The opinion
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8 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
9 EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA
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12 EMMANUEL LOPEZ, No. 2:25-cv-01792 WBS CSK
13 Plaintiff,
14 v. MEMORANDUM AND ORDER RE:
DEFENDANTS’ MOTION TO DISMISS
15 COUNTY OF SAN JOAQUIN, a
California municipal
16 corporation; CITY OF STOCKTON, a
California municipal
17 corporation; PETER DEVENCENZI;
GENEVIEVE VALLOTTON, PHIRUN VAR,
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Defendants.
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This action originated from a series of gang-related
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shootings between September and December 2015 in Stockton,
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California. (Docket No. 1 (“Compl.”) at 4.) Plaintiff Emmanuel
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Lopez is an individual and resident of Los Angeles County,
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California. (Id. at 2.) Defendants Peter Devencenzi and
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Genevieve Vallotton were, at the times relevant to this action,
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prosecutors for the County of San Joaquin. (Id. at 3.)
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1 Defendant Phirun Var was, at the times relevant to this action, a
2 police officer of the Stockton Police Department. (Id.)
3 Plaintiff alleges that defendants knew that he did not
4 commit any of the crimes that occurred during these shootings.
5 (Id. at 4-5.) Yet, plaintiff claims, that did not deter them
6 from attempting to indict him via grand jury by violating his
7 constitutional rights. (Id. at 5.)
8 Specifically, plaintiff brings the following claims
9 under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (“Section 1983”): (1) a claim against
10 Devencenzi and Vallotton for failing to disclose exculpatory
11 evidence in violation of Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 (1963);
12 (2) a claim against all defendants for conspiring to deprive him
13 of his constitutional rights as established by Brady; (3) a claim
14 against Devencenzi and Vallotton for utilizing unreliable
15 eyewitness identifications in violation of Manson v. Braithwaite,
16 432 U.S. 98 (1967) and Neil v. Biggers, 409 U.S. 188 (1972); (4)
17 a claim against Devencenzi and Vallotton for conspiring to
18 deprive him of his constitutional rights as established by
19 Manson/Biggers; (5) a claim against all defendants for conspiring
20 to deprive him of his constitutional right to not have false
21 evidence used against him; and (6) a claim against the City of
22 Stockton (the “City”) for failing to adequately train, supervise,
23 and control its officers regarding the investigation and
24 questioning of eyewitnesses and duty to disclose exculpatory
25 information1. (See generally Compl.)
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1 At oral argument and in their briefs, the parties
27 disputed whether plaintiff alleged his Monell claim against the
County of San Joaquin or the City of Stockton. The complaint
28 unambiguously provides that the Monell claim is brought against
1 Defendants now move to dismiss plaintiff’s complaint.
2 (Docket Nos. 8, 8-1.)
3 I. Motion to Dismiss
4 Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) allows for
5 dismissal when the plaintiff’s complaint fails to state a claim
6 upon which relief can be granted. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6).
7 The inquiry before the court is whether, accepting the
8 allegations in the complaint as true and drawing all reasonable
9 inferences in the plaintiff’s favor, the complaint has stated “a
10 claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” Bell Atl. Corp.
11 v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007). “Threadbare recitals of
12 the elements of a cause of action, supported by mere conclusory
13 statements, do not suffice.” Id.
14 An affirmative defense may be raised by motion to
15 dismiss when “the defense raises no disputed issues of fact.”
16 Scott v. Kuhlmann, 746 F.2d 1377, 1378 (9th Cir. 1984). “In
17 other words, dismissal based on an affirmative defense is
18 permitted when the complaint establishes the defense.” U.S.
19 Commodity Futures Trading Comm'n v. Monex Credit Co., 931 F.3d
20 966, 973 (9th Cir. 2019) (emphasis in original).
21 Correspondingly, “a complaint that otherwise states a claim” may
22 be dismissed under Rule 12(b)(6) “[o]nly when the plaintiff
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24 the City (see Compl. at 15-16), so the court construes the claim
as such. See Steen v. Am. Nat'l Ins. Co., 609 F. Supp. 3d 1066,
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1071 (C.D. Cal. 2022) (courts are “generally limited to the
pleadings” when deciding a motion to dismiss). Since the City
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has not moved to dismiss this claim, the court does not address
27 it.
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1 pleads itself out of court—that is, admits all the ingredients of
2 an impenetrable defense.” Jensen v. Brown, 131 F.4th 677, 691
3 (9th Cir. 2025) (citation modified).
4 II. Claims Against Devencenzi and Vallotton
5 The parties dispute multiple aspects of plaintiff’s
6 claims against Devencenzi and Vallotton, including whether a
7 Brady violation could have occurred absent plaintiff being
8 convicted at trial; whether plaintiff’s right to a fair trial
9 under Manson/Biggers could have been violated by the usage of
10 allegedly unreliable eyewitness identifications absent a trial;
11 whether Devencenzi fabricated evidence to be used against
12 plaintiff; and whether Devencenzi and Vallotton are entitled to
13 absolute immunity.2 (See generally Docket Nos. 8-1, 12, 14.)
14 Because the court finds that Devencenzi and Vallotton
15 are entitled to absolute immunity, it need not address the
16 remainder of the parties’ dispute regarding these claims. See,
17 e.g., Peterson v. Sutter Med. Found., 615 F. Supp. 3d 1097, 1107
18 (N.D. Cal. 2022), aff'd, No. 23-2911, 2025 WL 1823959 (9th Cir.
19 July 2, 2025) (because defendants “[we]re entitled to
20 prosecutorial or quasi-judicial immunity,” there was “no need to
21 address the adequacy of the claims” against them).
22 Absolute immunity “appl[ies] with full force” to
23 actions of prosecutors that are “intimately associated with the
24 judicial phase of the criminal process.” Imbler v. Pachtman, 424
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2 In his opposition to defendants’ motion to dismiss,
plaintiff argues that Devencenzi and Vallotton are not entitled
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to qualified immunity, either. (See Docket No. 12 at 17-18.)
27 But plaintiff does not cite a single case in which a prosecutor
was found to not be protected by qualified immunity for their
28 conduct before a grand jury. (See id.)
1 U.S. 409, 430 (1976). These actions include ones undertaken “in
2 pre paring for the initiation of judicial proceedings or for
3 trial, and which occur in the course of [the prosecutor’s] role
4 as an advocate for the State,” such as the assembly and
5 presentation of evidence “before a grand jury after a decision to
6 seek an indictment has been made.” Buckley v. Fitzsimmons, 509
7 U.S. 259, 273 (1993).
8 “Intent should play no role in the immunity analysis.”
9 Ashelman v. Pope, 793 F. 2d 1072, 1078 (9th Cir. 1986) (en banc);
10 see also Imbler, 424 U.S. at 427 (acknowledging that absolute
11 prosecutorial immunity could “leave the genuinely wronged
12 defendant without civil redress against a prosecutor whose
13 malicious or dishonest action deprives him of liberty.”). As
14 such, the Supreme Court and Ninth Circuit have found that
15 absolute immunity shields prosecutors who knowingly use false
16 testimony and suppress exculpatory evidence at trial, Imbler, 424
17 U.S. at 431; conspire with a judge to “predetermine the outcome
18 of a judicial proceeding,” Ashelman, 793 F. 2d at 1078; and
19 evaluate a witness in a manner that is “harsh, unfair or clouded
20 by personal animus,” Roe v. City & Cnty. of San Francisco, 109
21 F.3d 578, 584 (9th Cir. 1997).
22 Devencenzi and Vallotton’s actions are covered by
23 absolute immunity, regardless of the intent governing them, see
24 Ashelman, 793 F. 2d at 1078. Regarding whether Devencenzi and
25 Vallotton failed to disclose exculpatory evidence and knowingly
26 used false testimony, the Ninth Circuit has established that
27 absolute immunity extends to “the knowing use of false testimony
28 at trial” and “the suppression of exculpatory evidence.”
1 Milstein v. Cooley, 257 F.3d 1004, 1008 (9th Cir. 2001); see also
2 Imbler, 424 U.S. at 431. This immunity applies equally to such
3 conduct when undertaken before a grand jury. See Herb Hallman
4 Chevrolet, Inc. v. Nash-Holmes, 169 F.3d 636, 643 (9th Cir. 1999)
5 (citing Burns v. Reed, 500 U.S. 478, 490 n.6 (1991)). As for
6 whether these defendants conducted eyewitness identifications
7 tainted by improper suggestion or influence, although this
8 “alleged conduct was performed out of court, said conduct was
9 nevertheless in preparation for the criminal proceedings against
10 [plaintiff]” and therefore entitled to absolute immunity. Pierre
11 v. Treasury Dep't, No. 18-cv-3443 JLL, 2018 WL 5801549, at *8
12 (D.N.J. Nov. 5, 2018) (citing Burns, 500 U.S. at 485); see also
13 Buckley, 509 U.S. at 272 (“[A]cts undertaken by a prosecutor in
14 preparing for the initiation of judicial proceedings or for
15 trial, and which occur in the course of his role as an advocate
16 for the State, are entitled to the protections of absolute
17 immunity.”).
18 Accordingly, the court will dismiss plaintiff’s claims
19 against Devencenzi and Vallotton.3
20 III. Conspiracy Claims
21 Plaintiff brings three conspiracy claims against
22 various defendants. (See Compl. at 11-15.) “To state a claim
23 for conspiracy to violate one’s constitutional rights under §
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3 Plaintiff also appears to bring claims one and three
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against the County. (See Compl. at 9, 12.) But plaintiff has
not offered any theory under which the County may be held liable
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for the actions of Devencenzi and Vallotton or any other theory
27 for why the County may be held liable under these claims.
Accordingly, the court will dismiss claims one and three against
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1 1983, the plaintiff must state specific facts to support the
2 existence of the claimed conspiracy.” Burns v. Cnty. of King,
3 883 F. 2d 819, 821 (9th Cir. 1989). This includes, among other
4 things, “alleg[ing] facts with sufficient particularity to show
5 an agreement or a meeting of the minds to violate the plaintiff’s
6 constitutional rights.” Davis v. Powell, 901 F. Supp. 2d 1196,
7 1217 (S.D. Cal. 2012) (collecting Ninth Circuit cases).
8 Plaintiff’s allegations for his conspiracy claims do
9 little but recite the elements of a conspiracy under Section
10 1983. (See Compl. at 11-15.) Indeed, these allegations are
11 devoid of any facts demonstrating a “meeting of the minds to
12 violate [his] constitutional rights.” Davis, 901 F. Supp. 2d at
13 1217. Accordingly, because “[v]ague and conclusory allegations
14 of official participation in civil rights violations are not
15 sufficient to withstand a motion to dismiss,” the court will
16 dismiss plaintiff’s conspiracy claims. Ivey v. Bd. of Regents of
17 Univ. of Alaska, 673 F.2d 266, 268 (9th Cir. 1982).
18 ITI. Conclusion
19 IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED that defendants’ motion to
20 dismiss (Docket No. 8-1) be, and the same hereby is, GRANTED.
21 Counts I, II, III, IV, and V are DISMISSED as against defendants
22 Devencenzi, Vallotton, and the County.
23 Plaintiff has twenty-one (21) days from the date of
24 this Order to file an amended complaint if he can do so
25 consistent with this Order.
26 | Dated: December 9, 2025 bitten Hh. fid..t€-—-
7 WILLIAM B. SHUBB
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
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