Macomber

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8 IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

9 FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

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11 LARRY SERMENO, No. 2:25-CV-02377-TLN-DMC

12 Plaintiff,

13 v. FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

14 JEFF MACOMBER, et al.,

15 Defendants.

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17 Plaintiff, who is proceeding pro se, brings this civil action. In light of the District

18 Judge’s order, which dismissed Plaintiff’s claims seeking declaratory and injunctive relief, and

19 allowed Plaintiff’s claims for damages to proceed, the undersigned will review Plaintiff’s

20 proceeding claims in accordance with 28 U.S.C. 1915(e)(2)(B).

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22 I. PLAINTIFF’S ALLEGATIONS

23 Plaintiff filed the original complaint on August 20, 2025. See ECF No. 1. Plaintiff

24 names the following as defendants: (1) California Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation

25 (CDCR); (2) Jeff Macomber; (3) Heather Bowlds; (4) Sabrina Williams; (5) Melissa Romero; and

26 (6) Amy Asher. Id. at 1. Plaintiff contends that he “was sentenced to PRCS [Postrelease

27 Community Supervision] by the Butte County Superior Court on September 5, 2024, yet upon

28 release from CDCR custody was placed on CDCR parole supervision with harsher restrictions,

1 contrary to court order.” Id. at 2.

2 According to Plaintiff, Judge Lucena sentenced him to PRCS under California

3 Penal Code § 3451 in Butte County Superior Court case No. 24CF02944 and the probation report

4 for sentencing also recommended PRCS. See id. at 5. Plaintiff asserts that Defendants Macomber,

5 Bowlds, and Williams “approved or allowed parole intake in violation of Plaintiff’s sentence” and

6 Defendants Romero and Asher “failed to initiate PRCS intake or contest CDCR’s unlawful

7 jurisdictional overreach.” Id. at 6. Plaintiff contends that the parole conditions he is required to

8 adhere too are “more restrictive than PRCS, including CPS monitoring, curfews, housing bans,

9 and unrelated programming requirements.” Id. According to Plaintiff, these additional

10 requirements, such as attendance of counseling programs, “places him at a high risk of losing

11 employment due to scheduling conflicts.” Id. at 7. Plaintiff asserts these actions were “deliberate”

12 and are part of a “pattern or practice of PRCS-to-parole reassignment without due process” that

13 “disproportionately impact Black individuals.” Id. at 6-7.

14 Plaintiff asserts fifteen claims for relief, including violations of his Fifth and

15 Fourteenth Amendment due process rights, violation of equal protection rights under the

16 Fourteenth Amendment, prohibiting Plaintiff’s access to courts in violation of the First

17 Amendment, excessive punishment in violation of the Eighth Amendment, involuntary servitude

18 violation of the Thirteenth Amendment, Monell and Supervisory liability, and conspiracy to

19 interfere with Plaintiff’s civil rights. Plaintiff requests declaratory relief, injunctive relief to

20 change Plaintiff to PRCS, compensatory damages, punitive damages, and attorneys’ fees. Id. at

21 13-15. Plaintiff attached information about PRCS, including how such status is determined, to the

22 complaint. See ECF No. 1-3. That information appears to be from the CDCR website. See id.

23 On August 20, 2025, Plaintiff filed a motion for judicial notice. See ECF No. 7. In

24 that notice, Plaintiff informs the Court that on August 4, 2025, Plaintiff appealed his conviction to

25 the California Court of Appeal. See id. at 1. According to Plaintiff, the appeal “addresses the

26 same factual nucleus underlying this federal complaint.” Id. at 2. Plaintiff asserts that filing of the

27 appeal “establish[es] the contemporaneous pursuit of parallel remedies . . . [and] Plaintiff’s

28 diligence and exhaustion of available state remedies.” Id. at 3.

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2 II. DISCUSSION

3 On November 25, 2025, the District Judge adopted the findings and

4 recommendations in part, permitting Plaintiff’s claims for damages to proceed and dismissing

5 Plaintiff’s claims for declaratory and injunctive relief without prejudice on the basis of Younger

6 abstention doctrine. See ECF No. 14. The District Judge additionally referred the matter back to

7 the undersigned “for further proceedings, including any further 28 U.S.C. 1915(e)(2)(B) review,

8 if necessary, and assessment of whether it is appropriate to enter a stay of this action based on

9 Ninth Circuit precedent.” Id. at 2-3. The undersigned finds that, in light of the District Judge’s

10 order, further review under 28 U.S.C. 1915(e)(2)(B) is necessary.

11 The Court is required to screen complaints brought by litigants who, as here, have

12 been granted leave to proceed in forma pauperis. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2). Under this

13 screening provision, the Court must dismiss a complaint or portion thereof if it: (1) is frivolous or

14 malicious; (2) fails to state a claim upon which relief can be granted; or (3) seeks monetary relief

15 from a defendant who is immune from such relief. See 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915(e)(2)(A), (B).

16 Moreover, pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(h)(3), this Court must dismiss an

17 action if the Court determines that it lacks subject matter jurisdiction. Pursuant to Rule 12(h)(3),

18 the Court will also consider as a threshold matter whether it has subject-matter jurisdiction.

19 Plaintiff’s claims against CDCR and individuals in their official capacity are

20 barred by Eleventh Amendment immunity and therefore, the undersigned will recommend

21 dismissal of such claims, with prejudice. Plaintiff’s claims against Defendant Bowlds may be

22 subject to a bar based on absolute parole official immunity, but as currently pled, there are

23 insufficient facts to determine whether Defendant Bowlds took actions that resulted in the alleged

24 constitutional violations and whether such actions were taken when deciding to grant, deny, or

25 revoke parole, which would extend parole official immunity over such claims. Plaintiff’s

26 remaining claims against Defendants Macomber, Williams, Romero, and Asher in their individual

27 capacities are conclusory and therefore fail to establish that their actions resulted in Plaintiff’s

28 alleged constitutional violations. As explained further below, the undersigned will therefore

1 recommend the remaining claims against Defendants Macomber, Bowlds, Williams, Romero, and

2 Asher in their individual capacities be dismissed with leave to amend.

3 A. Eleventh Amendment Immunity

4 The Eleventh Amendment prohibits federal courts from hearing suits brought

5 against a state both by its own citizens, as well as by citizens of other states. See Brooks v.

6 Sulphur Springs Valley Elec. Coop., 951 F.2d 1050, 1053 (9th Cir. 1991). This prohibition

7 extends to suits against states themselves, and to suits against state agencies. See Lucas v. Dep’t

8 of Corr., 66 F.3d 245, 248 (9th Cir. 1995) (per curiam); Taylor v. List, 880 F.2d 1040, 1045 (9th

9 Cir. 1989). A state’s agency responsible for incarceration and correction of prisoners is a state

10 agency for purposes of the Eleventh Amendment. See Alabama v. Pugh, 438 U.S. 781, 782

11 (1978) (per curiam); Hale v. Arizona, 993 F.2d 1387, 1398-99 (9th Cir. 1993) (en banc).

12 The Eleventh Amendment also bars actions seeking damages from state officials

13 acting in their official capacities. See Eaglesmith v. Ward, 73 F.3d 857, 859 (9th Cir. 1995); Pena

14 v. Gardner, 976 F.2d 469, 472 (9th Cir. 1992) (per curiam). The Eleventh Amendment does not,

15 however, bar suits against state officials acting in their personal capacities. See id.

16 Here, Plaintiff asserts claims for monetary damages against Defendant CDCR and

17 all other Defendants in their individual and official capacities. Under the Eleventh Amendment,

18 CRCR and officials sued in their official capacity are immune from such claims. See Alabama v.

19 Pugh, 438 U.S. 781, 782 (1978) (per curiam); Eaglesmith v. Ward, 73 F.3d 857, 859 (9th Cir.

20 1995). Accordingly, the undersigned will recommend dismissing all claims against CDCR and

21 any claims against the remaining Defendants in their official capacities, with prejudice.

22 B. Parole Board Official Immunity

23 Because “. . . parole board officials perform functionally comparable to tasks to

24 judges when they decide to grant, deny, or revoke parole,” parole board officials are entitled to

25 absolute immunity from suits by prisoners for actions taken when processing parole applications.

26 See Sellars v. Procunier, 641 F.2d 1295, 1302-03 (9th Cir. 1981); see also Bermudez v. Duenas,

27 936 F.2d 1064, 1066 (9th Cir. 1991) (per curiam).

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1 Plaintiff brings claims against Defendant Bowlds, the Acting Director of Adult

2 Parole Operations. To the extent that such claims arise from Defendant Bowlds’ determination of

3 Plaintiff’s parole, parole board official immunity would extend to such claims. However,

4 Plaintiff’s complaint is not clear as to what actions Defendant Bowlds specifically took that

5 resulted in the alleged deprivation of Plaintiff’s constitutional rights. Accordingly, as currently

6 pled, it is unclear whether claims against Defendant Bowlds arise from the parole board

7 determination. Thus, the undersigned will recommend dismissing claims against Defendant

8 Bowlds, with leave to amend.

9 C. Qualified Immunity

10 Government officials enjoy qualified immunity from civil damages unless their

11 conduct violates “clearly established statutory or constitutional rights of which a reasonable

12 person would have known.” Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 818 (1982). In general,

13 qualified immunity protects “all but the plainly incompetent or those who knowingly violate the

14 law.” Malley v. Briggs, 475 U.S. 335, 341 (1986). In ruling upon the issue of qualified

15 immunity, the initial inquiry is whether, taken in the light most favorable to the party asserting the

16 injury, the facts alleged show the defendant’s conduct violated a constitutional right. See Saucier

17 v. Katz, 533 U.S. 194, 201 (2001). If a violation can be made out, the next step is to ask whether

18 the right was clearly established. See id. This inquiry “must be undertaken in light of the specific

19 context of the case, not as a broad general proposition . . . .” Id. “[T]he right the official is

20 alleged to have violated must have been ‘clearly established’ in a more particularized, and hence

21 more relevant, sense: The contours of the right must be sufficiently clear that a reasonable

22 official would understand that what he is doing violates that right.” Id. at 202 (citation omitted).

23 Thus, the final step in the analysis is to determine whether a reasonable officer in similar

24 circumstances would have thought his conduct violated the alleged right. See id. at 205.

25 When identifying the right allegedly violated, the court must define the right more

26 narrowly than the constitutional provision guaranteeing the right, but more broadly than the

27 factual circumstances surrounding the alleged violation. See Kelly v. Borg, 60 F.3d 664, 667 (9th

28 Cir. 1995). For a right to be clearly established, “[t]he contours of the right must be sufficiently

1 clear that a reasonable official would understand [that] what [the official] is doing violates the

2 right.” See Anderson v. Creighton, 483 U.S. 635, 640 (1987). Ordinarily, once the court

3 concludes that a right was clearly established, an officer is not entitled to qualified immunity

4 because a reasonably competent public official is charged with knowing the law governing his

5 conduct. See Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 818-19 (1982). However, even if the plaintiff

6 has alleged a violation of a clearly established right, the government official is entitled to

7 qualified immunity if he could have “. . . reasonably but mistakenly believed that his . . . conduct

8 did not violate the right.” Jackson v. City of Bremerton, 268 F.3d 646, 651 (9th Cir. 2001); see

9 also Saucier, 533 U.S. at 205.

10 The first factors in the qualified immunity analysis involve purely legal questions.

11 See Trevino v. Gates, 99 F.3d 911, 917 (9th Cir. 1996). The third inquiry involves a legal

12 determination based on a prior factual finding as to the reasonableness of the government

13 official’s conduct. See Neely v. Feinstein, 50 F.3d 1502, 1509 (9th Cir. 1995). The district court

14 has discretion to determine which of the Saucier factors to analyze first. See Pearson v. Callahan,

15 555 U.S. 223, 236 (2009). In resolving these issues, the court must view the evidence in the light

16 most favorable to plaintiff and resolve all material factual disputes in favor of plaintiff. See

17 Martinez v. Stanford, 323 F.3d 1178, 1184 (9th Cir. 2003).

18 Here, Plaintiff explicitly brings the claims for damages against Defendants

19 Macomber, Bowlds, Williams, Romero, and Asher in their individual capacities. Plaintiff makes

20 general assertions such as “Defendants failed to implement the PRCS order . . . Each Defendant

21 had access to the sentencing records yet failed to disclose or act upon the PRCS designation . . .

22 [and] Defendants omitted the PRCS status from communications and treated Plaintiff as a

23 parolee, concealing unlawfulness of this designation.” ECF No. 1, pgs. 5-6. Plaintiff’s allegations

24 are conclusory and fail to demonstrate how each specific Defendants’ conduct resulted in the

25 alleged deprivation of Plaintiff’s constitutional rights. Thus, Plaintiff’s allegations do not show

26 the defendant’s conduct violated a constitutional right. See Saucier v. Katz, 533 U.S. 194, 201

27 (2001). Accordingly, the undersigned will recommend dismissing Plaintiff’s claims against

28 Defendants Macomber, Bowlds, Williams, Romero, and Asher in their individual capacity, with

1 || leave to amend.

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3 Ill. CONCLUSION

4 Based on the foregoing, the undersigned recommends that:

5 1. Defendant California Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation

6 (CDCR) be dismissed without leave to amend due to Eleventh Amendment Immunity;

7 2. All claims brought against any Defendant in their official capacity be

8 dismissed without leave to amend under Eleventh Amendment Immunity;

9 2. All claims against Defendant Heather Bowlds in her individual capacity be

10 dismissed with leave to amend;

11 3. Remaining claims brought against Defendants Macomber, Bowlds,

12 Williams, Romero, and Asher in their individual capacities, be dismissed with leave to

13 amend.

14 These findings and recommendations are submitted to the United States District

15 || Judge assigned to the case, pursuant to the provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1). Within 14 days

16 || after being served with these findings and recommendations, any party may file written

17 || objections with the court. Responses to objections shall be filed within 14 days after service of

18 || objections. Failure to file objections within the specified time may waive the right to appeal. See

19 | Martinez v. Yist, 951 F.2d 1153 (9th Cir. 1991).

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21 | Dated: December 8, 2025 = IS Co

22 DENNIS M. COTA

3 UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

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