“in a trial de novo, a court may consider arguments and evidence that are introduced afresh”
How later courts described this case
- “in a trial de novo, a court may consider arguments and evidence that are introduced afresh”
- agreeing with court of appeals’ application of the clearly-erroneous standard when it was “left with a firm and definite impression of error.”
- “A court without jurisdiction has power to do only one thing: dismiss.”
Written by the judges who cited it.
The opinion
ACCEPTED
15-25-00156-cv
FIFTEENTH COURT OF APPEALS
AUSTIN, TEXAS
12/12/2025 1:40 PM
No. 15-25-00156-CV CHRISTOPHER A. PRINE
CLERK
FILED IN
In the Fifteenth District Court of Appeals, Austin, TexasOF APPEALS
15th COURT
AUSTIN, TEXAS
12/12/2025 1:40:55 PM
TEXAS RACING COMMISSION, CHRISTOPHER A. PRINE
Clerk
Appellant,
v.
TOBY KEETON,
Appellee.
On Appeal from the 126th District Court of Travis County, Texas
The Honorable Aurora Martinez Jones, Presiding
APPELLANT TEXAS RACING COMMISSION’S BRIEF
KEN PAXTON LAUREN MCGEE
Attorney General of Texas State Bar No. 24128835
Assistant Attorney General
BRENT WEBSTER Administrative Law Division
First Assistant Attorney General Office of the Attorney General of Texas
P.O. Box 12548, Capitol Station
RALPH MOLINA
Austin, Texas 78711-2548
Deputy First Assistant Attorney
Telephone: (512) 475-3203
General
Lauren.McGee@oag.texas.gov
AUSTIN KINGHORN ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT
Deputy Attorney General for Civil TEXAS RACING COMMISSION
Litigation
ERNEST C. GARCIA
Chief, Administrative Law Division
December 12, 2025
ORAL ARGUMENT REQUESTED
IDENTITY OF PARTIES AND COUNSEL
Plaintiff/Appellee: Counsel:
Toby Keeton Joseph C. DeAngelis, pro hac vice
Clark O. Brewster
State Bar No. 786841
Brewster & DeAngelis, PLLC
2617 E. 21st Street
Tulsa, OK 74114
Don Griffin, Jr.
State Bar No. 08456975
Vinson & Elkins, LLP
845 Texas St., Ste 4700
Houston, TX 77002-2946
Defendant/Appellant: Counsel:
Texas Racing Commission Lauren McGee
State Bar No. 24128835
Assistant Attorney General
Administrative Law Division
Office of the Attorney General of Texas
P.O. Box 12548, Capitol Station
Austin, Texas 78711-2548
ii
REFERENCES TO THE RECORD AND ABBREVIATIONS
Appellee/ Mr. Keeton Toby Keeton
Appellant/ Commission Texas Racing Commission
C.R. [page] Clerk’s Record
Final Judgment Order Denying Defendant’s First Amended
Plea to the Jurisdiction signed by Judge
Martinez Jones on October 9, 2025
Texas A&M Texas A&M University Veterinary Medical
Diagnostic Laboratory
UC Davis Kenneth L. Maddy Equine Analytical
Chemistry Laboratory at the University of
California at Davis
319.362 (2024) 16 Texas Administrative Code section
319.362, prior to changes that went into
effect on February 5, 2025
319.362 (2025) 16 Texas Administrative Code section
319.362 as it exists currently, with changes
that went into effect on February 5, 2025
iii
TABLE OF CONTENTS
Identity of Parties and Counsel .................................................................ii
References to the Record and Abbreviations........................................... iii
Table of Contents ....................................................................................... iv
Index of Authorities ................................................................................... vi
Statement of the Case ............................................................................... ix
Statement on Oral Argument .................................................................... x
Issues Presented ........................................................................................ xi
1. Whether the delay in setting a hearing on the merits violated
Mr. Keeton’s due process rights when the Commission had a
valid justification for the delay directly related to the
government interest, the risk of erroneous deprivation was
low, and Mr. Keeton could have sought a stay of the
suspension pending the outcome of the merits hearing, but
chose not to. ...................................................................................... xi
2. Whether Mr. Keeton’s 42 U.S.C. § 1983 claim is barred by
sovereign immunity. ......................................................................... xi
3. Whether the Commission exceeded its statutory authority by
sending samples to UC Davis for testing after complying with
the requirements in Texas Occupations Code section
2034.002, and whether Mr. Keeton’s ultra vires claim against
the Commission waives sovereign immunity. ................................. xi
4. Whether the Commission properly determined that Mr.
Keeton waived his right to split sample testing by not
requesting split testing within 48 hours from when he was
notified of the positive results as required by 16 Texas
Administrative Code section 319.362(c) (2024) and 319.362(b)
(2025). ............................................................................................... xi
Statement of Facts...................................................................................... 1
iv
Standard of Review .................................................................................... 3
Summary of the Argument ........................................................................ 4
Argument .................................................................................................... 7
I. The merits hearing was set as soon as practicable, given when
the necessary discovery and evidence was produced. .......................... 8
A. Importance of the private interest and the harm occasioned by
delay. ................................................................................................ 10
B. Justification offered by Government for delay and relation to
underlying governmental interest. ................................................. 10
C. The likelihood that the interim decision may have been mistaken. .
................................................................................................... 12
II. Mr. Keeton’s second claim fails because 42 U.S.C. 1983 claims
against the state are barred by sovereign immunity and Mr.
Keeton’s due process rights have not been violated. .......................... 14
III.Mr. Keeton’s third claim fails because the Commission complied with
statute in selecting and sending samples to UC Davis. ..................... 15
A. The Commission’s actions were within its statutory authority.
................................................................................................... 16
IV.Mr. Keeton’s fourth claim fails because the Commission complied with
statute and agency rules...................................................................... 19
V. Mr. Keeton’s fifth claim fails because he lacks standing. .................. 21
Conclusion & Prayer................................................................................. 25
Certificate of Service ................................................................................ 28
Index of Appendices .................................................................................. 29
v
INDEX OF AUTHORITIES
Cases
Barry v. Barchi,
443 U.S. 55 (1979) ....................................................................... 9, 11, 12
Boddie v. Connecticut,
401 U.S. 371 (1971) ................................................................................. 9
City of El Paso v. Heinrich,
284 S.W.3d 366 (Tex. 2009) .................................................................... 6
Cleveland Bd. of Educ. v. Loudermill,
470 U.S. 532 (1985) ................................................................................. 9
Creedmor-Maha Water Supply Corp. v. Tex. Comm’n of Envt’l
Quality,
307 S.W.3d 505 (Tex. App.—Austin 2010, no pet.) ................................ 8
Data Foundry, Inc. v. City of Austin,
620 S.W.3d 692 (Tex. 2021) .................................................................. 23
Federal Deposit Ins. Corp. v. Mallen,
486 U.S. 230 (1988) ............................................................................... 10
Heckman v. Williamson Cty.,
369 S.W.3d 137 (Tex. 2012) ................................................................ 3, 4
Houston Belt & Terminal Ry. Co. v. City of Houston,
487 S.W.3d 154 (Tex. 2016) .................................................................... 6
Howlett v. Rose,
496 U.S. 356 (1990) ......................................................................... 14, 15
In re Abbott,
601 S.W.3d 802 (Tex. 2020) .................................................................. 15
In re State,
682 S.W.3d 890 (Tex. 2023) .................................................................. 15
vi
Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife,
504 U.S. 555 (1992) ............................................................................... 23
Nettles v. GTECH Corp.,
606 S.W.3d 726 (Tex. 2020) .................................................................... 4
Southwestern Elec. Power Co. v. Lynch,
595 S.W.3d 678 (Tex. 2020) .................................................................. 23
State v. Naylor,
466 S.W.3d 783 (Tex. 2015) .................................................................... 5
Tex. A&M Univ. Sys. v. Koseoglu,
233 S.W.3d 835 (Tex. 2007) .................................................................... 4
Tex. Ass’n of Bus. v. Tex. Air Control Bd.,
852 S.W.2d 440 (Tex. 1993) ................................................................ 3, 4
Tex. Dep’t of Parks & Wildlife v. Miranda,
133 S.W.3d 217 (Tex. 2004) ................................................................ 4, 8
Statutes
Tex. Occ. Code § 2023.001(a)................................................................ 1, 10
Tex. Occ. Code § 2034.001 ........................................................................ 21
Tex. Occ. Code § 2034.001(b).................................................................... 16
Tex. Occ. Code § 2034.002 .......................................................................... 6
Tex. Occ. Code § 2034.002(a).............................................................. 16, 17
Tex. Occ. Code § 2034.004 .......................................................................... 1
Tex. Occ. Code § 2034.005(c) .................................................................... 19
Tex. Occ. Code §§ 2034.001(a), (b) ............................................................. 1
Rules
16 Tex. Admin. Code § 307.62(i) ................................................................ 2
vii
16 Tex. Admin. Code § 307.68 .................................................................. 10
16 Tex. Admin. Code § 319.301(a) ............................................................. 1
16 Tex. Admin. Code § 319.361(b) ............................................................. 1
16 Tex. Admin. Code § 319.361(c) .............................................................. 2
16 Tex. Admin. Code § 319.362(b) (2025) ................................................ 21
16 Tex. Admin. Code § 319.362(c) (2024) .......................................... 20, 21
viii
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Nature of the Case: Mr. Keeton filed suit in district court alleging
unconstitutional application of Commission
rules and statute that violate his
Constitutional due process rights and seeking
declaratory judgment. C.R. 4-9. The
Commission filed a plea to the jurisdiction,
arguing that as a matter of law, Mr. Keeton’s
due process rights have not been violated, so
the allegations do not waive the Commission’s
sovereign immunity.
Trial Court: The Honorable Judge Aurora Martinez Jones,
sitting in the 126th Judicial District Court,
Travis County, Texas.
Trial Court After a hearing, the trial Court denied the
Disposition: Commission’s First Amended Plea to the
Jurisdiction. Now, the Commission appeals.
ix
STATEMENT ON ORAL ARGUMENT
Oral argument is requested because the Commission would like an
opportunity to answer any questions not adequately resolved after
reading the briefs.
x
ISSUES PRESENTED
1. Whether the delay in setting a hearing on the merits violated Mr.
Keeton’s due process rights when the Commission had a valid
justification for the delay directly related to the government interest, the
risk of erroneous deprivation was low, and Mr. Keeton could have sought
a stay of the suspension pending the outcome of the merits hearing, but
chose not to.
2. Whether Mr. Keeton’s 42 U.S.C. § 1983 claim is barred by sovereign
immunity.
3. Whether the Commission exceeded its statutory authority by
sending samples to UC Davis for testing after complying with the
requirements in Texas Occupations Code section 2034.002, and whether
Mr. Keeton’s ultra vires claim against the Commission waives sovereign
immunity.
4. Whether the Commission properly determined that Mr. Keeton
waived his right to split sample testing by not requesting split testing
within 48 hours from when he was notified of the positive results as
required by 16 Texas Administrative Code section 319.362(c) (2024) and
319.362(b) (2025).
xi
STATEMENT OF FACTS
The Texas Racing Commission is the state agency responsible for
the licensing and regulation of horse and greyhound racing in Texas. Tex.
Occ. Code § 2023.001(a). The Commission’s licensing responsibilities
extend to licensing those who train racehorses, such as Mr. Keeton.
The Commission is statutorily required to conduct testing to
determine whether a prohibited substance has been used in a race animal
during a race and to promulgate rules pertaining to such testing. Tex.
Occ. Code §§ 2034.001(a), (b). Rule 319.301 allows the collection of hair,
urine, blood, saliva, tissue, or other bodily substance to be taken for the
purpose of testing for prohibited substances. 16 Tex. Admin. Code §
319.301(a). Statute dictates that the trainer of an animal is responsible
for ensuring no prohibited substance has been administered. Tex. Occ.
Code § 2034.004. Horses are tested in accordance with 16 Texas
Administrative Code section 319.332 if they finish first in a race. 16 Tex.
Admin. Code § 319.361(b). Testing may occur if: “(1) a horse that finishes
second; (2) a beaten favorite; (3) for a race with a gross purse of $50,000
or more, the horse that finishes third; (4) a horse selected at random by
the stewards; and (5) any other horse designated for cause by the
stewards or the commission veterinarian.” 16 Tex. Admin. Code §
319.361(c).
Many horses trained by Mr. Keeton were subject to testing in
September, October, and November of 2024. Of the samples taken, 24
tested positive for prohibited substances; 22 tested positive for
Carmoterol, and one tested positive for d-Methamphetamine. C.R. 727-
750. One sample had split testing done, which also came back positive for
Carmoterol. 1
On January 30, 2025, pursuant to authority granted in Texas
Occupations Code section 2034.006(a), the Commission summarily
suspended Mr. Keeton’s license for the positive tests. C.R. 29. Mr. Keeton
requested a hearing before the board of stewards, which must occur
within seven calendar days after the day the licensee is suspended. 16
Tex. Admin. Code § 307.62(i). Mr. Keeton’s hearing was set for February
4, 2025, but his counsel became ill, and the hearing was reset to February
11, 2025, on agreement of the parties. C.R. 89- 90. The board of stewards
declined to lift the summary suspension and notified Mr. Keeton that he
1 The result at C.R. 750 is the result of a split sample test for the original positive
result at C.R. 728.
APPELLANTS’ BRIEF
Case No. 15-25-00026-CV Page 2 of 29
had the right to appeal the decision to the Commission. C.R. 91. Mr.
Keeton appealed to the Commission, and a hearing before SOAH
occurred on May 22, 2025. C.R. 755-760. A final decision had not been
made in the SOAH proceeding at the time of the district court hearing on
the Commission’s First Amended Plea to the Jurisdiction. 2 Mr. Keeton
filed suit in district court on April 9, 2025, before the administrative
process concluded. C.R. 3.
Mr. Keeton has not sought a stay of the summary suspension as
allowed by 16 Texas Administrative Code section 307.68.
STANDARD OF REVIEW
The standard of review for subject matter jurisdiction decisions is
de novo.
Subject-matter jurisdiction is essential to a court’s authority to
decide a case. Tex. Ass’n of Bus. v. Tex. Air Control Bd., 852 S.W.2d 440,
443 (Tex. 1993). Subject-matter jurisdiction is properly challenged in a
plea to the jurisdiction. Heckman v. Williamson Cty., 369 S.W.3d 137, 149
(Tex. 2012).
2 The Commission asks this Court to take judicial notice of the final order resulting
from the SOAH hearing which was adopted by the Commission at an open meeting
on October 8, 2025. Appendix A.
APPELLANTS’ BRIEF
Case No. 15-25-00026-CV Page 3 of 29
The plaintiff has the burden of pleading facts sufficient to
demonstrate the trial court’s jurisdiction over the plaintiff’s claims. Tex.
Ass’n of Bus., 852 S.W.2d at 446. In the face of a plea to the jurisdiction
challenging the pleadings, the court should look to the pleader’s intent,
construe the pleadings liberally in favor of jurisdiction, and accept the
allegations in the pleading as true to determine whether the plaintiff has
alleged facts sufficient to demonstrate, affirmatively, that the trial court
has jurisdiction to hear the claim. Heckman, 369 S.W.3d at 150. If the
plaintiff’s pleadings negate the existence of jurisdiction by revealing an
incurable defect, the claims should be dismissed without an opportunity
for the plaintiff to replead. Tex. A&M Univ. Sys. v. Koseoglu, 233 S.W.3d
835, 840 (Tex. 2007).
Whether a trial court has subject-matter jurisdiction over the
plaintiff’s claims is a question of law. Tex. Dep’t of Parks & Wildlife v.
Miranda, 133 S.W.3d 217, 226 (Tex. 2004). For that reason, a court will
review a ruling on a plea to the jurisdiction de novo. Nettles v. GTECH
Corp., 606 S.W.3d 726, 731 (Tex. 2020).
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT
The trial court erred in denying the Commission’s First Amended
APPELLANTS’ BRIEF
Case No. 15-25-00026-CV Page 4 of 29
Plea to the Jurisdiction. Mr. Keeton brought five claims against the
Commission, but none of his claims identify a valid waiver of sovereign
immunity or confer subject matter jurisdiction on the court.
Mr. Keeton’s due process rights were not violated by the
Commission’s application of 16 Texas Administrative Code section
307.62(i). Mr. Keeton could have sought a stay of the summary
suspension until the Commission made a final decision on the merits of
the case, but he did not. The Commission could not set a hearing on the
merits until all laboratory evidence was received from UC Davis. This is
a valid justification for not setting the merits hearing immediately and is
directly related to the government’s underlying interest of ensuring the
integrity of racing. The risk of error is minimal as 24 separate tests were
conducted, and all came back positive.
Mr. Keeton’s claim brought under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 is barred by
sovereign immunity, and relief of any kind cannot be granted, as a court
cannot grant relief if it lacks jurisdiction. State v. Naylor, 466 S.W.3d 783,
805 (Tex. 2015) (“A court without jurisdiction has power to do only one
thing: dismiss.”).
The Commission did not exceed its statutory authority by sending
APPELLANTS’ BRIEF
Case No. 15-25-00026-CV Page 5 of 29
samples to UC Davis because the Commission selected UC Davis in
consultation with Texas A&M as allowed by statute. Tex. Occ. Code §
2034.002. Additionally, claims that an action was in excess of statutory
authority or ultra vires claims cannot be brought against an agency
because they are barred by sovereign immunity. Ultra vires claims can
only be brought against a government actor in an attempt to reassert
control over the state. Houston Belt & Terminal Ry. Co. v. City of
Houston, 487 S.W.3d 154, 164 (Tex. 2016) (citing City of El Paso v.
Heinrich, 284 S.W.3d 366, 372 (Tex. 2009)). Mr. Keeton brings his ultra
vires claim against the Commission, which is protected by sovereign
immunity.
Mr. Keeton’s fourth and fifth claims are related. Mr. Keeton waived
his right to split sample testing by not requesting split testing within a
48-hour period as required by rule. The Commission rule allows a trainer
to request split testing, but that request must be made to the executive
secretary within 48 hours after notice of the positive result. Mr. Keeton
received notice of the positive results on January 30, 2025, but he did not
request split testing until February 3, 2025. Because the 48-hour period
had lapsed, he waived his right to split testing.
APPELLANTS’ BRIEF
Case No. 15-25-00026-CV Page 6 of 29
The rule outlining the procedure for split testing, 16 Texas
Administrative Code 319.362, was amended in 2024. The amended
version of the rule went into effect on February 4, 2025. Mr. Keeton
complains that the version of section 319.362 that went into effect on
February 4, 2025, lacks several safeguards and guarantees provided for
in the version effective before February 4, 2025. However, both the 2024
and 2025 versions of section 319.362 require a trainer to request split
testing within 48 hours after the trainer is notified of the positive result.
Even if this Court were to grant Mr. Keeton the relief he seeks, declaring
the 2025 version of section 319.362 is inapplicable to him or invalid, the
outcome does not change. Because granting Mr. Keeton the relief he
seeks does not redress the issue he complains of, Mr. Keeton lacks
standing and the court lacks subject matter jurisdiction.
None of the claims brought by Mr. Keeton identify a valid waiver of
sovereign immunity or confer subject matter jurisdiction on the court.
Therefore, a plea to the jurisdiction is proper and should have been
granted.
ARGUMENT
The Commission’s First Amended Plea to the Jurisdiction should
APPELLANTS’ BRIEF
Case No. 15-25-00026-CV Page 7 of 29
have been granted because the Commission has sovereign immunity with
respect to all of Mr. Keeton’s claims and because Mr. Keeton has failed
to state a claim which would confer subject matter jurisdiction on the
court. See Miranda, 133 S.W.3d at 227 (If the pleadings affirmatively
negate the existence of jurisdiction, then the plea should be granted.).
The mere fact that a plaintiff alleges unconstitutional acts does not,
alone, demonstrate that sovereign immunity has been waived, and the
plaintiff has invoked the trial court’s jurisdiction. Creedmor-Maha Water
Supply Corp. v. Tex. Comm’n of Envt’l Quality, 307 S.W.3d 505, 515 (Tex.
App.—Austin 2010, no pet.).
I. The merits hearing was set as soon as practicable, given
when the necessary discovery and evidence was produced.
Mr. Keeton claims 16 Texas Administrative Code section 307.62(i)
is constitutionally invalid as applied in this case because the delay in a
merits hearing before the board of stewards violated his due process
rights. C.R. 14-16. However, the delay in setting the SOAH merits
hearing was not a deprivation of due process because the rule provides a
way for Mr. Keeton to change the summary suspension sooner, and the
state had a legitimate justification for delay.
“[A] rule may be held constitutionally invalid as applied when it
APPELLANTS’ BRIEF
Case No. 15-25-00026-CV Page 8 of 29
operates to deprive an individual of a protected right although its general
validity as a measure enacted in the legitimate exercise of state power is
beyond question.” Boddie v. Connecticut, 401 U.S. 371, 379 (1971).
Procedural due process is a constitutional right guaranteed by the
Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution. U.S. Const.
art. XIV. The question in this case is whether the time between Mr.
Keeton’s summary suspension and the merits hearing constitutes an
unjust delay that violates Mr. Keeton’s procedural due process rights.
The Supreme Court has recognized that “at some point a delay in
the post-termination hearing would become a constitutional violation,”
but there is no set timeline for when such a violation occurs. Cleveland
Bd. of Educ. v. Loudermill, 470 U.S. 532, 547 (1985); see also Barry v.
Barchi, 443 U.S. 55, 66 (1979). Rather, to determine whether a delay is
just, the court must consider “the importance of the private interest and
the harm to this interest occasioned by the delay; the justification offered
by the Government for the delay and its relation to the underlying
governmental interest; and the likelihood that the interim decision may
have been mistaken.” Federal Deposit Ins. Corp. v. Mallen, 486 U.S. 230,
242 (1988).
APPELLANTS’ BRIEF
Case No. 15-25-00026-CV Page 9 of 29
A. Importance of the private interest and the harm
occasioned by delay.
Both the Court and the Commission recognize that the loss of
livelihood is a serious matter, but Commission rules provide that a
trainer whose license has been summarily suspended can seek a stay of
that summary suspension pending the outcome of the merits hearing. 16
Tex. Admin. Code § 307.68. A stay in the summary suspension would
allow Mr. Keeton to resume training until the Commission makes a final
decision. Id. Mr. Keeton has not sought a stay of his summary
suspension. Mr. Keeton has an avenue available for seeking to have the
summary suspension lifted, allowing him to resume work, mitigating the
harm he is facing, and he has chosen not to take advantage of that option.
B. Justification offered by Government for delay and
relation to underlying governmental interest.
The second factor, the justification offered by the Government for
the delay and its relation to the underlying governmental interest,
weighs in favor of the Commission. The Commission is the state agency
responsible for the licensing and regulation of horse and greyhound
racing in Texas. Tex. Occ. Code § 2023.001(a). The Supreme Court has
recognized that the State has an important “interest in preserving the
APPELLANTS’ BRIEF
Case No. 15-25-00026-CV Page 10 of 29
integrity of the sport and in protecting the public from harm.” Barchi,
443 U.S. at 64. The presence of prohibited substances creates a risk for
both the horses being drugged and to the betting public who will be
harmed by tainted results.
Mr. Keeton was summarily suspended because 24 samples from
horses he trained tested positive for prohibited substances. C.R. 727-750.
The Commission received notice of the positive results because the
testing laboratories sent a one-page document indicating, among other
information, the horse, sample number, result of the test, substance
found, and general testing method. Id. This is not all the information
needed. The testing laboratories must provide a complete laboratory
packet for each sample tested, which includes much more in-depth
information. The Commission has been communicating with UC Davis in
a diligent effort to obtain the laboratory packets for all samples tested.
Despite the Commission’s efforts, UC Davis was slow in providing the
packets, sending over a few at a time until finally all packets were
received by the Commission. In the same vein, the Commission could not
provide the laboratory packets to Mr. Keeton until the Commission had
the packets to share. Both the Commission and Mr. Keeton would have
APPELLANTS’ BRIEF
Case No. 15-25-00026-CV Page 11 of 29
been hamstrung in a merits hearing without the laboratory packets.
The need for the laboratory packets is directly related to the
governmental interest because the Commission needs to ensure that the
fact finders can decide based on all information. The Commission’s
interest in ensuring it holds trainers’ doping horses accountable and
enforces its rules appropriately.
The merits hearing could not be set until the Commission received
complete laboratory packets, which are necessary for both parties to
present a full case. The delay is justified, and this factor weighs in favor
of no due process violation.
C. The likelihood that the interim decision may have been
mistaken.
The third factor, the likelihood that the interim decision may have
been mistaken, weighs in favor of the Commission. The Supreme Court
has found that “[a]t the interim suspension stage, an expert’s affirmance,
although untested and not beyond error, would appear sufficiently
reliable to satisfy constitutional requirements.” Barchi, 443 U.S. at 65.
UC Davis Equine Analytical Chemistry Laboratory is A2LA
accredited and ISO/ IEC 17025 accredited. C.R. 727-749. Of the 23 tests
conducted at UC David, 21 of the test result pages are signed by Dr. Ben
APPELLANTS’ BRIEF
Case No. 15-25-00026-CV Page 12 of 29
Moeller, Associate Professor at the UC Davis laboratory. C.R. 727- 749.
Each page has a certification stating: “the confirmatory data supporting
this report was reviewed for accuracy by two separate Certifying
Reviewers/ Certifying Scientists.” Id. The split sample test result from
Industrial Laboratories is a confirmation of positive results, meaning
that the primary sample tested by UC Davis and the split sample tested
by Industrial Laboratories both tested positive. 3 C.R. 728, 750. The split
sample test was signed by Senior Chemist Timothy Krueger. C.R. 750.
The fact that 24 separate tests were positive for prohibited substances,
combined with the fact that the laboratories conducting the tests are
accredited to test for prohibited substances, and that the reports are all
verified, makes the likelihood of mistake low. As a result, this factor
weighs in favor of the delay being just.
Of the three factors the Court considers in determining whether a
delay of a merits hearing violates due process, only one factor weighs
slightly in favor of the delay being unjust. The other two factors clearly
weigh in favor of the delay being just. As such, the delay in the merits
3 The result at C.R. 750 is the result of a split sample test for the original positive test
at C.R. 728.
APPELLANTS’ BRIEF
Case No. 15-25-00026-CV Page 13 of 29
hearing is just and does not violate Mr. Keeton’s due process rights.
II. Mr. Keeton’s second claim fails because 42 U.S.C. 1983
claims against the state are barred by sovereign immunity
and Mr. Keeton’s due process rights have not been violated.
Mr. Keeton claims that the Commission’s failure to set a hearing on
the merits has deprived him of his property interest in his trainer’s
license without due process and attempts to bring a 1983 claim against
the Commission. C.R. 16-17.
42 U.S.C. § 1983 “creates a remedy for violations of federal rights
committed by persons acting under color of state law.” Howlett v. Rose,
496 U.S. 356, 358 (1990). In bringing a claim under § 1983, the Plaintiff
must show (1) they have a federal right that has been violated, (2) the
person accused of violating the Plaintiff’s federal right was acting under
color of state law, and (3) the court has jurisdiction to hear the claim. Id.
at 357.
Mr. Keeton’s federal due process right has not been violated. As
discussed above in section I, a delay in setting a post-deprivation merits
hearing does not violate the due process clause so long as the state has a
valid justification for the delay, which is determined by a three-factor
balancing test. As analyzed above, while the first factor weighs slightly
APPELLANTS’ BRIEF
Case No. 15-25-00026-CV Page 14 of 29
in Mr. Keeton’s favor, the second and third factors weigh in favor of the
Commission. The balancing test indicates that the delay in the merits
hearing did not violate Mr. Keeton’s due process rights. Thus, Mr. Keeton
has failed to establish a federal right that has been violated.
As to the second and third factors necessary to bring a § 1983 claim,
while there is no argument that the Commission was acting under color
of state law, the Court lacks jurisdiction to hear this claim.
It is well recognized that “the State and arms of the State, which
have traditionally enjoyed Eleventh Amendment immunity, are not
subject to suit under § 1983 in either federal court or state court.”
Howlett, 496 U.S. at 365. “A trial court without jurisdiction cannot order
relief, even temporarily.” In re State, 682 S.W.3d 890, 893 (Tex. 2023); see
also In re Abbott, 601 S.W.3d 802, 805 (Tex. 2020). Mr. Keeton’s attempt
to bring a § 1983 claim against the State cannot stand because such a
claim against the Commission is barred by sovereign immunity, which
deprives the court of subject matter jurisdiction. Without jurisdiction, the
court cannot grant relief of any type, monetary or equitable. Thus, Mr.
Keeton’s claim fails.
III. Mr. Keeton’s third claim fails because the Commission
complied with statute in selecting and sending samples to
APPELLANTS’ BRIEF
Case No. 15-25-00026-CV Page 15 of 29
UC Davis.
Mr. Keeton claims the Commission acted in excess of its statutory
authority by sending samples to UC Davis for testing in violation of Texas
Occupations Code section 2034.002 and thereafter taking disciplinary
action under 16 Texas Administrative Code sections 307.62(i), 319.3, and
319.304. C.R. 17-20.
A. The Commission’s actions were within its statutory
authority.
The Commission is statutorily required to mandate testing to
determine the presence of prohibited substances. Tex. Occ. Code §
2034.001(b). The statutory procedures for such testing are found in
section 2034.002.
Texas Occupations Code section 2034.002(a) states:
(a) Medication or drug testing performed on a race animal
under this subtitle must be conducted by:
(1) the Texas A&M Veterinary Medical Diagnostic
Laboratory; or
(2) a laboratory operated by or in conjunction with or by a
private or public agency selected by the commission
after consultation with Texas A&M Veterinary Medical
Diagnostic Laboratory.
Tex. Occ. Code § 2034.002(a).
The statute mandates the Commission use Texas A&M for drug
APPELLANTS’ BRIEF
Case No. 15-25-00026-CV Page 16 of 29
testing samples from race animals or in the alterative, another lab if it is
selected by the commission in consultation with Texas A&M. Id.
The Commission relied on Texas A&M for testing samples from race
animals for several years until Texas A&M restructured its program.
When Texas A&M restructured, it could no longer perform testing for the
Commission. C.R. 557: 21-22. Texas A&M identified UC Davis as a
laboratory capable of meeting the Commission’s testing needs. Because
the Commission and Texas A&M were already in a contract, Texas A&M
subcontracted the testing to UC Davis. C.R. 935: 2-936:8. In an open
meeting held on June 26, 2024, the Commission approved the
interagency agreement with Texas A&M whereby testing would be
subcontracted to UC Davis. C.R. 939:24-940:22.
Even if the Court were to find that sending samples to UC Davis
prior to the Commission’s approval of the interagency agreement on June
26, 2024, were in violation of Texas Occupations Code 2034.001(b), all of
the samples at issue in this case were taken after the Commission’s
approval of the agreement. C.R. 727-750. Of the samples underlying this
case, the earliest was collected on September 14, 2024, nearly three
months after UC Davis was appropriately selected by the Commission in
APPELLANTS’ BRIEF
Case No. 15-25-00026-CV Page 17 of 29
consultation with Texas A&M.
Whether Texas A&M initiated the agreement with UC Davis, or the
Commission initiated the agreement with UC Davis is irrelevant. At the
time the samples at issue in this case were taken, the Commission had
selected UC Davis as its testing lab and had done so in consultation with
Texas A&M as required by statute.
Thus, it did not act in excess of its statutory authority, and the
Commission properly relied on the positive results from UC Davis as a
basis for Mr. Keeton’s summary suspension. Because the Commission
acted within its statutory authority, Mr. Keeton’s claim fails and does not
waive sovereign immunity.
B. The Commission did not act in excess of its statutory
authority when it took disciplinary action under 16 Texas
Administrative Code sections 307.62(i), 319.3, and 319.304.
The basis of Mr. Keeton’s claim that the Commission acted in excess
of its statutory authority when it took disciplinary action under 16 Texas
Administrative Code sections 307.62(i), 319.3, and 319.304, is predicated
on his argument that the Commission violated Texas Occupations Code
2034.002(a), its statutory authority, by sending samples to UC Davis.
C.R. 19-20.
APPELLANTS’ BRIEF
Case No. 15-25-00026-CV Page 18 of 29
As discussed above in section IIIA, the Commission complied with
statute in selecting UC Davis and thus did not act in excess of its
statutory authority by sending samples to UC Davis.
Because the testing conducted by UC Davis was permissible and
the results all indicated the presence of a prohibited substance, the
Commission was authorized to take disciplinary action against Mr.
Keeton and this claim fails to waive the Commission’s sovereign
immunity.
IV. Mr. Keeton’s fourth claim fails because the Commission
complied with statute and agency rules.
Mr. Keeton claims the Commission acted in excess of its statutory
authority by not sending split samples to Mr. Keeton’s laboratory of
choice for testing. C.R. 20-22.
Texas Occupations Code section 2034.005(c) provides “[a] license
holder whose animal test shows the presence of a prohibited substance is
entitled to have a split portion of the test sample or specimen tested at a
testing facility authorized to perform drug testing under this subtitle and
selected by the license holder. The commission shall adopt rules relating
to split testing procedures.” Tex. Occ. Code § 2034.005(c).
The Commission adopted rules related to split testing procedures
APPELLANTS’ BRIEF
Case No. 15-25-00026-CV Page 19 of 29
in 16 Texas Administrative Code section 319.362. Of utmost importance
here is subsection (c) which states “[a]n owner or trainer of a horse which
has received a positive result on a drug test may request, in writing, that
the retained serum or urine, whichever provided the positive result, be
submitted for testing to a Commission approved and listed laboratory
that is acceptable to the owner or trainer. The owner or trainer must
notify the executive secretary of the request not later than 48 hours after
notice of the positive result. Failure to request the split within the
prescribed time period will be deemed a waiver of the right to the split
specimen.” 16 Tex. Admin. Code § 319.362(c) (2024).
If an owner or trainer does not request split testing within 48 hours
after notice of the positive result, then the right to the split has been
waived, and the remaining subsections (a), (b), (d)-(g) are irrelevant.
In this case, Mr. Keeton received actual notice of the positive test
results on January 30, 2025, when he was summarily suspended. C.R.
29. Mr. Keeton did not request split testing until February 3, 2025, when
his attorney emailed the Commission General Counsel. C.R. 254. Mr.
Keeton waived his right to split testing because his request came more
than 48 hours after notice. Furthermore, Mr. Keeton did not send his
APPELLANTS’ BRIEF
Case No. 15-25-00026-CV Page 20 of 29
request to the executive secretary.
The Commission acted within its statutory authority by adopting
rules for procedures for split testing. Tex. Occ. Code § 2034.001. The rules
allow for 48 hours to request split testing. 16 Tex. Admin. Code §§
319.362(b) (2025); 319.362(c) (2024). Mr. Keeton exceeded that. C.R. 29,
254. Therefore, in accordance with their rule, the Commission considered
his right to the splits waived.
The Commission did not act outside of its statutory authority by not
sending split samples to Mr. Keeton’s laboratory of choice for testing
because Mr. Keeton waived his right to the splits.
V. Mr. Keeton’s fifth claim fails because he lacks standing.
Mr. Keeton claims the Commission violated his due process rights
by promulgating an updated version of 16 Texas Administrative Code
section 319.362, which changed the procedure for handling split sample
testing. 4 C.R. 22-26. Importantly, the updated version of 16 Texas
Administrative Code section 319.362 went into effect on February 5,
2025, after Mr. Keeton had been summarily suspended and after the 48
4 The version of 16 Texas Administrative Code section 319.362 that was in effect when
Mr. Keeton was summarily suspended will be referred to as “319.362 (2024).” The
version of 16 Texas Administrative Code section 319.362 that went into effect on
February 5, 2025, will be referred to as “319.362 (2025).”
APPELLANTS’ BRIEF
Case No. 15-25-00026-CV Page 21 of 29
hours for Mr. Keeton to request split testing had run.
Section 319.362 (2024) required the Commission to keep split
samples in its custody and store them appropriately for potential future
testing, to ship split samples to the laboratory of the trainer or owners
choosing if split sample testing was properly requested and allowed the
trainer or owner to be present when the split sample was shipped for
testing. However, just like section 319.362 (2025), section 319.362 (2024)
provides 48 hours for an owner or trainer to notify the executive secretary
of the request for split testing. In both versions of the rule, failing to
request split testing within 48 hours after notice of a positive result
constitutes a waiver of the right to split testing.
As explained above in section IV, Mr. Keeton did not request split
testing within the 48-hour period after he was notified of the positive
results, and as such, he waived his right to split sample testing.
Regardless of which version of 319.362 is considered, the remaining
subsections do not apply to Mr. Keeton because he has no right to split
testing. There is no due process violation if an agency fails to provide
process that is not due. As a result, Mr. Keeton has failed to establish a
viable constitutional claim, so there is no waiver of the Commission’s
APPELLANTS’ BRIEF
Case No. 15-25-00026-CV Page 22 of 29
sovereign immunity, and the court lacks subject matter jurisdiction.
The relief sought by Mr. Keeton in this claim is also barred by
sovereign immunity. Mr. Keeton seeks declaratory relief that the
amendments made to section 319.362 (2025) are either inapplicable or
invalid.
“[T]he often future-looking nature of UDJA suits does not remove
the requirement that the court must have subject matter jurisdiction over
the suit—that is, that the parties must have standing, and a ripe,
justiciable controversy must exist.” Southwestern Elec. Power Co. v.
Lynch, 595 S.W.3d 678, 685 (Tex. 2020). To establish standing, a party
“must show: (1) an injury in fact that is both concrete and particularized
and actual or imminent, not conjectural or hypothetical; (2) the injury is
fairly traceable to the defendant’s challenged action; and (3) that it is
likely, as opposed to merely speculative, that the injury will be redressed
by a favorable decision.” Data Foundry, Inc. v. City of Austin, 620 S.W.3d
692, 696 (Tex. 2021); see also Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555
(1992).
Mr. Keeton does not meet any of the three standing requirements.
Because Mr. Keeton waived his right to split testing, the changes to the
APPELLANTS’ BRIEF
Case No. 15-25-00026-CV Page 23 of 29
rule he complains of do not impact him, making his injury, in fact,
hypothetical. The injury Mr. Keeton complains of is that he did not
receive all due process he could have received under section 319.362
(2024). Because Mr. Keeton waived his right to split testing, the
procedures for processing the splits do not apply. It was Mr. Keeton’s
action that caused the injury he complains of, not the Commission's
action. Lastly, the injury is not redressable. Mr. Keeton is asking the
court to declare that the amendments made to section 319.362 are
inapplicable or invalid. C.R. 25 at 147-48. Even if the Court were to
declare that the amendments made to section 319.362 do not apply to Mr.
Keeton or are invalid, that would not change the outcome. Under both
the 2024 and 2025 versions of section 319.362, the right to split testing
is waived if it is not requested by the owner or trainer within 48 hours
after notice of a positive result.
Because the 48-hour requirement is the same in both the 2024 and
2025 rule, even if this Court were to declare the changes made to rule
319.362 inapplicable to Mr. Keeton or invalid, it would not redress Mr.
Keeton’s complaint. As a result, Mr. Keeton lacks standing to bring this
claim, and there is no waiver of sovereign immunity.
APPELLANTS’ BRIEF
Case No. 15-25-00026-CV Page 24 of 29
CONCLUSION & PRAYER
Appellant, Texas Racing Commission, respectfully requests the
Court to reverse the district court’s Final Judgment denying the
Commission’s Amended Plea to the Jurisdiction because Mr. Keeton has
failed to identify a valid waiver of sovereign immunity that would confer
subject matter jurisdiction on the court.
Appellant requests such other and further relief to which they may
be justly entitled.
APPELLANTS’ BRIEF
Case No. 15-25-00026-CV Page 25 of 29
Respectfully submitted,
KEN PAXTON
Attorney General of Texas
BRENT WEBSTER
First Assistant Attorney General
RALPH MOLINA
Deputy First Assistant Attorney General
AUSTIN KINGHORN
Deputy Attorney General for Civil
Litigation
ERNEST C. GARCIA
Chief, Administrative Law Division
/s/ Lauren McGee
LAUREN MCGEE
State Bar No. 24128835
Assistant Attorney General
Administrative Law Division
Office of the Attorney General of Texas
P.O. Box 12548, Capitol Station
Austin, Texas 78711-2548
Telephone: (512) 475-3203
Lauren.McGee@oag.texas.gov
ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT TEXAS RACING
COMMISSION
APPELLANTS’ BRIEF
Case No. 15-25-00026-CV Page 26 of 29
CERTIFICATE OF COMPLIANCE
I certify that the submitted brief complies with Rule 9 of the Texas
Rules of Appellate Procedure and the word count of this document is
4,9874. The word processing software used to prepare this filing and
calculate the word count of the document is Microsoft Word for Office 365.
Date: December 12, 2025.
/s/ Lauren McGee
LAUREN MCGEE
Assistant Attorney General
APPELLANTS’ BRIEF
Case No. 15-25-00026-CV Page 27 of 29
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I hereby certify that on December 12, 2025, a true and correct copy
of the above and foregoing document has been served to the following
party of record via electronic service and/or electronic mail:
Joseph C. DeAngelis, pro hac vice
Clark O. Brewster
State Bar No. 786841
Brewster & DeAngelis, PLLC
2617 E. 21st Street
Tulsa, OK 74114
Don Griffin, Jr.
State Bar No. 08456975
Vinson & Elkins, LLP
845 Texas St., Ste 4700
Houston, Texas 77002-2946
Attorneys for Appellee
/s/ Lauren McGee
LAUREN MCGEE
Assistant Attorney General
APPELLANTS’ BRIEF
Case No. 15-25-00026-CV Page 28 of 29
INDEX OF APPENDICES
Final Order from SOAH hearing, adopted by the Commission on October
8, 2025 ........................................................................................................ A
APPELLANTS’ BRIEF
Case No. 15-25-00026-CV Page 29 of 29
STATE OFFICE OF ADMINISTRATIVE HEARINGS RECEIVED ON 8/6/2025 11:12 AM
ACCEPTED
476-25-13726
FILED 8/6/2025 11:20:16 am
476-25-13726 STATE OFFICE OF
8/6/2025 11:12 AM ADMINISTRATIVE HEARINGS
STATE OFFICE OF Amy Robles, CLERK
ADMINISTRATIVE HEARINGS
Amy Robles, CLERK
State Office of Administrative Hearings
Kristofer S. Monson
Chief Administrative Law Judge
August 6, 2025
David Holmes VIA EFILE TEXAS
Attorney for Texas Racing Commission
Clark Brewster VIA EFILE TEXAS
Joseph DeAngelis
Attorneys for Toby Keeton
RE: SOAH Docket Number 476-25-13726.TRC; Toby Keeton v. Texas
Racing Commission
Dear Parties:
Please find attached a Proposal for Decision in this case.
Exceptions and replies may be filed by any party in accordance with 1 Texas
Administrative Code section 155.507(b), a SOAH rule which may be found at
www.soah.texas.gov.
CC: Service List
P.O. Box 13025 Austin, Texas 78711-3025 | 300 W. 15th Street Austin, Texas 78701
Phone: 512-475-4993 | www.soah.texas.gov
Copy from re:SearchTX
TABLE OF CONTENTS
I. Notice, Jurisdiction, and Procedural History ..................................................... 3
II. Applicable Law .................................................................................................. 3
III. Evidence ............................................................................................................ 7
A. Background ................................................................................................ 8
B. Stewards’ Hearing Evidence ...................................................................... 8
1. Testimony of Dr. Jesse Phillips ............................................................ 9
2. Testimony of Investigator Thomas Huckaby ..................................... 11
3. Testimony of Aaron Grigsby ............................................................. 12
C. SOAH Appeal Hearing Evidence ............................................................. 16
1. Testimony of Amy Cook ................................................................... 16
2. Testimony of Aaron Grigsby ............................................................. 18
VI.Analysis ........................................................................................................... 21
A. It Was Not Clear Error to Consider The Test Results. ............................. 21
B. It Was Not Clear Error to Rely On The Chain of Custody. ....................... 23
C. It Was Not Clear Error To Consider The Test Results From UC-
Davis. ...................................................................................................... 24
D. The Stewards Did Not Err in Issuing a Ruling Absent Split-
Sample Analysis on All Samples .............................................................. 25
E. It Was Not Clear Error To Designate Appellant As The Absolute
Insurer Of Horses that Tested Positive. ................................................... 26
F. The Stewards Did Not Clearly Err By Upholding the Summary
Suspension Pending a Hearing On the Merits. ......................................... 27
VII. Findings of Fact ....................................................................................... 28
VIII. Conclusions of Law.................................................................................. 31
Copy from re:SearchTX
SOAH Docket No. 476-25-13726 Suffix: TRC
Before the
State Office of Administrative
Hearings
TOBY KEETON,
Appellant
v.
TEXAS RACING COMMISSION,
Appellee
PROPOSAL FOR DECISION
Toby Keeton (Appellant) appealed the Sam Houston Park Board of
Stewards’ (Stewards’) ruling (LSP 32350) affirming the summary suspension issued
by the Texas Racing Commission (Commission). The Stewards declined to lift the
summary suspension pending a hearing on the merits. Further, Appellant is denied
access to all areas under the jurisdiction of the Commission. After considering the
evidence and applicable law, the Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) finds that the
Stewards’ ruling should be upheld.
2
Proposal for Decision, SOAH Docket No. 476-25-13726,
Toby Keeton v. Texas Racing Commission
Copy from re:SearchTX
I. NOTICE, JURISDICTION, AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
There were no contested issues of notice or jurisdiction. Those issues are set
forth in the Findings of Fact and Conclusion of Law below. On May 22, 2025, ALJ
Roshunda Atchison with the State Office of Administrative Hearings (SOAH)
convened the hearing by videoconference. Attorney David Holmes represented the
Commission. Attorneys Clark Brewster and Joseph DeAngelis represented
Appellant. The hearing concluded that day, but the record was held open to allow the
parties to file written closing arguments and file admitted exhibits. The record closed
on June 6, 2025.
II. APPLICABLE LAW
Horse racing in Texas is governed by the Texas Racing Act (Act)1 and the rules
promulgated by the Commission pursuant to the Act.2 The Commission has adopted
rules providing that a horse participating in a race “may not carry in its body a
prohibited drug, chemical, or other substance,”3 and requiring a trainer to “guard
each animal in his or her custody before the animal races in the manner and for the
time necessary to prevent the administration of a prohibited drug, chemical or other
substance.” 4
1
Tex. Occ. Code chs. 2021-2035.
2
Tex. Occ. Code §§ 2023.003-.004.
3
16 Tex. Admin. Code § 319.3(a).
4
16 Tex. Admin. Code § 319.302.
3
Proposal for Decision, SOAH Docket No. 476-25-13726,
Toby Keeton v. Texas Racing Commission
Copy from re:SearchTX
“Prohibited substance” means a drug, chemical, or other substance that in use
or in intended use, is reasonably capable of influencing or affecting the outcome of a
race, and is prohibited by rule regulating the unlawful influence of a race. 5 By rule,
“prohibited drugs, chemicals, or other substances” means: any stimulants,
depressants, tranquilizers, local anesthetics, drugs, other drug metabolites which
could affect the health or performance of a race animal, however minimal, except as
expressly permitted.”6
The Commission’s rules also regard trainers as the “absolute insurer” of any
horse entered into a race and require them to ensure that each horse in the care and
custody of the trainer is “free from all prohibited drugs, chemicals, or other
substances.” 7 Further, the trainer is responsible for ensuring that no prohibited
substance is administered to the animal. 8
After a race, a specimen must be collected from the horse that finished first,
and a specimen may be collected from the horse that finished second, in a test barn
at the racetrack. 9 A positive finding by a chemist of a prohibited drug, chemical, or
other substance in a test specimen of a horse collected on the day of a race, “subject
to the rules of the Commission relating to split-specimens, is prima facie evidence
5
Tex. Occ. Code § 2021.003(38).
6
16 Tex. Admin. Code § 319.1(b)(1).
7
16 Tex. Admin. Code § 311.104(b)(2).
8
Tex. Occ. Code § 2034.004(2).
9
16 Tex. Admin. Code § 319.361(b), (c)(1).
4
Proposal for Decision, SOAH Docket No. 476-25-13726,
Toby Keeton v. Texas Racing Commission
Copy from re:SearchTX
that the prohibited drug, chemical, or other substance was administered to the animal
and was carried in the body of the animal while participating in a race.” 10 Beta-
agonists are prohibited substances and shall not be administered to a horse
participating in racing at any time. 11
If the stewards or racing judges determine that a licensee’s actions constitute
an immediate danger to the public health, safety, or welfare, the stewards or racing
judges may enter a ruling summarily suspending the license, without a prior hearing.
A summary suspension takes effect immediately on issuance of the ruling. If the
stewards or racing judges suspend a license under this subsection, the licensee is
entitled to a hearing on the suspension not later than seven calendar days after the
day the license is suspended. 12
The Act provides for a board of three stewards at each racetrack to supervise
horse races. 13 Stewards are authorized to interpret and enforce the Act and its rules
and to issue rulings. 14 Stewards also have the authority to investigate alleged
violations of the Act or rules by a licensee, charge a licensee with a violation, conduct
disciplinary hearings, and impose fines and suspend licenses. 15
10
16 Tex. Admin. Code § 319.3(e).
11
16 Tex. Admin. Code § 319.3(f ).
12
16 Tex. Admin. Code § 307.62.
13
Tex. Occ. Code § 2023.101(a).
14
16 Tex. Admin Code § 313.22(b).
15
16 Tex. Admin. Code § 307.61(a).
5
Proposal for Decision, SOAH Docket No. 476-25-13726,
Toby Keeton v. Texas Racing Commission
Copy from re:SearchTX
A person aggrieved by a ruling of the stewards may appeal to the Commission,
and those appeals are referred to SOAH for hearing. 16 In an appeal, the petitioner has
the burden of proving that the Stewards’ ruling was clearly erroneous. 17 In applying
a clear error standard of review, the ALJ must review all of the evidence in the light
most favorable to the ruling and then determine if the ruling was clearly erroneous.
If, after reviewing all the evidence, the ALJ cannot say that the ruling was clearly
erroneous, the ALJ must recommend that the Commission uphold the ruling even if
the ALJ would have weighed the evidence differently had the ALJ been sitting as the
trier of fact. 18
16
16 Tex. Admin. Code § 307.67.
17
16 Tex. Admin. Code § 307.67(c).
18
Lopez v. State, 940 S.W.2d 388, 390 (Tex. App.—Austin 1997, pet. ref’d) (describing the clear error standard in the
context of a Batson challenge for a juror); see Hernandez v. New York, 500 U.S. 352, 369 (1991); Hunter v. Underwood,
471 U.S. 222, 229-30 (1985) (agreeing with court of appeals’ application of the clearly-erroneous standard when it was
“left with a firm and definite impression of error.”).
6
Proposal for Decision, SOAH Docket No. 476-25-13726,
Toby Keeton v. Texas Racing Commission
Copy from re:SearchTX
III. EVIDENCE
At the SOAH hearing, Appellant offered twenty exhibits of which sixteen
exhibits were admitted into evidence. 19 Appellant also solicited witness testimony
from the Executive Director Amy Cook and Deputy Executive Director
Aaron Grigsby. Staff had eighteen exhibits admitted into evidence20 and presented
no witness testimony.
19
Appellant’s exhibits consist of the following: SOAH Demo (Exhibit 1), Email with TXRC Counsel re: Hearing
(Exhibit 2), Jan. 30, 2025 Notice (Exhibit 3), Feb. 2, 2025 Notice with Metadata (Exhibit 5), Email Requesting Splits
(Exhibit 6), Race Chart – 10/4/24 Race 7 (Exhibit 7), Dynamo Corporate Registration Documents and Public Records
(Exhibit 8), TPIA Request/Response – Department of Public Safety (Exhibit 9), Email – Grigsby (Cetirizine)
(Exhibit 10), TPIA Request re: UC Davis (Exhibit 14), TPIA Response re: UC Davis (Exhibit 15), UC Davis
Accreditation Certificate (Exhibit 16), Email 2024-9-3 Grigsby et al re: Subcontract (Exhibit 17), TXRC Meeting
Transcript (6-26-24) (Exhibit 18), TXRC Meeting Transcript (8-8-24) (Exhibit 19), TXRC Meeting Agendas
( June 2024-December 2024) (Exhibit 20). The exhibits presented as offers of proof consist of Keeton Equibase Profile-
Starts (Exhibit 4), UC-Davis EACL Submission Form (Exhibit 11), Email 2025-2-8 Moeller re: Key Individuals
(Exhibit 12), and Example Lab Packet from UC Davis (Ky) (Exhibit 13).
20
Commission’s exhibits consist of the following: Series of communications between Mr. Brewster and Texas Racing
Commission’s General Counsel, Mr. David Holmes (Exhibit 1), Pro Hac Vice Motion submitted by Mr. Brewster and
received by the Commission on February 10, 2025 (Exhibit 2), Presentation by Mr. Brewster on questions of law and
facts. (Exhibit 3), Test Barn Chain of Custody Instructions (Exhibit 4), Compound isomers (Exhibit 5), Curriculum
Vitae of Dr. Jesse Phillips (Exhibit 6); Ruling 32350 (LSP32350) January 30, 2025 (Exhibit 7), Ruling 32350
(LSP32350) Supplemental Ruling January 30, 2025 (Exhibit 8), Email request for a hearing on the validity of the
summary suspension February 1, 2025 (Exhibit 9), Acknowledgment letter by Mr. David Holmes of the request for a
hearing with attachments 10.1 and 10.2 (Exhibit 10), Keeton's positive laboratory letters (Exhibit 11), Keeton’s sample
documents (Exhibit 12), SOAH Proposal of Decision- SOAH DOCKET NO. XXX-XX-XXXX TXRC N0. 2017-02-03,
January 2, 2018 (Exhibit 13), Commission’s order adopting SOAH Proposal of Decision-SOAH DOCKET NO. 47617-
5681 October 29, 2019 (Exhibit 14), Final Summary Suspension Ruling (Exhibit 15), Transcript-Summary suspension
hearing February 11, 2025 (Exhibit 16), Transcript-Texas Racing Commission meeting June 26, 2024 (Exhibit 17), and
Interagency Agreement between Commission and Texas A&M Veterinary Medical Diagnostic Laboratory (Exhibit 18).
7
Proposal for Decision, SOAH Docket No. 476-25-13726,
Toby Keeton v. Texas Racing Commission
Copy from re:SearchTX
A. BACKGROUND
Appellant is licensed by the Commission as an owner/trainer with license
number 3056. On January 30, 2025, Appellant’s license was summarily suspended
by the Stewards after twenty-three horses trained by him had positive drug tests for
Carmoterol and one horse tested positive for d-Methamphetamine. 21 A hearing on
the summary suspension of Appellant’s license was held. The following day, the
Stewards issued a ruling affirming the summary suspension. The Stewards’ ruling
read, “[u]pon consideration of all of the evidence and testimony, the Board of
Stewards respectfully decline to lift the summary suspension pending a hearing on
the merits.” Appellant appealed the Stewards’ ruling, and the Commission referred
the case to SOAH.
B. STEWARDS’ HEARING EVIDENCE
At the Stewards’ summary suspension hearing, six exhibits were admitted for
the Stewards’ consideration, along with testimony from Dr. Jesse Phillips and
Investigator Thomas Huckaby.22 The Commission presented the testimony of
21
Mr. Grigsby testified that Carmoterol was a novel drug that has not been approved by the Food and Drug
Administration, nor was the drug available on the market, except for research purposes in the United States.
22
Appellant’s evidence submitted at the summary suspension consisted of the following: Series of communications
between Mr. Brewster and Commission’s General Counsel, Mr. David Holmes (Exhibit 1), Pro Hac Vice Motion,
submitted by Mr. Brewster and received by the Commission on February 10, 2025 (Exhibit 2), Presentation by Mr.
Brewster on questions of law and facts (Exhibit 3), Test Barn Chain of Custody Instructions (Exhibit 7), Compound
isomers. (Exhibit 13), and Curriculum Vitae of Dr. Jesse Phillips. (Exhibit 16).
8
Proposal for Decision, SOAH Docket No. 476-25-13726,
Toby Keeton v. Texas Racing Commission
Copy from re:SearchTX
Deputy Executive Director Aaron Grigsby, and seven exhibits were admitted for the
Stewards’ consideration.23
1. Testimony of Dr. Jesse Phillips
Dr. Phillips testified as an expert in the general field of analytical chemistry.
Dr. Phillips operates an analytical research and testing lab in Pryor, Oklahoma that
is ISO 17025 accredited. 24 His duties include developing novel methods for detecting
and distinguishing between analytical compounds.
Dr. Phillips reviewed the Compound Isomers 25 and testified that he observed
several compounds, specifically Carmoterol hydrochloride and cetirizine oxide.26
According to Dr. Phillips, several of the compounds had the same chemical and
molecular formula as Carmoterol.27 He explained that such compounds are known
as isomers of one another. 28 Dr. Phillips further explained that there is a known risk
23
The Commission’s evidence submitted at the summary suspension consisted of the following; Ruling 32350
(LSP32350), January 30, 2025 (Exhibit A), Ruling 32350 (LSP32350) Supplemental Ruling, January 30, 2025
(Exhibit B), Email request for a hearing on the validity of the summary suspension, February 1, 2025 (Exhibit C)
Acknowledgment letter by Mr. David Holmes of the request for a hearing with attachments 10.1 and 10.2 (Exhibit D)
Keeton’s positive laboratory letters (Exhibit E), Keeton’s sample documents (Exhibit F), and SOAH Proposal of
Decision, SOAH DOCKET NO. XXX-XX-XXXX, TXRC N0. 2017-02-03, January 2, 2018 (Exhibit G)
24
An ISO 17025 accredited laboratory is one that has been independently assessed and recognized for its technical
competence in performing specific tests and calibrations.
25
Commission Ex. 5.
26
Commission Ex. 16 at pg. 56-58.
27
Dr. Phillips identified Mitraphylline Uncarine C, Uncarine E, Uncarine A, Uncarine B, Uncarine F, and
Speciophylline as compounds having the same chemical and molecular formula as Carmoterol.
28
An isomer is two or more compounds with the same formula but a different arrangement of atoms in
the molecule and different properties.
9
Proposal for Decision, SOAH Docket No. 476-25-13726,
Toby Keeton v. Texas Racing Commission
Copy from re:SearchTX
of misidentification when confronted with isomers. Dr. Phillips testified that the
report noted that liquid chromatography mass spectrometry with enzymatic
hydrolysis (LC-MS testing) was the type of analytical methodology used to identify
Carmoterol. According to Dr. Phillips, there is a risk of misidentification between
isomers with LC-MS testing. Dr. Phillips explained that some sort of orthogonal type
testing method should have been used instead of using LC-MS testing to prevent
summarization from occurring and to ensure correct identification.
Regarding the laboratory report, Dr. Phillips said that more documentation is
needed to deem the laboratory reports acceptable. 29 In his opinion, more information
is needed to support the conclusion that the method was reliable to detect
Carmoterol. Based on the evidence noted in the laboratory report, Dr. Phillips stated
that he could not confirm that a Carmoterol standard was used to confirm
Carmoterol. According to Dr. Phillips, there is an inherent risk of confusing any
compound that has any type of isomer because of unknowns, such as diffraction
patterns and fragmentation patterns, which risked the misidentification of an isomer
with another compound. Therefore, based on the laboratory report, he would not
confirm to a degree of scientific certainty that the test performed is a positive test for
Carmoterol.30
On cross-examination, Dr. Phillips acknowledged that he has never worked in
racing medication testing. He further acknowledged that he was not familiar with
29
Commission Ex. 11.
30
Commission Ex. 16 at pg. 64.
10
Proposal for Decision, SOAH Docket No. 476-25-13726,
Toby Keeton v. Texas Racing Commission
Copy from re:SearchTX
how positive drug results were handled in horse racing, only how ISO labs report
results. 31 According to Dr. Phillips, based on the laboratory report he reviewed, he
could not speak to whether the laboratory took measures to distinguish Carmoterol.
However, he maintained that the laboratory report lacked necessary information.
2. Testimony of Investigator Thomas Huckaby
Mr. Huckaby has been working as an investigator at the law firm of Brewster
DeAngelis since July 2018. Mr. Huckaby testified that he was familiar with the chain
of custody process in litigation matters. He reviewed the chain of custody documents
provided by the Commission related to certain samples taken from horses trained by
Appellant. In Mr. Huckaby’s opinion, the documentation is devoid of the
information necessary to make it a true chain of custody. According to Mr. Huckaby,
the start of the chain of custody for the evidence is clear; however, the
documentation shows no forwarding information about the chain or evidence.
Mr. Huckaby noted that none of the twenty-three samples had a clearly
documented chain of custody. He said that the documents only showed that the
samples were picked up by Dynamo Delivery, Inc.32 Additionally, the owner of
Dynamo, Ronnie L. Richardson, signed for some of the samples. According to
Mr. Huckaby, online public records revealed that Dynamo forfeited its corporate
status in August 2008, and has not been reinstated as a viable company since being
31
Commission Ex. 16 at pg. 66.
32
Commission Ex. 16 at pg. 80.
11
Proposal for Decision, SOAH Docket No. 476-25-13726,
Toby Keeton v. Texas Racing Commission
Copy from re:SearchTX
suspended by the Texas Secretary of State. 33 Mr. Huckaby said that he performed a
background check on Mr. Richardson and found that Mr. Richardson had a criminal
history dating back to 1976, and he had federal and state tax liens filed against him. 34
On cross-examination, Mr. Huckaby acknowledged that he had been
investigated for falsifying documents at one time in his career. However,
Mr. Huckaby denied ever being terminated as a police officer for misconduct. When
asked whether he instructed the Appellant, during a recent interview, to withhold or
destroy evidence, Mr. Huckaby responded that he only instructed the Appellant to
put a lock on his phone because he did not believe the warrant served on the
Appellant for his phone was a valid warrant. He explained that the warrant failed to
identify an individual and did not specify any particular phone.
3. Testimony of Aaron Grigsby
Mr. Grigsby is the Deputy Executive Director for operations for the
Commission. His duties consist of assisting the executive director with the oversight
of operations, live racing operations, and overseeing the investigative groups.
Mr. Grigsby testified that he was familiar with the sample documents, lab results, and
letters showing positive tests for Carmoterol and d-Methamphetamine 35 pertaining
33
Commission Ex. 16 at pg. 80.
34
Commission Ex. 16 at pg. 81.
35
The blood sample in racehorse Flyin Rabbit 123, collected on November 15, 2024, tested positive for d-
Methamphetamine.
12
Proposal for Decision, SOAH Docket No. 476-25-13726,
Toby Keeton v. Texas Racing Commission
Copy from re:SearchTX
to Appellant’s case.36 Further, Mr. Grigsby said that a split-sample included in the
lab results showed a positive result for Carmoterol. 37
Regarding the chain of custody documents, Mr. Grigsby said that the
documents were authentic and true copies of the originals kept in the regular course
of the Commission’s operations. 38 He explained that the documents were emailed to
the Commission by the University of California at Davis (UC-Davis). Mr. Grigsby
acknowledged that there were some discrepancies in the chain of custody
documents. He explained that upon accession by the UC-Davis laboratory, it was
noted that hair samples were in two envelope containers in close proximity to each
other. 39
According to Mr. Grigsby, the administration of Carmoterol poses an
immediate danger to the integrity of horse racing because the drug is an ultra long-
lasting beta-agonist, which is a performance-enhancing drug, particularly for quarter
horses. He explained that beta-agonists have a bronchodilator effect that increases
respiratory values and also have an anabolic effect with long-term training. In
summary, the drug can affect the outcome of racing. In Mr. Grigsby’s opinion,
36
Commission Ex. 11 provides details regarding the positive drug test results, the date of testing, and detailed
information on each horse tested between September 14, 2024, to November 15, 2024. Each horse is specifically
identified in the Findings of Fact section of this decision.
37
A split-specimen collected from Dashin Girlfriend on September 28, 2024, was tested at Industrial Laboratories.
This entity confirmed the presence of Carmoterol in Dashin Girlfriend on the above-stated date.
38
Commission Ex. 12.
39
On cross-examination, Mr. Grigsby explained the discrepancy in samples noted by UC-Davis involved hair testing,
which is not relevant to Petitioner’s case. He further explained that none of the hair sampling identified in the
discrepancy tested positive for Carmoterol.
13
Proposal for Decision, SOAH Docket No. 476-25-13726,
Toby Keeton v. Texas Racing Commission
Copy from re:SearchTX
allowing Appellant to continue training or racing horses during a protracted
investigation poses a risk to the betting public, the integrity of racing, and the health
of the horse. Further, continued use of the drug has the potential to financially impact
race winnings, purse distribution, and wagering.40 He believes that immediate action
was necessary to protect the public, the horses, and the integrity of the sport.
Mr. Grigsby said that the Commission was still building the criminal case against
Appellant because the positives are still incoming for Carmoterol.
On cross-examination, Mr. Grigsby acknowledged talking with the Stewards;
however, he explained that the conversations consisted of notifying the Stewards of
the administrative case and the ongoing criminal investigation. Mr. Grigsby
explained that the summary suspension packet pertaining to Appellant’s case
included the sample document chain, the positives from the lab, and an affidavit.
When questioned whether he had any knowledge of any actions that Appellant
took that were a violation of the rules, Mr. Grigsby did not answer the question and
informed Appellant’s counsel that he would not discuss the criminal case or the
contents of the execution of the search warrant. 41 Further, Mr. Grigsby refused to
discuss or provide evidence of a criminal investigation in an administrative hearing.
In his opinion, the scope of the hearing is solely a summary suspension hearing based
on positive drug test results. 42
40
Commission Ex. 16 at pg. 102.
41
Commission Ex. 16 at pg. 109.
42
Commission Ex. 16 at pg. 111, line 5-8.
14
Proposal for Decision, SOAH Docket No. 476-25-13726,
Toby Keeton v. Texas Racing Commission
Copy from re:SearchTX
Mr. Grigsby testified that the state of Texas has a test barn chain of custody
manual to ensure the integrity of samples. 43 He acknowledged that there are
deviations in the sample collection process, such as weather conditions. Regarding
documentation of the chain of custody, Mr. Grigsby explained that the required
information of the date and time a specimen is handled or transferred and the
identification of each individual in the chain of custody only applies to a specific
specimen and not the container holding the specimen as long as the container is
sealed. He further explained that the Commission is not obligated to document the
chain of custody once the specimens are sealed and leave the
Commission’s possession for delivery to the laboratory. In this case, the specimens
were shipped through FedEx. Mr. Grigsby testified that the process of maintaining
integrity for the chain of custody for these samples had been maintained. However,
Mr. Grigsby would not acknowledge whether or not the test barn chain of custody
manual had been followed regarding the specimens. In his opinion, the chain of
custody documents shows UC-Davis successfully accessioned the samples without
incident, meaning the seal remained intact, the temperatures remained viable, and
an intact sample arrived at the laboratory.
Mr. Grigsby reviewed the chain of custody documentation and confirmed that
the documents show equine samples that were pulled from the test barn crew and
successfully attained by UC-Davis.44 He was specifically questioned about split-
43
Commission Ex. 4.
44
Commission Ex. 12.
15
Proposal for Decision, SOAH Docket No. 476-25-13726,
Toby Keeton v. Texas Racing Commission
Copy from re:SearchTX
samples and whether information regarding the samples was required to be presented
for consideration by the Steward. In response, Mr. Grigsby said that evidence
regarding split-samples is not required in the summary suspension hearing.
C. SOAH APPEAL HEARING EVIDENCE 45
1. Testimony of Amy Cook
Ms. Cook is the Executive Director of the Commission. As the Executive
Director, she is familiar with the Commission’s regulations and regularly makes
decisions on behalf of the Commission’s quorum for the administration of the Act
and the rules. Ms. Cook’s responsibilities include operating a laboratory for the
Commission and approving racing officials, such as the Stewards. She also
acknowledged that her duties consist of receiving split-sample requests; however,
she explained that the requests are handled by the stewards and the investigators on
her behalf.
Regarding notices of a positive test, Ms. Cook testified that the Commission
receives daily sample reports from the laboratory indicating positives and negatives.
According to Ms. Cook, the samples do not have the names of the licensees but are
given a sample number. She explained that the reports reflect a trend of the number
of positives and negatives received from the laboratory. Although she is aware of the
forms used to notify trainers and has approved the test barn procedures and
guidelines, Ms. Cook said that she is not involved in the notification process. She
45
The documentary evidence admitted at the appeals hearing is addressed above.
16
Proposal for Decision, SOAH Docket No. 476-25-13726,
Toby Keeton v. Texas Racing Commission
Copy from re:SearchTX
further explained that the notification form contains the date results were received
from the laboratory and the date the race was held. Ms. Cook said that a follow-up
letter from the laboratory provides more details, such as the type of drug detected in
a specific sample that is then used to identify the horse and trainer involved. She
testified that the name of the horse and licensee are anonymous at the time of testing;
therefore, the laboratory has no knowledge of the licensee connected to the
samples. 46
Ms. Cook reviewed and testified to the Stewards’ ruling. Ms. Cook
acknowledged that she did not participate in the determination and preparation of
the ruling. She acknowledged that a summary suspension ruling is not detailed
because the matter is still at the Stewards’ level. According to Ms. Cook, she does
not review case documents. She said that she only reviews the final rulings and posts
them on the agency’s website. Ms. Cook testified that she assisted with creating the
PDF for Adobe Sign on the supplemental ruling so that the ruling could be publicly
posted for notification. In Appellant’s case, the need for timely notification of the
supplemental ruling was to ensure that the horses stabled at the track were cared for.
Ms. Cook testified regarding UC-Davis. Ms. Cook confirmed that the
Commission held a special meeting on June 26, 2024, for the purpose of approving
an interagency agreement with Texas A&M Veterinary Medical Diagnostic
Laboratory (TVMDL) for the next fiscal year. Ms. Cook said that it was discussed
46
On cross-examination, Ms. Cook confirmed that there was no requirement to include the names of horses on the
notices to trainers or rulings by the Stewards.
17
Proposal for Decision, SOAH Docket No. 476-25-13726,
Toby Keeton v. Texas Racing Commission
Copy from re:SearchTX
that UC-Davis was the only available laboratory that met the needs of the
Commission; therefore, TVMDL was advised that UC-Davis was the preferred
laboratory of the Commission.47 As it relates to Appellant and the special meeting
held on June 26, 2024, Ms. Cook further explained that the purpose of the meeting
was to add a definition for the word “provide” because it was not in the previous
agreement. Since the statute requires TVMDL to perform testing, with the addition
of the added word, TVMDL could either perform the drug testing directly or through
a subcontractor while still maintaining oversight of the process.
2. Testimony of Aaron Grigsby
At the appeals hearing, Mr. Grigsby’s testimony was mostly consistent with
the testimony he provided at the summary suspension hearing before the Stewards.
He maintained that the Commission acted in good faith and with due diligence to
generate the lab packets as fast as possible, considering the prolific amount of drug
use by Appellant in the racing industry. Mr. Grigsby acknowledged that the full data
packets were not provided for the summary suspension hearing, only the initial
confirmation letters. 48 Mr. Grigsby confirmed that the letter from the UC-Davis lab
was the only documentary evidence presented to the Stewards establishing the
presence of Carmoterol and/or d-methamphetamine in Appellant’s horses.
47
On cross-examination, Ms. Cook explained that UC-Davis was the only laboratory with the ability to potentially
handle 18,000 horse samples per year. Additionally, the testing laboratory is required to meet the statutory
requirements under the Act, such as the educational and public institution requirements.
48
Mr. Grigsby testified that the full data packets were received after the summary suspension hearing.
18
Proposal for Decision, SOAH Docket No. 476-25-13726,
Toby Keeton v. Texas Racing Commission
Copy from re:SearchTX
Regarding additional evidence pertaining to Appellant’s conduct, Mr. Grigsby
refused to provide any evidence and would not confirm whether there was evidence
that Appellant obtained or possessed the drug. However, he did acknowledge that
there was evidence related to the administration of the drug by Appellant and
potentially by a veterinarian.
Mr. Grigsby added that he is not physically involved in the test barn sample
collection process and does not recall being present for samples collected regarding
Appellant’s case. He expounded on the sample collection process and explained that
specimens are collected and logged by the technician and supervising test barn
technician at collection. Afterwards, samples are refrigerated and secured in the test
barn area. He further explained that samples are sealed in a triplicate-sealing process
before being shipped. Individuals assigned to collect the initial samples are noted on
collection cards. As stated by Mr. Grigsby, the split-samples are taken from the
primary initial collection.
According to Mr. Grigsby, once the collections are received at the laboratory,
documentation contains a signature and a checkmark verifying that all samples were
intact and none of the samples were found to be broken, damaged, or out of
temperature controls. He further explained that if there were discrepancies with
samples, the Commission would receive photographs of the container and
correspondence from the laboratory describing the discrepancy discovered by the
laboratory.
19
Proposal for Decision, SOAH Docket No. 476-25-13726,
Toby Keeton v. Texas Racing Commission
Copy from re:SearchTX
When questioned regarding courier services, Mr. Grigsby said that the
Commission does not veterinary courier services who deliver samples to TVMDL.
He acknowledged that Dynamo was a courier service used to deliver samples.
Mr. Grigsby said that once containers are given to Dynamo, the container of samples
is out of the Commission’s custody. When questioned on Dynamo’s status as a
defunct business, Mr. Grigsby said that he was unable to verify whether the
business’s name had been transferred to a different business name.
On cross-examination, Mr. Grigsby acknowledged that only one split-sample
was done on one of the initial positive results. He explained that only one split-
sample was done because the Commission did not fully conceptualize the wave of
positives that would be received or the total impact to the industry and community
with one positive. As a result of the wave of positives, a criminal investigation was
initiated. According to Mr. Grigsby, the prosecutors elected to hold the split-samples
for the criminal defense team as opposed to the administrative defense team in this
case.
Mr. Grigsby expounded on his testimony regarding beta-agonists. Mr. Grigsby
said that the Commission rules prohibit all beta-agonists because of the abuse value
and its performance-enhancing value. Mr. Grigsby further explained that Rule 319.1
defines prohibited drugs, chemicals, or other substances. According to Mr. Grigsby,
Carmoterol falls into the definition of prohibited substance as stated in the rules of
racing.
20
Proposal for Decision, SOAH Docket No. 476-25-13726,
Toby Keeton v. Texas Racing Commission
Copy from re:SearchTX
VI. ANALYSIS
Appellant has the burden to prove that the Stewards clearly erred by upholding
the summary suspension of Appellant’s license pending a hearing on the merits. This
case is unique in that it is an appeal from a Stewards’ ruling and not an appeal from
a hearing on the merits. This is not a de novo appeal in which the ALJ cannot decide
the matter in the first instance. Appellant is entitled to relief from the
Stewards’ ruling only if Appellant can show that the ruling was clearly erroneous.
Appellants raises various arguments contesting the validity of the evidence,
asserting (1) the positive test letters and certificate of analysis were uncorroborated
hearsay; (2) the evidence failed to authenticate the chain of custody for the samples;
(3) the positive test results were obtained from an unauthorized lab (UC-Davis);
(4) issues surrounding split-sample analysis were unresolved prior to the
Stewards’ ruling; (5) the many positive test results were not proof of
Appellant’s actions, and (6) imposing an “indefinite” suspension on a lesser burden
violated Appellant’s procedural protections under the statute.
Because Appellants have not shown that the Stewards clearly erred, the ALJ
recommends upholding their decision.
A. IT WAS NOT CLEAR ERROR TO CONSIDER THE TEST RESULTS.
Appellant asserted that the Stewards’ ruling was supported solely by
uncorroborated and inadmissible hearsay and should not have been considered by the
Stewards. In this regard, Appellant asks the ALJ to reweigh the evidence to address
21
Proposal for Decision, SOAH Docket No. 476-25-13726,
Toby Keeton v. Texas Racing Commission
Copy from re:SearchTX
the issue of inadmissible hearsay, which the ALJ cannot do. By law, the Stewards
“shall allow a full presentation of evidence and are not bound by the technical rules
of evidence” in a hearing.49 Since the technical rules of evidence do not apply to the
Stewards’ hearing, technical evidentiary arguments are not enough to prevail; they
do not show clear error.50
Additionally, under 16 Texas Administrative Code section 307(d)(4), the
Stewards may admit hearsay evidence if the Stewards determine the evidence is of a
type that is commonly relied on by reasonably prudent people and the hearsay was
not the sole basis for the ruling. Scientific lab results are the type of information relied
upon by reasonably prudent people. And based on the parties’ written arguments, it
is undisputed that the lab results were not the sole evidence considered by the
Stewards. Here, in reaching their ruling, the Stewards considered the positive test
letters, along with a split-sample confirmation that similarly showed a positive test
and testimony from Mr. Grigsby. Petitioner did not establish clear error on this
ground.
49
16 Tex. Admin. Code § 307.62(d)(4).
50
Cf. Los Fresnos Consol. Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Vazquez, 481 S.W.3d 742, 746 (Tex. App.—Austin 2015, pet. denied)
(explaining that hearsay could be considered in a school district’s nonrenewal hearing because the hearing procedures
did not include the Texas Rules of Evidence).
22
Proposal for Decision, SOAH Docket No. 476-25-13726,
Toby Keeton v. Texas Racing Commission
Copy from re:SearchTX
B. IT WAS NOT CLEAR ERROR TO RELY ON THE CHAIN OF
CUSTODY.
Second, Appellant asserted that the Commission failed to sufficiently prove
the reliability of the lab test results without the full record of the chain of custody.
Yet, there was sufficient evidence of reliability here.
At the summary suspension hearing, Mr. Grigsby testified extensively about
the chain of custody records. Although Mr. Grigsby could not personally attest to the
condition, collection, sealing, and shipping of these samples since he was not
physically involved with processing them, he testified about the
Commission’s practice, customs, habits, and the chain of custody documentation
received from UC-Davis—showing sufficient authentication of the chain of custody
and why relying on the test results was reasonable. That evidence is enough here,
where no error was shown with respect to these particular test results.
In his testimony before the Stewards, Mr. Grigsby acknowledged some
discrepancies in the chain of custody documents; however, he explained that those
discrepancies in the samples noted by UC-Davis involved hair testing, which is not
relevant to Appellant’s case and the samples did not test positive for Carmoterol.
Outside of the discrepancies mentioned, the evidence considered by the Stewards
did not establish that there were flaws or any irregularities related to the chain of
custody, calling questions to the integrity of the samples. Mr. Grigsby’s testimony at
the hearing before SOAH was consistent with his testimony provided at the
Stewards’ hearing. The Stewards’ reliance on the chain of custody documentation
accompanied by Mr. Grigsby’s testimony was not clear error.
23
Proposal for Decision, SOAH Docket No. 476-25-13726,
Toby Keeton v. Texas Racing Commission
Copy from re:SearchTX
C. IT WAS NOT CLEAR ERROR TO CONSIDER THE TEST RESULTS
FROM UC-DAVIS.
Next, Appellant asserted that reliance on test results from UC-Davis was clear
error because UC-Davis was not an approved laboratory under section 2034.002(a)
of the Texas Occupations Code, which provides that drug testing on a race animal
must be performed by either (1) the TVMDL, or (2) a laboratory “selected by the
Commission after consultation with the [TVMDL].”51 But there are two problems
with this argument.
First, Appellant did not raise this issue before the Stewards. Because the issue
was not raised during the hearing before the Stewards, it should not be considered
now “on appeal.”52 As previously stated, this is not a de novo trial, in which the court
may consider arguments and evidence that are introduced afresh. In this case, the
standard of review is clear error, which is an appellant standard. 53 Additionally, an
appeal is a “proceeding undertaken to have a decision reconsidered by a higher
authority,” especially, “the submission of a lower court’s or agency’s decision to a
higher court for review and possible reversal.” 54 Implicit in the common
understanding of an appeal is the concept of reconsideration or rehearing—that the
original issue was presented to the initial decision-maker, here the Stewards.
51
Tex. Occ. Code § 2034.002.
52
16 Tex. Admin. Code § 307.67(c).
53
Willacy Cty. Appraisal Dist. v. Sebastian Cotton & Grain, Ltd., 555 S.W.3d 29, 42 (Tex. 2018) (“in a trial de novo, a
court may consider arguments and evidence that are introduced afresh”).
54
Black’s Law Dictionary 104 (8th ed. 2004); see also Webster’s New Collegiate Dictionary 54 (1979) (“a legal
proceeding by which a case is brought from a lower to a higher court for rehearing”).
24
Proposal for Decision, SOAH Docket No. 476-25-13726,
Toby Keeton v. Texas Racing Commission
Copy from re:SearchTX
Second, the record shows that the Commission consulted with the TVMDL
on June 26, 2024, and that afterward the Commission sent the samples to UC-Davis
for analysis. Ms. Cook’s testimony confirmed that the Commission entered into an
interagency agreement with TVMDL, and UC-Davis was noted and chosen as the
preferred laboratory of the Commission. Ms. Cook further explained that the
primary purpose of the meeting was to add “provide” to the previous agreement to
allowed TVMDL to perform testing or have testing performed through a
subcontractor while still maintaining oversight of the process, as required by statutes.
The evidence is sufficient to show compliance with the statute.
D. THE STEWARDS DID NOT ERR IN ISSUING A RULING ABSENT
SPLIT-SAMPLE ANALYSIS ON ALL SAMPLES
Appellant also asserted that the Stewards erred in upholding and continuing
the summary suspension without resolving the split-sample issue or permitting a
split-sample testing. Based on Mr. Grigsby’s testimony, evidence regarding split-
samples is not required in the narrowly focused summary suspension hearing.
However, the evidence established that the Commission presented one split-sample
analysis for Dashin Girlfriend (LS065407). Rule 319.362(e) states that a positive test
results from both the original lab and the split-sample lab will establish a “prima facie
violation” of the Commission’s rules on prohibited substances.55 At least for Dashin
Girlfriend, a prima facie violation was established. The rule does not require that
more than one split-sample analysis be done before the Stewards can summarily
55
Prima facie means generally that the evidence is “[s]ufficient to establish a fact or raise a presumption unless
disproved or rebutted.” Black's Law Dictionary 1228 (8th ed.).
25
Proposal for Decision, SOAH Docket No. 476-25-13726,
Toby Keeton v. Texas Racing Commission
Copy from re:SearchTX
suspend a license. The Appellant failed to show that more than one corroborating
split-sample test was required before imposing a summary suspension.
E. IT WAS NOT CLEAR ERROR TO DESIGNATE APPELLANT AS THE
ABSOLUTE INSURER OF HORSES THAT TESTED POSITIVE.
Appellant asserted that the Stewards erred in inferring that the positive test
letters were evidence that Appellant personally or intentionally administered the
medication or permitted such administration. But under the law, Appellant was
responsible for the horses he trained.
According to the Commission’s rules, Appellant is the “absolute insurer” of
any horse entered into a race. 56 Additionally, as the trainer, Appellant is responsible
for ensuring that each horse in his care and custody is “free from all prohibited drugs,
chemicals, or other substances.” 57 Essentially, the rule makes the trainer strictly
liable for the integrity of the horse.
In Appellant’s interpretation of the rule, the Commission is required to
present evidence of an act or an intent on Appellant’s part to find that he was liable
and that his actions constituted an immediate threat. Appellant’s interpretation of
the rule is unconvincing. Further, because Appellant trained twenty-three horses
with positive test results, the Stewards reasonably concluded that his suspension was
appropriate.
56
16 Tex. Admin. Code § 311.104(b)(2).
57
Tex. Occ. Code § 2034.004(2).
26
Proposal for Decision, SOAH Docket No. 476-25-13726,
Toby Keeton v. Texas Racing Commission
Copy from re:SearchTX
F. THE STEWARDS DID NOT CLEARLY ERR BY UPHOLDING THE
SUMMARY SUSPENSION PENDING A HEARING ON THE MERITS.
Appellant argued that the Stewards’ ruling to impose a suspension without
determining the merits of the case was clear error. Further, Appellant contended that
allowing the suspension to continue pending a hearing on the merits amounted to an
“indefinite” suspension. Under the Commission’s rules, Appellant’s complaint
about the period of the suspension is not a matter for the ALJ but for the executive
secretary, who may grant a stay of the suspension. 58 The Stewards are authorized to
interpret and enforce the Act and its rules and to issue rulings. 59 Stewards also have
the authority to investigate alleged violations of the Act or rules by a licensee, charge
a licensee with a violation, conduct disciplinary hearings, impose fines, and suspend
licenses. 60 In this case, after considering the evidence, the Stewards’ made a
determination to not lift the suspension pending a hearing on the merits.
Pursuant to 16 Texas Administrative Code section 307.62(i), Stewards may
summarily suspend a licensee when it determines the licensee’s actions pose an
immediate danger to the public health, safety or welfare. In this case,
Appellant’s license was summarily suspended after twenty-three horses he trained
tested positive for a prohibited substance. Based on Mr. Grigsby’s testimony, the case
is still under investigation and positive drug test results for horses trained by
Appellant are expected to increase. Under the rule, Appellant was entitled to a
58
16 Tex. Admin. Code § 307.68.
59
16 Tex. Admin Code § 313.22(b).
60
16 Tex. Admin. Code § 307.61(a).
27
Proposal for Decision, SOAH Docket No. 476-25-13726,
Toby Keeton v. Texas Racing Commission
Copy from re:SearchTX
hearing on the summary suspension The hearing contemplated by section 307.62(i),
the summary suspension hearing, was held on February 11, 2025.
Unlike the evidentiary trial, in which a full-blown hearing on the merits occurs,
the purpose of summary suspension hearing is narrowly focused: the Stewards must
determine whether the summary suspension is warranted, based on whether the
continued active licensure of Appellant poses an immediate threat or danger to the
public health, safety, welfare. In light of the evidence presented and the narrow focus
of the hearing, the ALJ finds that Appellant failed to show that the Stewards
committed clear error when upholding the suspension Appellant’s license pending a
hearing on the merits.
For all the reasons stated above, the ALJ finds that the Stewards’ ruling is
supported by the evidence presented and further finds that Appellant failed to
establish that the Stewards’ ruling is clearly erroneous.
VII. FINDINGS OF FACT
1. Toby Keeton (Appellant) is licensed by the Texas Racing Commission
(Commission) as an owner/trainer under license number 3056.
2. On September 14, 2024, Appellant was the trainer of a racehorse,
Hocksareback, which won the second race at Lone Star Park, a Texas
racetrack.
3. On September 28, 2024, Appellant was the trainer of a racehorse, Dashin
Girlfriend, which won second place in the seventh race at Lone Star Park.
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4. On October 3, 2024, Appellant was the trainer of racehorses, Louisiana
Mystery, which won second place in the seventh race at Lone Star Park, and
Queen of Drama, which won the ninth race at Lone Star Park.
5. On or about October 4, 2024, Appellant was the trainer of a racehorse,
Favorite MVP Z, which won third place in the seventh race at Lone Star Park.
6. On October 5, 2024, Appellant was the trainer of a racehorse, Hocksareback,
which won second place in the eleventh race at Lone Star Park.
7. On October 10, 2024, Appellant was the trainer of a racehorse, Purple Rain,
which won second place in the fourth race at Lone Star Park.
8. On October 18, 2024, Appellant was the trainer of racehorses, Pt Rose, which
won third place in the sixth race at Lone Star Park, and Kati Bug, which won
the ninth race at Lone Star Park.
9. On October 25, 2024, Appellant was the trainer of racehorses, Aguila Rapida,
which won the first race at Lone Star Park; Favorite MVP Z, which won the
second race at Lone Star Park; Future Look, which won third place in the third
race at Lone Star Park; Hard to Politic, which won second place in the fifth
race at Lone Star Park; Air Force, which won second place in the sixth race at
Lone Star Park; and Lotta Big Love, which won second place in the seventh
race at Lone Star Park.
10. On October 26, 2024, Appellant was the trainer of racehorses, Flyin Rabbit
123, which won second place in the eighth race at Lone Star Park; Shoeless,
which won the tenth race at Lone Star Park; and Top Cowboy, which won
second place in the eleventh race at Lone Star Park.
11. On November 1, 2024, Appellant was the trainer of racehorses, Kiss My Tail
Lights, which won the second race at Lone Star Park, and Dashin Girlfriend,
which won second place in the tenth race at Lone Star Park.
12. On November 2, 2024, Appellant was the trainer of a racehorse, Queen of
Drama, which won the tenth race at Lone Star Park.
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13. On November 9, 2024, Appellant was the trainer of a racehorse, Pt Rose,
which won second place in the eleventh race at Lone Star Park.
14. On November 15, 2024, Appellant was the trainer of a racehorse, Flyin Rabbit
123, which won the seventh race at Lone Star Park.
15. Urine and/or blood samples were collected from each racehorse immediately
after the races and were given to Commission representatives.
16. The samples were properly obtained, secured, stored, and transported to the
laboratory for analysis.
17. The Commission consulted with the Texas A&M Veterinary Medical
Diagnostic Laboratory (TVMDL) on June 26, 2024. The University of
California at Davis (UC-Davis) was designated as the preferred laboratory of
the Commission and the interagency agreement was amended to allow UC-
Davis to provide testing as a subcontractor of TVMDL.
18. The Commission sent the samples to UC-Davis for analysis.
19. UC-Davis performed a scientific analysis of the samples provided.
20. All urine samples tested positive for Carmoterol.
21. Carmoterol is a beta agonist.
22. The blood sample in racehorse Flyin Rabbit 123, collected on
November 15, 2024, tested positive for d-Methamphetamine.
23. A split-specimen collected from Dashin Girlfriend on September 28, 2024,
was tested at Industrial Laboratories. This entity confirmed the presence of
Carmoterol in Dashin Girlfriend on the above-stated date.
24. The use of Carmoterol and d-Methamphetmine in horses could have affected
the health or performance of horses and thus posed an immediate and ongoing
threat to racing integrity and the public health, safety, or welfare.
25. On January 30, 2025, the Commission’s Stewards summarily suspended
Appellant’s trainer license as a result of the twenty-three positives for
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Toby Keeton v. Texas Racing Commission
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Carmoterol and d-Methamphetamine found on racehorses owned or trained
by Appellant.
26. On February 3, 2025, the Stewards scheduled a summary suspension hearing
for February 11, 2024.
27. On February 12, 2025, the Stewards issued a ruling affirming the summary
suspension.
28. The Stewards’ ruling read, “[u]pon consideration of all of the evidence and
testimony, the Board of Stewards respectfully decline to lift the summary
suspension pending a hearing on the merits.”
29. On February 15, 2025, Appellant appealed the Stewards’ ruling and the case
was referred to the State Office of Administrative Hearings (SOAH).
30. On May 13, 2025, Staff sent Appellant the Notice of Hearing. The Notice of
Hearing contained a statement of the time, place, and nature of the hearing; a
statement of the legal authority and jurisdiction under which the hearing was
to be held; a reference to the particular sections of the statutes and rules
involved; and either a short, plain statement of the factual matters asserted or
an attachment that incorporated by reference the factual matters asserted in
the complaint or petition filed with the state agency.
31. On May 22, 2025, Administrative Law Judge Roshunda Atchison convened
the hearing on the merits via Zoom. Attorney David Holmes represented
Commission Staff. Attorneys Clark Brewster and Joseph DeAngelis
represented Appellant.
32. The record was held open to allow the parties to file written closing arguments
and file admitted exhibits.
33. The record closed on June 6, 2025.
VIII. CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
1. The Commission has jurisdiction over this matter pursuant to the Texas
Racing Act. Tex. Occ. Code §§ 2023.001, .109.
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2. SOAH has appellate jurisdiction under the clear error standard of review over
matters relating to the hearing in this case. Tex. Gov’t Code, Ch. 2001,
Subchapter D, and Ch. 2003; 16 Tex. Admin. Code 307.67(c).
3. Timely and adequate notice was given in this case. Tex. Gov’t Code §§
2001.051-.052.
4. The Commission’s stewards have authority to conduct hearings and impose
penalties. Tex. Occ. Code § 2023.106; 16 Tex. Admin. Code § 307.61.
5. A trainer who has care and custody of a race animal is required to guard each
animal in his or her custody to prevent the administration of a prohibited drug,
chemical, or other substance. 16 Tex. Admin. Code §§ 311.104(b)(2), 319.302.
6. The licensed trainer of a racehorse is considered by law to be the absolute
ensurer that no prohibited substance has been administered to the animal. Tex.
Occ. Code § 2034.004; 16 Tex. Admin. Code §§ 311.104(b)(2), 319.302.
7. A prohibited substance is a drug that, in its use or intended use, is reasonably
capable of influencing or affecting the outcome of a race in a manner contrary
to the Texas Racing Act or a Commission rule and is prohibited by a rule
regulating the unlawful influence of a race. Tex. Occ. Code § 2021.003(38).
Commission rule defines a prohibited drug as any stimulants, depressants,
tranquilizers, local anesthetics, drugs, or other drug metabolites that could
affect the health or performance of a race animal, however minimal. 16 Tex.
Admin. Code § 319.1(b)(1).
8. Carmoterol is a beta-agonist. Beta-agonists are prohibited substances. 16 Tex.
Admin. Code § 319.3(f ).
9. Methamphetamine is expressly scheduled as a Class1A drug under the
Commission’s Classification Guidelines for Foreign Substances.
Methamphetamine is a prohibited substance. 16 Tex. Admin. Code
§ 319.1(b)(1).
10. The positive findings by a chemist of a prohibited drug in the test specimens
of a horse collected on the day of the race, subject to the rules of the
Commission relating to split-specimens, is prima facie evidence that the
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prohibited drug was administered to the horse and was carried in the body of
the horse while participating in the race. 16 Tex. Admin. Code § 319.3(e).
11. A person aggrieved by a ruling of the stewards may appeal to the Commission,
and those appeals are referred to SOAH for hearing. 16 Tex. Admin. Code §§
307.67(a).
12. Appellant has the burden of proof at the hearing on the merits to show that the
Stewards’ ruling was clearly erroneous. 16 Tex. Admin. Code § 307.67(c).
13. Appellant did not prove that the Stewards’ ruling to uphold the summary
suspend of Appellant’s license was clearly in error.
Signed August 6, 2025
ALJ Signature:
_____________________________
Roshunda Atchison
Presiding Administrative Law Judge
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Automated Certificate of eService
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Envelope ID: 104035993
Filing Code Description: Proposal for Decision
Filing Description: PROPOSAL FOR DECISION
Status as of 8/6/2025 11:38 AM CST
Case Contacts
Name BarNumber Email TimestampSubmitted Status
David Holmes david.holmes@txrc.texas.gov 8/6/2025 11:12:34 AM SENT
Clark Brewster cbrewster@brewsterlaw.com 8/6/2025 11:12:34 AM SENT
Joey DeAngelis jcdeangelis@brewsterlaw.com 8/6/2025 11:12:34 AM SENT
Copy from re:SearchTX
Automated Certificate of eService
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Jennifer Foster on behalf of Lauren McGee
Bar No. 24128835
jennifer.foster@oag.texas.gov
Envelope ID: 109044277
Filing Code Description: Brief Requesting Oral Argument
Filing Description: TRC Brief
Status as of 12/12/2025 2:11 PM CST
Associated Case Party: Toby Keeton
Name BarNumber Email TimestampSubmitted Status
Clark Brewster 786841 cbrewster@brewsterlaw.com 12/12/2025 1:40:55 PM SENT
Don Griffin 8456975 dgriffin@velaw.com 12/12/2025 1:40:55 PM SENT
Joseph DeAngelis jcdeangelis@brewsterlaw.com 12/12/2025 1:40:55 PM SENT
Case Contacts
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Jennifer Foster Jennifer.Foster@oag.texas.gov 12/12/2025 1:40:55 PM SENT
Associated Case Party: Texas Racing Commission
Name BarNumber Email TimestampSubmitted Status
Lauren McGee lauren.mcgee@oag.texas.gov 12/12/2025 1:40:55 PM SENT