The opinion
An unpublished opinion of the North Carolina Court of Appeals does not constitute
controlling legal authority. Citation is disfavored but may be permitted in accordance with
the provisions of Rule 30(e)(3) of the North Carolina Rules of Appellate Procedure.
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF NORTH CAROLINA
No. COA25-225
Filed 17 December 2025
Gaston County, No. 23CRS305026-350
STATE OF NORTH CAROLINA
v.
OSTIL FLORES-ROCA
Appeal by Defendant from order entered on 28 October 2024 by Judge Justin
N. Davis in Gaston County Superior Court. Heard in the Court of Appeals 18
November 2025.
Attorney General Jeff Jackson, by Special Deputy Attorney General Robert T.
Broughton, for the State-Appellee.
Darren Jackson for Defendant-Appellant.
COLLINS, Judge.
Defendant Ostil Flores-Roca appeals from the trial court’s order denying his
motion to suppress evidence obtained during a checkpoint. Defendant argues that
the checkpoint was improper pursuant to federal and state constitutional law and
statutory law. For the reasons discussed below, we affirm the trial court’s order.
I. Background
STATE V. FLORES ROCA
Opinion of the Court
Belmont Police Department Sergeant McRee authorized a checkpoint on 12
May 2023 at the intersection of Keener Boulevard and Parkdale Drive in Belmont,
N.C., due to speeding complaints. The checkpoint was set up to check for any motor
vehicle violations under Chapter 20 of our General Statutes. Defendant was stopped
by three Belmont officers at the checkpoint. Defendant was subsequently charged
with driving while impaired, no operator’s license, and an open container violation.
Defendant filed a motion to suppress in district court, moving to suppress all
evidence obtained during the traffic stop, arguing the checkpoint violated his federal
and state constitutional rights and state law. The motion was denied. Judgment was
entered upon Defendant’s plea of guilty to driving while impaired. Defendant
appealed the judgment to the superior court.
Defendant filed his motion to suppress in superior court, and his motion came
on for hearing on 2 October 2024. Two out of the three arresting officers testified,
and documentary evidence was admitted. The trial court concluded that there was
sufficient supervisory approval for the checkpoint, and that the checkpoint was
reasonable, constitutional, and proper pursuant to federal and state constitutional
law. The motion to suppress was denied.
The court found the following findings of fact:
1. That on May 12, 2023, Officer Dunlap, Officer Guffie, and Sergeant McRee
were on duty and determined that a checkpoint was to be established at
Keener Boulevard and Parkdale Drive.
2. That this checkpoint was conducted pursuant to Belmont Police
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STATE V. FLORES ROCA
Opinion of the Court
Department policy (State’s Exh. 1) that was effective August 16, 2018.
3. That the checkpoint supervisor, Sergeant McRee[,] personally approved
conducting a checkpoint on that date and time.
4. That while no “Authorization for Checkpoint” form was filled out, Sergeant
McRee testified that the Traffic License Check Record (State’s Exh. 2) acted
as an approval form.
5. That the location at Keener Boulevard and Parkdale Drive was chosen due
to speeding complaints on these roads.
6. That this checkpoint’s purpose, as both Sergeant McRee and Officer Dunlap
testified, was to enforce all Chapter 20 violations. This is also evidenced by
the Traffic License Check Record (State’s Exh. 2).
7. That speeding, which is an issue at the location of the checkpoint, is a grave
public concern due to public safety.
8. That a checkpoint in a location with a speeding issue is a way of addressing
that concern.
9. That this checkpoint occurred at 2:00 AM, there were not a lot of cars on
the road, and that the time to stop a vehicle and check for identification and
registration would have been only ten to fifteen seconds per vehicle, and
therefore there was little interference with individual liberty.
10. That the Defendant was the first car to pass through the checkpoint.
11. That the Defendant did not present a valid driver’s license and presented
indications of other Chapter 20 violations, including Driving While
Impaired.
12. That due to the number of people in the [D]efendant’s vehicle, there were
officer safety issues which prevented officers from stopping other cars while
the stop of the Defendant was ongoing.
13. That the Court made additional findings of fact on the record in open court.
Defendant pled no contest to driving while impaired while preserving his right
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STATE V. FLORES ROCA
Opinion of the Court
to appeal the denial of his motion to suppress. The no operator’s license and open
container violation charges were dismissed pursuant to the plea agreement.
Defendant was sentenced accordingly. From the denial of his motion to suppress and
the judgment entered upon his guilty plea to driving while impaired, Defendant
appeals.
II. Discussion
Defendant argues that the trial court erred by denying his motion to suppress
because the checkpoint was not reasonable, constitutional, and proper pursuant to
federal and state constitutional law.
A. Standard of Review
“The standard of review in evaluating the denial of a motion to suppress is
whether competent evidence supports the trial court’s findings of fact and whether
the findings of fact support the conclusions of law.” State v. Biber, 365 N.C. 162,
167-68 (2011) (citation omitted). “When supported by competent evidence, the trial
court’s factual findings are conclusive on appeal, even where the evidence might
sustain findings to the contrary.” State v. Hall, 268 N.C. App. 425, 428 (2019)
(citation omitted). “Unchallenged findings of fact are binding on appeal.” State v.
Fizovic, 240 N.C. App. 448, 451 (2015) (citation omitted). “We review the trial court’s
conclusions of law on a motion to suppress de novo.” State v. Ladd, 246 N.C. App.
295, 298-99 (2016) (italics and citation omitted). “Under a de novo review, the court
considers the matter anew and freely substitutes its own judgment for that of the
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STATE V. FLORES ROCA
Opinion of the Court
lower tribunal.” State v. Williams, 362 N.C. 628, 632-33 (2008) (cleaned up).
The Fourth Amendment of the United States Constitution prohibits
unreasonable searches and seizures. U.S. Const. amend. IV. “[T]he Fourth
Amendment reasonableness standard usually requires that a search or seizure be
based on either consent or individualized suspicion of the person to be searched or
seized.” State v. Veazy, 191 N.C. App. 181, 184 (2008). “Article I, Section 20 of the
North Carolina Constitution similarly prohibits unreasonable searches and seizures.”
State v. Furtch, 289 N.C. App. 413, 418 (2023) (citation omitted). “Our state
constitution has not been interpreted to provide ‘any enlargement or expansion of
rights beyond those afforded in the Fourth Amendment[.]’ Thus, [the Appellate]
Court need not inquire whether defendant enjoys greater protection under our State's
constitutional guarantee against unreasonable searches and seizures.” State v. Gore,
272 N.C. App. 98, 104 (2020) (citing State v. Garner, 331 N.C. 491 (1992)).
To determine whether a checkpoint meets constitutional requirements, the
court must 1) “determine the primary programmatic purpose of the checkpoint,” and
2) if a legitimate purpose is found, “must judge its reasonableness . . . on the basis of
individual circumstances.” Veazy, 191 N.C. App. at 185; Illinois v. Lidster, 540 U.S.
419, 426 (2004). Checkpoints with an invalid primary purpose cannot be saved by
adding a lawful secondary purpose. State v. McDonald, 239 N.C. App. 559, 565-66
(2015).
1. Findings of Fact
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STATE V. FLORES ROCA
Opinion of the Court
Defendant challenges findings of fact 2, 4, 5, and 8 as unsupported by the
evidence.
Findings of fact 2 and 4 state:
2. That this checkpoint was conducted pursuant to the
Belmont Police Department Policy (State’s Exh. 1) that was
effective August 16, 2018.
....
4. That while no “Authorization for Checkpoint” form was
filled out, Sergeant McRee testified that the Traffic License
Check Record (State’s Exh. 2) acted as an approval form.
Sergeant McRee testified that he gave preauthorization approval for the
checkpoint on 12 May 2023 and that his plan for the checkpoint complied with the
written policy of the Belmont Police Department. Although the Part A Authorization
form was not completed prior to the checkpoint, Sergeant McRee testified that the
Traffic License Record he submitted served as “the authorization form.” Thus, the
trial court’s findings of fact 2 and 4 are supported by competent evidence.
Findings of fact 5 and 8 state:
5. That the location at Keener Boulevard and Parkdale
Drive was chosen due to speeding complaints on these
roads.
....
8. That a checkpoint in a location with a speeding issue is
a way of addressing that concern.
However, the trial court also made the following unchallenged findings of fact:
6. That this checkpoint’s purpose, as both Sergeant McRee
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STATE V. FLORES ROCA
Opinion of the Court
and Officer Dunlap testified, was to enforce all Chapter 20
violations. This is also evidenced by the Traffic License
Check Record (State’s Exh. 2).
7. That speeding, which is an issue at the location of the
checkpoint, is a grave public concern due to public safety.
....
9. That this checkpoint occurred at 2:00 AM, there were not
a lot of cars on the road, and that the time to stop a vehicle
and check for identification and registration would have
been only ten to fifteen seconds per vehicle, and that
therefore there was little interference with individual
liberty.
In assessing the challenged findings of fact 5 and 8, in conjunction with the
unchallenged findings of fact 6, 7, and 9, it is evident that the trial court’s findings
are supported by competent evidence. The trial court considered Sergeant McRee’s
testimony in which he stated he authorized a checkpoint upon officer request and
public concerns for speeding. The trial court properly determined, using competent
evidence from officer testimony, that the checkpoint was appropriately conducted to
enforce all Chapter 20 violations.
2. Conclusions of Law
Defendant challenges conclusion of law 2:
2. That in conducting the balancing test under Brown v.
Texas, 443 U.S. 47 (1979) and State v. Veazy, 191 N.C. App.
181, the factors weigh in favor of the public interest and
that therefore, the checkpoint is reasonable and
constitutional.
Here, both officers testified that the primary purpose of the checkpoint was
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STATE V. FLORES ROCA
Opinion of the Court
checking for Chapter 20 violations. Although Sergeant McRee stated that the
checkpoint also served a “general crime patrol” purpose, this was in addition to the
primary purpose of Chapter 20 violations. In State v. Cobb, the court found that a
checkpoint’s primary purpose of checking for Chapter 20 violations “operated to
advance the public concern and was reasonable.” 381 N.C. App. 161, 167 (2022)
(citation omitted). “[T]he use of time and location limitations in establishing and
operating [a] checking station provides evidence that [a] vehicle stop was
appropriately tailored.” Id. (citation omitted). Here, the checkpoint was limited in
time and location, ending early due to an increase in dispatch calls. Additionally, the
trial court’s findings of fact, which are supported by competent evidence, further
support conclusion of law 2. Biber, 365 N.C. at 167-68. Thus, the trial court properly
determined conclusion of law 2.
Defendant also challenges conclusions of law 1 and 4:
1. That sufficient supervisory authority for the checkpoint
was given.
....
4. That the checkpoint was proper pursuant to State and
Federal Law.
Here, the State provided testimony of Sergeant McRee who stated the
checkpoint followed proper preauthorization protocol, as the check record acted as
preauthorization under the policy. Sergeant McRee stated that subordinate officers
were briefed on the approved checkpoint prior to site arrival, and they were told “to
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STATE V. FLORES ROCA
Opinion of the Court
stop every vehicle unless traffic flow [was] an issue.”
Although the Belmont Police written policy states that an officer-in-charge
must “fil[e] a request form” Sergeant McRee testified that the Traffic Check Record
acted as a preauthorization form and Officer Dunlap corroborated the checkpoint
approval in his testimony. The trial court’s findings of fact, which are supported by
competent evidence, further support the challenged conclusions of law 1 and 4. Id.
Thus, the trial court properly determined conclusions of law 1 and 4.
Accordingly, the trial court did not err by denying Defendant’s motion to
suppress.
III. Conclusion
As the trial court’s findings of fact are supported by competent evidence, and
the trial court’s findings of fact support its conclusions of law, the trial court did not
err in denying Defendant’s motion to suppress. Accordingly, we affirm the trial
court’s denial of Defendant’s motion to suppress.
AFFIRMED.
Judges ARROWOOD and HAMPSON concur.
Report per Rule 30(e).
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