Martino

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

MIDDLE DISTRICT OF FLORIDA

TAMPA DIVISION

LESA MARIA MARTINO,

Plaintiff,

v.

Case No. 8:25-cv-521-JLB-SPF

CHRISTINE MARLEWSKI,

Defendant.

/

REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION

Before the Court is Plaintiff’s Application to Proceed in District Court without

Prepaying Fees or Costs, construed by the Court as a motion to proceed in forma pauperis

(Doc. 3). Upon review of Plaintiff’s Complaint (Doc. 1) and request to proceed in forma

pauperis (Doc. 3), the undersigned recommends that Plaintiff’s motion be denied and the

complaint dismissed.

I. Background

There is a lengthy backstory to Plaintiff’s allegations, which she recounts piecemeal

through this and other lawsuits. This is not her first attempt to sue characters who played key

roles in this backstory.1 Here, along with her affidavit of indigency, Plaintiff submits a Form

1 Although this is Plaintiff’s first lawsuit against Judge Marlewski, Plaintiff filed 11 cases

between 2019 and 2022 in the Tampa Division of the Middle District of Florida alleging

similar facts; each has been dismissed. See Martino v. Samuel, No. 8:19-cv-1703-VMC-TGW

(filed Jul. 15, 2019; dismissed without prejudice Dec. 9, 2019); Martino v. Manning, No. 8:19-

cv-3054-MSS-CPT (filed Dec. 12, 2019; dismissed with prejudice Feb. 18, 2020); Martino v.

Campbell, No. 8:20-cv-694-VMC-SPF (filed Mar. 25, 2020; dismissed with prejudice May 8,

2020); Martino v. Campbell, et al., No. 8:21-cv-1636-KKM-JSS (filed July 28, 2021; dismissed

without prejudice Dec. 13, 2021); Martino v. Hudson, No. 8:21-cv-2035-SDM-CPT (filed Aug.

24, 2021; dismissed Nov. 18, 2021); Martino v. Peacock, No. 8:21-cv-2390-WFJ-TGW (filed

Pro Se 15, Complaint for Violation of Civil Rights (Doc. 1), in which she purports to sue the

Honorable Christine Marlewski (“Judge Marlewski”), a Hillsborough County judge assigned

to civil cases in Florida’s Thirteenth Judicial Circuit, in her official and individual capacities

under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, for violating her due process rights (Id. at 1-3). Plaintiff claims that

Judge Marlewski acted under color of state law and that “in Florida, a judge who acts under

color of law to violate a person’s constitutional rights can be charged with a felony.” (Id. at

4).

From the “Statement of Claim” section of Plaintiff’s Complaint, the Court discerns

that Plaintiff takes issue with some of Judge Marlewski’s rulings in cases Plaintiff is a party

to, dating back to 2018 (Id. at 4-5). Plaintiff accuses Judge Marlewski of colluding with

attorney John. F. Hayter, who represented Traci Samuel Hudson in Samuel v. Martino, Case

No. 2018-CA-5020,2 a “fraudulent libel slander lawsuit” against Plaintiff over which Judge

Marlewski presided (Id.). Plaintiff claims that Judge Marlewski violated her own procedures

and judicial preferences when she allowed Attorney Hayter to set a unilateral hearing on a

motion to strike Plaintiff’s filings in that case (Id.).

Oct. 12, 2021; dismissed with prejudice Oct. 21, 2021); Martino v. Weidner, No. 8:21-cv-2585-

SDM-SPF (filed Nov. 3, 2021; dismissed Feb. 23, 2022); Martino v. Weis, et al., No. 8:21-cv-

2979-MSS-TGW (filed Dec. 27, 2021; dismissed with prejudice Dec. 28, 2021); Martino v.

Hayter, et al., No. 8:22-cv-2181-CEH-CPT (filed Sept. 20, 2022; dismissed without prejudice

Sept. 11, 2023); Martino v. Bryanton, et al., No. 8:22-cv-2187-TPB-SPF (filed Sept. 21, 2022;

dismissed Sept. 30, 2022); Martino v. Bryanton, et al., No. 8:22-cv-2811-CEH-JSS (filed Dec.

12, 2022; dismissed without prejudice Sept. 12, 2023).

2 The docket is available at https://hover.hillsclerk.com/html/home.html, a verified website

of a public agency. The Court may take judicial notice of “a fact that is not subject to

reasonable dispute because it [ ] … can be accurately and readily determined from sources

whose accuracy cannot reasonably be questioned.” Fed. R. Evid. 201(b). “The court may

take judicial notice at any stage of the proceeding.” Fed. R. Evid. 201(d).

Plaintiff underscores that Judge Marlewski’s Procedures and Preferences for setting

unilateral hearings, available on the state court’s website, require a minimum of 60 days’

notice to opposing counsel and a detailed description of the efforts made to reach an

agreement with opposing counsel on a hearing date (Id.). Plaintiff alleges that Attorney

Hayter set a unilateral hearing with only three weeks’ notice to her, without conferring with

her beforehand (Id.). So, according to Plaintiff, Judge Marlewski violated Florida’s Vexatious

Litigant Law, Fla. Stat. § 68.093, and Plaintiff’s due process rights when she permitted the

unilateral hearing and barred Plaintiff from submitting any more pro se filings in Samuel v.

Martino (1-1 at 2).3 Plaintiff seeks monetary damages and equitable relief, asking the Court

to reach back in time into the state court docket and reverse Judge Marlewski’s orders (Id. at

5).

II. Legal Standard

Under 28 U.S.C. § 1915, the Court may, upon a finding of indigency, authorize the

commencement of an action without requiring the prepayment of fees or security therefor. 28

U.S.C. § 1915(a)(1). When an application to proceed in forma pauperis is filed, the court must

review the case and dismiss it sua sponte if the court determines the action is frivolous or

malicious, fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted, or seeks monetary relief

3 Plaintiff has another case against Judge Marlewski pending before the undersigned. In

Martino v. Marlewski, No. 8:25-cv-01431-SDM-SPF, Plaintiff attempts to sue Judge Marlewski

in her official and individual capacities for violating plaintiff’s First and Fourteenth

Amendment rights in both Samuel v. Martino, Case No. 18-CA-5020, and In re Estate of Roland

T. Martino, Case No. 2022-CP-003391-A001-HC. Plaintiff claims that Judge Marlewski, in

the latter state case, violated her rights by not allowing her to file objections without an

attorney when she was unable to afford one, and for striking Plaintiff’s pro se filings. Plaintiff

also claims Judge Marlewski aided and abetted a felon (Traci Samuel Hudson) and her

attorney, Attorney Hayter, in stealing $35,000 from Plaintiff’s deceased father’s estate. In

that case, the undersigned also found that Plaintiff’s in forma pauperis motion should be denied

and the case dismissed with prejudice.

against a defendant immune from such relief. 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(i)-(iii). A suit is

frivolous when it is “without any merit in fact or law.” Selensky v. Alabama, 619 F. App’x 846,

848 (2015).4 Where a district court determines from the face of the complaint that the factual

allegations are baseless or the legal theories are without merit, the court may conclude that

the case has little or no chance of success and dismiss the complaint before service of process.

Carroll v. Gross, 984 F.2d 392, 393 (11th Cir. 1993).

The phrase “fails to state a claim on which relief may be granted” has the same

meaning as the nearly identical phrase in Rule 12(b)(6), Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. See

Mitchell v. Farcass, 112 F.3d 1483, 1490 (11th Cir. 1997) (“The language of section

1915(e)(2)(B)(ii) tracks the language of Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6), and we will

apply Rule 12(b)(6) standards in reviewing dismissals under section 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii).”).

Namely:

To withstand a motion to dismiss, a complaint must state a “plausible”

claim for relief. Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, ––––, 129 S.Ct. 1937, 1949,

173 L.Ed.2d 868 (2009). This requires sufficient “factual content that allows

the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for

the misconduct alleged.” Id. at ––––, 129 S.Ct. at 1949. Although we must

accept all factual allegations in the complaint as true, we need not apply this

rule to legal conclusions. Id. at ––––, 129 S.Ct. at 1949. Furthermore, the

factual allegations must go beyond “naked assertions” and establish more

than “a sheer possibility” of unlawful activity. Id. at ––––, 129 S.Ct. at 1949

(quotation marks, alteration, and citation omitted). In other words, the

“[f]actual allegations must be enough to raise a right to relief above the

speculative level.” Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555, 127 S.Ct.

1955, 1965, 167 L.Ed.2d 929 (2007).

Azar v. Nat'l City Bank, 382 F. App’x 880, 884 (11th Cir. 2010).

4 Unpublished opinions of the Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals are not considered binding

precedent; however, they may be cited as persuasive authority. 11th Cir. R. 36-2.

And under Rule 8(a)(2), Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, a complaint must contain

“a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief.” Fed.

R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2). “[T]he pleading standard Rule 8 announces does not require ‘detailed

factual allegations,’ but it demands more than an unadorned, the defendant-unlawfully-

harmed-me accusation.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678 (quoting Bell, 550 U.S. at 555).

Dismissal is also appropriate if, upon review, the complaint is found to lack subject

matter jurisdiction. Cafaro v. Wyllins, No. 8:10-cv-1836-T-30EAJ, 2010 WL 3747868, at *1

(M.D. Fla. Sept. 7, 2010), report and recommendation adopted, 2010 WL 3747837 (M.D. Fla.

Sept. 22, 2010). Finally, in reviewing a complaint, courts hold pro se pleadings to a less

stringent standard and, therefore, construe the complaint more liberally. Tannenbaum v. United

States, 148 F.3d 1262, 1263 (11th Cir. 1998) (“Pro se pleadings are held to a less stringent

standard than pleadings drafted by attorneys and will, therefore, be liberally construed.”).

III. Analysis

Upon review of Plaintiff’s filings, she appears financially eligible to proceed in forma

pauperis: She receives social security benefits and has no other income, she has a lien on her

vehicle, and she has a judgment against her in a previous case (see Doc. 3). Despite this, the

undersigned recommends dismissal of Plaintiff’s Complaint with prejudice.

A. Eleventh Amendment Immunity

This Court lacks subject matter jurisdiction over Plaintiff’s claims because Judge

Marlewski is entitled to Eleventh Amendment immunity. The Eleventh Amendment

provides, “The judicial power of the United States shall not be construed to extend to any suit

in law or equity, commenced or prosecuted against one of the United States by Citizens of

another State, or by Citizens or Subjects of any Foreign State.” U.S. Const. amend. XI. “The

Eleventh Amendment protects a State from being sued in federal court without the State’s

consent.” Manders v. Lee, 338 F.3d 1304, 1308 (11th Cir. 2003) (en banc), cert. denied, 540 U.S.

1107 (2004). “Because of the Eleventh Amendment, States may not be sued in federal court

unless they consent to it in unequivocal terms or unless Congress, pursuant to a valid exercise

of power, unequivocally expresses its intent to abrogate the immunity.” Green v. Mansour, 474

U.S. 64, 68 (1985).

The State of Florida has not consented to be sued under § 1983, and Congress has not

abrogated a state’s immunity for a § 1983 violation. Gamble v. Fla. Dep’t of Health & Rehab.

Servs., 779 F.2d 1509, 1515 (11th Cir. 1986); Carr v. City of Florence, 916 F.2d 1521, 1525 (11th

Cir. 1990). Eleventh Amendment immunity applies whether the requested relief is legal or

equitable, see Uberoi v. Supreme Ct. of Fla., 819 F.3d 1311, 1313 (11th Cir. 2016); it extends to

a state agency or state entity functioning as an arm of the state, see Ross v. Jefferson Cty. Dep’t

of Health, 701 F.3d 655, 659 (11th Cir. 2012); and it extends to a state official in her official

capacity if the state is the real, substantive party in interest. Carr, 916 F.2d at 1524.

Here, Judge Marlewski, in her official capacity, is entitled to Eleventh Amendment

immunity. See Badillo v. Thorpe, 158 F. App’x 208, 213-14 (11th Cir. 2005) (finding that a

Florida judge, acting in their official capacity, is an arm of the State of Florida). Further,

Plaintiff does not seek prospective relief in her Complaint, foreclosing application of the Ex

Parte Young doctrine (often invoked to defeat Eleventh Amendment immunity). Under this

doctrine, a “state official in his or her official capacity, when sued for injunctive relief, would

be a person under § 1983 because official-capacity actions for prospective relief are not treated

as actions against the State.” Will, 491 U.S. at 71, n.10. Likewise, a suit for prospective relief

to enjoin a state official from enforcing an unconstitutional act is not a suit against the state.

It thus is not barred by the Eleventh Amendment. Scott v. Taylor, 405 F.3d 1251, 1255 (11th

Cir. 2005). The Ex Parte Young doctrine is “narrow” and applies to prospective relief only.

Puerto Rico Aqueduct & Sewer Auth. v. Metcalf & Eddy, Inc., 506 U.S. 139, 146 (1993). The

doctrine does not permit a judgment against a state officer that declares that the officer

violated federal law in the past. Id.

Plaintiff does not request prospective equitable relief against Judge Marlewski in her

official capacity to end ongoing violations of federal law. Instead, she asks the Court to

reverse orders that Judge Marlewski previously entered in state court; the Ex Parte Young

doctrine does not apply in this case. See Higdon v. Tusan, 746 F. App’x 805, 809-10 (11th Cir.

2018) (holding that the Eleventh Amendment barred claims against state judges in their

official capacities because the plaintiff sought only the entry of an order overturning state

court orders or declaring that the state court violated federal law in the past).5 Because the

5 It is unclear from Plaintiff’s Complaint whether any of the state proceedings she complains

of are ongoing. If she is challenging Judge Marlewski’s procedural orders in a closed case, her

claims that she was denied due process are inextricably intertwined with the state-court

judgment, and this Court’s review is forestalled by the Rooker-Feldman doctrine. See Valentine

v. BAC Home Loan Servicing, L.P., 635 F. App’x 753, 756 (11th Cir. 2015) (“Under the Rooker-

Feldman doctrine, a district court lacks jurisdiction over claims ‘brought by state-court losers

complaining of injuries caused by state-court judgments rendered before the district court

proceedings commenced and inviting district court review and rejection of those judgments.”

(quoting Exxon Mobil Corp. v. Saudi Basic Indus. Corp., 544 U.S. 280, 284 (2005))). On the other

hand, if the state court proceedings are ongoing, Plaintiff’s Complaint is subject to dismissal

under the abstention doctrine of Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37 (1971). “The Younger doctrine

bars federal court intervention in state noncriminal proceedings where the proceedings

constitute an ongoing state judicial proceeding, the proceedings implicate important state

interests, and there is an adequate opportunity in the state proceedings to raise constitutional

challenges.” Adams v. State of Fla., 185 Fed. App’x 816, 816-17 (11th Cir. 2006) (per curiam)

(citing 31 Foster Children v. Bush, 329 F.3d 1255, 1274 (11th Cir. 2003)); see Middlesex Cnty.

Ethics Comm. v. Garden State Bar Ass’n, 457 U.S. 423, 432 (1982). If the state court proceedings

have not concluded, this Court’s review or modification of state court orders would clearly

interfere. The State of Florida has an interest in presiding over its own cases, and Plaintiff

can assert her constitutional challenges—through counsel—in state court.

Court lacks subject matter jurisdiction over claims barred by the Eleventh Amendment,

dismissal of Plaintiff’s § 1983 claims against Judge Marlewski is warranted.

B. Absolute Judicial Immunity

Plaintiff purports to sue Judge Marlewski in both her individual and official capacities

under § 1983. “[T]o prevail on a civil rights action under § 1983, a plaintiff must show that

he or she was deprived of a federal right by a person acting under color of state law.” Rosa v.

Fla. Dep't of Corr., 522 F. App'x 710, 714 (11th Cir. 2013) (citing Griffin v. City of Opa–Locka, 261

F.3d 1295, 1303 (11th Cir.2001)); see also Beaubrun v. Dodge State Prison, No. 23-12757, 2025

WL 2490396, at * 3 (11th Cir. Aug. 29, 2025) (quoting West v. Atkins, 487 U.S. 42, 48 (1988))

(“To state a claim under section 1983, a plaintiff must allege (1) that a right secured by the

Constitution or laws of the United States was violated, and (2) that the alleged violation was

committed by a ‘person acting under the color of state law.’”).

But § 1983 claims are no exception to the edict that a judge is entitled to absolute

judicial immunity for acts performed within the scope of their judicial office. See Stump v.

Sparkman, 435 U.S. 349, 356–57 (1978) (citing Bradley v. Fisher, 80 U.S. 335, 351 (1871)).

Judicial immunity applies when “(1) the judge dealt with the plaintiff in his judicial capacity

and (2) the judge did not act in the clear absence of all jurisdiction.” Bush v. Wash. Mut. Bank,

177 F. App’x 16, 17 (11th Cir. 2006) (alteration in original) (citation omitted). “The immunity

applies even when the judge’s conduct ‘was in error, was done maliciously, or was in excess

of his authority. . . .’” Stevens v. Osuna, 877 F.3d 1293, 1301 (11th Cir. 2017) (quoting Stump,

435 U.S. at 356–57). “Whether a judge’s actions were made while acting in his judicial

capacity depends on whether: (1) the act complained of constituted a normal judicial function;

(2) the events occurred in the judge’s chambers or in open court; (3) the controversy involved

a case pending before the judge; and (4) the confrontation arose immediately out of a visit to

the judge in his judicial capacity.” Sibley v. Lando, 437 F.3d 1067, 1070 (11th Cir. 2005) (citing

Scott v. Hayes, 719 F.2d 1562, 1565 (11th Cir. 1983)).

Here, construing Plaintiff’s Complaint liberally, she alleges that Judge Marlewski,

while presiding over a case in which Plaintiff was a party, colluded with Attorney Hayter to

set a unilateral hearing and bar Plaintiff from filing documents pro se, in violation of her due

process rights (Doc. 1 at 4-5). Plaintiff does not allege that Judge Marlewski acted outside

her judicial capacity and in “clear absence of all jurisdiction,” as required to defeat judicial

immunity. See Bolin v. Story, 225 F.3d 1234, 1339 (11th Cir. 2000). Setting hearings, entering

orders, and striking filings in cases pending before her are normal judicial functions.

Additionally, even if Judge Marlewski made legal errors, acted maliciously, or exceeded her

authority (there is no evidence to support any of these allegations), she is nonetheless entitled

to absolute judicial immunity with respect to claims asserted against her in her individual

capacity. See id. (citing Stump, 435 U.S. at 356-57).

C. Failure to State a Claim

Additionally, Plaintiff’s “official capacity” claims against Judge Marlewski under §

1983 fail, because a judge in their official capacity is not a “person” within the meaning of §

1983. An “official capacity” suit generally is another way to plead an action against the entity

of which the officer is an agent. Kentucky v. Graham, 473 U.S. 159, 165 (1985). A Florida

judge, acting in their official capacity, is an arm of the State of Florida. See Badillo v. Thorpe,

158 F. App’x 208, 213-14 (11th Cir. 2005); Shean v. Garcia, No. 3:20-cv-750-MMH-PDB, 2021

WL 2403936, at *5 (M.D. Fla. Apr. 15, 2021), report and recommendation adopted, 2021 WL

1811772 (M.D. Fla. May 6, 2021). Consequently, Judge Marlewski is treated as an arm of

the State of Florida, and a state—including the State of Florida—is not a person within the

meaning of § 1983. Will v. Michigan Dep’t of State Police, 491 U.S. 58, 64 (1989); Newton v. Duke

Energy Fla., LLC, 895 F.3d 1270, 1278 (11th Cir. 2018). Therefore, Judge Marlewski, in her

official capacity, is not a “person” within the meaning of § 1983; dismissal of Plaintiff’s claims

is warranted. See Clark v. Clark, 984 F.2d 272, 273 (8th Cir. 1993) (“Courts are not persons

within the meaning of 42 U.S.C. § 1983.”).6

D. Pleading Deficiencies

Finally, Plaintiff’s Complaint is an impermissible shotgun pleading. To comply with

federal pleading standards, a complaint “must contain . . . a short and plain statement of the

claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2). The Federal

Rules also require plaintiffs to “state [their] claims . . . in numbered paragraphs, each limited

as far as practicable to a single set of circumstances.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 10(b). “A ‘shotgun

pleading’ is one that lacks the minimum clarity, brevity, or coherence required by Rules 8 and

10 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.” Lozano v. Prummell, No. 2:22-cv-600-JES-KCD,

2022 WL 4384176, at *2 (M.D. Fla. Sept. 22, 2022). A shotgun pleading is a type of pleading

that is not allowed, even from pro se plaintiffs. See Weiland v. Palm Beach Cty. Sheriff's Office,

792 F.3d 1313, 1320 (11th Cir. 2015).

Four basic types of shotgun pleadings violate Rules 8(a), 10(b), or both: (1) a complaint

that contains multiple counts where each count adopts the allegations of all preceding counts;

6 Plaintiff alleges that Judge Marlewski violated the Florida Vexatious Litigant Law, Fla.

Stat. § 68.093. (Id.) Plaintiff does not and cannot state a claim under this state statute. Under

§ 1983, a Plaintiff can only claim a deprivation of their rights “secured by the Constitution

and [federal] laws,” not state laws. 42 U.S.C § 1983. Additionally, Fla. Stat. § 68.093 is

designed to protect the state judiciary from vexatious pro se litigants, not the other way around.

And the statute does not create a private cause of action.

(2) a complaint that is replete with conclusory, vague, and immaterial facts not obviously

connected to any particular cause of action; (3) a complaint that fails to separate into different

counts each cause of action or claim for relief; and (4) a complaint that asserts multiple claims

against multiple defendants without specifying which of the defendants are responsible for

which acts or omissions or which of the defendants the claim is brought against. Id. at 1321-

23. “The unifying characteristic of all types of shotgun pleadings is that they fail to one degree

or another, and in one way or another, to give the defendants adequate notice of the claims

against them and the grounds upon which each claim rests.” Id. at 1323. Shotgun pleadings

“exact an intolerable toll on the trial court’s docket, lead to unnecessary and unchanneled

discovery, and impose unwarranted expense on the litigants, the court and the court’s

parajudicial personnel and resources.” Jackson v. Bank of Am., N.A., 898 F.3d 1348, 1356-57

(11th Cir. 2018) (citation omitted). Consequently, the Eleventh Circuit has said that a

shotgun complaint may be dismissed “on that basis alone.” Id.

Plaintiff’s Complaint is the second type of shotgun pleading, comprised of conclusory,

vague, and immaterial facts not obviously connected to Plaintiff’s causes of action. To the

extent the Court can make heads or tails of Plaintiff’s allegations, she accuses Judge

Marlewski of colluding with an attorney appearing before her with the intent of harming

Plaintiff. She states that “[t]he case is beyond egregious in nature with glaring corruption and

bias.” (Doc. 1 at 5). She offers no non-frivolous argument in support of this conclusion,

however, and does not give Judge Marlewski adequate notice of the grounds upon which her

claims rest.

IV. Conclusion

The undersigned recommends that Plaintiffs Complaint (Doc. 1) be dismissed with

prejudice. Although pro se parties are often entitled to the opportunity to amend their

complaints before dismissal, Plaintiff's claims do not appear amendable. See Jenkins v. Walker,

620 F. App’x 709, 711 (11th Cir. 2015) (“[A] district court need not allow amendment if the

amended complaint would still be subject to dismissal.”); Cockrell v. Sparks, 510 F.3d 1307,

1310 (11th Cir. 2007) (“Leave to amend a complaint is futile when the complaint as amended

would still be properly dismissed or be immediately subject to summary judgment for the

defendant.”) (citation omitted). The Court lacks subject matter jurisdiction under the

Eleventh Amendment, Judge Marlewski is entitled to absolute judicial immunity, and

Plaintiff fails to state a claim under § 1983. Additionally, considering Plaintiff has attempted

to assert similar claims unsuccessfully on numerous occasions, an amended complaint would

be futile.

For these reasons, the Court RECOMMENDS:

1. Plaintiff's Motion to proceed in forma pauperis (Doc. 3) be denied.

2. Plaintiff's Complaint (Doc. 1) be dismissed with prejudice.

IT IS SO REPORTED in Tampa, Florida, on November 14, 2025.

: lL

SEAN P. FLYNN )

UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

12

NOTICE TO PARTIES

Within fourteen days after being served with a copy of this Report and

Recommendation, any party may serve and file written objections to the proposed findings

and recommendations or request an extension of time to do so. 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1); 11th

Cir. R. 3-1. Failure of any party to timely object in accordance with the provisions of §

636(b)(1) waives that party’s right to challenge on appeal the district court’s order based on

the unobjected-to factual and legal conclusions contained in this Report and

Recommendation. 11th Cir. R. 3-1.