Opinion

Opinion

Court
District Court, M.D. Louisiana
Filed
Dec 15, 2025
Cited by
0 cases
Authority
More cited than 37.7%

The opinion

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

MIDDLE DISTRICT OF LOUISIANA

IN RE: CIVIL ACTION

IN THE MATTER OF

APPROXIMATELY 1.96356404 BTC

AND 60139.57337 USDT IN

KUCOIN WALLET ADDRESS

ENDING IN LRTLOE2 WITH

ACCOUNTHOLDER NAME OF

MAYANK AGGARAWAL NO. 25-00432-BAJ-SDJ

RULING AND ORDER

This action seeks civil forfeiture of certain property allegedly derived from

wire fraud and money laundering offenses. (Doc. 1). Now before the Court is the

Plaintiffs Motion For Entry Of Default Judgment And For Order Of

Forfeiture (Doc. 5), seeking a _ final default judgment forfeiting

the Defendant Property to the United States, namely the approximately

1.96356404 BTC and 60139.57337 USDT in the KuCoin wallet address ending in

LRtLoE2, with the accountholder name of Mayank Aggarawal (collectively,

“Defendant Property”). No party has appeared before the Court to claim an interest

in the Defendant Property and there are no objections to the Government’s Motion.

For reasons to follow, the Government’s Motion will be GRANTED.

I, FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

On May 22, 2025, the United States filed its verified complaint for forfeiture

in rem, seeking forfeiture to the United States of the Defendant Property, pursuant

to 18 U.S.C. §§ 981(a)(1)(A) and (a)(1)(C). (Doe. 1, the “Verified Complaint”). The

Defendant Property was seized on or about February 4, 2025. Ud. at § 2).

The Verified Complaint alleges that the Defendant Property is believed to be the

proceeds of a wire fraud and money laundering offense. (/d. at 4 22-23).

The approximately 1.96356404 BTC and _ 60139.57337 USDT from

the KuCoin wallet address ending in LRtLoE2 from the KuCoin Cryptocurrency

Exchange is in the custody of the United States Secret Service. (Id. at { 2).

The KuCoin Cryptocurrency Exchange showed that the accountholder of

the wallet address was “Mayank Aggarawal” (““Aggarawal”). (Doc. 5-1 at 1). The only

address for Aggarawal known to the Government is email address

mayank.aggarawal@gmail.com. (/d. at 2). On May 28, 2025, the Government sent

written notice of this civil forfeiture action against the Defendant Property and a copy

of the Verified Complaint to Aggarawal because he was the only person who

reasonably appeared to be a potential claimant to the Defendant Property pursuant

to Rule G(4)(b)G) of the Supplemental Rules for Admiralty or Maritime Claims and

Asset Forfeiture Actions, Federal Rules of Civil Procedure (“Supplemental Rule G”).

(Id.). As of July 14, 2025, Aggarawal had not filed a claim, nor had he contacted

the United States about filing a claim. Ud. at 2-3). On July 14, 2025, out of an

abundance of caution, the United States emailed a final notice to Aggarawal,

extending the deadline within which to file a claim to the Defendant Property until

July 28, 2025. Ud. at 3). Aggarawal ultimately failed to file a claim to

the Defendant Property, although the notice letter indicated that “[flailure to follow

the requirements set forth above may result in judgment by default taken against

you for relief demanded in the Complaint[.]” Ud. at 2—8).

In addition to sending two direct notices to the only known potential claimant,

the Government published notice of the Verified Complaint to

http://www.forfeiture.gov, a U.S. Department of Justice forfeiture website, pursuant

to Supplemental Rule G(4)(a)(iv)(C). (Doc. 5-1 at 3; Doc. 5-7). This internet notice ran

for 30 consecutive days and advised that any claimant to the Defendant Property was

required to file a verified claim within 60 days from the first day of publication. (/d.).

Despite these notices and publications, no person or entity filed a valid claim to any

of the Defendant Property. (Doc. 5-1 at 8).

The United States submitted its Motion For Clerk’s Entry Of Default as to the

Defendant Property pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 55(a), on the basis

that “[nJo persons or entities have filed a claim” to the Defendant Property.

(Doc. 8 at 1). The United States supported its motion with the declaration of

Assistant U.S. Attorney J. Brady Casey. (Doc. 38-1). The Clerk granted

the Government’s Motion and entered default against the Defendant Property.

(Doc. 4). Since the Clerk’s entry of default, no party has filed a claim or an answer for

the Defendant Property.

Now before the Court is the United States’ Motion For Entry Of Default

Judgment And For Order Of Forfeiture (Doc. 5), seeking confirmation of the Clerk’s

entry of default, and a final judgment forfeiting the Defendant Property to

the United States. (Doc. 5).

TI. LAWAND ANALYSIS

A. Standard

The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit has adopted a three-step process

to obtain a default judgment. See N.Y. Life Ins. Co. v. Brown, 84 F.3d 187, 141

(5th Cir. 1996). First, a default occurs when a party “has failed to plead or otherwise

defend” against an action. Fed. R. Civ. P. 55(a). Next, an entry of default must be

entered by the Clerk when the default is shown “by affidavit or otherwise.” See td.

Third, a party may apply for a default judgment after an entry of default.

Fed. R. Civ. P. 55(b); N.Y. Life, 84 F.3d at 141.

After a party files for a default judgment, the Court applies a two-part analysis

to determine whether a final default judgment should be entered. First, the Court

considers whether the entry of default judgment is appropriate based on the factors

set forth in Lindsey v. Prive Corp., 161 F.3d 886, 893 (5th Cir. 1998). These factors

are: (1) whether there are material issues of fact at issue, (2) whether there has been

substantial prejudice, (8) whether the grounds for default have been clearly

established, (4) whether the default was caused by excusable neglect or good faith

mistake, (5) the harshness of the default judgment, and (6) whether the court would

think itself obliged to set aside the default on a motion for relief from the judgment.

Id.

Second, the Court assesses the merits of the action to determine whether

the plaintiff has a claim for relief. Nishimatsu Constr. Co. v. Hou. Natl Bank,

515 F.2d 1200, 1206 (5th Cir. 1975); Reyes v. VH Acoustic Ceilings, LLC,

No. 18-cv-00790, 2020 WL 504659, at *2 (M.D. La. Jan. 31, 2020) (Jackson, J.).

B. Discussion

“Default judgments are a drastic remedy, not favored by the Federal Rules and

resorted to by courts only in extreme situations.” Reyes, 2020 WL 504659, at *2

(citing Lindsey, 161 F.3d at 893). Here, however, no party has filed an Answer to the

Government’s Verified Complaint or responded in any way, the Clerk of Court has

entered default, and the United States has filed a motion for default judgment. Thus,

the procedural requirements for default judgment have been satisfied, N.Y. Life,

84 F.3d at 141, and the Court may turn to the merits of the Government’s request.

i. Lindsey Factors

All Lindsey factors plainly favor entry of default judgment in the United States’

favor.

First, there are no material facts in dispute because no person or entity filed a

timely claim to the remaining Defendant Property.

Second, any putative claimants would not be unduly prejudiced by a default

judgment because the United States has provided ample opportunity to respond

under the requisite procedures.

Third, the grounds for granting a default judgment against any potential

claimants are clearly established by the factual and procedural history in this case

and the Clerk’s entry of default.

Fourth, there is no evidence that default was caused by excusable neglect or

good faith mistake.

Fifth, an entry of default would not be unduly harsh to any putative claimants

because any and all such claimants were provided sufficient notice and opportunity

to file a claim to the Defendant Property based on the direct mailings and the

publication on the DOJ website.

Finally, there has been no showing of any facts that would lead the Court to

anticipate that it may set aside a default judgment if a claimant appears and contests

it.

ii. Sufficiency of the Pleadings

Second, the merits of the United States’ case are strong. Here,

the Verified Complaint alleges that the Defendant Property is attributable to wire

fraud and money laundering offenses. Such moneys are unquestionably subject to

forfeiture.

Moreover, upon entry of a default judgment in this matter, no one will have an

interest in, or claim to, the Defendant Property. As such, a forfeiture judgment

vesting all interests in, claims to, and title to, the Defendant Property with

the United States is warranted.

II. CONCLUSION

Accordingly,

IT IS ORDERED that a default judgment is entered against the interests of

potential claimant, Mayank Aggarawal, and any and all unknown possible claimants

to the Defendant Property, specifically the approximately 1.96356404 BTC and

60139.57337 USDT in the KuCoin wallet address ending in LRtLoE2, with the

accountholder name of Mayank Aggarawal seized on or about February 4, 2025.

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the Defendant Property, specifically the

approximately 1.96356404 BTC and 60139.57337 USDT in the KuCoin wallet

address ending in LRtLoE2, with the accountholder name of Mayank Aggarawal,

seized on or about February 4, 2025, is forfeited to the United States of America, and

that title to the Defendant Property is vested in the United States of America, to be

disposed of in accordance with law, and that no right, title, or interest in

the Defendant Property shall exist in any other person or entity.

Judgment shall be issued separately.

Baton Rouge, Louisiana, this 1sBe of December, 2025

Boa. f—

JUDGE BRIAN A. JACKSON

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

MIDDLE DISTRICT OF LOUISIANA

This is a copy of a public record, reproduced as it was published. It is not legal advice, and it may not be the version a court would rely on. Check the official source before you cite it.

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