Brown

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK

SHARON LESLIE BROWN,

Plaintiff,

1:24-CV-7018 (LTS)

-against-

ORDER OF DISMISSAL

GOOGLE, et al., WITH LEAVE TO REPLEAD

Defendants.

LAURA TAYLOR SWAIN, Chief United States District Judge:

Plaintiff Sharon Leslie Brown, of Jamaica, Queens County, New York, who is appearing

pro se, filed this action invoking the court’s federal question jurisdiction. She names as

defendants the following entities: (1) Google; (2) DistroKid; (3) Spotify; (4) Twitter;

(5) YouTube; (6) TikTok; (7) Facebook; (8) “All Social Media Platforms”; (9) Lulu.com;

(10) Ning.com; (11) “Big Tech”; (12) Boomdizzle; (13) Deezer; (14) Apple; (15) Tidal;

(16) iTunes; and (17) Boomplay. Plaintiff states that the federal constitutional or federal statutory

bases for her claims are: “freedom of speech, freedom of religion, freedom of expression,

freedom to be a capitalist, pursuit of happiness . . . , civil rights, intellectual property rights[,] all

constitutional rights have been trampled [sic].” (ECF 1, at 2.) In her complaint, Plaintiff seems to

seek one billion dollars in damages as well as the following relief: “ideas songs concepts and

more any and all just and fair relief pain and suffering, mental anguish any and all torts

applicable, having to sue for things that are obvious to perpetrators and loss of business, stature,

awards, recognitions my religious content desecrated by plagiarist etc [sic].” (Id. at 6.)

Plaintiff filed with her complaint an order to show cause for a preliminary injunction and

a temporary restraining order (“OTSC”). (ECF 4.) In that OTSC, Plaintiff asked the court for

immediate relief that would enjoin the defendants from “removing music from [her] accounts,

locking accounts, closing accounts, malicious copyright violating actions, assisting in theft of

intellectual property etc., hindering freedom of speech religion and all constitutional rights [sic].”

(Id. at 1.) Plaintiff also asked for immediate “access to all [her] accounts closed or open.” (Id.)

She further asked the court to enjoin any of the defendants’ “actions to delay [her] work to

further other artists, accounts, users monetarily, views, likes, comments, followers [sic].” (Id. at

2.) In a brief order dated September 26, 2024, the Court denied Plaintiff’s first OTSC, indicating

that it would issue an explanatory order at a later date. (ECF 8.)

Plaintiff also filed a motion with her complaint in which she asks the Court to enjoin the

defendants from “remov[ing] [her] music from accounts, locking accounts, closing accounts,

malicious copyright violating actions, assisting in theft of intellectual property etc, hindering

freedom of speech religion and all constitutional rights [sic]” (“motion”). (ECF 5.) She further

seeks “access to all [her] accounts closed or open.” (Id.) That motion is pending.

After the Court denied Plaintiff’s first OTSC, Plaintiff, on February 21, 2025, under the

name “Sharon Jeter,” filed a second OTSC in this action, and in other actions that she has

brought in this court, in which she seems to ask the Court to reopen “cases remaining closed

without cause or having been heard or not having discovery in each case [sic].” (ECF 9, at 1.) In

her second OTSC, Plaintiff asserts that the defendants “have evidence they stole or used to

commit crimes and torts against [her], America, [and] Israel,” and that they are “stopping [her]

days in court.” (Id.) She also seems to seek, in her second OTSC, injunctive relief that would

allow “discovery hearings, [her] day in court, [and would allow her to] fac[e] those [she] accused

of torts [and] crimes, [to] get[] justice, . . . [and to] face those [she] ha[s] accused so [all] of

[them] can be heard in court.” (Id.) Plaintiff further asks the Court to “stop them from possessing

[her] personal property[,] intellectual and otherwise.” (Id.)

On April 23, 2025, Plaintiff filed a notice of appeal,1 a motion for leave to proceed in

forma pauperis (“IFP”) on appeal, an application to appeal IFP, a motion for an extension of

time to file a notice of appeal under Rule 4(a)(5) of the Federal Rules of Appellate Procedure,

and what appears to be her third OTSC. (ECF 10-12.) In her third OTSC, Plaintiff asks the Court

to enjoin:

Twitter, Google, DistroKid, Lulu.com, etc. . . . from burying [her] clickable links

to [her] books, music, intellectual property[,] content[,] etc. [;] [to] stop removing

[her] links with [her] books, music[,] [and] intellectual property[;] [and]

inhibiting[,] suppressing, stealing, [and] redirecting [her] sales/clicks [and]

withholding [her] revenue for clicks and views etc. [she] did get.

(ECF 12, at 1.) She also asks “to be reimbursed as well as receive royalties, monies for writing

articles[,] [and] everything advertised by Twitter[,] X, Lulu.com, [D]istroKid.” (Id. at 2.)

By order dated September 19, 2024, the Court granted Plaintiff’s request to proceed IFP,

that is, without prepayment of fees. For the reasons set forth below, the Court: (1) explains why

it denied Plaintiff’s first OTSC, and denies her second and third OTSCs; (2) denies Plaintiff’s

motion for an extension of time to file a notice of appeal, motion for leave to proceed IFP on

appeal, and application to appeal IFP; and (3) dismisses this action, but grants Plaintiff 30 days’

leave to replead certain claims in an amended complaint.

STANDARD OF REVIEW

The Court must dismiss an IFP complaint, or any portion of the complaint, that is

frivolous or malicious, fails to state a claim on which relief may be granted, or seeks monetary

relief from a defendant who is immune from such relief. 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B); see

1 Plaintiff’s notice of appeal informed the Court of Plaintiff’s intent to appeal the Court’s

September 26, 2024 order denying her first OTSC. (ECF 11, at 1.) That appeal appears to have

been dismissed, effective August 15, 2025, due to Plaintiff’s failure to pay the fees or seek IFP to

bring her appeal in the Court of Appeals. . See Brown v. Google LLC, No. 25-1029 (2d Cir. July

25, 2025) (effective Aug. 15, 2025).

Livingston v. Adirondack Beverage Co., 141 F.3d 434, 437 (2d Cir. 1998). The Court must also

dismiss a complaint when the Court lacks subject matter jurisdiction of the claims raised. See

Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(h)(3).

While the law mandates dismissal on any of these grounds, the Court is obliged to

construe pro se pleadings liberally, Harris v. Mills, 572 F.3d 66, 72 (2d Cir. 2009), and interpret

them to raise the “strongest [claims] that they suggest,” Triestman v. Fed. Bureau of Prisons, 470

F.3d 471, 474 (2d Cir. 2006) (internal quotation marks and citations omitted, emphasis in

original). But the “special solicitude” in pro se cases, id. at 475 (citation omitted), has its

limits—to state a claim, pro se pleadings still must comply with Rule 8 of the Federal Rules of

Civil Procedure, which requires a complaint to make a short and plain statement showing that the

pleader is entitled to relief.

Rule 8 requires a complaint to include enough facts to state a claim for relief “that is

plausible on its face.” Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007). A claim is facially

plausible if the plaintiff pleads enough factual detail to allow the Court to draw the inference that

the defendant is liable for the alleged misconduct. Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009). In

reviewing the complaint, the Court must accept all well-pleaded factual allegations as true. Id.

But it does not have to accept as true “[t]hreadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action,”

which are essentially just legal conclusions. Id. (citing Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555). After

separating legal conclusions from well-pleaded factual allegations, the Court must determine

whether those facts make it plausible—not merely possible—that the pleader is entitled to relief.

Id. at 679.

BACKGROUND

Plaintiff alleges the following in her complaint’s statement of claim:

DistroKid – took my money for distribution deal fee then refused to distribute

many of my projects for no reason. [It] made my albums late because [its] website

wouldn’t load properly. When it did[,] [DistroKid] refused good projects

superstitiously or to help further other artist[s]. When I added my music to

DistroKid competitions between artists[,] [i]t was never available to [the] public

to vote on for feature if it won [the] vote. I checked for years. [DistroKid]

removed my music for no reason without warning. I need it put back on social

media platforms and I need access to those accounts. [G]oogle searches allow[]

others to benefit from my work instead of me. Others show up when I put the

name[s] of easily identifiable unique works. All companies[] remove good content

without cause, they aid plagiarists, cause monopol[ies], [and] others get my

views, likes, reposts, subscriptions, fans, friends, followers, boost[s] in analytics

that I lawfully own and garnered. [sic]

(ECF 1, at 5-6.)

In the injuries section of her complaint, Plaintiff alleges the following: “I’ve lost money

from investments in making albums, equipment, office material, likes, shares, views, reposts,

subscription fees, fans, friends, followers, analytics skewed [and] suppressed, money and

earnings and opportunities past[,] present[,] [and] future to earn[,] make[,] produce[,] write[,]

act[,] etc. in projects. [sic]” (Id. at 6.)

In the declaration Plaintiff filed in support of her motion (ECF 6), which the Court

construes as a supplement to the complaint, she asserts the following:

My songs were manipulated on various websites making [them] inaccessible even

when visible or often not visible[.] [G]oogle is [doing this] either by request from

. . . plagiarist[s], or of [its] own accord [it is] scrubbing my [G]oogle search of

links to my content and making it difficult to find my work or links to my works

on the internet. [It] also show[s] other people instead of my work when someone

searches for me on the internet. For instance[,] [i]f you search for a title of my

song or for my account name[,] many people show up in the search as if they

were me or the person the search was making a query for. Then i[t] leads people

to [others’] accounts and they get my views, likes, comments, friends, subscribers,

shares, reposts, monetary gain, standing in the compiled analytics for website

traffic etc. . . . There are artists who have released songs after I have with the

same name or similar name and topic and sometimes beat and lyrics, and my

songs are taken down and the plagiarist artist[s] use[] my idea, intellectual

property, impeccable timing for what should be released now or at certain times,

my creativity, my style, color scheme etc. These skills are very costly and original

and they steal my intellectual property, artistry and views[,] like[s], comments,

shares, repost[s], streams, money, followers, fans, subscriptions, opportunity[ies]

for other projects by people who see my content. Example: My song

[“]Heterosexual[”] was on Spotify. [Spotify] took it down because [D]istroKid

and later an “artist” released a song [“]Heterosexuality[”] to garner fans and the

topic of my song . . . it’s brand confusion. [sic]

(Id. at 1-3.)

DISCUSSION

The Court understands that Plaintiff is asserting claims in which she seeks the criminal

prosecution of the defendants. The Court also understands that Plaintiff is asserting claims of

federal constitutional violations, which the Court construes as brought under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.

The Court further understands that Plaintiff asserts claims of copyright infringement and

trademark infringement under federal law, as well as claims under state law. Finally, with respect

to Plaintiff’s OTSCs, Plaintiff seems to seek immediate injunctive relief, notwithstanding her

failure to satisfy the pleading requirements of Rule 8 to plausibly allege facts to state certain

claims under federal law, and to satisfy the subject matter jurisdiction requirements as to any

claims she raises under state law, as specified below.

A. Plaintiff’s OTSCs

The Court has denied Plaintiff’s first OTSC, in which Plaintiff sought immediate

injunctive relief in this action, and the Court must deny Plaintiff’s second and third OTSCs, in

which she seems to seek immediate injunctive relief as well,2 because of the deficiencies

discussed below. To obtain such relief, Plaintiff must show: (1) that she is likely to suffer

irreparable harm and (2) either (a) that she has a likelihood of success on the merits of her case

2 The Court will address, in this order, Plaintiff’s second OTSC only inasmuch as

Plaintiff seeks immediate injunctive relief in this action.

or (b) has raised sufficiently serious questions going to the merits to make them a fair ground for

litigation and that there is a balance of hardships tipping decidedly in her favor. See UBS Fin.

Servs., Inc. v. W.V. Univ. Hosps., Inc., 660 F.3d 643, 648 (2d Cir. 2011) (citation and internal

quotation marks omitted); Wright v. Giuliani, 230 F.3d 543, 547 (2d Cir. 2000). Preliminary

injunctive relief “is an extraordinary and drastic remedy, one that should not be granted unless

the movant, by a clear showing, carries the burden of persuasion.” Moore v. Consol. Edison Co.

of N.Y., Inc., 409 F.3d 506, 510 (2d Cir. 2005) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted).

Because of the deficiencies discussed below, none of Plaintiff’s submissions filed in this

action demonstrate: (1) a likelihood of success on the merits, or (2) sufficiently serious questions

going to the merits to make them a fair ground for litigation and a balance of hardships tipping

decidedly in Plaintiff’s favor. These deficiencies are the bases for the Court’s previous denial of

Plaintiff’s first OTSC, and why the Court now denies her second and third OTSCs.

B. Private prosecution

Plaintiff seems to seek the criminal prosecution of at least some of the defendants. The

Court must dismiss the claims seeking such relief. Plaintiff cannot initiate a criminal prosecution

in this court because “the decision to prosecute is solely within the discretion of the prosecutor.”

Leeke v. Timmerman, 454 U.S. 83, 86-87 (1981). Neither Plaintiff nor the Court can direct

prosecutors to initiate a criminal proceeding against anyone because prosecutors possess

discretionary authority to bring criminal actions, and they are “immune from control or

interference by citizen or court.” Conn. Action Now, Inc. v. Roberts Plating Co., 457 F.2d 81, 87

(2d Cir. 1972). Accordingly, because Plaintiff lacks standing to cause the federal criminal

prosecution of others, see Linda R.S. v. Richard D., 410 U.S. 614, 618-19 (1973), the Court

dismisses, for lack of subject matter jurisdiction, all claims in which Plaintiff seeks the federal

criminal prosecution of anyone, including the defendants, see Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(h)(3); Mahon v.

Ticor Title Ins. Co., 683 F.3d 59, 62 (2d Cir. 2012) (“If [a] plaintiff[ ] lack[s] Article III standing,

a [federal] court has no subject matter jurisdiction to hear [his] claim.” (internal quotation marks

and citation omitted)).

C. Claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1983

The Court construes Plaintiff’s claims that defendants violated her federal constitutional

rights as brought under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. The Court must, however, dismiss those claims. A

claim for relief under Section 1983 must allege facts showing that the defendants acted under the

color of a state “statute, ordinance, regulation, custom or usage.” 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Thus, to state

a viable claim under Section 1983, a plaintiff must allege both that: (1) a right secured by the

Constitution or laws of the United States was violated, and (2) the right was violated by a person

acting under the color of state law, or a “state actor.” West v. Atkins, 487 U.S. 42, 48-49 (1988);

Meadows v. United Servs., Inc., 963 F.3d 240, 243 (2d Cir. 2020) (“State action [for the purpose

of Section 1983 liability] requires both . . . the exercise of some right or privilege created by the

State . . . and the involvement of a person who may fairly be said to be a state actor.” (internal

quotation marks and citation omitted, emphasis in original)). Private entities are not generally

considered to be state actors. Sykes v. Bank of Am., 723 F.3d 399, 406 (2d Cir. 2013) (quoting

Brentwood Acad. v. Tenn. Secondary Sch. Athletic Ass’n, 531 U.S. 288, 295 (2001)); see also

Ciambriello v. Cnty. of Nassau, 292 F.3d 307, 323 (2d Cir. 2002) (“[T]he United States

Constitution regulates only the Government, not private parties . . . .” (internal quotation marks

and citations omitted)).

Plaintiff has alleged no facts showing how any of the defendants—all of which are

private entities—functioned as state actors when they allegedly violated Plaintiff’s federal

constitutional rights. The Court therefore dismisses Plaintiff’s claims of federal constitutional

violations under Section 1983 for failure to state a claim on which relief may be granted. See 28

U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii).

D. Copyright infringement

To the extent that Plaintiff asserts claims of copyright infringement against any of the

defendants, under the federal Copyright Act, 17 U.S.C. § 501, et seq., the Court must dismiss

these claims. “To state a claim for copyright infringement, a plaintiff must allege ‘both

(1) ownership of a valid copyright and (2) infringement of the copyright by the defendant.’”

Spinelli v. Nat’l Football League, 903 F.3d 185, 197 (2d Cir. 2018) (citation omitted). The

registration of a plaintiff’s copyright with the United States Copyright Office is not required for a

work to obtain copyright protection. See 17 U.S.C. § 408(a) (“[R]egistration is not a condition of

copyright protection.”). Nevertheless, preregistration or registration of a copyright with the

United States Copyright Office is a precondition for bringing a copyright infringement action in

federal court. The Copyright Act provides that “no civil action for infringement of the copyright

in any United States work shall be instituted until preregistration or registration of the copyright

claim has been made in accordance with this title.” 17 U.S.C. § 411(a); see also Reed Elsevier,

Inc. v. Muchnick, 559 U.S. 154, 158 (2010) (holding that copyright registration is a condition

that a plaintiff “must satisfy before filing an infringement claim and invoking the [Copyright]

Act’s remedial provisions”); Newton v. Penguin/Berkley Publ’g USA, No. 13-CV-1283 (CM),

2014 WL 61232, at *4 (S.D.N.Y. Jan. 6, 2014) (“The Supreme Court has held that this provision

imposes a ‘precondition’ to filing a claim for copyright infringement.”).

Plaintiff alleges nothing to suggest that she owns any copyrights that are preregistered or

registered with the United States Copyright Office with respect to any of the songs or other

works that she mentions or alludes to in her complaint, OTSCs, motion, or declaration in support

of her motion. It is also unclear from those submissions which, if any, of the defendants

allegedly infringed any preregistered or registered copyrights Plaintiff may own, and how they

did so. The Court therefore dismisses Plaintiff’s claims of copyright infringement for failure to

state a claim on which relief may be granted. See § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii). In light of Plaintiff’s pro se

status, however, the Court grants Plaintiff leave to replead her federal law claims of copyright

infringement in an amended complaint in which she provides facts showing that: (1) she owns

copyrights for the works that are the bases for her federal law claims of copyright infringement;

(2) those copyrights are preregistered or registered with the United States Copyright Office; and

(3) the defendants named in the amended complaint infringed on those copyrights.

E. Trademark infringement

Plaintiff may also be attempting to assert claims of trademark infringement, under the

Federal Trademark Act of 1946, 15 U.S.C. § 1051, et seq., which is also known as the Lanham

Act. To state such a claim, “a plaintiff ‘must allege sufficient facts to establish: (1) that the

plaintiff’s mark is entitled to protection, and (2) that the defendant’s use of [the] mark is likely to

cause consumers confusion as to the origin or sponsorship of [its] goods’ [or services].” Adidas

Am., Inc. v. Thom Brown Inc., 599 F. Supp. 3d 151, 158 (S.D.N.Y. 2022) (citation omitted,

second alteration in original). For the purposes of the Lanham Act, “[t]he term ‘mark’ includes

any trademark, service mark, collective mark, or certification mark.” 15 U.S.C. § 1127. The

statute defines those terms in the following manner:

The term “trademark” includes any word, name, symbol, or device, or any

combination thereof—

(1) used by a person, or

(2) which a person has a bona fide intention to use in commerce and applies to

register on the principal register established by this chapter,

to identify and distinguish his or her goods, including a unique product, from

those manufactured or sold by others and to indicate the source of the goods, even

if that source is unknown.

The term “service mark” means any word, name, symbol, or device, or any

combination thereof—

(1) used by a person, or

(2) which a person has a bona fide intention to use in commerce and applies to

register on the principal register established by this chapter,

to identify and distinguish the services of one person, including a unique service,

from the services of others and to indicate the source of the services, even if that

source is unknown. Titles, character names, and other distinctive features of radio

or television programs may be registered as service marks notwithstanding that

they, or the programs, may advertise the goods of the sponsor.

The term “certification mark” means any word, name, symbol, or device, or any

combination thereof—

(1) used by a person other than its owner, or

(2) which its owner has a bona fide intention to permit a person other than the

owner to use in commerce and files an application to register on the principal

register established by this chapter,

to certify regional or other origin, material, mode of manufacture, quality,

accuracy, or other characteristics of such person’s goods or services or that the

work or labor on the goods or services was performed by members of a union or

other organization.

The term “collective mark” means a trademark or service mark—

(1) used by the members of a cooperative, an association, or other collective

group or organization, or

(2) which such cooperative, association, or other collective group or organization

has a bona fide intention to use in commerce and applies to register on the

principal register established by this chapter,

and includes marks indicating membership in a union, an association, or other

organization.

Id. “A certificate of registration with the [United States Patent and Trademark Office] is prima

facie evidence that the mark is registered and valid (i.e., protectible), that the registrant owns the

mark, and that the registrant has the exclusive right to use the mark in commerce.” Lane Capital

Mgmt. Inc. v. Lane Capital Mgmt., Inc., 192 F.3d 337, 345 (2d Cir. 1999) (citing 15 U.S.C.

§ 1115(a)).

Plaintiff alleges nothing to suggest that she owns any sort of mark, as defined in the

Lanham Act, that is entitled to protection, or that any of the defendants’ use of such mark is

likely to cause consumers confusion as to the origin or sponsorship of that defendant’s goods or

services. The Court therefore dismisses Plaintiff’s claims of trademark infringement, under the

Lanham Act, for failure to state a claim on which relief may be granted. See § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii).

The Court, however, grants Plaintiff leave to replead these claims in an amended complaint in

which she alleges facts to state such a claim, as specified above.

F. Claims under state law

The focus of Plaintiff’s complaint, OTSCs, motion, and declaration in support of that

motion does not seem to be any claims under federal law, including any claims of federal

constitutional violations, claims of copyright infringement, or claims of trademark infringement.

Rather, the focus of Plaintiff’s submissions appears to be claims under state law, which the Court

understands as brought, alternatively, under the court’s supplemental jurisdiction or under the

court’s original diversity jurisdiction.

If Plaintiff fails to file an amended complaint in response to this order, or if she files an

amended complaint and asserts claims under federal law, as well as claims under state law under

the court’s supplemental jurisdiction, and should the Court dismiss her federal law claims, the

Court will decline to consider, under the court’s supplement jurisdiction, her claims under state

law. See 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c)(3); Carnegie-Mellon Univ. v. Cohill, 484 U.S. 343, 350 (1988)

(generally, “when the federal-law claims have dropped out of the lawsuit in its early stages and

only state-law claims remain, the federal court should decline the exercise of [supplemental]

jurisdiction” (footnote omitted)).

If, however, Plaintiff alleges facts in her amended complaint showing that the court has

original diversity jurisdiction to consider her claims under state law, the court must consider

those claims. See 28 U.S.C. 1332(a). To establish diversity jurisdiction, a plaintiff must first

allege that she and the defendants are citizens of different States. See § 1332(a)(1); Wis. Dep’t of

Corr. v. Schacht, 524 U.S. 381, 388 (1998) (“A case falls within the federal district court’s

‘original’ diversity ‘jurisdiction’ only if diversity of citizenship among the parties is complete,

i.e., only if there is no plaintiff and no defendant who are citizens of the same State.”). For

diversity purposes, an individual is a citizen of the State where she is domiciled, which is defined

as the place where the individual “has [her] true fixed home . . . and to which, whenever [s]he is

absent, [s]he has the intention of returning.” Palazzo ex rel. Delmage v. Corio, 232 F.3d 38, 42

(2d Cir. 2000) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). An individual “has but one

domicile.” Id. A corporation is, however, a citizen “of every State and foreign state by which it

has been incorporated and of the State or foreign state where it has its principal place of

business.” § 1332(c)(1); see also Hertz Corp. v. Friend, 559 U.S. 77, 92-93 (2010) (a

corporation’s principal place of business is its “nerve center,” usually its main headquarters). For

purposes of diversity jurisdiction, a limited liability company (an “LLC”) is deemed to be a

citizen of each State of which its members are citizens.3 See Bayerische Landesbank, N.Y.

Branch v. Aladdin Capital Mgmt. LLC, 692 F.3d 42, 49 (2d Cir. 2012).

There is a second component of diversity jurisdiction—the amount in controversy must

be in excess of the sum or value of $75,000. See § 1332(a). The sum claimed by a plaintiff will

3 Because a limited liability company is not a corporation, the rule for determining the

citizenship of a corporation is inapplicable to determining the citizenship of a limited liability

company. See Ali v. Am. Univ. of Antigua, Inc., No. 1:25-CV-2065 (LTS), 2025 WL 897043, at

*4 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 24, 2025).

control if it the claim of value made in good faith. See St. Paul Mercury Indem. Co. v. Red Cab

Co., 303 U.S. 283, 288 (1938). The Court can dismiss a diversity action for failing to plead that

the amount in controversy exceeds the sum or value of $75,000, but only if there is “a legal

certainty from the complaint that the plaintiff cannot recover sufficient damages to invoke

[diversity] jurisdiction.” Zacharia v. Harbor Island Spa, Inc., 684 F.2d 199, 202 (2d Cir. 1982);

see Ochoa v. Interbrew Am., Inc., 999 F.2d 626, 629 (2d Cir. 1993) (“[I]n determining whether a

challenged jurisdictional amount has been met, district courts are permitted only to assess the

allegations in a complaint and not the validity of any asserted defenses.”). “A plaintiff seeking to

invoke diversity jurisdiction ‘cannot[,] [however,] meet [her] burden of proof with mere

conclusory allegations of indirect or speculative value.’” Chavez v. Maker, No. 1:18-CV-7965

(RA) (GWG), 2019 WL 4926348, at *4 (S.D.N.Y. Oct. 7, 2019) (citation omitted), report &

recommendation adopted sub nom., Chavez v. Wylie, No. 18-CV-7965 (RA), 2019 WL 6873806

(S.D.N.Y. Dec. 17, 2019), appeal dismissed, No. 20-383, 2020 WL 4332758 (2d Cir. May 28,

2020); Weir v. Cenlar FSB, No. 7:16-CV-8650 (CS), 2018 WL 3443173, at *12 (S.D.N.Y. July

17, 2018) (reasoning that “the jurisdictional amount, like any other factual allegation, ought not

to receive the presumption of truth unless it is supported by facts rendering it plausible” (citation

omitted)).

Plaintiff, who alleges that she is a citizen of the State of New York, and that she resides

in Jamaica, Queens County, New York, sues entities that, she alleges, are all incorporated within

that State and have their principal places of business within that State as well. (ECF 1, at 3.) If

this is true with respect to at least one of the defendants named, then that defendant is also a

citizen of the State of New York, and the parties are not diverse for the purposes of the court’s

diversity jurisdiction. Schacht, 524 U.S. at 388 (“A case falls within the federal district court’s

‘original’ diversity ‘jurisdiction’ only if diversity of citizenship among the parties is complete,

i.e., only if there is no plaintiff and no defendant who are citizens of the same State.” (emphasis

added)). It does not appear, however, that all of the defendants are corporations—some appear to

be limited liability companies—or that they are all citizens of the State of New York. See, e.g.,

Statement Pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 7.1 at 2, Phillips v. Google LLC, No.

1:24-CV-5742 (VF) (S.D.N.Y. 2024) (stating that “[t]he sole member of Defendant Google LLC

is XXVI Holdings Inc., which is a company incorporated in Delaware with its principal place of

business in Mountain View, California. Accordingly, Google LLC is a citizen of Delaware and

California.”); Doeman Music. Grp. Media & Photography LLC v. DistroKid, LLC, No. 1:23-CV-

4776 (MMG), 2024 WL 4349480, at *5 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 30, 2024) (noting that DistroKid, a

limited liability company, did not contest the plaintiff’s assertion that its members are citizens of

Delaware, Massachusetts, or New York); Romero v. Meta Platforms Inc., No. 7:23-CV-3306

(TMC) (KFM), 2024 WL 1554826, at *1 (D.S.C. Mar. 14, 2024) (noting that Meta Platforms,

Inc. operates Facebook, and is a Delaware corporation with its principal place of business in

Menlo, Park, California), report & recommendation adopted, 2024 WL 3466403 (D.S.C. July

19, 2024), aff’d, No. 24-1729, 2024 WL 5200156 (4th Cir. Dec. 23, 2024), cert. denied, 145 S.

Ct. 1972 (2025); Maoz v. Shop, No. 1:22-CV-2039 (LTS), 2022 WL 1063152, at *3 (S.D.N.Y.

Apr. 5, 2022) (“Apple, because it is incorporated in California, where it maintains its principal

place of business . . . is a citizen of California for diversity purposes.”) (citation omitted)); Day v.

TikTok, Inc., No. 21-CV-50129 (PGR), 2022 WL 595745, at *1 (N.D. Ill. Feb. 28, 2022) (noting

that TikTok, Inc., is “a California corporation with its principal place of business in California”);

Eight Mile Style, LLC v. Spotify USA Inc., No. 3:19-CV-0736 (AAT), 2020 WL 1640425, at *1

(M.D. Tenn. Apr. 2, 2020) (noting that Spotify USA Inc. “is a New York-based company

incorporated in Delaware and wholly owned by a Swedish corporate parent.”); Lulu Enters., Inc.

v. N-F Newsite, LLC, No. 5:07-CV-0347-D (TWB), 2007 WL 3101011, at *1 (E.D.N.C. Oct. 19,

2007) (noting that Lulu Enterprises, Inc., operates the website “Lulu.com” and is a Delaware

corporation with its headquarters in Morrisville, North Carolina); Goryl v. Tidal Software, Inc.,

No. H-07-2079 (SL), 2007 WL 2471469, at *2 n.18 (S.D. Tex. Aug. 27, 2007) (“The parties do

not dispute that Tidal [Software, Inc.], as a California corporation, is a citizen of California for

diversity purposes.”).

In addition, Plaintiff seems to seek at least $1 billion in damages. (ECF 1, at 6.) She does

not, however, allege any non-conclusory facts in support of that claim.

In sum, Plaintiff does not allege facts sufficient to show that the parties are diverse—that

she and all of the defendants named in her original complaints are not citizens of the same State.

In addition, she has not alleged non-conclusory facts showing that her claims under state law

satisfy the jurisdictional amount in controversy for a diversity action—an amount in excess of

the sum or value of $75,000. Accordingly, to the extent that Plaintiff asserts claims under state

law, under the court’s diversity jurisdiction, the Court dismisses these claims for lack of subject

matter jurisdiction. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(h)(3). The Court, however, grants Plaintiff leave to

replead her claims brought under state law in an amended complaint in which she alleges facts

showing that the court has original diversity jurisdiction of such claims against the defendants

named in her amended complaint. If Plaintiff files an amended complaint raising claims under

state law under the court’s diversity jurisdiction, none of the defendants named in her amended

complaint can be a citizen of the same State as her, and she must include non-conclusory facts

showing that her claims under state law satisfy the more-than $75,000 jurisdictional amount for a

diversity action.

G. Plaintiff’s motion for an extension of time to file a notice of appeal, motion to

proceed IFP on appeal, and application to appeal IFP

Plaintiff’s appeal of the Court’s September 26, 2024 order denying her first OTSC was an

interlocutory appeal of an order denying an injunction. See 28 U.S.C. § 1292(a)(1); The Res.

Grp. Int’l Ltd. v. Chishti, 91 F.4th 107, 111 (2d Cir. 2024). As mentioned above, the Court of

Appeals dismissed Plaintiff’s interlocutory appeal effective August 15, 2025. Accordingly,

because there is no longer any interlocutory appeal arising from the Court’s September 26, 2024

order for Plaintiff to pursue, the Court denies as moot her motion for an extension of time to file

a notice of appeal, motion for leave to proceed IFP on appeal, and her application to appeal IFP.

(ECF 10-11.)

LEAVE TO AMEND GRANTED

Plaintiff proceeds in this matter without the benefit of an attorney. District courts

generally should grant a self-represented plaintiff an opportunity to amend a complaint to cure its

defects, unless amendment would be futile. See Hill v. Curcione, 657 F.3d 116, 123-24 (2d Cir.

2011). Indeed, the Court of Appeals has cautioned that district courts “should not dismiss [a pro

se complaint] without granting leave to amend at least once when a liberal reading of the

complaint gives any indication that a valid claim might be stated.” Cuoco v. Moritsugu, 222 F.3d

99, 112 (2d Cir. 2000) (quoting Gomez v. USAA Fed. Sav. Bank, 171 F.3d 794, 795 (2d Cir.

1999) (internal quotation marks omitted)). Because Plaintiff may be able to allege additional

facts to state valid claims, the Court grants Plaintiff 30 days’ leave to replead those claims for

which the Court has granted her such leave above, in an amended complaint.

If Plaintiff does not file an amended complaint within the time allowed, the Court will

direct the Clerk of Court to enter a judgment dismissing this action for the reasons set forth in

this order, which will include: (1) the dismissal of Plaintiff’s claims under federal law for the

reasons set forth in this order: (2) the alternative dismissal of Plaintiff’s claims under state law

because the Court declines to consider, under its supplemental jurisdiction, such claims, see 28

U.S.C. § 1367(c)(3), or because the court lacks original diversity jurisdiction to consider them,

see Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(h)(3); and (3) the denial of any pending motions or other requests for relief

as moot.

WARNINING

The Court notes that Plaintiff, under the name “Sharon Jeter,” is barred, under 28 U.S.C.

§ 1915(g), from filing any federal civil action IFP while she is a prisoner, unless she is under

imminent danger of serious physical injury. See Bar Order Under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(g), Jeter v.

CNYPC, ECF 1:15-CV-6802, 6 (S.D.N.Y. Dec. 7, 2015) (lead action). A prisoner is only barred

under Section 1915(g) when, while she has been a prisoner, she has filed three or more previous

civil actions or appeals in a federal court that have been dismissed as frivolous, malicious, or for

failure to state a claim on which relief may be granted. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915(g).

It seems that Plaintiff, now that she is no longer a prisoner, has continued to file

nonmeritorious civil actions in this court under the names “Sharon Brown,” “Sharon L. Brown,”

and “Sharon Leslie Brown.” Some of these actions have been dismissed for lack of subject

matter jurisdiction. See Order of Dismissal, Brown v. Columbia Univ., ECF 1:25-CV-3213, 6,

(S.D.N.Y. June 18, 2025); Order of Dismissal, Brown v. World Health Org., ECF 1:24-CV-7216,

11 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 7, 2025) (notice of appeal filed Mar. 28, 2025); Order of Dismissal, Brown v.

United Nations, ECF 1:24-CV-7061, 10 (S.D.N.Y. Feb. 26, 2025), appeal dismissed, No. 25-563

(2d Cir. July 31, 2025). She has also filed other actions in this court that have been dismissed as

frivolous, and the court has warned her that, if she continues to file nonmeritorious litigation in

this court, the court may issue an order barring her from filing new civil actions in this court IFP

without leave of court. Order of Dismissal, Brown v. Trump, ECF 1:24-CV-7909, 10 (S.D.N.Y.

July 21, 2025); Order of Dismissal, Brown v. Ventura, ECF 1:25-CV-3635, 11 (S.D.N.Y. June

20, 2025) (notice of appeal filed June 30, 2025). If Plaintiff is unable to cure the deficiencies in

this action that are mentioned above, for which the Court has granted her leave to replead in an

amended complaint, it would appear that this action is yet another nonmeritorious civil action

that Plaintiff has filed in this court. Accordingly, the Court again warns Plaintiff that, if she

continues to file nonmeritorious litigation in this court, the court may issue an order barring her

from filing new civil actions in this court IFP without leave of the court. See 28 U.S.C. § 1651.

CONCLUSION

The Court denies Plaintiff’s second and third OTSCs. (ECF 9, 12). The Court also denies

Plaintiff’s motion for an extension of time to file a notice of appeal, motion for leave to proceed

IFP on appeal, and her application to appeal IFP as moot. (ECF 10-11.) The Court further

dismisses this action for the reasons set forth in this order. The Court, however, grants Plaintiff

30 days’ leave to replead certain claims in an amended complaint, as specified above.

If Plaintiff does not file an amended complaint within the time allowed, the Court will

direct the Clerk of Court to enter a judgment dismissing this action for the reasons set forth in

this order, which will include: (1) the dismissal of Plaintiff’s claims under federal law for the

reasons set forth in this order: (2) the alternative dismissal of Plaintiff’s claims under state law

because the Court declines to consider, under its supplemental jurisdiction, such claims, see 28

U.S.C. § 1367(c)(3), or because the court lacks original diversity jurisdiction to consider them,

see Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(h)(3); and (3) the denial of any pending motions or other requests for relief

as moot.

The Court certifies under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a)(3) that any appeal from this order would

not be taken in good faith and, therefore, IFP status is denied for the purpose of an appeal. See

Coppedge v. United States, 369 U.S. 438, 444-45 (1962).

The Court directs the Clerk of Court to hold this matter open on the docket until a

judgment is entered.

SO ORDERED.

Dated: October 8, 2025

New York, New York

/s/ Laura Taylor Swain

LAURA TAYLOR SWAIN

Chief United States District Judge