The opinion
Filed 12/15/25 P. v. Arnold CA2/6
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions
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IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT
DIVISION SIX
THE PEOPLE, 2d Crim. No. B338391
(Super. Ct. No. 2023029743)
Plaintiff and Respondent, (Ventura County)
v.
JASON ARNOLD,
Defendant and Appellant.
Jason Arnold appeals the judgment after a jury convicted
him of stalking (Pen. Code,1 § 646.9); sending a threatening letter
for extortion (§ 523); and three counts of distributing private
intimate photos (§ 647, subd. (j)(4)(A)). He contends the trial
court erred in the denial of his speedy trial motion, and the
court’s evidentiary rulings denied his right to confront and cross-
examine witnesses. We affirm.
1 Unless otherwise noted, all further statutory references
are to the Penal Code.
FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
Arnold and H.P. were in a dating relationship. Before they
started dating, Arnold saw her for chiropractic treatment. Their
relationship ended in April 2019.
Arnold did not want the relationship to end. He wrote
letters and sent text messages and e-mails to H.P. begging her to
stay. In November 2019, H.P. found an envelope on her car
which contained nude photographs of her. Arnold was the only
person who had access to those photographs.
H.P. later received an e-mail from Arnold that indicated he
had filed a complaint with the Board of Chiropractic Examiners
about treatment he received when he was her patient. The
chiropractic board found H.P. violated some rules when she
treated Arnold, his ex-wife, and daughter.
Between November and December 2019, H.P. received
several text messages from a number she did not recognize. The
messages contained explicit language and pictures, threatening
to turn her nude photographs into sexual advertisements listing
her name and contact information, and posting them at various
areas around town including her children’s school. H.P. found a
sexual advertisement flyer depicting her on the bathroom doors
at her place of employment. H.P.’s boyfriend and family
members also received the same text messages. Police found
nude photographs of H.P. and language identical to that used in
the text messages and advertisements on Arnold’s cell phone and
computer.
The jury found Arnold guilty of stalking (§ 646.9, subd. (a));
sending a threatening letter for extortion (§ 523); and three
counts of distributing private intimate photos (§ 647, subd.
(j)(4)(A)). Imposition of sentence was suspended, and Arnold was
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placed on formal probation for three years with specified terms
and conditions.
DISCUSSION
Speedy Trial Motion
On March 18, 2024, the day trial began, Arnold filed a
motion to dismiss pursuant to Serna v. Superior Court (1985) 40
Cal.3d 239, alleging a violation of his speedy trial rights. The
motion claimed the prosecution improperly dismissed Arnold’s
prior case on the last day and subsequently re-filed it resulting in
delays which prejudiced the defense. The motion was served on
the prosecution the morning of the hearing. The trial court
dismissed the motion finding Arnold failed to give proper, timely
notice. Arnold contends this was error. We disagree.
In a criminal case, parties are required to notice all pretrial
motions prior to the hearing date. (Daws v. Superior Court
(2019) 42 Cal.App.5th 81, 87.) They must comply with California
Rules of Court, rule 4.111(a), which requires all pretrial motions
to be filed and served at least 10 court days before the hearing.
The trial court may consider the failure to serve and file the
motion within the time permitted without good cause as an
admission the motion is without merit. (Id., subd. (b).)
Here, Arnold did not give proper notice and did not comply
with the rules of court. The motion was filed and served the
same day the jury trial began. The prosecutor confirmed receipt
of the motion earlier that morning and had no opportunity to
respond. Given his failure to comply with the filing rules and
procedures, the trial court did not err in dismissing his motion.
(See People v. Lewis (1977) 71 Cal.App.3d 817, 820-821 [no error
in the trial court’s refusal to consider the defendant’s motion to
suppress due to his failure to comply with the local court rule
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regarding written motions]; Sabato v. Brooks (2015) 242
Cal.App.4th 715, 723 [a trial court may properly refuse to
consider a litigant’s position when there is no compliance with
filing rules and procedures].)
The Right to Confront and Cross-Examine Witnesses
Arnold contends the trial court violated his Sixth
Amendment right to confront and cross-examine witnesses when
it excluded: 1) full cross-examination on the chiropractic board
charges and discipline of H.P.; 2) testimony of the chiropractic
board investigator; and 3) cross-examination of H.P. about a rape
allegation she made in a civil suit against Arnold. We are not
persuaded.
Arnold sought to introduce the full details of the
chiropractic board’s disciplinary action against H.P., including
testimony from the investigator, to show H.P. initially denied the
allegations but later admitted them and signed a stipulation.
The trial court noted that admitting all the information Arnold
requested “will not only necessitate undue consumption of time,
[but also] create[] substantial danger of undue prejudice and . . .
confusing the issues or misleading the jury.” The court denied
Arnold’s requests in part and stated his right to cross-examine
and confront adverse witnesses “can be accomplished in a way
while balancing Evidence Code section 352.” The court ruled that
the chiropractic board’s decision that H.P. violated the policies
and guidelines and the fact that Arnold was involved in that
decision were admissible, but the specific facts about the
violations were inadmissible. The court also ruled the existence
of the civil suit and countersuit and the fact each involved money
were admissible, but the specific allegations in the civil case,
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including the rape allegation, were inadmissible. There was no
error in these rulings.
“ ‘Within the confines of the confrontation clause, the trial
court retains wide latitude in restricting cross-examination that
is repetitive, prejudicial, confusing of the issues, or of marginal
relevance.’ ” (People v. Ayala (2000) 23 Cal.4th 225, 301.)
“Moreover, reliance on Evidence Code section 352 to exclude
evidence of marginal impeachment value that would entail the
undue consumption of time generally does not contravene a
defendant’s constitutional rights to confrontation and cross-
examination.” (People v. Brown (2003) 31 Cal.4th 518, 545.) If
the impeachment evidence is on a collateral matter and only
slightly probative of the witness’s veracity, the evidence may be
properly excluded under Evidence Code section 352 and the
defendant’s right of confrontation is not infringed. (People v.
Jennings (1991) 53 Cal.3d 334, 372.) “A trial court's limitation on
cross-examination pertaining to the credibility of a witness does
not violate the confrontation clause unless a reasonable jury
might have received a significantly different impression of the
witness’s credibility had the excluded cross-examination been
permitted.” (People v. Quartermain (1997) 16 Cal.4th 600, 623-
624.)
In this case, Arnold was permitted to conduct effective
cross-examination of H.P. The trial court allowed Arnold to
cross-examine H.P. about the discipline she received from the
chiropractic board for rule violations in her treatment of him and
his family, presumably to impeach her credibility and show she
had a motive to retaliate against him for filing the board
complaint. The court reasonably found Arnold’s request to
further impeach H.P. with the investigator’s testimony that H.P.
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initially denied the allegations but later admitted them was
unnecessary. H.P. admitted she violated the chiropractic board’s
rules. Anything more on this issue would be a time-consuming
inquiry into a collateral administrative proceeding that would be
of marginal relevance for impeachment. (People v. Contreras
(2013) 58 Cal.4th 123, 152.) Trial courts have broad discretion
“ ‘ “to prevent criminal trials from degenerating into nitpicking
wars of attrition over collateral credibility issues.” ’ ” (People v.
Pearson (2013) 56 Cal.4th 393, 454.)
Nor do we find error in the exclusion of the rape allegation
in the civil suit. This allegation had no factual connection to any
of the criminal offenses charged and Arnold sought to attack
H.P.’s credibility by showing that allegation was false. This
would have triggered a trial within a trial on a wholly collateral
issue. Under these circumstances, the application of Evidence
Code section 352 to restrict cross-examination on that issue did
not contravene Arnold’s constitutional rights. (People v. Brown,
supra, 31 Cal.4th at p. 545.)
Moreover, Arnold has not shown he was prejudiced by the
trial court’s evidentiary rulings. The People’s case was strong
and presented compelling evidence of guilt. The detective’s
testimony showed Arnold was the one who sent the threatening
and explicit text messages to H.P. and her family members. The
jury did not find Arnold to be credible. Given the strength of the
People’s case, Arnold has not shown a reasonable probability of a
different result had the trial court made different rulings on the
admissibility of evidence or the scope of cross-examination. (In re
Sassounian (1995) 9 Cal.4th 535, 550; People v. Watson (1956) 46
Cal.2d 818, 836.)
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DISPOSITION
The judgment is affirmed.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED.
HIPPACH, J.*
We concur:
BALTODANO, Acting P. J.
CODY, J.
*(Judge of the Santa Barbara Sup. Ct assigned by the Chief
Justice pursuant to art. VI, § 6 of the Cal. Const.)
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Paul W. Baelly, Judge
Superior Court County of Ventura
______________________________
Law Offices of Michael D. Kwasigroch and Michael D.
Kwasigroch for Defendant and Appellant.
Rob Bonta, Attorney General, Lance E. Winters, Chief
Assistant Attorney General, Susan Sullivan Pithey, Assistant
Attorney General, Scott A. Taryle and Chung L. Mar, Deputy
Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.