Sanders

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF TEXAS

DALLAS DIVISION

JACQUELINE HELEN SANDERS, §

Plaintiff, §

§

v. § No. 3:25-CV-1525-X-BT

§

DELUXE, §

Defendant. §

FINDINGS, CONCLUSIONS, AND RECOMMENDATION

OF THE UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

Plaintiff Jacqueline Helen Sanders filed a pro se civil action

alleging employment discrimination, which the Court referred to the United States

magistrate judge pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(b). The Court granted Plaintiff leave

to proceed in forma pauperis (IFP) but withheld issuing process pending judicial

screening. See Order (ECF No. 19). Having screened the complaint, the magistrate

judge recommends that Plaintiff’s complaint be DISMISSED.

Background

On June 13, 2025, Plaintiff filed an original complaint alleging that her

employer, “Deluxe,” caused her both “mental abuse and medical abuse.” Compl. at

221 (ECF No. 3). On July 10, 2025, the Court sent Plaintiff a notice of deficiency

explaining that her complaint failed to comply with Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a). Order at 1

(ECF No. 10). After Plaintiff filed seemingly unrelated documents on August 5,

2025 (ECF No. 11), the Court entered a second notice of deficiency reminding

Plaintiff of her obligation to comply with Rule 8. Order at 1 (ECF No. 12). The Court

also sent Plaintiff a form employment discrimination complaint. Id.

Plaintiff filed an amended complaint on the appropriate form on September

30, 2025. See generally Am. Compl. (ECF No. 21). Plaintiff raises claims for

employment discrimination based on race, gender/sex, religion, age, and

disability.1 See id. at 4. But Plaintiff does state how Defendant discriminated

against her or what relief she is seeking.

Rather, Plaintiff submitted various papers containing emails and other

miscellaneous documents that supposedly support her claims of discrimination.

See generally Compl.; Add’l Attachments (ECF Nos. 6–9, 11, 13, 17, 20, 22–26). In

these documents, Plaintiff complains that (i) her training included a mandatory

question about homosexuality; (ii) personal belongings were taken from her desk;

(iii) she overheard “sex jokes”; (iv) “a man” showed another woman his “private

behind,” and, Plaintiff “looked up and saw it”; (v) this same man pulled on

Plaintiff’s chair; and (vi) other people at her job talked to each other in African

languages. See Compl. at 4, 11.

Plaintiff believes this discrimination occurred due to her race (Black/African

American), age (over 40 years of age), national origin and/or ethnicity, sex

(female), religion (Pentecostal), and disability. Id. at 11. However, Plaintiff is

1 Sanders purportedly suffers from “heart problems, work injury, high blood

pressure and high heart rates.” Am. Compl. at 4.

unaware if anyone in a similarly situation was “treated the same, better, or worse

than [her].” Id. at 5.

Legal Standards and Analysis

A district court may summarily dismiss a complaint filed IFP if it concludes

the action is: (1) frivolous or malicious; (2) fails to state a claim on which relief may

be granted; or (3) seeks monetary relief against a defendant who is immune from

such relief. 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B). To state a claim upon which relief may be

granted, a plaintiff must plead “enough facts to state a claim to relief that is

plausible on its face,” Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007),

and must plead those facts with enough specificity “to raise a right to relief above

the speculative level[.]” Id. at 555. “A claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff

pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that

the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662

(2009). While a complaint need not contain detailed factual allegations, the

plaintiff must allege more than labels and conclusions. Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555.

I. Employment Discrimination

To establish a claim of employment discrimination, Plaintiff must plead and

prove that she (1) is a member of a protected class; (2) was qualified for the

position; (3) was subject to an adverse employment action; and (4) was replaced

by someone outside the protected class, or, in the case of disparate treatment,

shows that other similarly situated employees were treated more favorably. Bryan

v. McKinsey & Co., 375 F.3d 358, 360 (5th Cir. 2004). While Plaintiff is not

required to submit evidence to establish all the elements of her claim to survive

summary dismissal at this stage of the litigation, she must plead enough facts on

all the ultimate elements of her claim to make her case plausible. Chhim v. Univ.

of Tex. at Austin, 836 F.3d 467, 470 (5th Cir. 2016) (per curiam) (citing Raj v. La.

State Univ., 714 F.3d 322, 331 (5th Cir. 2013)).

In this case, Plaintiff fails to allege that she was qualified for the position she

held, was subject to adverse employment action, was replaced by someone outside

the protected class, or other similarly situated employees outside her protected

group were treated more favorably. She also fails to plead any facts regarding

discrimination based on her gender/sex or religion. The section of the form

complaint where Plaintiff was supposed to include the facts of her case is

completely blank. See Am. Compl. at 4–5. Instead, Plaintiff states in a conclusory

manner that she was “discriminated against in violation of Title VII of Civil Rights.”

Id. at 4. Plaintiff’s various filings similarly do not provide any facts that would show

that she was qualified for the position, was subject to an adverse employment

action, or was treated less favorably than other similarly situated employees.

Plaintiff has thus failed to state a plausible claim for employment discrimination.

See Flowers v. Taylor Farm, 2019 WL 2493406, at *2 (N.D. Tex. May 29, 2019)

(Rutherford, J.), rec. adopted, 2019 WL 2492295 (N.D. Tex. June 14, 2019)

(dismissing employment discrimination claims where the plaintiff failed to plead

facts to support the elements of employment discrimination).

II. Hostile Work Environment

To the extent that Plaintiff’s claims could be interpreted as sex

discrimination under a theory of a hostile or abusive work environment, Plaintiff

is similarly unable to state a plausible claim for relief.

To establish a prima facie case of sex discrimination under a theory of a

hostile or abusive work environment, Plaintiff must prove (1) she belongs to a

protected class; (2) she was subjected to unwelcome sexual harassment; (3) the

harassment was based upon sex; (4) the harassment affected a term, condition, or

privilege of her employment; and (5) Defendant knew or should have known of the

harassment and failed to take prompt remedial action. Watts v. Kroger Co., 170

F.3d 505, 509 (5th Cir. 1999); Woods v. Delta Bev. Grp., Inc., 274 F.3d 295, 298

(5th Cir. 2001).

Here, Plaintiff cannot establish that she was subjected to

unwelcome sexual harassment that affected a term, condition, or privilege of her

employment. In determining if a workplace environment is sufficiently abusive to

be actionable under Title VII, a court must review all the relevant circumstances,

including the frequency of the conduct, its severity, whether it is physically

threatening or humiliating, or a mere offensive utterance, and whether it

unreasonably interferes with the employee’s work performance. Butler v. Ysleta

Indep. Sch. Dist., 161 F.3d 263, 269 (5th Cir. 1998) (citing Faragher v. City of

Boca Raton, 524 U.S. 775, 787–88 (1998)). Incidental or occasional sexual

comments, discourtesy, rudeness, or isolated incidents (unless extremely severe)

are not discriminatory changes in the terms and conditions of a worker’s

employment. Id. ”To be actionable, the challenged conduct must be objectively

offensive, meaning that a reasonable person would find the conduct hostile or

abusive, and subjectively offensive, meaning that the victim perceived the conduct

to be hostile or abusive.” Walker v. SBC Servs., Inc., 375 F. Supp. 2d 524, 538 (N.D.

Tex. 2005). With respect to sexual harassment, it is actionable under Title VII only

if it is “so ‘severe or pervasive’ as to ‘alter the conditions of [the victim’s]

employment and create an abusive working environment.’ “ Faragher, 524 U.S. at

786 (quoting Meritor Savings Bank, FSB v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57, 67 (1986) (some

internal quotation marks omitted)).

Plaintiff’s allegations regarding overhearing “sex jokes,” while discourteous,

do not rise to the level of harassment. See Butler, 161 F.3d at 269 (citing Faragher,

524 U.S. at 787–88). Moreover, Plaintiff’s account of a man exposing his posterior

and, at a different point in time, grabbing Plaintiff’s chair does not support a prima

facie case of harassment. See Shepherd v. Comptroller of Pub. Accounts, 168 F.3d

871, 874 (5th Cir. 1999) (finding plaintiff’s allegations that a male coworker stared

at her and touched her arm, shoulder, and waist inappropriately on several

occasions were not severe or physically threatening); Hockman v. Westward

Commc’ns, LLC, 407 F.3d 317, 328 (5th Cir. 2004) (finding harassment non-severe

and non-pervasive where female employee alleged male coworker “harassed her in

the following ways: (1) he once made a remark to [plaintiff] about another

employee’s body, (2) he once slapped her on the behind with a newspaper, (3) he

“grabbed or brushed” against [plaintiff’s] breasts and behind, (4) he once held her

cheeks and tried to kiss her, (5) he asked [plaintiff] to come to the office early so

that they could be alone, and (6) he once stood in the door of the bathroom while

she was washing her hands”); Jackson v. Boise Locomotive, 2009 WL 2252246, at

*14 (S.D. Tex. July 28, 2009) (rejecting hostile work environment claim based, in

part, on a co-worker “mooning” the plaintiff).

Accordingly, Plaintiff is unable to state a claim for sex discrimination under

a theory of a hostile or abusive work environment.

Leave to Amend

Ordinarily, a pro se plaintiff should be granted the opportunity to amend her

complaint prior to a dismissal. But leave to amend is not required when the

plaintiff has already pleaded her “best case.” Brewster v. Dretke, 587 F.3d 764,

767-68 (5th Cir. 2009). The Court previously notified Plaintiff on two occasions

that her original complaint was deficient and allowed her an opportunity to file an

amended complaint. The amended complaint failed to cure these deficiencies.

Plaintiff has, therefore, pleaded her “best case,” and the complaint should be

dismissed with prejudice.

Recommendation

Plaintiff’s complaint should be summarily dismissed with prejudice for

failure to state a claim pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2).

SO RECOMMENDED November 14 2025.

Ta\ IO)

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simitors sHERFORD

UNITED ST. \TES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

INSTRUCTIONS FOR SERVICE AND

NOTICE OF RIGHT TO APPEAL/OBJECT

A copy of this report and recommendation shall be served on all parties in

the manner provided by law. Any party who objects to any part of this report and

recommendation must file specific written objections within 14 days after being

served with a copy. See 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(4); FED. R. Civ. P. 72(b). To be specific,

an objection must identify the specific finding or recommendation to which

objection is made, state the basis for the objection, and specify the place in the

magistrate judge’s report and recommendation where the disputed determination

is found. An objection that merely incorporates by reference or refers to the

briefing before the magistrate judge is not specific. Failure to file specific written

objections will bar the aggrieved party from appealing the factual findings and legal

conclusions of the magistrate judge that are accepted or adopted by the district

court, except upon grounds of plain error. See Douglass v. United Servs. Auto.

Assn, 79 F.3d 1415, 1417 (5th Cir. 1996).