Gonzalez

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8 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

9 FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

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11 SERGIO GONZALEZ, JR., No. 2:25-cv-00715-DAD-AC

12 Plaintiff,

13 v. ORDER GRANTING IN PART AND

DENYING IN PART DEFENDANTS’

14 CITY OF MODESTO, et al., MOTION TO DISMISS

15 Defendants. (Doc. No. 9)

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18 This matter is before the court on defendants’ motion to dismiss plaintiff’s complaint filed

19 on April 30, 2025. (Doc. No. 9.) Defendants’ motion was taken under submission on the papers

20 on July 7, 2025. (Doc. No. 23.) For the reasons explained below, defendants’ motion to dismiss

21 will be granted in part and denied in part.

22 BACKGROUND

23 On February 28, 2025, plaintiff Sergio Gonzalez, Jr. filed this civil rights action against

24 defendants City of Modesto, David Ramirez, Vanessa Del Toro, and Eric Martinez-Garcia

25 (collectively, “defendants”) for purported fabrication of evidence resulting in him being falsely

26 charged with the robbery and arrested and detained for a week. (Doc. No. 1.) In his complaint

27 plaintiff alleges as follows.

28 /////

1 On October 14, 2022, an armed robbery purportedly occurred. (Id. at ¶ 19.) A female

2 witness told the defendant police officers that the robbery was committed by her cousin, Sergio

3 Gonzales (with an “s” at the end, unlike plaintiff Gonzalez), who resides in Ceres, California

4 (unlike plaintiff, who resides in Stockton), and by her cousin’s friend. (Id. at ¶ 21.) The female

5 witness was repeatedly caught lying to the defendant police officers, including as to whether she

6 witnessed the alleged crime. (Id.) The defendant officers threatened the witness with jail if she

7 failed to cooperate in identifying plaintiff. (Id.) The witness then claimed that she was uncertain

8 whether her cousin’s name ended with an “s” or a “z” or if he was from Stockton or Ceres, before

9 finally relenting and falsely identifying plaintiff. (Id.) The defendant officers ignored the alleged

10 victim of the robbery when he told them that he thought he had just seen the suspect, with the

11 officers telling the victim of the robbery that he was wrong in this regard. (Id.) The defendant

12 officers also ignored the alleged victim of the robbery when he questioned whether the female

13 witness was being truthful. (Id.)

14 As a result, plaintiff was arrested in Texas on March 1, 2024. (Id. at ¶ 23.) He was then

15 detained for one week. (Id.) On or about March 4, 2024, while plaintiff was still incarcerated in

16 Texas, his parents called the Modesto Police Department and spoke with Officer DeLaCruz. (Id.

17 at ¶ 24.) They explained the misidentification, and the officer appeared to believe that plaintiff

18 was falsely arrested and imprisoned, but he claimed that there was nothing he could do. (Id.)

19 After hiring an attorney, plaintiff was released on bail on the condition that he return to

20 California to face the robbery charge. (Id. at ¶ 25.) Following the attorney’s communications

21 with the Stanislaus County District Attorney, the District Attorney moved to dismiss plaintiff’s

22 case in the interest of justice. (Id. at ¶¶ 26–27.) The court dismissed the case the same day. (Id.

23 at ¶ 28.)

24 As a result of his arrest plaintiff was detained for one week, causing him severe emotional

25 distress. (Id. at ¶ 29.) Plaintiff also lost wages during his imprisonment, which jeopardized his

26 employment and top secret security clearance at his place of employment. (Id.) He had his

27 Global Entry application and card revoked and incurred approximately $25,000 in attorney’s fees.

28 (Id.)

1 Based on these allegations, plaintiff brought four claims: (1) violation of the Fourth

2 Amendment and 42 U.S.C. § 1983; (2) false arrest/imprisonment in violation of California law;

3 (3) violation of the Bane Act; and (4) Intentional Infliction of Emotional Distress (“IIED”). (Id.

4 at ¶¶ 30–60.)

5 On April 30, 2025, defendants brought the pending motion to dismiss plaintiff’s

6 complaint. (Doc. No. 9.) On May 14, 2025, plaintiff filed his opposition to the motion. (Doc.

7 No. 15.) On May 26, 2025, defendants filed their reply thereto. (Doc. No. 16.)

8 LEGAL STANDARD

9 The purpose of a motion to dismiss pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6) is to test the legal

10 sufficiency of the complaint. N. Star Int’l v. Ariz. Corp. Comm’n, 720 F.2d 578, 581 (9th Cir.

11 1983). “Dismissal can be based on the lack of a cognizable legal theory or the absence of

12 sufficient facts alleged under a cognizable legal theory.” Balistreri v. Pacifica Police Dep’t, 901

13 F.2d 696, 699 (9th Cir. 1988). A plaintiff is required to allege “enough facts to state a claim to

14 relief that is plausible on its face.” Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007). “A

15 claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw

16 the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Ashcroft v.

17 Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009).

18 In determining whether a complaint states a claim on which relief may be granted, the

19 court accepts as true the allegations in the complaint and construes the allegations in the light

20 most favorable to the plaintiff. Hishon v. King & Spalding, 467 U.S. 69, 73 (1984). However,

21 the court need not assume the truth of legal conclusions cast in the form of factual allegations.

22 U.S. ex rel. Chunie v. Ringrose, 788 F.2d 638, 643 n.2 (9th Cir. 1986). While Rule 8(a) does not

23 require detailed factual allegations, “it demands more than an unadorned, the-defendant-

24 unlawfully-harmed-me accusation.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678. A pleading is insufficient if it offers

25 mere “labels and conclusions” or “a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action.”

26 Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555; see also Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678 (“Threadbare recitals of the elements

27 of a cause of action, supported by mere conclusory statements, do not suffice.”). Moreover, it is

28 inappropriate to assume that the plaintiff “can prove facts that it has not alleged or that the

1 defendants have violated the . . . laws in ways that have not been alleged.” Associated Gen.

2 Contractors of Cal., Inc. v. Cal. State Council of Carpenters, 459 U.S. 519, 526 (1983).

3 ANALYSIS

4 A. Monell Claim

5 Defendants argue that plaintiff has failed to state a cognizable Monell claim against

6 defendant City of Modesto (“the municipal defendant”) under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (claim 1) because

7 plaintiff has not alleged the requisite custom, policy, or practice, and plaintiff alleges, at most,

8 two incidents of unconstitutional conduct—(1) the defendant officers’ initial purported

9 fabrication of evidence and (2) the failure of Officer DeLaCruz to correct the situation once he

10 was told about the misidentification of plaintiff. (Doc. No. 9 at 9–11.) In opposition, plaintiff

11 argues that his allegations involve a minimum of two instances of unconstitutional conduct,

12 which is sufficient to support the claim. (Doc. No. 15 at 9–10.)

13 “Neither state officials nor municipalities are vicariously liable for the deprivation of

14 constitutional rights by employees.” Flores v. Cnty. of Los Angeles, 758 F.3d 1154, 1158 (9th

15 Cir. 2014).

16 A local government is liable for an injury under § 1983 under three

possible theories. See Clouthier v. County of Contra Costa, 591 F.3d

17 1232, 1249 (9th Cir. 2010), overruled on other grounds by Castro,

833 F.3d 1060. First, a local government may be liable if “execution

18 of a government’s policy or custom, whether made by its lawmakers

or by those whose edicts or acts may fairly be said to represent

19 official policy, inflict[ed] the injury.” Monell v. Dep’t of Soc. Servs.

of City of New York, 436 U.S. 658, 694, 98 S. Ct. 2018, 56 L.Ed.2d

20 611 (1978). Second, a local government can fail to train employees

in a manner that amounts to “deliberate indifference” to a

21 constitutional right, such that “the need for more or different training

is so obvious, and the inadequacy so likely to result in the violation

22 of constitutional rights, that the policymakers of the city can

reasonably be said to have been deliberately indifferent to the need.”

23 City of Canton v. Harris, 489 U.S. 378, 390, 109 S. Ct. 1197, 103

L.Ed.2d 412 (1989). Third, a local government may be held liable if

24 “the individual who committed the constitutional tort was an official

with final policy-making authority or such an official ratified a

25 subordinate’s unconstitutional decision or action and the basis for it.”

Gravelet-Blondin, 728 F.3d at 1097 (internal quotation marks and

26 citation omitted).

27 Rodriguez v. Cnty. of Los Angeles, 891 F.3d 776, 802–03 (9th Cir. 2018). Plaintiff has neither

28 alleged nor argued that the municipal defendant failed to train its officers (the second possible

1 theory) or that the unconstitutional action was committed or ratified by an official with final

2 policy-making authority (the third possible theory). Nor has plaintiff alleged or argued the

3 existence of a “formal governmental policy[.]” Trevino v. Gates, 99 F.3d 911, 918 (9th Cir.

4 1996), holding modified by Navarro v. Block, 250 F.3d 729 (9th Cir. 2001). Instead, plaintiff

5 argues only that the two unconstitutional acts alleged in his complaint are sufficient basis upon

6 which to plead an official policy or custom.

7 The court disagrees.

8 Absent a formal governmental policy, Trevino must show a

“longstanding practice or custom which constitutes the standard

9 operating procedure of the local government entity.” Gillette, 979

F.2d at 1346–47. The custom must be so “persistent and widespread”

10 that it constitutes a “permanent and well settled city policy.” Monell

v. Dept. of Soc. Serv. of N.Y., 436 U.S. 658, 691, 98 S. Ct. 2018, 2036,

11 56 L.Ed.2d 611 (1978). Liability for improper custom may not be

predicated on isolated or sporadic incidents; it must be founded upon

12 practices of sufficient duration, frequency and consistency that the

conduct has become a traditional method of carrying out policy.

13 Bennett v. City of Slidell, 728 F.2d 762, 767 (5th Cir.1984); see also,

Meehan v. Los Angeles County, 856 F.2d 102 (9th Cir.1988) (two

14 incidents not sufficient to establish custom); Davis v. Ellensburg, 869

F.2d 1230 (9th Cir.1989) (manner of one arrest insufficient to

15 establish policy).

16 Id.; see also Meehan v. Cnty. of Los Angeles, 856 F.2d 102, 107 (9th Cir. 1988) (“Proof of

17 unconstitutional assaults by SEB agents on December 21 and March 10, standing alone, does not

18 support a finding of liability against the County.”); Chu v. Cnty. of San Bernardino, No. 16-cv-

19 02185-MWF-KK, 2017 WL 11634382, at *4 (C.D. Cal. Feb. 14, 2017) (“At the hearing, Plaintiff

20 argued that she need only plead that she was arrested twice by two separate deputies to state a

21 claim for failure to act against the County under Monell. . . . Contrary to Plaintiff’s contention,

22 merely pleading a few isolated incidents of misconduct by individual deputies, without more, will

23 not suffice to state a claim against the County under Monell.”); Lesher v. City of Anderson, No.

24 2:21-cv-00386-WBS-DMC, 2021 WL 5744691, at *4 (E.D. Cal. Dec. 2, 2021) (“[T]he Ninth

25 Circuit has suggested that one or two prior similar incidents, standing alone, are generally

26 insufficient to prove the existence of an unconstitutional custom or practice[.]”).

27 It is the case that more than one or two incidents of unconstitutional activity is not always

28 necessary to allege a cognizable Monell claim. City of Oklahoma City v. Tuttle, 471 U.S. 808,

1 823–24 (1985) (“Proof of a single incident of unconstitutional activity is not sufficient to impose

2 liability under Monell, unless proof of the incident includes proof that it was caused by an

3 existing, unconstitutional municipal policy, which policy can be attributed to a municipal

4 policymaker.”). However, because plaintiff bases his Monell claim solely on the two alleged

5 constitutional violations by non-policymakers, absent additional allegations, plaintiff has failed to

6 state a cognizable claim for Monell liability under the applicable law set forth above.

7 B. Fabrication of Evidence

8 Defendants argue that plaintiff’s claims brought against the individual officers for false

9 arrest in violation of the Fourth Amendment (claim 1) and false arrest and improper

10 imprisonment in violation of state law (claim 2) fail because the defendant officers had probable

11 cause to arrest plaintiff because even under the allegations of his complaint, a witness identified

12 him as the perpetrator of the robbery. (Doc. No. 9-1 at 11.) In opposition, plaintiff argues that he

13 has sufficiently plead that the defendant officers lacked probable cause by alleging that the

14 officers fabricated the witness’s testimony by threatening jail time and ignored exculpatory

15 evidence that was made known to them. (Doc. No. 15 at 11.) In reply, defendants “concede the

16 issue of whether defendants had probable cause to apply for an arrest warrant at this stage in the

17 proceedings is unnecessary to the Court’s ruling on its motion to dismiss.”1 (Doc. No. 16 at 3.)

18 In that reply defendants proceed to raise new arguments regarding plaintiff’s false arrest and

19 improper imprisonment claims. (Id. at 3–4.) The court declines to consider these arguments

20 raised for the first time in defendants’ reply. See Zamani v. Carnes, 491 F.3d 990, 997 (9th Cir.

21 2007) (“The district court need not consider arguments raised for the first time in a reply brief.”).

22 “If an officer has probable cause to believe that an individual has committed even a very

23 minor criminal offense in his presence, he may, without violating the Fourth Amendment, arrest

24 the offender.” Atwater v. City of Lago Vista, 532 U.S. 318, 354 (2001). “Probable cause exists

25 1 The court notes that “the existence of probable cause does not resolve [a plaintiff’s] Fourteenth

Amendment claim for deliberate fabrication of evidence” but “in the Fourth Amendment warrant-

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issuance context, the probable-cause inquiry collapses into the causation inquiry.” Spencer v.

27 Peters, 857 F.3d 789, 802 (9th Cir. 2017). Here, plaintiff’s § 1983 claim relies on the Fourth

Amendment, not the Fourteenth Amendment, and arises in the warrant-issuance context, making

28 the probable cause inquiry relevant to it.

1 when ‘under the totality of circumstances known to the arresting officers, a prudent person would

2 have concluded that there was a fair probability that [the suspect] had committed a crime.’”

3 Luchtel v. Hagemann, 623 F.3d 975, 979 (9th Cir. 2010) (internal citation omitted); see also

4 Reimann v. Town of Los Gatos, No. 24-5816, 2025 WL 2452055, at *1 (9th Cir. 2025). 2 “In a

5 garden-variety false arrest claim challenging the probable cause for an arrest, if the arrest warrant

6 is facially valid, the arresting officer enjoys qualified immunity unless ‘the warrant application is

7 so lacking in indicia of probable cause as to render official belief in its existing unreasonable[.]”

8 Smith v. Almada, 640 F.3d 931, 937 (9th Cir. 2011). “To maintain a false arrest claim for judicial

9 deception, a plaintiff must show that the officer who applied for the arrest warrant ‘deliberately or

10 recklessly made false statements or omissions that were material to the finding of probable

11 cause.’” Id. “In order to prevail on a judicial deception claim,” where that claim is based on

12 fabrication of evidence, “a plaintiff must prove” the elements of a deliberate fabrication claim,

13 “that ‘(1) the defendant official deliberately fabricated evidence and (2) the deliberate fabrication

14 caused the plaintiff’s deprivation of liberty.’”3 Keates v. Koile, 883 F.3d 1228, 1240 (9th Cir.

15 2018); see also Spencer, 857 F.3d at 798 (“To prevail on a § 1983 claim of deliberate fabrication,

16 a plaintiff must prove” the same two elements.); Lim v. Menne, No. 22-16798, 2024 WL

17 2239004, at *1 (9th Cir. May 17, 2024) (“We acknowledge the potential confusion regarding the

18 differences between a deliberate fabrication claim and a judicial deception claim.”).

19 Coercive interview techniques may rise to the level of deliberate fabrication, but “mere

20 allegations that Defendants used interviewing techniques that were in some sense improper, or

21 that violated state regulations, without more, cannot serve as the basis for a claim under § 1983.”

22 Devereaux v. Abbey, 263 F.3d 1070, 1075 (9th Cir. 2001). In the context of a motion for

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2 Citation to unpublished Ninth Circuit opinions throughout this opinion is appropriate pursuant

24 to Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3(b).

25 3 Because defendants’ argument exclusively relies on the statement of a witness who implicated

plaintiff to demonstrate that the officers had probable cause to arrest and detain plaintiff, and

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plaintiff argues that the same witness statement was allegedly fabricated, the court finds that,

27 assuming plaintiff has properly alleged that the witness statement was fabricated pursuant to the

first element, then defendants have effectively conceded causation for purposes of the second

28 element.

1 summary judgment, the plaintiff “must, at a minimum, point to evidence that supports at least one

2 of the following two propositions: (1) Defendants continued their investigation of [the plaintiff]

3 despite the fact that they knew or should have known that he was innocent; or (2) Defendants

4 used investigative techniques that were so coercive and abusive that they knew or should have

5 known that those techniques would yield false information.”4 Id. at 1076. “At the motion to

6 dismiss phase, district courts have looked to whether a plaintiff alleges the existence of evidence

7 that would corroborate their claim.” Souliotes v. City of Modesto, No. 1:15-cv-00556-LJO-SKO,

8 2016 WL 3549266, at *9 (E.D. Cal. June 29, 2016) (noting that where “a plaintiff alleged that

9 investigators ‘ignored the initial autopsy findings, the inconsistencies in the lab test results, [and]

10 the opinion of several independent forensic toxicologists,’ all of which pointed to the fact that a

11 victim was not poisoned with arsenic[,]” the court found that the plaintiff had stated a viable

12 Devereaux claim, but where the plaintiff alleged that his spouse had fooled investigators with her

13 convincing allegations against him, the court found that the plaintiff had failed to state a viable

14 Devereaux claim) (citations omitted).

15 Here, plaintiff alleges the following regarding the defendant officers’ purported

16 fabrication of evidence:

17 Upon threats of imprisonment by Defendants, a female who

allegedly witnessed the robbery claimed that it was committed by her

18 cousin, Sergio Gonzales (with an “s” at the end, unlike Gonzalez),

who resides in Ceres, California (unlike Gonzalez, who resides in

19 Stockton), along with her cousin’s friend. Body camera footage

shows that the female was caught repeatedly lying to Defendants,

20 including as to whether she even witnessed the alleged crime. After

Defendants did a Department of Motor Vehicles search for Sergio

21 Gonzales in Ceres and found an abundance of results, they fabricated

evidence by coercing the female, threatening her with jail if she

22 failed to cooperate in identifying the suspect. The female then

claimed that she was uncertain whether her cousin’s name ended

23 with an “s” or a “z,” or if he was from Stockton or Ceres, before

finally relenting and falsely identifying Gonzalez, per Defendants’

24 demands. Thus, Defendants deliberately falsified evidence

identifying Gonzalez as the suspect.

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4 Though not applicable here, the court notes that “those methods of proving deliberate

27 fabrication are unnecessary in a case involving direct evidence of deliberate fabrication.”

Spencer, 857 F.3d at 799. Direct evidence includes, “for example, direct misquotation of

28 witnesses in investigative reports.” Id.

1 Worse still, the body camera footage shows that Defendants ignored

the alleged victim’s claim that he thought he had just seen the

2 suspect, incredibly telling him that he was wrong. Defendants also

ignored the alleged victim when he questioned whether the female

3 who identified Gonzalez was being truthful.

4 (Doc. No. 1 at ¶¶ 21–22.) Taken together, and particularly in light of plaintiff’s allegation that

5 defendants threatened the witness with jail time if she failed to identify plaintiff as the

6 perpetrator, the court finds that these allegations are sufficient to plead a claim based upon

7 alleged deliberate fabrication of evidence. See Gantt v. City of Los Angeles, 717 F.3d 702, 708

8 (9th Cir. 2013) (finding “that there was sufficient evidence to instruct the jury on the claim of

9 fabrication of evidence” where there was evidence that “the detectives threatened to charge [the

10 witness] with the murder if he did not provide information” and where evidence of “[t]he manner

11 and circumstances” of the “interrogation also support[ed] the” court’s conclusion); Caldwell v.

12 City & Cnty. of San Francisco, 889 F.3d 1105, 1113 (9th Cir. 2018) (reversing a grant of

13 summary judgment as to fabrication of evidence claim against one of the defendant officers

14 where there was a dispute of material fact as to whether the officer showed up at a witness’s door

15 with the plaintiff in an effort to “purposely put [the witness] in front of [the plaintiff] to infect her

16 recollection and suggest” that the plaintiff committed the crime at issue); Ciria v. City & Cnty. of

17 San Francisco, No. 4:22-cv-07510-KAW, 2024 WL 2306285, at *6 (N.D. Cal. May 21, 2024)

18 (finding that law enforcement need not “engage in extreme or aggressive conduct to find coercion

19 under the Devereaux line of cases” and that “it can be enough to threaten to charge the witness

20 with murder if they did not provide the desired information”); cf. Devereaux, 263 F.3d at 1077

21 (finding that “interviewers of child witnesses of suspected sexual abuse must be permitted to

22 exercise some discretion in deciding when to accept initial denials at face value and when to

23 reject them (or withhold judgment on them) and proceed further [and] [c]onsequently, an

24 allegation that an interviewer disbelieved an initial denial and continued with aggressive

25 questioning of the child cannot, without more, support a deliberate-fabrication-of-evidence

26 claim”) (emphasis added).

27 /////

28 /////

1 Because plaintiff has sufficiently alleged deliberate fabrication, including of the witness

2 statement implicating plaintiff, defendants’ argument that the arrest and detention was lawful

3 because they had probable cause based on the witness’s statement is unpersuasive and fails to

4 support their motion to dismiss this claim.

5 C. Bane Act

6 Defendants argue that plaintiff’s Bane Act claim (claim 3) must be dismissed because the

7 individual officers had “sufficient probable cause[.]”5 (Doc. No. 9-1 at 14.) For the reasons

8 explained above, to the extent defendants contend that even accepting allegations of plaintiff’s

9 complaint as true this claim should be dismissed because they had probable cause to arrest

10 plaintiff, that argument is rejected.

11 D. IIED

12 Defendants next argue that plaintiff’s IIED claim (claim 4) must be dismissed because his

13 complaint contains no allegations that the officers intended to cause emotional distress or that

14 plaintiff suffered severe or extreme emotional distress. (Id. at 14–15.) In opposition, plaintiff

15 argues that he has sufficiently identified “Defendants’ actions, and the consequences of those

16 actions, that caused Plaintiff to suffer severe emotional distress.” (Doc. No. 15 at 15.) Plaintiff

17 identifies these consequences as including severe emotional distress, lost wages, jeopardizing of

18 his employment and his top secret security clearance, revocation of his Global Entry application,

19 and $25,000 in attorney’s fees. (Id. at 14–15.)

20 “The elements of the tort of intentional infliction of emotional distress are: (1) extreme

21 and outrageous conduct by the defendant with the intention of causing, or reckless disregard of

22 the probability of causing, emotional distress; (2) the plaintiff’s suffering severe or extreme

23 emotional distress; and (3) actual and proximate causation of the emotional distress by the

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5 Defendants briefly argue that plaintiff’s Bane Act claim fails because of California Penal Code

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§ 847 et seq. (Doc. No. 9-1 at 14) (citing Blankenhorn v. City of Orange, 485 F.3d 463, 486–87

(9th Cir. 2007)). “That statute provides that an officer cannot be held civilly liable for false

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imprisonment where the officer, ‘acting within the scope of his or her authority,’ made a ‘lawful’

27 arrest or ‘had reasonable cause to believe the arrest was lawful.’” Blankenhorn, 485 F.3d at 486

(citations omitted). This argument relies on defendants’ previous argument, that the defendant

28 officers had probable cause to arrest and detain plaintiff, which the court has already rejected.

1 defendant’s outrageous conduct.” Christensen v. Superior Ct., 54 Cal. 3d 868, 903 (1991)

2 (cleaned up) (internal citation omitted). As to this second element, the plaintiff must allege

3 “emotional distress of such substantial quality or enduring quality that no reasonable person in

4 civilized society should be expected to endure it.” Hughes v. Pair, 46 Cal. 4th 1035, 1051 (2009)

5 (cleaned up) (citations omitted).

6 The only allegation in plaintiff’s complaint relevant to the second element is his

7 conclusory assertion that the misconduct caused him to suffer “severe emotional distress.” (Doc.

8 No. 1 at ¶¶ 5, 29, 59.) “There are no details as to how Plaintiff’s emotional distress manifested.

9 This is grounds for dismissal.” Suarez v. Bank of Am. Corp., No. 18-cv-01202-MEJ, 2018 WL

10 2431473, at *28 (N.D. Cal. May 30, 2018); see also Delk v. Ocwen Fin. Corp., No. 3:17-cv-

11 02769-WHO, 2017 WL 3605219, at *11 (N.D. Cal. Aug. 21, 2017) (“Her conclusory allegations

12 of ‘mental anguish and severe emotional distress’ are insufficient, and the IIED claim is

13 DISMISSED WITH LEAVE TO AMEND.”). The other harms alleged by plaintiff, including

14 lost wages and attorney’s fees, are not manifestations of plaintiff’s emotional distress but instead

15 independent alleged harms that may have, as plaintiff argues, “caused” or contributed to his

16 emotional distress. (Doc. No. 15 at 15.) In contrast, relevant manifestations of severe emotional

17 distress might include, among others, panic attacks consisting of anxiety, tightness in the chest

18 and heart palpitations, depression, inability to sleep, developing a serious drinking problem, and a

19 post-traumatic stress disorder diagnosis involving recurring and intrusive recollections of the

20 events, recurring nightmares, and flashbacks of the events. See Kelly-Zurian v. Wohl Shoe Co.,

21 22 Cal. App. 4th 397, 410 (1994), as modified (Mar. 4, 1994).6

22 As presently alleged, plaintiff’s IIED claim is insufficient and will therefore be dismissed.

23 E. Qualified Immunity

24 Defendants argue that the individual officers are entitled to the dismissal on qualified

25 immunity grounds because, they contend, there was no clearly established law that would have

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27 6 Plaintiff is warned for purposes of any amendment to the complaint that allegations of

“discomfort, worry, anxiety, upset stomach, concern, and agitation” would be insufficient to plead

28 severe emotional distress. Hughes, 46 Cal. 4th at 1051.

1 put them on notice that their actions were unlawful when they applied for and were granted a

2 warrant for plaintiff’s arrest. (Doc. No. 9-1 at 17.) In opposition, plaintiff argues that there is a

3 clearly established right to be free from criminal charges based on false evidence that was

4 deliberately fabricated by law enforcement officers. (Doc. No. 15 at 15.)

5 In Saucier v. Katz, 533 U.S. 194, 121 S. Ct. 2151, 150 L.Ed.2d 272

(2001), the Supreme Court clarified the two-step qualified immunity

6 inquiry. To decide whether a defendant is protected by qualified

immunity, a court must first determine whether, “[t]aken in the light

7 most favorable to the party asserting injury, . . . the facts alleged

show the officer’s conduct violated a constitutional right.” Id. at

8 2156. If the plaintiff’s factual allegations do add up to a violation of

the plaintiff’s federal rights, then the court must proceed to determine

9 whether the right was “clearly established,” i.e., whether the contours

of the right were already delineated with sufficient clarity to make a

10 reasonable officer in the defendant’s circumstances aware that what

he was doing violated the right. Id.

11

12 Devereaux, 263 F.3d at 1074. Above, the court has already addressed and rejected defendants’

13 arguments as to the first step, whether the defendant officers’ conduct as alleged violated a

14 constitutional right. Therefore, the court turns to the second step of the qualified immunity

15 inquiry, whether the right was clearly established.

16 In Devereaux, the Ninth Circuit found that the right to be free from criminal charges based

17 on fabricated evidence is a clearly established right. Id. at 1074–75 (“[W]e are persuaded that

18 there is a clearly established constitutional due process right not to be subjected to criminal

19 charges on the basis of false evidence that was deliberately fabricated by the government. . . .

20 [T]he proposition is virtually self-evident[.]”). Further, “Devereaux answers the question of

21 whether it was clearly established in 1992 that coercive interview tactics . . . violated a

22 defendant’s constitutional rights.” Godfrey v. Trujillo, No. 25-cv-03462-AMO, 2025 WL

23 2391445, at *5, *8 (N.D. Cal. Aug. 18, 2025), motion to certify appeal denied, No. 25-cv-03462-

24 AMO, 2025 WL 3034063 (N.D. Cal. Oct. 30, 2025); see also Devereaux, 263 F.3d at 1076

25 (finding a clearly established right to be free from charges brought based on fabricated evidence

26 and further finding that fabricated evidence includes the use of “investigative techniques that

27 were so coercive and abusive that they knew or should have known that those techniques would

28 yield false information”).

1 Although Devereaux did not specify that individuals have a clearly established right to be

2 free from arrest or detention based on fabricated evidence, as recognized by one California

3 district court, the Sixth Circuit has spoken directly to this issue.

4 In the qualified immunity context, the Sixth Circuit has observed that

“the requirement of probable cause is one of the cornerstones of

5 Fourth Amendment protection. . . . Thus, a reasonable police officer

would know that fabricating probable cause, thereby effectuating a

6 seizure, would violate a suspect’s clearly established Fourth

Amendment right to be free from unreasonable seizures. . . .

7 Similarly, a reasonable police officer would be on notice that

unlawfully detaining a suspect, despite the fact that the evidence used

8 to detai[n] that individual was fabricated, would also be unlawful.”

Spurlock v. Satterfield, 167 F.3d 995, 1005–07 (6th Cir. 1999); see

9 Medeiros v. Clark, 713 F. Supp. 2d 1043, 1062–63 (E.D. Cal. 2010)

(quoting Spurlock and citing Bretz).

10

11 Baertschiger v. Lopez, No. 20-cv-06635-ODW-KS, 2021 WL 4555613, at *4 (C.D. Cal. June 11,

12 2021). The court is persuaded that, just as it is “virtually self-evident” that there is a clearly

13 established right to be free from charges brought based on evidence fabricated through the use of

14 sufficiently coercive interview tactics, so also is there a clearly established right to be free from

15 arrest and detention based on evidence fabricated through the use of sufficiently coercive

16 interview tactics. Devereaux, 263 F.3d at 1075; see also id. (relying on a prior Supreme Court

17 decision finding a clearly established right to be free from a conviction secured through the

18 knowing use of perjury and finding that this was sufficiently analogous to the right to be free

19 from charges brought based on fabricated evidence).

20 Because the right to be free from arrest and detention based on fabricated evidence,

21 including evidence elicited by law enforcement officers using sufficiently coercive interview

22 tactics, is clearly established, defendants are not entitled to dismissal on qualified immunity

23 grounds.

24 F. Leave to Amend

25 Leave to amend should be granted “freely” when justice so requires. Fed. R. Civ.

26 P. 15(a). The Ninth Circuit maintains a policy of “extreme liberality generally in favoring

27 amendments to pleadings.” Rosenberg Bros. & Co. v. Arnold, 283 F.2d 406, 406 (9th Cir. 1960).

28 Reasons “such as undue delay, bad faith or dilatory motive . . . repeated failure to cure

1 deficiencies . . . undue prejudice to the opposing party . . . [or] futility” may support denial of

2 leave to amend. Foman v. Davis, 371 U.S. 178, 182 (1962); see also Brown v. Stored Value

3 Cards, Inc., 953 F.3d 567, 574 (9th Cir. 2020) (same). A district court “should grant leave to

4 amend even if no request to amend the pleading was made, unless it determines that the pleading

5 could not possibly be cured by the allegation of other facts.” Cook, Perkiss and Liehe, Inc. v. N.

6 Cal. Collection Servs., 911 F.2d 242, 247 (9th Cir. 1990); see also Yagman v. Garcetti, 852 F.3d

7 859, 863 (9th Cir. 2017) (same).

8 Here, plaintiff has requested leave to amend, and he has yet to have had an opportunity to

9 amend his complaint following the court’s ruling on a motion to dismiss. (Doc. No. 15 at 17.)

10 Further, it is possible the deficiencies the court has identified above may be capable of being

11 cured by the allegation of additional facts. Cook, 911 F.2d at 247. Accordingly, plaintiff will be

12 granted leave to amend.

13 CONCLUSION

14 For the reasons explained above,

15 1. Defendants’ motion to dismiss (Doc. No. 9) is GRANTED in part and DENIED in

16 part as follows:

17 a. Defendants’ motion to dismiss plaintiff’s § 1983 Monell claim (claim 1) is

18 granted with leave to amend as to defendant City of Modesto and denied as

19 to all other defendants;

20 b. Defendants’ motion to dismiss plaintiff’s false arrest/imprisonment claim

21 (claim 2) and plaintiff’s Bane Act claim (claim 3) is denied;

22 c. Defendants’ motion to dismiss plaintiff’s IIED claim (claim 4) is granted

23 with leave to amend;

24 2. Within twenty-one (21) days from the date of entry of this order, plaintiff shall file

25 either a first amended complaint, or a notice of intent not to do so and to proceed

26 only on the claims found to be cognizable in this order; and

27 /////

28 /////

1 3, If plaintiff files a notice of intent not to file a first amended complaint, then

2 defendants shall file an answer as to the claims found to be cognizable in this order

3 within twenty-one (21) days of service of that notice.

4 IT IS SO ORDERED.

> | Dated: _ December 11, 2025 Dab A. 2, sxe

6 DALE A. DROZD

5 UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

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