Jacob Blankenship v. Louisville-Jefferson Cnty. Metro Gov't

RECOMMENDED FOR PUBLICATION

Pursuant to Sixth Circuit I.O.P. 32.1(b)

File Name: 25a0343p.06

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE SIXTH CIRCUIT

┐

JACOB GLENN BLANKENSHIP, as an individual,

│

Plaintiff-Appellant, │

│

v. > No. 25-5014

│

│

LOUISVILLE-JEFFERSON COUNTY, KENTUCKY METRO │

GOVERNMENT; ELLIOTT YOUNG, in his individual │

capacity and acting as a Trooper/Officer for the │

Kentucky State Police, │

Defendants-Appellees. │

┘

Appeal from the United States District Court for the Western District of Kentucky at Louisville.

No. 3:23-cv-00235—Rebecca Grady Jennings, District Judge.

Argued: October 21, 2025

Decided and Filed: December 16, 2025

Before: MOORE, CLAY, and WHITE, Circuit Judges.

_________________

COUNSEL

ARGUED: David J. Markese, AMERICAN LIBERTIES INSTITUTE, Orlando, Florida, for

Appellant. Bruce B. Paul, MCBRAYER PLLC, Louisville, Kentucky, for Appellee Louisville-

Jefferson County, Kentucky Metro Government. Brenn O. Combs, KENTUCKY STATE

POLICE, Frankfort, Kentucky, for Appellee Elliott Young. ON BRIEF: David J. Markese,

AMERICAN LIBERTIES INSTITUTE, Orlando, Florida, for Appellant. Bruce B. Paul,

William G. Carroll, MCBRAYER PLLC, Louisville, Kentucky, for Appellee Louisville-

Jefferson County, Kentucky Metro Government. Brenn O. Combs, KENTUCKY STATE

POLICE, Frankfort, Kentucky, for Appellee Elliott Young.

No. 25-5014 Blankenship v. Louisville-Jefferson Cnty., Ky. Page 2

Metro Gov’t, et al.

_________________

OPINION

_________________

CLAY, Circuit Judge. Plaintiff Jacob Blankenship appeals the district court’s grant of

summary judgment to Defendants Louisville-Jefferson County, Kentucky Metro Government

and Elliott Young. At summary judgment, the district court dismissed Plaintiff’s free speech,

free exercise, and due process claims against both Defendants. The district court also dismissed

Plaintiff’s Monell municipal liability claim against Defendant Louisville-Jefferson County,

Kentucky Metro Government and granted qualified immunity to Defendant Elliott Young.

For the reasons set forth below, we AFFIRM the district court’s judgment.

I. BACKGROUND

A. Factual Background

In advance of the Kentucky Derby in 2022, Churchill Downs Racetrack, LLC (“Churchill

Downs”) submitted a “Special Event Permit Application” to Defendant Louisville-Jefferson

County, Kentucky Metro Government (“Metro”). See Permit Appl., R. 55-3. The application

described the event as the “148th running of the Kentucky Derby and Kentucky Oaks, two of the

most famous horse races in North America.” Permit Appl., R. 55-3, Page ID #481. The

application provided that, in seeking a permit, Churchill Downs “has accounted for perimeter

and event security,” along with “traffic control and access” to “protect the venue and spectators

attending the events.” Id. at 487. As part of the “traffic control plan,” the application requested

“street closures” and “restricted access” in several areas around the event at Churchill Downs,

including along Central Avenue from Taylor Boulevard to Floyd Street. Id. at 491. The

application also requested temporary fencing along Central Avenue from Taylor Boulevard to

Floyd Street. The application stated that the sidewalk on Central Avenue closest to Churchill

Downs would “be restricted to ticket holder access only” from Fourth Street to Ninth Street, and

guests “may be required to show [a] valid ticket at a designated checkpoint.” Id. at 498. The

application also planned on private security and law enforcement, including Kentucky State

Police, offering support during the event.

No. 25-5014 Blankenship v. Louisville-Jefferson Cnty., Ky. Page 3

Metro Gov’t, et al.

In April 2022, Metro approved Churchill Downs’s application and issued an “Event

Permit.” See Event Permit, R. 52-2, Page ID #266–67. The permit authorized “restricted

access” from May 4 to May 7, 2022 in several areas around Churchill Downs, including along

Central Avenue between Taylor Boulevard and Floyd Street. Id. at 266. The permit also

reflected multiple “street closures,” including along Central Avenue between Taylor Boulevard

and Floyd Street. Id. at 267.

Within that restricted area along Central Avenue, at the intersection of Central Avenue

and Third Street, Churchill Downs placed two signs that both read:

NO TRESPASSING

VALID CREDENTIALS ONLY

BEYOND THIS POINT

CONSENT TO SEARCH OF

PROPERTY OR PERSON

BEFORE ENTERING

R. 52-5, Page ID #287. According to the security director for Churchill Downs, Josh Ball

(“Ball”), a member of the public would need either a ticket or valid credentials to walk beyond

the signs. According to the special events manager for Metro, Churchill Downs retained the

authority to establish a ticket requirement anywhere within the restricted area. State Police

leadership also understood that the permit allowed Churchill Downs the authority “to limit

access.” Johnson Dep., R. 55-7, Page ID #535. But as stated by the special events manager for

Metro, the permit did not allow Churchill Downs to take any action that is “not allowed by

established law.” Sweeney Dep., R. 59-3, Page ID #873.

On May 7, 2022, Plaintiff Jacob Blankenship (“Blankenship”) gathered with a group in a

parking lot near Churchill Downs. Blankenship and the group began walking towards Churchill

Downs with signs, flags, megaphones, cameras, and other equipment. Blankenship and the

group encountered the temporary fence along Central Avenue and then walked through a tunnel

under Central Avenue. After exiting the tunnel, they crossed Third Street, walked beyond the

“NO TRESPASSING” signs, and entered the fenced-in area. Blankenship and the group then

No. 25-5014 Blankenship v. Louisville-Jefferson Cnty., Ky. Page 4

Metro Gov’t, et al.

walked along Central Avenue between Third Street and Fourth Street, where they stopped to

engage with patrons of the Kentucky Derby by demonstrating with signs, distributing literature,

and using sound equipment to preach. Blankenship does not claim that he or any member of his

group had a ticket or other credentials for the event.

After several minutes, a security guard approached Blankenship and the group and stated,

“Y’all gotta go . . . you’re trespassing.” Video, R. 62, 13:08:35–13:08:40.1 A member of

Blankenship’s group began a conversation with the security guard, and Blankenship later stated,

“Hey, hey don’t even argue with them . . . they are security guards,” and continued preaching.

Id. at 13:09:34–13:09:42. A second security guard joined the conversation and stated to the

group: “You can go on the other side all you want.” Id. at 13:10:35–13:10:39. Both security

guards stepped away from the conversation and remained nearby while the preaching continued.

Blankenship spoke with another member of the group, Joseph Estephane (“Estephane”).

Blankenship stated, “This is a sidewalk, and this is a right-of-way, so we don’t have to listen to

them . . . Don’t even entertain them. They’re not cops.” Id. at 13:11:29–13:11:35. Estephane

responded, “Yesterday, I had state troopers threaten me with trespassing.” Id. at 13:11:39–

13:11:41. And Blankenship then stated, “I’ll talk to them when they get here.” Id. at 13:11:42–

13:11:43. As the preaching continued, Blankenship stated, “Just ignore that guy. I’m not

listening to anybody but the cops. Okay. I don’t care what this guy says.” Video, R. 62,

13:36:00–13:35:06. Blankenship additionally stated, “I don’t move for anybody. Unless a cop

directly threatens me to move, I’m not moving.” Id. at 13:39:00–13:39:04.

Later, as Blankenship himself preached on the megaphone, a woman and Blankenship got

into a physical altercation, in which they both appeared to hit each other, and the woman fell to

the ground. Blankenship stated on the megaphone, “Hey cops! She just assaulted me right

there.” Id. at 14:04:34.

Ball, the security director for Churchill Downs, eventually contacted the commanding

officer of Kentucky State Police, Major Matt Johnson (“Johnson”), and requested that Kentucky

1

Blankenship wore a bodycam, which recorded a video of the events on that day. The citations to this

video (R. 62) reference the time stamp in the bottom middle of the frame.

No. 25-5014 Blankenship v. Louisville-Jefferson Cnty., Ky. Page 5

Metro Gov’t, et al.

State Police come to Central Avenue and Fourth Street because “there were several groups of

personnel within the permitted restricted areas that were refusing to leave.” Johnson Dep., R.

55-7, Page ID #555. In that conversation, Johnson confirmed with Ball that Churchill Downs

staff had already told the groups to leave the restricted area and they did not comply. When

Johnson arrived, Churchill Downs security pointed out Blankenship and his group to Johnson

and confirmed that they had already been instructed to leave. Johnson called for additional

police officers to join him. Johnson stated his understanding of the situation: “[I]t’s a private

event on private property for the purposes of this [event] . . . And if the owner of said property

tells someone, you’re not allowed to be here, you need to leave the property, and they refuse. At

that point, they’re trespassing.” Id. at 557–58.

Approximately one hour after Churchill Downs security told Blankenship and his group

to leave, Kentucky State Police troopers, including Defendant Trooper Elliot Young, gathered at

the scene. At that time, Ball spoke with Blankenship and his group and asked them to leave.

Young understood that Blankenship and his group were “approached by security and told that

they were trespassing and that that they had to go, and [they] continued remaining there

unlawfully.” Young Dep., R. 55-2, Page ID #391. Young further understood that Blankenship

and his group were not allowed beyond the “NO TRESPASSING” signs without proper

credentials.

After observing Blankenship and the group, the Kentucky State Police troopers

approached and detained Estephane. A trooper announced, “You’re trespassing. You can leave

now, or you go to jail.” Video, R. 62, 14:18:28–14:18:31. Another trooper stated, “You have

been warned multiple times . . . You can leave or you’re gonna go like him,” gesturing to

Estephane. Id. at 14:18:32–14:18:38. That trooper also told Blankenship, “This is not public,”

id. at 14:18:42, and as Blankenship argued with the trooper, the trooper stated, “This is Churchill

Downs. You have been warned to leave . . . You can go ahead and leave,” id. at 14:18:46–

4:18:48. Despite stating that he would leave, Blankenship continued to argue with the troopers.

Blankenship repeatedly claimed that he was never warned to leave. As Blankenship remained,

the other members of the group moved to another location and continued preaching.

No. 25-5014 Blankenship v. Louisville-Jefferson Cnty., Ky. Page 6

Metro Gov’t, et al.

Defendant Young then arrested Blankenship. Defendant Young stated that he made that

decision because Blankenship “was remaining unlawfully on the premises after having been told

numerous times to vacate and refusing to do so.” Young Dep., R. 55-2, 407–08. Blankenship

testified that no Metro representatives were involved in his arrest. Blankenship was cited for

third-degree criminal trespass with Young as the charging officer. See Ky. Rev. Stat. § 511.080

(“A person is guilty of criminal trespass in the third degree when he knowingly enters or remains

unlawfully in or upon premises.”). Blankenship’s criminal trespassing charge was dismissed

without prejudice, provided that he has no unlawful contact with Churchill Downs.

B. Procedural History

On May 8, 2023, Plaintiff filed a complaint in the United States District Court for the

Western District of Kentucky, bringing free speech, free exercise, and due process claims under

42 U.S.C. § 1983 against Defendant Metro and Defendant Young (“Defendants”), in addition to

a false arrest claim against Defendant Young. On March 21, 2024, the district court granted

Defendant Young’s motion to dismiss the false arrest claim and all claims against Defendant

Young in his official capacity.2

On September 3, 2024, all three parties moved for summary judgment. On December 6,

2024, the district court denied Plaintiff’s motion for summary judgment in full and granted

Defendant Metro’s and Defendant Young’s motions for summary judgment in full. As to

Plaintiff’s free speech claim, the district court held that although it was unclear whether

Plaintiff’s arrest occurred in a traditional or limited public forum, in any event, the challenged

restriction was content-neutral and survived intermediate scrutiny. As to Plaintiff’s free exercise

claim, the district court held that the challenged restriction affected Plaintiff’s preaching only

incidentally and no differently than non-religious conduct. As to Plaintiff’s due process claim,

the district court held that Plaintiff had not asserted any property or liberty interest and was not

subjected to the law that he challenges. The district court then held that, because Plaintiff’s

rights were not violated, Metro has no municipal liability under Monell. Additionally, the

district court held that, because Plaintiff’s rights were not violated and because Defendant Young

2

Plaintiff does not challenge on appeal the district court’s dismissal of his false arrest claim.

No. 25-5014 Blankenship v. Louisville-Jefferson Cnty., Ky. Page 7

Metro Gov’t, et al.

had probable cause to arrest Plaintiff, Defendant Young is entitled to qualified immunity on all

of Plaintiff’s claims against Defendant Young in his individual capacity. This appeal followed,

challenging the district court’s grant of summary judgment to Defendants.

II. DISCUSSION

A. Standard of Review

We review the district court’s grant of summary judgment de novo. Kubala v. Smith, 984

F.3d 1132, 1137 (6th Cir. 2021). Summary judgment is proper “if the movant shows that there is

no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of

law.” Id. (quoting Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a)). “In reviewing a motion for summary judgment, this

court must view the evidence in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party.” Barton v.

Martin, 949 F.3d 938, 947 (6th Cir. 2020) (citing Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242,

248 (1986)).

B. Free Speech Claim

Plaintiff appeals the district court’s grant of summary judgment to Defendants on his free

speech claim under the First Amendment. The First Amendment “protects the right to be free

from government abridgment of speech.” Ysursa v. Pocatello Educ. Ass’n, 555 U.S. 353, 358

(2009). “Free-speech claims require a three-step inquiry: first, we determine whether the speech

at issue is afforded constitutional protection; second, we examine the nature of the forum where

the speech was made; and third, we assess whether the government's action in shutting off the

speech was legitimate, in light of the applicable standard of review.” Bible Believers v. Wayne

Cnty., 805 F.3d 228, 242 (6th Cir. 2015) (citing Cornelius v. NAACP Legal Def. & Educ. Fund,

Inc., 473 U.S. 788, 797 (1985)).

1. Protected Speech

The parties do not dispute that the First Amendment protects Plaintiff’s conduct. By

distributing literature, displaying signs, preaching, and engaging in conversation with patrons of

the Kentucky Derby, Plaintiff engaged in protected speech. See Parks v. City of Columbus, 395

F.3d 643, 647–48 (6th Cir. 2005) (holding that the plaintiff “by distributing literature, displaying

No. 25-5014 Blankenship v. Louisville-Jefferson Cnty., Ky. Page 8

Metro Gov’t, et al.

a religious message, and preaching” engaged in activity “that has been recognized as protected

speech under the First Amendment”).

2. Nature of the Forum

The forum at issue is the restricted area around the Kentucky Derby, along Central

Avenue, where Plaintiff engaged in protected conduct and was arrested. Traditionally, “public

streets and sidewalks have been used for public assembly and debate, the hallmarks of a

traditional public forum.” Frisby v. Schultz, 487 U.S. 474, 480 (1988) (citations omitted).

However, “there have been limited circumstances” where a public street or sidewalk does not

constitute a traditional public forum. Parks, 395 F.3d at 648.

For example, the Supreme Court has recognized “significant differences” between a

typical public street and fairgrounds that include streets. See Heffron v. Int’l Soc’y for Krishna

Consciousness, Inc., 452 U.S. 640, 651 (1981). While a street is “continually open, often

uncongested, and constitutes . . . a necessary conduit in the daily affairs of a locality’s citizens,”

a fair “is a temporary event attracting a great number of visitors . . . for a short period to see”

certain attractions, and the “flow of the crowd and demands of safety are more pressing.” Id.

Similar to a fair, the Kentucky Derby occurs for a temporary period to showcase horse races for a

large number of spectators. See id. at 655 (“The Minnesota State Fair is a limited public forum

in that it exists to provide a means for a great number of exhibitors temporarily to present . . . to a

large number of people in an efficient fashion.”). Although the restricted area around the

Kentucky Derby included streets and sidewalks, the area “is more akin to a fair than a normal

city street” for the duration of the event. See Spingola v. Vill. of Granville, 39 F. App’x 978, 983

(6th Cir. 2002) (concluding that a festival area “comprised of public streets” does not serve “in

that function during the festival”).

Moreover, the restricted area was not open to the public. The permit established

“restricted access” along Central Avenue between Taylor Boulevard and Floyd Street, and the

street was subject to closure during the event. Event Permit, R. 52-2, Page ID #266–67.

Although it was physically possible for people to walk inside the restricted area without a ticket,

the fencing surrounding the restricted area and the “NO TRESPASSING” signs reflected that the

No. 25-5014 Blankenship v. Louisville-Jefferson Cnty., Ky. Page 9

Metro Gov’t, et al.

area was closed from public access. See Hartman v. Thompson, 931 F.3d 471, 479 (6th Cir.

2019) (holding that fairgrounds constituted a limited public forum because the “public cannot

access the [f]airgrounds unless they pay admission”). The Kentucky Derby itself is a private

event and is not “free and open to the public.” Cf. Parks, 395 F.3d at 652 (holding that an arts

festival constituted a traditional public forum where the event occurred on city streets, “was not a

private event,” and “remained free and open to the public”). Under these circumstances, the

restricted area constituted a limited public forum.

Plaintiff argues that the restricted area is a traditional public forum because Metro’s

permit was not exclusive. In support of this argument, Plaintiff highlights only distinguishable

cases. In Parks v. City of Columbus, this Court held that a festival area constituted a traditional

public forum “notwithstanding” a non-exclusive permit because the festival, unlike the Kentucky

Derby, “remained free and open to the public.” See 395 F.3d at 652. In Sistrunk v. City of

Strongsville, this Court held that a city may issue a permit to a group “seeking to make exclusive

use of [a public area] for expressive activity during a limited period of time,” and the group may

“exercise its free speech rights and autonomy over the content of its own message.” 99 F.3d 194,

198, 200 (6th Cir. 1996). Unlike the permittee in Sistrunk, however, Churchill Downs used the

restricted area for horse races, not expressive activity, and did not seek to exclude Plaintiff from

the content of any message of its own. Moreover, Sistrunk does not support Plaintiff’s position;

rather, it confirms the constitutionality of a city providing a permit that temporarily closes a

public forum for a private event. Here, Defendant Metro similarly permitted a private event that

temporarily closed a public forum. In fact, the permit in this case raises even less constitutional

concern than the permit in Sistrunk because it authorized Churchill Downs to exclude only those

without tickets or credentials, not dissenters. Additionally, in Parks v. Finan, this Court struck

down a permitting scheme that required an individual to obtain a permit before speaking on

Capitol grounds. See 385 F.3d 694, 696–698 (6th Cir. 2004). But Churchill Downs required that

an individual have a ticket or other credentials to enter the immediate area surrounding the

Kentucky Derby, not that an individual obtain permission before speaking. Not only are these

cases distinguishable, but Plaintiff also fails to point to a case in this Circuit that demonstrates

that the nature of the forum depends on the exclusivity of the permit.

No. 25-5014 Blankenship v. Louisville-Jefferson Cnty., Ky. Page 10

Metro Gov’t, et al.

Plaintiff next argues that the restricted area is a traditional public forum because the

location of his arrest was not ticketed and the public could enter the area freely. At the time of

his arrest, Plaintiff was located along Central Avenue inside of the restricted area, within the

fencing, and beyond the “NO TRESPASSING” signs. Although Churchill Downs staff may not

have checked for tickets precisely at the location of Plaintiff’s arrest, the street was closed from

the public for the duration of the Kentucky Derby, and the posted signs reflected the street

closure. Further, the Kentucky Derby was a ticketed event, and the record shows that Churchill

Downs retained the authority to limit access, including impose a ticketing requirement, anywhere

within the restricted area around the event. Since Churchill Downs retained the authority to limit

access in the location of Plaintiff’s arrest and took steps to close that location off from the public,

the record does not support Plaintiff’s second argument.

In any event, regardless of whether the restricted area constitutes a traditional public

forum or a limited public forum, we examine the enforcement of the restricted area, as a content-

neutral restriction, under the same level of intermediate scrutiny. See Spingola, 39 F. App’x at

983. “The government may enforce content-neutral time, place, and manner regulations if they

are narrowly tailored to serve a significant government interest and leave open ample alternative

channels of communication.” Id.

3. Intermediate Scrutiny

a. Not Content-Based

“Government regulations of speech are content neutral if they are ‘justified without

reference to the content or viewpoint of the regulated speech.’” Saieg v. City of Dearborn, 641

F.3d 727, 735 (6th Cir. 2011) (quoting Christian Legal Soc’y Chapter of the Univ. of Cal.,

Hastings Coll. of the Law v. Martinez, 561 U.S. 661, 696 (2010)). “The government’s purpose is

the controlling consideration.” Ward v. Rock Against Racism, 491 U.S. 781, 791 (1989).

Defendants justify Plaintiff’s arrest and removal “without reference to the content or

viewpoint of” Plaintiff’s speech. See Saieg, 641 F.3d at 735. Plaintiff remained within the

restricted area despite receiving multiple warnings to leave from both Churchill Downs security

and Kentucky State Police troopers. A security guard for Churchill Downs initially told Plaintiff

No. 25-5014 Blankenship v. Louisville-Jefferson Cnty., Ky. Page 11

Metro Gov’t, et al.

to leave because he was “trespassing.” Video, R. 62, 13:08:35–13:08:40. Later, after the state

troopers allowed Plaintiff a final opportunity to leave, Young made the decision to arrest

Plaintiff because Plaintiff “was remaining unlawfully on the premises after having been told

numerous times to vacate and refusing to do so.” Young Dep., R. 55-2, Page ID #407–08.

Johnson, the commanding officer of Kentucky State Police, stated his understanding of the

situation: “[I]t’s a private event on private property for the purposes of this [event] . . . And if the

owner of said property tells someone, you’re not allowed to be here, you need to leave the

property, and they refuse. At that point, they’re trespassing.” Johnson Dep., R. 55-7, Page ID

#557–58. The basis for Plaintiff’s arrest was a criminal trespass law. See Ky. Rev. Stat. §

511.080 (“A person is guilty of criminal trespass in the third degree when he knowingly enters or

remains unlawfully in or upon premises.”). Plaintiff does not claim that he had any tickets or

credentials for the event. Plaintiff offers no evidence to demonstrate that his arrest had any other

basis besides his continued unauthorized presence in a restricted area. See Reform Am. v. City of

Detroit, 37 F.4th 1138, 1149 (6th Cir. 2022) (holding that there is “no genuine dispute that the

group’s lack of tickets was the true basis for the officers’ denial of its entry into the restricted

area” because “there is no evidence that officers somehow used the group’s lack of tickets as an

ostensibly content-neutral pretext to deny its members entry when the real reason was the

group’s message” (citations omitted)).

As further evidence of content-neutrality, Churchill Downs sought removal of multiple

groups, not just Plaintiff’s group, because they all were unauthorized to remain in the restricted

area. Ball, the security director for Churchill Downs, requested that Kentucky State Police come

to the area because “there were several groups of personnel within the restricted areas that were

refusing to leave.” Johnson Dep., R. 55-7, Page ID #555. Those other groups did not share

Plaintiff’s message. See Reform Am., 37 F.4th at 1149 (holding that “there is no genuine dispute

that defendants’ enforcement of the restricted area was ideologically evenhanded” where they

“turned away all uncredentialed protestors” (cleaned up)). To this point, at oral argument,

Plaintiff argued that the enforcement of the restricted area was not content-neutral because a t-

shirt vendor remained within the restricted area without facing any consequences. However,

Plaintiff did not mention a t-shirt vendor in his motion for summary judgment at the district court

No. 25-5014 Blankenship v. Louisville-Jefferson Cnty., Ky. Page 12

Metro Gov’t, et al.

or in his brief on appeal. Moreover, it is not apparent to this Court where it shows in the record,

including in Plaintiff’s bodycam footage, that Churchill Downs security and the Kentucky State

Police allowed a t-shirt vendor to remain within the restricted area while they asked Plaintiff to

leave that same location. Even if Churchill Downs had allowed a t-shirt vendor to remain within

the restricted area, there is no indication that the t-shirt vendor was not authorized to be in the

restricted area and lacked the proper ticket or credentials to remain at the event. Additionally, at

oral argument, Plaintiff argued that Estephane was allowed to remain within the restricted area

without facing any consequences on the day before Plaintiff preached. But that statement is also

unsupported by the record, as Estephane stated in Plaintiff’s own bodycam footage, “Yesterday, I

had state troopers threaten me with trespassing.” Video, R. 62, 13:11:39–13:11:41. Therefore,

the record demonstrates not that the restricted area was selectively enforced but that multiple

groups with different messages, including Plaintiff’s group, were instructed to leave.

Plaintiff argues, “Metro’s censorship, instilled in the permitting process, empowers a

permittee unbridled discretion to exclude disfavored people and speech from the confines of the

permitted space. In turn, Churchill Downs exercised this privilege to expel Blankenship due to

the content of his message.” Appellant’s Br. at 33. But the permit did not provide Churchill

Downs unbridled discretion to exclude disfavored people because of their speech. The permit

did not allow Churchill Downs to take any action that is “not allowed by established law.”

Sweeney Dep., R. 59-3, Page ID #873. To be sure, Louisville-Jefferson Metro’s Code of

Ordinances (“Metro’s Code”) provides: “A permitee shall comply with all terms and conditions

set forth in a permit, with the provisions of this chapter, and with all other applicable laws and

ordinances.” LOUISVILLE-JEFFERSON, KY., CODE OF ORDINANCES § 100.08. Metro thus did not

empower Churchill Downs with unfettered discretion to remove people, such as Plaintiff,

because of the content of their message.

Plaintiff also suggests that the ticketing requirement was not the actual basis for his arrest

because Plaintiff encountered no check for tickets prior to his arrest. But Young testified that he

believed Plaintiff “did not have the valid credentials to remain” in the restricted area because

Plaintiff “did not present [Young] with any valid credentials.” Young Dep., R. 55-2, Page ID

#391. This assumption that Plaintiff did not have a ticket for the event was reasonable because

No. 25-5014 Blankenship v. Louisville-Jefferson Cnty., Ky. Page 13

Metro Gov’t, et al.

Plaintiff offered no indication to Churchill Downs staff or the Kentucky State Police that he did

in fact have a ticket. Rather, Plaintiff repeatedly claimed that he had a right to stand in the

restricted area because the area was open to the public. In response to Churchill Downs staff’s

initial instruction to leave, Blankenship stated, “This is a sidewalk, and this is a right-of-way, so

we don’t have to listen to them,” Video, R. 62, 13:11:29–13:11:35, and in arguing with the

Kentucky State Police troopers before his arrest, Blakenship stated, “This is public, isn’t it?,” id.

at 14:18:31–14:18:32. Plaintiff fails to demonstrate, and the record fails to support his

contention, that his lack of tickets is a pretextual reason for his arrest.

Absent any showing that the content of Plaintiff’s message motivated his arrest, Plaintiff

fails to raise a genuine dispute that the enforcement of the restricted area was content-neutral.

Such a “content-neutral time, place, or manner restriction can survive intermediate scrutiny if

[D]efendants make three showings.” See Reform Am., 37 F.4th at 1149.

b. Significant Governmental Interest

First, the enforcement of the restricted area “must have served a ‘significant

governmental interest.’” Id. at 1149 (quoting Ward, 491 U.S. at 791). Defendant Metro names

multiple interests in the restricted area: “to protect the venue and spectators attending the events

at Churchill Downs,” along with accounting for “perimeter and event security, traffic control and

access, and safety and medical in support of the Kentucky Oaks and Kentucky Derby.” Appellee

Metro’s Br. at 32 (quoting Permit Appl., R. 55-3, Page ID #487). Defendant Metro argues that

public safety and security against potential violence at the Kentucky Derby is a particularly

important interest because the event is one of the largest sporting events in the world, with an

expected peak attendance of 160,000 people at any given time.

Those asserted reasons constitute significant governmental interests. The Supreme Court

has recognized similar purposes as significant interests: “Because the [f]air attracts large crowds,

it is apparent that the State's interest in the orderly movement and control of such an assembly of

persons is a substantial consideration. As a general matter, it is clear that a [s]tate's interest in

protecting the safety and convenience of persons using a public forum is a valid governmental

objective.” Heffron, 452 U.S. at 650 (citations and quotations omitted). Additionally, this Court

No. 25-5014 Blankenship v. Louisville-Jefferson Cnty., Ky. Page 14

Metro Gov’t, et al.

has recognized “crowd control” as a legitimate reason for restriction, Spingola, 39 F. App’x at

984, and that “[p]ublic safety and security against potential violence are no doubt significant

governmental interests.” Reform Am., 37 F.4th at 1149–50.

Plaintiff points to Saieg in arguing that Defendants do not assert a significant

governmental interest in this case. In Saieg, the defendants identified the following interests in a

leafleting restriction at a festival: “relieving pedestrian overcrowding, enhancing traffic flow,

minimizing threats to public safety, and limiting disorderliness at the [f]estival.” 641 F.3d at 736

(cleaned up). We held that such interests were merely “conjectural” under the facts of that case.

Id. at 737 (quoting Turner Broad. Sys., Inc. v. F.C.C., 512 U.S. 622, 664 (1994)). We noted that

the sidewalks along the festival’s perimeter were “open for public use,” such that festival

organizers “intentionally maintained the public character of the sidewalks” and kept “those

sidewalks open for traffic that is unrelated to the [f]estival.” Id. Because the defendants chose

“to keep the sidewalks open for public use,” we held that the defendant showed that “the

interests in crowd control and public safety are not so pressing that they justify restricting normal

activity that occurs on streets and sidewalks.” Id. We also noted that the festival organizers

allowed vendors on the sidewalk, which further belied “the significance of their interest in clear

sidewalks and crowd control.” Id. Unlike in Saieg, however, Churchill Downs closed off from

the public several sidewalks and streets along the event perimeter, including along Central

Avenue, and enclosed the sidewalk where Plaintiff remained with fencing, marking the area with

“NO TRESPASSING” signs. Plaintiff’s own bodycam footage illustrates that the sidewalk

along Central Avenue within the restricted area functioned as a pathway to the Kentucky Derby,

with hundreds of patrons walking within the fenced area towards the event. Churchill Downs did

not keep the “sidewalks open for traffic that is unrelated to the [event].” See Saieg, 641 F.3d at

737. Moreover, unlike in Saieg, the record here does not indicate that multiple authorized

vendors were stationed along the enclosed sidewalk. The evidence, therefore, does not undercut

Defendants’ asserted interests, and this case is distinguishable from Saieg. Plaintiff thus fails to

raise a genuine dispute that the enforcement of the restricted area served significant

governmental interests.

No. 25-5014 Blankenship v. Louisville-Jefferson Cnty., Ky. Page 15

Metro Gov’t, et al.

c. Narrowly Tailored

The enforcement of the restricted area must also be “narrowly tailored” to its purpose,

“meaning that the restriction survives so long as the governmental interest would have been

achieved less effectively in its absence.” Reform Am., 37 F.4th at 1149 (citations and quotations

omitted). In “the context of intermediate scrutiny as applied to a content-neutral time, place, or

manner restriction, we simply ask whether the state would have achieved its asserted interest

‘less effectively absent the regulation.’” Id. at 1151 (quoting Ward, 491 U.S. at 799).

Defendants would have achieved their interests in safety and security of the event, along

with traffic control, less effectively in the absence of a restricted area. A great number of people

were expected to attend the event. Without establishing and enforcing a restricted area, security

and police would have had no control over the individuals present within the immediate vicinity

of the Kentucky Derby and may have had difficulty ensuring an orderly flow of people into the

event. See id. at 1151 (holding that the defendants “have easily shown that the restricted area

satisfies that standard” because without it, “officers would have had no control over which or

how many individuals were present in the immediate vicinity of [the event],” and the restricted

area produced “a smaller and more manageable crowd for law enforcement to superintend”).

Plaintiff argues that the enforcement of the restricted area is not narrowly tailored

because Defendants “burdened substantially more speech than necessary” by “ceding complete

control over public property to a private entity, authorizing and enforcing the exclusion of

Blankenship simply because he was unwanted.” Appellant’s Br. at 41. It is true that, to be

narrowly tailored, a restriction may not burden “substantially more speech than is necessary to

further [its] goal.” Spingola, 39 F. App’x at 984 (citing Ward, 491 U.S. at 799). But Plaintiff

again highlights only distinguishable cases for this argument. In McCullen v. Coakley, the

Supreme Court held that “35-foot buffer zones [that prohibited protesting] at every [abortion]

clinic across the [state]” is “hardly a narrowly tailored solution” because the defendant had “a

variety of approaches that appear capable of serving its interests [in preventing congestion

outside abortion clinics], without excluding individuals from areas historically open for speech

and debate.” 573 U.S. 464, 493–94 (2014). Churchill Downs did not create the equivalent of a

No. 25-5014 Blankenship v. Louisville-Jefferson Cnty., Ky. Page 16

Metro Gov’t, et al.

protest-free zone outside of every healthcare facility across the state, but rather temporarily

restricted public access in the immediate streets and sidewalks near one of the largest sporting

events in the world. Apart from restricting entrance to authorized ticket holders and properly

credentialed individuals in the immediate area of the Kentucky Derby, there was not “a variety of

approaches that appear capable of serving” the interests of public security and safety, along with

traffic control, for the event. Id. at 494. Plaintiff also points to McMahon v. City of Panama City

Beach, where the court held that a city’s “stated policy of unquestioning deference to the whims

of the permit holder in enforcing trespass statutes at a free and open-to-the-public event is, to put

it gently, troubling.” 180 F. Supp. 3d 1076, 1106 (N.D. Fla. 2016). Not only is McMahon not

binding on this Court, but also the Kentucky Derby is not a “free and open-to-the-public event.”

See id. Further, the permit did not provide “unquestioning deference to the whims” of Churchill

Downs, see id., inasmuch as Churchill Downs was prohibited from taking any action “not

allowed by established law,” Sweeney Dep., R. 59-3, Page ID #873. Plaintiff, therefore, fails to

raise a genuine dispute that the enforcement of the restricted area is narrowly tailored.

d. Alternative Channels

Third, Defendants must show that the enforcement of the restricted area “left open ample

alternative channels of communication” for Plaintiff to spread his message. Reform Am., 37

F.4th at 1151 (citation and quotations omitted). The relevant question in this circuit is “whether

the proffered alternatives allow the speaker to reach its intended audience.” Contributor v. City

of Brentwood, 726 F.3d 861, 865 (6th Cir. 2013) (citations omitted). Although Plaintiff does not

articulate his intended audience in his brief, we may assume that the patrons of the Kentucky

Derby, in addition to members of the public, were Plaintiff’s intended audience. Plaintiff could

have still reached this audience, and likely even more people, by moving just outside of the

restricted area, only a half block away. In asking Plaintiff and his group to leave the restricted

area, a security guard for Churchill Downs confirmed: “You can go on the other side all you

want.” Video, R. 62, 13:10:35–13:10:39. Indeed, other members of Plaintiff’s group moved to a

different location and were able to continue spreading their message.

No. 25-5014 Blankenship v. Louisville-Jefferson Cnty., Ky. Page 17

Metro Gov’t, et al.

Plaintiff argues that he never received “the option to move,” Appellant’s Br. at 43, but the

record demonstrates that Plaintiff received multiple opportunities to move outside of the

restricted area and to continue spreading his message. Security guards for Churchill Downs first

instructed Plaintiff to leave and allowed Plaintiff the opportunity to move. Then Ball asked

Plaintiff to leave, and later, the Kentucky State Police troopers gave Plaintiff another opportunity

to move. Plaintiff refused these opportunities and remained in the restricted area.

Plaintiff alternatively argues that even if he had moved, relocating to the other side of the

street is not an alternative channel of communication. But in circumstances similar to this case,

this Court has held that a restricted area leaves open ample alternative channels where the

plaintiff could share his or her message across the street or virtually anywhere else. Reform Am.,

37 F.4th at 1151 (holding that “the restricted area left in place copious alternative channels”

because the plaintiff “could have engaged in its protest virtually anywhere outside the restricted

area”); Spingola, 39 F. App’x at 984–85 (finding an “alternative channel for speech has

obviously been provided” where the plaintiff could stand in a “designated speaking area” or

“anywhere outside the grounds of the festival if he so chose”); Grider v. Abramson, 180 F.3d

739, 751 (6th Cir. 1999) (“[T]he plaintiffs nevertheless had ample alternate channels of public

communication to proclaim their philosophical, political, or other agendas within the immediate

geographical area of the two scheduled rally sites by carrying signs or banners, broadcasting on a

street corner located outside but adjacent to the restricted area . . . or by arranging their own rally

at a site outside the restricted area.”). Plaintiff could have stood on public property (i.e., streets

and sidewalks) anywhere outside the restricted area, including just a half block away, to spread

his message. Moreover, Plaintiff’s message would have likely still been fully audible to the

patrons of the Kentucky Derby, since Plaintiff and his group were shouting and using

megaphones and other sound equipment to convey their message. Plaintiff thus fails to raise a

genuine dispute that he had ample alternative channels for communication.

Based on the record before us, it appears that Churchill Downs and the Kentucky State

Police were concerned about Plaintiff and his group blocking or impeding the orderly entrance of

the crowd into the Kentucky Derby, not seeking to thwart Plaintiff’s efforts to disseminate his

message. With all three showings met, the enforcement of the restricted area satisfies

No. 25-5014 Blankenship v. Louisville-Jefferson Cnty., Ky. Page 18

Metro Gov’t, et al.

intermediate scrutiny, and the district court did not err in granting summary judgment to

Defendants on Plaintiff’s free speech claim.

C. Free Exercise Claim

To the extent that Plaintiff appeals the district court’s grant of summary judgment to

Defendants on his free exercise claim under the First Amendment, Plaintiff has failed to preserve

the issue on appeal. To preserve an issue, a litigant must (1) “state the issue with sufficient

clarity to give the court and opposing parties notice that it is asserting the issue” and (2) provide

“some minimal level of argumentation in support of it” before the district court. United States v.

Huntington Nat’l Bank, 574 F.3d 329, 332 (6th Cir. 2009).

Plaintiff brought a free exercise claim under the First Amendment against Defendants in

his complaint. In Plaintiff’s motion for summary judgment, Plaintiff argued that “there is no

genuine dispute as to any material fact concerning whether Defendants violated Plaintiff’s First

Amendment rights.” Pl.’s Mot., R. 58, Page ID #726. In his motion, however, Plaintiff’s

argument focused solely on his free speech claim, and he provided little to no explanation

regarding his free exercise claim. The district court noted that Plaintiff “hardly distinguishes his

two First Amendment claims” and held that Defendants were “entitled to judgment as a matter of

law” because Plaintiff failed to show that the challenged restrictions had more than an incidental

effect on Plaintiff’s preaching. Order, R. 101, Page ID #1332–33.

On appeal, in his statement of issues, Plaintiff refers generally to his “First Amendment

rights.” See Appellant’s Br. at 2. In his entire appellate brief, Plaintiff mentions “free exercise”

only twice, states that Defendants “unlawfully censored speech and religious exercise,” and

claims that Defendants “have successfully chilled Blankenship’s core religious speech” in

violation of the First Amendment. Id. at 4, 30, 43, 44. Besides these passing and conclusory

remarks, Plaintiff does not provide any argumentation in his brief regarding his free exercise

claim. Although the Free Exercise and Free Speech Clauses of the First Amendment “work in

tandem,” they offer different protections and require separate analyses. Kennedy v. Bremerton

Sch. Dist., 597 U.S. 507, 523 (2022); Autocam Corp. v. Sebelius, 730 F.3d 618, 628 (6th Cir.

2013) (“The Free Exercise Clause and Free Speech Clause of the First Amendment have

No. 25-5014 Blankenship v. Louisville-Jefferson Cnty., Ky. Page 19

Metro Gov’t, et al.

historically been interpreted in very different ways.” (citation omitted)), vacated, 573 U.S. 956

(2014). In instances where issues are “adverted to in a perfunctory manner, unaccompanied by

some effort at developed argumentation, we consider them forfeited.” Buetenmiller v. Macomb

Cnty. Jail, 53 F.4th 939, 946 (6th Cir. 2022) (citation and quotations omitted). Since Plaintiff

failed to develop any argument regarding his free exercise claim under the First Amendment,

Plaintiff failed to preserve this issue, and this Court need not address the merits of the claim.

D. Due Process Claim

Plaintiff appeals the district court’s grant of summary judgment to Defendants on his due

process claim under the Fourteenth Amendment. “The Due Process Clauses of the Fifth and

Fourteenth Amendments provide the constitutional foundation for the void-for-vagueness

doctrine.” Belle Maer Harbor v. Charter Twp. of Harrison, 170 F.3d 553, 556 (6th Cir. 1999)

(citations omitted). As a preliminary matter, an “individual ‘must establish that [he or] she has

been deprived of a life, liberty, or property interest sufficient to trigger the protection of the Due

Process Clause’ before being allowed to raise a Due Process challenge.” Tomaszczuk v.

Whitaker, 909 F.3d 159, 164 (6th Cir. 2018) (quoting Ashki v. INS, 233 F.3d 913, 921 (6th Cir.

2000)). In the argument in support of his due process claim, Plaintiff alleges a violation of his

First Amendment rights, which is sufficient to trigger protection of the Due Process Clause. See

Bauer v. Montgomery, 215 F.3d 656, 661 (6th Cir. 2000) (“First Amendment freedoms of speech

and association are within the term ‘liberty’ as protected by the due process clause of the

Fourteenth Amendment.” (citations omitted)).

To succeed on a vagueness claim, a plaintiff must show that the relevant ordinance

“(1) fails to provide people of ordinary intelligence a reasonable opportunity to understand what

conduct it prohibits or (2) authorizes or even encourages arbitrary and discriminatory

enforcement.” Brown v. City of Albion, 136 F.4th 331, 344 (6th Cir. 2025) (cleaned up); Hill v.

Colorado, 530 U.S. 703, 732 (2000).

Plaintiff provides minimal argument in support of his due process claim. Plaintiff argues

that Metro’s policy is “vague” and “allows for unbridled discretion in enforcement.” Appellant’s

Br. at 53. In a different section of his brief, Plaintiff describes the challenged policy as the

No. 25-5014 Blankenship v. Louisville-Jefferson Cnty., Ky. Page 20

Metro Gov’t, et al.

“permitting scheme” in which “Metro cedes control over public property to private entities by

granting them a permit” pursuant to Metro’s Code. Id. at 49. Although Plaintiff does not

specifically address any portion of Metro’s Code, Metro’s Code provides in relevant part: “No

person shall participate or take part in, promote, organize, form, hold, or assist in organizing any

parade or public assembly within Jefferson County unless a permit has been obtained from the

Licensing and Permit Division designee.” LOUISVILLE-JEFFERSON, KY., CODE OF ORDINANCES §

100.02(A).

Plaintiff does not argue that the permitting scheme “fails to provide people of ordinary

intelligence a reasonable opportunity to understand what conduct it prohibits.” See Brown, 136

F.4th at 344. Further, Plaintiff does not argue that he himself was unable to understand what

conduct the permitting scheme prohibits (nor does the permitting scheme prohibit any conduct of

Plaintiff’s for that matter, as Plaintiff was not a permit holder). Therefore, the first method of

demonstrating unconstitutional vagueness is foreclosed.

As to the second method, Plaintiff fails to show that the permitting scheme “authorizes or

even encourages arbitrary and discriminatory enforcement.” See id. (cleaned up). To that end,

Plaintiff offers only a bare assertion: “The permit itself was vague, and together with Metro’s

laissez-faire treatment of the permit, led to Churchill Downs treating public streets and sidewalks

like their own private property, and excluding whomever they wished based on a non-existent

ticketing requirement.” Appellant’s Br. at 53–54. Plaintiff has neither pointed to any section of

Metro’s Code, nor highlighted any term or provision in Metro’s Code, that Plaintiff believes is

vague. See 600 Marshall Ent. Concepts, LLC v. City of Memphis, 705 F.3d 576, 587 (6th Cir.

2013) (holding that the plaintiff “has not shown that the [o]rdinance itself is unconstitutionally

vague” where the plaintiff “has not pointed to any term or provision in the [o]rdinance that it

believes is vague”). Moreover, although the permitting scheme may have allowed public streets

to function temporarily as Churchill Downs’s private property for the duration of the Kentucky

Derby, the permitting scheme never authorized or encouraged Churchill Downs to exclude

whomever they wished in violation of the law. As previously mentioned, Metro’s Code

provides: “A permitee shall comply with all terms and conditions set forth in a permit, with the

provisions of this chapter, and with all other applicable laws and ordinances.” LOUISVILLE-

No. 25-5014 Blankenship v. Louisville-Jefferson Cnty., Ky. Page 21

Metro Gov’t, et al.

JEFFERSON, KY., CODE OF ORDINANCES § 100.08. The special events manager for Metro

reaffirmed that the permit did not allow Churchill Downs to take any action that is “not allowed

by established law.” Sweeney Dep., R. 59-3, Page ID #873.

Additionally, the permitting scheme itself was not even enforced against Plaintiff in this

case. Plaintiff testified that Metro representatives had no involvement in his arrest. Defendant

Young alone made the decision to arrest Plaintiff, and he did so because Plaintiff “was remaining

unlawfully on the premises after having been told numerous times to vacate and refusing to do

so.” Young Dep., R. 55-2, Page ID #407–08. Defendant Young enforced only a criminal

trespass law against Plaintiff. See Ky. Rev. Stat. § 511.080 (“A person is guilty of criminal

trespass in the third degree when he knowingly enters or remains unlawfully in or upon

premises.”). Plaintiff thus fails to demonstrate that in this case, let alone any case, Metro’s code

“authorizes or even encourages arbitrary and discriminatory enforcement.” See Brown, 136

F.4th at 344 (cleaned up). The district court did not err in granting summary judgment to

Defendants on Plaintiff’s due process claim.

E. Monell Claim

Plaintiff appeals the district court’s grant of summary judgment to Defendant Metro on

his municipal liability claim under Monell. Under Monell’s doctrine of municipal liability, “an

injured plaintiff can sue a local government directly for the unconstitutional actions of its

employees when those actions are taken pursuant to a policy or custom of the governing body.”

Ramage v. Louisville-Jefferson Cnty. Metro Gov’t, 520 F. App’x 341, 345 (6th Cir. 2013) (citing

Monell v. Dep’t of Soc. Servs., 436 U.S. 658, 690–91 (1978)). However, “there is no liability

under Monell without an underlying constitutional violation.” Zucker v. City of Farmington

Hills, 643 F. App’x 555, 570 (6th Cir. 2016) (citing Robertson v. Lucas, 753 F.3d 606, 622 (6th

Cir. 2014)). Therefore, a plaintiff “must show that [the local government] violated their

constitutional rights before they can establish Monell liability.” Hart v. Twp. of Presque Isle,

No. 24-2124, 2025 WL 2591409, at *3 (6th Cir. Sept. 8, 2025)). As set forth above, Plaintiff

fails to demonstrate an underlying constitutional violation. Metro, therefore, cannot be held

liable under Monell. See Martin v. Maurer, 581 F. App’x 509, 512 (6th Cir. 2014) (holding that

No. 25-5014 Blankenship v. Louisville-Jefferson Cnty., Ky. Page 22

Metro Gov’t, et al.

a plaintiff’s Monell claim fails because she “failed to state a constitutional violation”). Since

Plaintiff fails to demonstrate an underlying constitutional violation, the district court did not err

in granting summary judgment to Defendant Metro as to Plaintiff’s Monell claim.

F. Qualified Immunity

Plaintiff appeals the district court’s grant of qualified immunity to Defendant Young at

summary judgment. “Under the doctrine of qualified immunity, ‘government officials

performing discretionary functions generally are shielded from liability for civil damages insofar

as their conduct does not violate clearly established statutory or constitutional rights of which a

reasonable person would have known.’” Phillips v. Roane Cnty., 534 F.3d 531, 538 (6th Cir.

2008) (quoting Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 818 (1982)). “To prevail against a defense

of qualified immunity, a plaintiff must first establish the constitutional right that [he or] she

claims was violated by the defendants.” Gragg v. Kentucky Cabinet for Workforce Dev., 289

F.3d 958, 964 (6th Cir. 2002); see Wilson v. Layne, 526 U.S. 603, 609 (1999) (“A court

evaluating a claim of qualified immunity must first determine whether the plaintiff has alleged

the deprivation of an actual constitutional right at all, and if so, proceed to determine whether

that right was clearly established at the time of the alleged violation.” (citation and quotations

omitted)). As set forth above, Plaintiff cannot overcome Defendant Young’s defense of qualified

immunity because Plaintiff has not established a violation of a constitutional right. See Anderson

v. Ravenna Twp. Fire Dep’t., 159 F. App’x 619, 626 (6th Cir. 2005) (holding that the plaintiff

“cannot overcome the individual defendants’ defense of qualified immunity with respect to being

sued in their individual capacities” because the plaintiff “failed to demonstrate that there was any

violation of his constitutional rights” (citations omitted)). Since Plaintiff fails to establish a

violation of a constitutional right, the district court did not err in granting qualified immunity to

Defendant Young on Plaintiff’s claims against Defendant Young in his individual capacity.

III. CONCLUSION

For the reasons set forth above, this Court AFFIRMS the judgment of the district court.