BROWN

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA

JASON L. BROWN,

Plaintiff,

CIVIL ACTION

v. NO. 25-3008

PORT AUTHORITY TRANSIT

CORPORATION,

Defendant.

Pappert, J. December 12, 2025

MEMORANDUM

Pro se plaintiff Jason Brown again sues his employer, the Port Authority Transit

Corporation, under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 alleging retaliation and

hostile work environment. PATCO moves to dismiss the amended complaint and the

Court grants the motion because Brown fails again to allege facts which could state

such claims.

I

A

The Court dismissed Brown’s original complaint on September 11, 2025, giving

him until October 11 to amend his pleading. See Brown v. Port Auth. Transit Corp., No.

25-3008, 2025 WL 2627689 (E.D. Pa. Sept. 11, 2025); (Sept. 11, 2025 Order at 1, Dkt.

No. 16.) On October 10, Brown filed a “motion for summary judgment” in which he

attempted to clarify his original complaint. See (Pl.’s Mot. for Summ. J. at 1–12, Dkt.

No. 17). A few weeks later, the Court ordered PATCO to treat Brown’s motion as an

amended complaint and file a response. (Oct. 27, 2025 Order at 1–2, Dkt. No. 19.)

PATCO moved to dismiss Brown’s claims with prejudice, see (Def.’s Mot. to Dismiss at

1, Dkt. No. 20), and Brown filed a response, labelling it a “second motion for summary

judgment,” see (Pl.’s Second Mot. for Summ. J. at 1–14, Dkt. No. 21).

As a general rule, if “a plaintiff amends [his] complaint, the new pleading

supersedes the old one: The original pleading no longer performs any function in the

case.” Royal Canin U.S.A., Inc. v. Wullschleger, 145 S. Ct. 41, 52 (2025) (citation

omitted). But this rule does not apply if the “amended complaint specifically refers to

or adopts the earlier pleading.” West Run Student Hous. Assocs., LLC v. Huntington

Nat’l Bank, 712 F.3d 165, 171 (3d Cir. 2013) (citation omitted). Here, given that Brown

attempts to clarify his original pleading, he “filed [his] amended complaint with the

intention of supplementing [his] original complaint, not superseding it.” Phillip v.

Atlantic City Med. Ctr., 861 F. Supp. 2d 459, 462 n. 9 (D.N.J. 2012). The Court will

therefore “construe[] both the original complaint and the amended complaint and

consider[] these documents together in ruling on the pending motion[].” Id.

B

Brown began working for PATCO as a custodian in 2019 and became the senior

custodian on the night shift in October of 2024. (Pl.’s Mot. for Summ. J. ¶¶ 1–3.)

Around that time, the “custodial department faced overtime problems.” (Id. ¶ 4.)

Brown’s allegations about those problems remain unclear, but their gravamen appears

to be that PATCO did not permit night shift custodians to work as many overtime

hours as morning shift custodians. Brown, 2025 WL 2627689, at *1. In November of

2024, Brown emailed John Rink, his PATCO general manager, expressing “concern

about overtime and how it was being distributed [among] the custodians.” (Original

Compl. ¶ 2, Dkt. No. 1); see also (Pl.’s Mot. for Summ. J. at Page 8) (alleging he “made

an informal complaint and or inquiry about overtime access to his general manager”);

(Pl.’s Second Mot. for Summ. J. at 4–5) (alleging he “brought to the attention of

management” that “one crew [i.e., morning shift custodians] ha[d] . . . more access to

overtime [than another crew, i.e., night shift custodians]”). Sometime after Brown

emailed Rink, a PATCO director further reduced overtime opportunities for night shift

custodians. (Pl.’s Mot. for Summ. J. ¶ 15.) Brown alleges “only one custodian on night

shift could . . . access . . . overtime weekly . . . while the morning shift custodians [still]

had plentiful opportunities to engage in overtime.” (Id. ¶ 8); (Original Compl. ¶ 14.) In

sum, after Brown “made an informal complaint and or inquiry about overtime access,” a

PATCO director created an overtime policy that “included [even] less access to

overtime” for night shift custodians. (Pl.’s Mot. for Summ. J. at Page 8.)

II

A

Brown suggests PATCO retaliated against him. See, e.g., (PATCO’s Mem. of L.

in Supp. of Mot. to Dismiss at 14, Dkt. No. 20) (explaining Brown does not assert a

“standalone retaliation claim” in his amended complaint but “obliquely” refers to such a

claim). Title VII prohibits an employer from retaliating against an employee because

that employee “opposed any practice” made unlawful by Title VII or “made a charge,

testified, assisted, or participated in” a Title VII proceeding. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-3(a). To

state a claim for retaliation, Brown must show (1) he engaged in protected activity, (2)

he later suffered an adverse employment action and (3) there was a causal link between

the protected activity and the employer’s action. Connelly v. Lane Constr. Corp., 809

F.3d 780, 789 (3d Cir. 2016).

1

Brown first suggests a PATCO director reduced overtime opportunities for night

shift custodians because he “brought to the attention of management” that “one crew”

(morning shift custodians) “ha[d] . . . more access to overtime” than his crew (night shift

custodians). (Pl.’s Second Mot. for Summ. J. at 4–5); see also (Pl.’s Mot. for Summ. J. at

8.) But for the reasons the Court previously explained, Brown fails to allege sufficient

facts to support two elements of a retaliation claim: protected activity and causation.

First, an employee engages in protected activity if he “oppose[s]” an employment

practice Title VII forbids. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-3(a); Moore v. City of Philadelphia, 461

F.3d 331, 341 (3d Cir. 2006). Title VII “prohibits employers from discriminating on the

basis of race, color, religion, sex, or national origin.” Slagle v. County of Clarion, 435

F.3d 262, 265 (3d Cir. 2006). An informal complaint may qualify as protected activity if

it “protest[s]” a “discriminatory practice” made unlawful by Title VII. Aman v. Cort

Furniture Rental Corp., 85 F.3d 1074, 1085 (3d Cir. 1996). To determine whether a

plaintiff complained about a discriminatory practice under Title VII, the Court must

focus on the “message” he conveyed to his employer. Moore, 461 F.3d at 343 (citation

omitted).

Brown says he engaged in protected activity when he “brought to the attention of

management” that “one crew” (morning shift custodians) “ha[d] . . . more access to

overtime” than another crew (night shift custodians). (Pl.’s Second Mot. for Summ. J.

at 4–5.) Yet Brown did not oppose, or protest, something that Title VII proscribes—

discrimination based on race, color, religion, sex or national origin. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-

2(a)(1). Brown complained that night shift custodians were being treated unfairly

because PATCO permitted morning shift custodians to work overtime more than night

shift custodians. This is a “[g]eneral complaint[] of unfair treatment” unconnected to

race, color, religion, sex or national origin. Davis v. City of Newark, 417 F. App’x 201,

203 (3d Cir. 2011) (per curiam). And a “general complaint of unfair treatment does not

translate into a charge of illegal” race, color, religion, sex, or national origin treatment.

Barber v. CSX Distrib. Servs., 68 F.3d 694, 702 (3d Cir. 1995).

Second, even if Brown engaged in protected activity and later suffered an

adverse employment action in the form of overtime reduction, he fails to show a causal

link between the protected activity and the employer’s action. To establish causation,

Brown must show one of four things: (1) a “temporal proximity” between the protected

activity and adverse action that is “unusually suggestive of retaliatory motive,” (2) a

“pattern of antagonism” towards him after he sent his email, (3) inconsistencies in the

employer’s explanations for the adverse action, or (4) other facts from which the Court

could infer causation. Carvalho-Grevious v. Del. State Univ., 851 F.3d 249, 260 (3d Cir.

2017) (citations omitted); Connelly, 809 F.3d at 789, 793; Petril v. Cheyney Univ. of P.A.,

789 F. Supp. 2d 574, 581–82 (E.D. Pa. 2011).

Brown again fails to plead sufficient facts to support any theory of causation. He

does not allege the specific temporal proximity between his complaint and the decision

by the PATCO director to reduce overtime for night shift custodians. He does not plead

facts showing that PATCO engaged in a pattern of antagonism after his email and

before the overtime reduction decision. He shows no inconsistent explanations by

PATCO for the decision to reduce overtime for night shift custodians. And he pleads no

other allegations from which the Court could infer causation.

2

Under Brown’s second retaliation theory, a PATCO director reduced overtime

opportunities for night shift custodians because he had previously sued that director for

“racial discrimination.” (Pl.’s Mot. for Summ. J. ¶ 16.) But again, Brown fails to allege

sufficient facts to support a causal link between his lawsuit and the overtime reduction

decision.

Even if Brown previously engaged in protected conduct by suing a PATCO

employee for discriminatory conduct and later suffered an adverse employment action

in the form of overtime reduction, he fails to demonstrate a link between the lawsuit

and the overtime reduction decision. He states no specific details, including the

“nature,” of his previous lawsuit. (PATCO’s Mem. of L. in Supp. of Mot. to Dismiss at

18.) He does not allege the temporal proximity between the lawsuit and the decision to

reduce overtime for night shift custodians. He fails to allege facts showing that PATCO

(or any of its employees) engaged in a pattern of antagonism after he filed his lawsuit.

And he pleads no other facts from which the Court could infer that he lost overtime

opportunities because of his lawsuit.

B

Brown next alleges PATCO subjected him to a hostile work environment because

after he complained to his general manager, (1) PATCO reduced his overtime

opportunities and (2) morning shift custodians left trash for night shift custodians to

clean. (Pl.’s Mot. for Summ. J. at 8–12.) Title VII prohibits “the creation of a hostile

work environment” on the basis of an employee’s race. Vance v. Ball State Univ., 570

U.S. 421, 427 (2013); Caver v. City of Trenton, 420 F.3d 243, 262 (3d Cir. 2005). To

state a claim for hostile work environment, Brown must allege facts to show (1) he

suffered intentional discrimination because of his race, (2) the discrimination was

severe or pervasive, (3) the discrimination detrimentally affected him, (4) the

discrimination would detrimentally affect a reasonable person in like circumstances

and (5) the existence of respondeat superior liability. Mandel v. M&Q Packaging Corp.,

706 F.3d 157, 167 (3d Cir. 2013).

Brown fails to state a plausible claim for at least two of the reasons the Court

previously explained: He does not allege sufficient facts to support that he suffered

intentional discrimination because of race that was severe or pervasive. Brown, 2025

WL 2627689, at *3–4. First, he fails to show intentional discrimination because of race.

Aside from his own subjective belief, no allegations permit the inference that Brown

suffered discriminatory harassment. He fails to allege any facts suggesting that

PATCO reduced overtime opportunities for night shift custodians or that morning shift

custodians left trash on the ground for him to clean because of his race.

Second, Brown fails to allege facts which could establish that the harassment

was severe or pervasive. Title VII does not create a workplace “civility code.” Faragher

v. City of Boca Raton, 524 U.S. 775, 788 (1998) (citation omitted). To succeed, Brown

must show that his “work environment was so pervaded by discrimination that the

terms and conditions of employment were altered.” Vance, 570 U.S. at 427. The

indignities that Brown claims to have suffered fall short of that bar. He, again, offers

two: PATCO reduced his overtime opportunities and morning shift custodians dirtied

up his work environment. These incidents do not reflect behavior that was physically

threatening, severe or humiliating; they instead reflect “ordinary tribulations” in the

workplace. Faragher, 524 U.S. at 788 (quotation marks and citation omitted).

III

A court should grant a plaintiff leave to amend “when justice so requires.” Fed.

R. Civ. P. 15(a)(2). But a court need not do so when amendment would be “futile.”

Vorchheimer v. Philadelphian Owners Ass’n, 903 F.3d 100, 113 (3d Cir. 2018).

Amendment is futile if it would not “cure the deficiency” in the complaint or would not

“withstand” another motion to dismiss. Jablonski v. Pan Am. World Airways, Inc., 863

F.2d 289, 292 (3d Cir. 1988). Because the Court gave Brown a chance to fix the

problems with his claims, and because he all but ignored the Court’s prior opinion,

amendment would be futile. See Jones v. Unknown D.O.C. Bus Driver & Transp. Crew,

944 F.3d 478, 483 (3d Cir. 2019) (explaining that amendment by a pro se plaintiff would

be futile when he “already had two chances to tell his story”); see also Caiby v. Link,

No. 22-cv-1403, 2023 WL 2539011, at *2 (E.D. Pa. Mar. 16, 2023) (dismissing a pro se

plaintiff’s amended complaint with prejudice because the Court gave him “a chance to

amend his original complaint, and he has still not stated a claim”).

An appropriate Order follows.

BY THE COURT:

_/s_/_ _G_e_r_a__ld__ J__. _P_a__p_p_e_r_t___

Gerald J. Pappert, J.