Opinion

Opinion

Court
District Court, C.D. California
Filed
Dec 9, 2025
Cited by
0 cases
Authority
More cited than 37.6%

affirming district court’s dismissal of a Section 2241 26 petition under Habeas Rules 1(b) and 4

How later courts described this case

  • affirming district court’s dismissal of a Section 2241 26 petition under Habeas Rules 1(b) and 4
  • noting that the exhaustion 14 || requirement facilitates judicial review through development of a factual record
  • “Insofar as [petitioner] is challenging the BOP’s 12 individualized determination concerning his placement, the district court 13 properly concluded that it lacked jurisdiction over the petition.”

Written by the judges who cited it.

The opinion

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8 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

9 CENTRAL DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

10 EASTERN DIVISION

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12 DALLAS BLAKE JOHNSON,

No. 5:25-cv-3064-AH-BFM

13 Petitioner,

v. ORDER TO SHOW CAUSE

14 WHY HABEAS PETITION

WARDEN, USP VICTORVILLE, SHOULD NOT BE DISMISSED

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Respondent.

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This Order concerns a federal habeas petition. Petitioner Dallas Blake

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Johnson filed a petition for a writ of habeas corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2241.

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(ECF 1 (“Petition”).) Under Rule 4 of the Rules Governing Section 2254 Cases

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in the United States District Court—rules that apply to the Petition in this

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Court—the Court must review the Petition before ordering a response. See Rule

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1(b), Rules Governing Section 2254 Cases (a district court may “apply any or all

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of these rules” to any habeas petition); see also Bostic v. Carlson, 884 F.2d 1267,

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1269-70 (9th Cir. 1989) (affirming district court’s dismissal of a Section 2241

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petition under Habeas Rules 1(b) and 4). If it “plainly appears” from that initial

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1 review that Petitioner is not entitled to relief, the Court must dismiss the

2 Petition.

3 Here, Petitioner claims that the Bureau of Prisons has violated his

4 statutory right under the First Step Act to be placed within 500 miles of his

5 home address. (Petition at 1.) It appears, however, that the Petition must be

6 denied for three reasons.

7 First, this Court lacks authority to review a BOP’s individualized housing

8 decision under this provision. See 18 U.S.C. § 3621(b) (“Notwithstanding any

9 other provision of law, a designation of a place of imprisonment under this

10 subsection is not reviewable by any court.”); Brown v. Ives, 543 F. App’x 636,

11 637 (9th Cir. 2013) (“Insofar as [petitioner] is challenging the BOP’s

12 individualized determination concerning his placement, the district court

13 properly concluded that it lacked jurisdiction over the petition.”). It appears that

14 the Petition is subject to dismissal under that provision, because it appears that

15 the claim in the Petition challenges the BOP’s individualized housing decision

16 in his case.

17 Second, the First Step Act requires that the BOP place individuals within

18 500 driving miles of their home address, subject to a host of considerations,

19 including bed availability, security designation, programmatic needs, mental

20 and medical health needs, recommendations of the sentencing court, and

21 security concerns. 18 U.S.C. § 3621(b). Petitioner has alleged that he has been

22 placed more than 500 miles from his home address but has not alleged that the

23 BOP violated the statute, which requires consideration of more than simply the

24 distance from the prison to one’s home address.

25 Finally, Petitioner does not indicate that he has exhausted this claim

26 administratively using the BOP grievance system. Exhaustion in a § 2241

27 petition is not mandatory or jurisdictional; it can be excused under certain

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1 || circumstances. Ward v. Chavez, 678 F.3d 1042, 1045 (9th Cir. 2012). Those

2 || circumstances include where exhaustion would be futile because the agency

3 || would be bound by official policy to deny the claim, or where irreparable injury

4 || may occur without immediate judicial relief. Id.; see also Laing v. Ashcroft, 370

5 || F.8d 994, 1000 (9th Cir. 2004) (noting that the circumstances in which

6 || exhaustion can be waived include “where administrative remedies are

7 || inadequate or not efficacious, pursuit of administrative remedies would be a

8 || futile gesture, irreparable injury will result, or the administrative proceedings

9 || would be void”). But Petitioner has not offered any reason to think that any of

10 |} those exceptions apply here, or that he has any other good reason for not

11 |} exhausting his claim. And in cases involving difficult factual questions—like the

12 || basis for a designation decision—exhaustion is all the more important. See

13 || Ruviwat v. Smith, 701 F.2d 844, 845 (9th Cir. 1988) (noting that the exhaustion

14 || requirement facilitates judicial review through development of a factual record).

15 Petitioner is therefore ordered to show cause (meaning explain in

16 || writing) why the Court should not recommend dismissal of the Petition. No

17 || later than January 9, 2026, Petitioner shall respond, in writing, to this Order.

18 || In his response, Petitioner must set forth his arguments, if any, as to why his

19 || Petition should not be dismissed for the reasons stated in this Order.

20 Petitioner’s failure to file a timely response as ordered may result

21 || in the Court recommending to the District Judge that this case be

22 || dismissed for failure to prosecute and to follow court orders.

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24 || DATED: December 9, 2025

TMinf

26 BRIANNA FULLER MIRCHEFF

7 UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

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This is a copy of a public record, reproduced as it was published. It is not legal advice, and it may not be the version a court would rely on. Check the official source before you cite it.

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