western District of Louisiana’s bar on Ms. Bell

for vexatious litigation).

For the foregoing reasons, and upon consideration of the entire record herein,

it is hereby ORDERED that:

1. The Motion for Sanctions is DENIED;

2. Ms. Bell shall have 30 days from the date of this Memorandum Opinion and

Order within which to file a Contradictory Motion as authorized under La.

Code Civ. Proc. art. 2031B, noticing such motion for an evidentiary hearing

in accordance with this Court’s rules and procedures;

3. The Motion for Clarification is GRANTED as follows:

a. Ms. Bell may file the Contradictory Motion authorized by La. Code

Civ. Proc. art. 2031B;

b. Ms. Bell is prohibited from filing frivolous, abusive and/or vexatious

litigation in the United States Bankruptcy and District Courts for

the Western District of Louisiana; “frivolous, abusive and/or

vexatious litigation” includes, but is not limited to: all filings by Ms.

Bell raising (1) claims that the Bankruptcy Court lacks jurisdiction

over the Trust’s bankruptcy, (2) claims that the Trust is a spendthrift

trust and that her distributions are protected by the spendthrift

designation, (3) claims by Ms. Bell for reimbursement of expenses

she allegedly incurred while acting as trustee for the trust, and (4)

any matter put forth and litigated in any of the prior cases and

matters between Ms. Bell and the Trust; and

c. There are currently no orders or other judgments from this Court

that prohibits or limits Ms. Bell’s right to pursue any litigation in

Louisiana state courts.