Ransom

□ Southern District of Texas

! | ENTERED

a December 15, 2025

FOR THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF TEXAS

HOUSTON DIVISION

A. RANSOM, » §

INDIVIDUALLY AND, AS NEXT §

OF FRIEND OF A.R., §

Plaintiffs, §

§

§ Civil Action No. H-25-4187 □

§

BRYCE BARRY AND HOUSTON §

INDEPENDENT SCHOOL §

DISTRICT, §

§

Defendants. § .

ORDER

Pending before the Court is Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss Plaintiffs’ First

Amended Petition Pursuant to Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 12(b)(1) and

12(b)(6) (Document No. 10). Having considered the Defendants’ motion,

submissions, and applicable law, the Court determines that the Defendants’ motion

should be granted.

I. BACKGROUND

This is a case arising from an incident at an elementary school in Houston,

Texas. Plaintiff A. Ransom is the parent of Plaintiff “A.R.,” a minor who attended

Barbara Bush Elementary School in the Houston Independent School District □

(“HISD”). Ransom brings suit against Defendant HISD and Defendant Bryce Barry

(“Barry”), the principal of Barbara Bush Elementary School, alleging that “[o]n or

about January 2025, ... AR, age seven years old, was repeatedly sexually harassed

and assaulted by a fellow ond Grade Student at Barbara Bush Elementary.”! Ransom

further alleges that she reported the assaults to Defendant Barry, who failed to

provide remedy, guidance, or assistance to Plaintiffs. Ransom further alleges that as

a result of Barry’s lack of response, her daughter was “forced to attend school in the

same classroom and in close proximity to her attacker each and every day.””

Based on the foregoing, on May 27, 2025, Ransom filed suit on behalf of her

minor daughter, A.R., in state court, asserting claims against Barry for negligence

and failure to adhere to the Texas Constitution and Texas Education Code. Ransom

also asserts claims against HISD under Section 1983 and Title [X. Ransom seeks

monetary relief in an amount between $1,000,000.00 and $5,000,000.00. On

September 4, 2025, Defendants removed the case to this Court pursuant to the

Court’s federal question jurisdiction. On November 3, 2025, Ransom filed her first

amended complaint. On November 17, 2025, Defendants moved to dismiss this case

pursuant to Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 12(b)(1) and 12(b)(6). Ransom did not

respond to Defendants’ motion to dismiss within either the original response date,

or the date of this Order.

! Plaintiffs’ Original Petition, Document No. 1 at Exhibit A-2 at q 9.

? Plaintiffs’ Original Petition, Document No. 1 at Exhibit A-2 at 10.

Rule 12(b)(6) allows dismissal if a plaintiff fails “to state aclaim upon which

relief can be granted.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6). Under Rule 8(a)(2), a pleading must

contain “a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the mieaden is entitled

to relief.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2). Although “the pleading standard Rule 8 announces

does not require ‘detailed factual allegations,’ .. . it demands more than . . . ‘labels

and conclusions.’” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (quoting Bell Atl.

Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007)). “TA] formulaic recitation of the

elements of a cause of action will not do.” Jd. (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555).

In deciding a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim, “[t]he

‘court accepts all well-pleaded facts as true, viewing them in the light most favorable

to the plaintiff.’” In re Katrina Canal Breeches Litig., 495 F.3d 191, 205 (5th Cir.

2007) (quoting Martin K. Eby Constr. Co. v. Dall. Area Rapid Transit, 369 F.3d 464,

467 (Sth Cir. 2004)). To survive the motion, a plaintiff must plead “enough facts to

state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” T wombly, 550 U.S. at 570.

“Conversely, ‘when the allegations in a complaint, however true, could not raise a

claim of entitlement to relief, this basic deficiency should . . . be exposed at the point

of minimum expenditure of time and money by the parties and the court.’” Cuvillier

v. Taylor, 503 F.3d 397, 401 (Sth Cir. 2007) (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 558).

3

I. LAW& ANALYSIS

Defendants move to dismiss Ransom’s complaint, contending that Ransom

lacks standing to bring claims against Defendants, and fails to state a claim upon

which relief can be granted. Ransom did not respond to Defendants’ motion to

dismiss, failing to rebut or offer evidence to counter Defendants’ contentions.

Pursuant to Local Rule 7.4, failure to respond is taken as a representation of no

opposition. S.D. Tex. Local R. 7.4. ©

Ransom brings claims for: (1) negligence against Barry and Defendants Jane

and John Doe, as next friend of the minor Jane Doe: (2) violations of 42 U.S.C. §

1983 by Defendants Barry and HISD; and (3) a violation of Title IX against HISD

solely. Regardless of Ransom’s failure to respond to Defendants motion to dismiss,

the Court will consider, in turn, the merits of Ransom’s claim against Defendants.

A. Bryce Barry and Unidentified Doe Defendants

Ransom alleges a common law negligence claim against Barry, contending

that he was “aware of the offensive conduct inflicted on Minor Plaintiff ... [and] was

also aware of the child perpetrator predilections for abuse of fellow students.”

Ransom further alleges that “Defendant Barry had a duty to follow the [School]

3 Piaintiffy’ Amended Complaint, Document No. 8 at § 19.

District’s policies and procedures for this type of offensive contact.” Ransom also

alleges a violation of Section 1983 against Barry for failing to “adhere to the policies

of the Houston Independent School District” or “fully and properly investigate”

Ransom’s concerns.’ In response, Barry contends that he is entitled to both qualified

immunity under federal law and professional immunity under the Texas Education

Code. Ransom offers no rebuttal.

Qualified immunity is an affirmative defense that exists to shield government

officials from liability “when their actions could reasonably have been believed to

be legal.” Morgan v. Swanson, 659 F.3d 359, 370- 31 (Sth Cir. 2011). The defense .

is available to government officials who perform discretionary functions “insofar as

their conduct does not violate clearly established rights of which a reasonable person

would have known.” Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 US. 800, 818 (1982). Turning to

professional immunity, under the Texas Education Code a “professional employee

of a school district is not personally liable for any act that is incident to or within the

scope of the duties of the employee’s position of employment, and that involves the

exercise of judgment or discretion on the part of the employee.” Tex. Educ. Code §

22.051. The only exception found within the professional immunity standard

4 Plaintiffs’ Amended Complaint, Document No. 8 at 421.

> Plaintiffs’ Amended Complaint, Document No. 8 at $93 132.

outlined by the Texas Education Code is “in circumstances in which a professional

employee uses excessive force in the discipline of students ér negligence resulting

in bodily injury to students. Jd.

Here, Barry contends that he is entitled to qualified immunity because he was

a state government employee acting within the scope of his duties without violating

any clearly established rights of the plaintiff. Barry also contends that he is entitled

to professional immunity under the Texas Education Code based on Ransom’s own

complaint. Barry notes Ransom’s acknowledgement in her lawsuit that Barry is the

school principal, thus satisfying the “professional employee” element under the

Texas Education Code. Barry further contends that Ransom alleges that Barry “had

been advised” to institute “several remedies” within the school, decisions that

inherently require judgment and discretion within the scope of Barry’s employment

with the school district. Ransom offers no rebuttal. An independent review of

Ransom’s amended complaint reveals allegations confirming the four elements to

establish professional immunity under the Texas Education Code, that: (1) Barry

was a professional employee of the school district; (2) his challenged conduct was

within the scope of his duties; (3) his duties involved the exercise of discretion; and

(4) his acts did not fall within the stated exceptions.

Based on the foregoing, the Court finds that Barry is entitled to both qualified

and professional immunity. Accordingly, the Court a that Ransom’s

meelieence and Section 1983 claims against Barry should be dismissed.

Ransom also asserts a negligence claim against Defendants “Jane and John

Doe, as next friend of the minor Jane Doe,” which Ransom describes as the alleged

perpetrator.° The Court notes that Ransom filed this case in state court on May 27,

2025. Pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 4(m), service was required to be

made upon all Defendants ninety days later, by August 25, 2025. A review of the

record in this case reveals that Ransom has failed to serve any of the unidentified

Doe Defendants either by the timeline required under the Federal Rules or by the

date of this Order. Based on the foregoing, the Court finds that Ransom’s claims

against the unidentified Doe Defendants should be dismissed. The Court will now

consider Ransom’s elim against the last remaining defendant, HISD.

B. Houston Independent School District

Ransom alleges violations of Section 1983 and Title IX against HISD,

contending that HISD “failed in its codified duties to Plaintiffs” and “acted with

6 Plaintiffs’ Amended Complaint, Document No. 8 at § 18.

deliberate indifference to reports of Sexual Harassment.”” The Court will consider

each claim in turn.

First, HISD contends that Ransom’s Section 1983 claim is frivolous because

Ransom attempts to use Section 1983 as a vehicle to assert state law claims. HISD

notes Ransom’s complaint in which she alleges that HISD “failed to adhere” to the

Texas Constitution and the Texas Education Code in violation of Section 1983.

Ransom offers no rebuttal. Considering the Fifth Circuit’s clear guidance that “[i]t

is fundamental to our federal jurisprudence that state tort claims are not actionable

under federal law” and that “a plaintiff under section 1983 must show deprivation of

a federal right,” the Court finds that Ransom’s Section. 1983 claim should be

dismissed. See Nesmith v. T. aylor, 715 F.2d 194, 195 (Sth Cir. 1983).

Second, HISD contends that Ransom’s Title IX claim should be dismissed

because Ransom fails to plead facts plausibly demonstrating the elements of a Title

IX claim as a matter of law. Ransom offers no rebuttal. “A school district that

receives federal funds may be liable for student-on-student harassment if the district:

(1) had actual knowledge of the harassment, (2) the harasser was under the district's

control, (3) the harassment was based on the victim's sex, (4) the harassment was so

severe, pervasive, and objectively offensive that it effectively barred the victim's

1 Plaintiffy’ Amended Complaint, Document No. 8 at 33, 37-39. oe

~~ access to an educational opportunity or benefit, and (5) the district was deliberately

indifferent to the harassment.” M_K. by and through Koepp v. Pearl River Cty. Sch.

Dist., 144 F.4th 801, 806 (Sth Cir. 2025) (citations and quotations omitted). The

Supreme Court has also made clear that it is unlikely a single instance of severe one-

on-one peer harassment could be said to have a systemic effect barring the victim’s

access to education. See Davis v. Monroe Cty. Bd. of Educ., 526 U.S. 629, 631 (1999)

(finding it unlikely that a single incident of student-on-student sexual abuse could

constitute systemic harassment under Title IX).

Here, a review of the record reveals that Ransom pleads her minor child A.R.

was subject to abuse by a peer in January of 2025. HISD contends that Ransom fails

to plead any other incidents that occurred with respect to A.R., further arguing that

Ransom fails to allege facts sufficient to show that the harassment was so pervasive

to effectively bar A.R.’s access to education. Based on the Supreme Court’s holding

in Davis finding it unlikely that a single incident of student-on-student sexual abuse

could constitute systemic harassment under Title IX, the Court declines to do so here

in the absence of an adequately plead complaint or response. Accordingly, the Court

determines that Ransom’s claim under Title [IX should be dismissed.

Having considered the pending motion, submissions, and applicable law, the

Court finds that Ransom states no plausible claim upon which relief can be granted

with respect to any of the defendants in this case. Accordingly, the Court determines

||

that the pending motion should be granted, and Ransom’s claims against all —

. defendants in this matter should be dismissed. .

IV. CONCLUSION

Based on the foregoing, the Court hereby

ORDERS that Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss Plaintiffs’ First Amended

. Petition Pursuant to Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 12(b)(1) and 12(b)(6)

(Document No. 10) is GRANTED. The Court further

ORDERS that Plaintiffs’ claims against Defendants are DISMISSED.

THIS IS A FINAL JUDGMENT.

SIGNED at Houston, Texas, on this AZ day of December, 2025.

ped tl

DAVID HITTNER

United States District Judge