The opinion
1 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
2 SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA
3 Julieth Mayerly DURAN ROMERO, Case No.: 25-cv-3567-AGS-VET
4 Petitioner, ORDER REQUIRING RESPONSE
5 v.
6 Christopher J. LaROSE, et al.,
7 Respondents.
8
9 Petitioner Julieth Duran Romero seeks a writ of habeas corpus under 28 U.S.C.
10 § 2241 challenging her immigration detention. At this stage, she need only make out a
11 claim that is sufficiently cognizable to warrant a response. See Rules Governing Section
12 2254 Cases in the United States District Courts, Rule 4 (authorizing summary dismissal “if
13 it plainly appears from the petition and any attached exhibits that the petitioner is not
14 entitled to relief”); id., Rule 1(b) (permitting application of Rules Governing Section 2254
15 Cases to any “habeas corpus petition”). In this context, the relevant federal rules permit
16 “summary dismissal of claims that are clearly not cognizable.” Neiss v. Bludworth, 114
17 F.4th 1038, 1045 (9th Cir. 2024) (cleaned up). But “as long as a petition has any potential
18 merit, it is not so frivolous or incredible as to justify summary dismissal[.]” Id.
19 Duran Romero alleges that she’s been in immigration custody since “November 11,
20 2025,” after originally being detained upon entry in “January 2023” and being released on
21 “her own recognizance.” (ECF 1, at 6.) She claims to be subject to “mandatory detention”
22 and categorically ineligible for a “custody redetermination” under 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b).
23 (ECF 1, at 4, 6.) This is because a Board of Immigration Appeals’ opinion in “Matter of
24 Yajure Hurtado” “affirm[ed] the government’s new interpretation of § 1225” to apply to
25 individuals in her circumstances. (ECF 1, at 5.) Petitioner challenges her detention under
26 Yajure Hurtado and the government’s allegedly new, broader interpretation of § 1225,
27 claiming it “(a) disregards the plain meaning of section 1225(b)(2)(A); (b) disregards the
28 relationship between sections 1225 and 1226; (c) would render a recent amendment to
1 ||section 1226(c) superfluous; and (d) is inconsistent with decades of prior statutory
2 interpretation and practice.” (ECF 1, at 5.)
3 This challenge is sufficient to warrant a response. Functionally identical cases across
4 || the country have been found to have a “likelihood of success on the merits” or have resulted
5 ||in the writ being issued. See, e.g., Mosqueda v. Noem, No. 5:25-cv-02304 CAS (BFM),
6 WL 2591530, at *5 (C.D. Cal. Sept. 8, 2025) (“[T]he Court concludes that petitioners
7 ||are likely to succeed on the merits of their claims because section 1226(a), not section
8 || 1225(b)(2), likely governs their detention.”); Vazquez v. Feeley, No. 2:25-cv-01542-RFB-
9 2025 WL 2676082, at *11 (D. Nev. Sept. 17, 2025) (same); see also Rodriguez vy.
10 || Bostock, No. 3:25-cv-05240-TMC, 2025 WL 2782499, at *1 (W.D. Wash. Sept. 30, 2025)
11 ||(noting at the time “[e]very district court to address this question has concluded that the
12 ||government’s position belies the statutory text of the INA, canons of statutory
13 |/interpretation, legislative history, and longstanding agency practice.”); Quispe v.
14 || Crawford, No. 1:25-cv-1471-AJT-LRV, 2025 WL 2783799, at *6 (E.D. Va. Sept. 29,
15 |}2025) (“Petitioner’s detention is governed by § 1226(a)’s discretionary framework, not
16 1225(b)’s mandatory detention procedures, as at least thirty federal district courts around
17 || the country, including two in this Circuit, have concluded when faced with habeas petitions
18 || from comparably situated petitioners.”).
19 By December 30, 2025, respondent must answer the petition. Any reply by
20 || petitioner must be filed by January 8, 2026. The Court will hold oral arguments on the
21 || petition on January 14, 2026, at 3:00 p.m.
22 ||Dated: December 15, 2025
4 Hon. rew G. Schopler
United States District Judge
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