ROBINSON

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE

NORTHERN DISTRICT OF FLORIDA

TALLAHASSEE DIVISION

LATAVIUS ROBINSON,

Plaintiff,

v. Case No. 4:25-cv-14-RH/MJF

UNITED WHOLESALE MORTGAGE,

LLC,

Defendant.

/

REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION

Plaintiff alleges that Defendant United Wholesale Mortgage LLC and

other unidentified persons violated the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt

Organization Act. Doc. 1. Defendant United Wholesale Mortgage LLC filed

a motion to dismiss. Doc. 11. Plaintiff responded in opposition. Doc. 12.

Because Plaintiff’s initial complaint violates the Federal Rules of Civil

Procedure and fails to state a plausible claim for relief, the District Court

should grant Defendant’s motion to dismiss this civil action.

BACKGROUND

On January 10, 2025, Plaintiff commenced this civil action. Plaintiff

alleges that Defendant and other unidentified persons violated RICO, 18

U.S.C. §§ 1961, et seq. Defendant moved to dismiss the complaint because

Plaintiff failed to state a plausible claim for relief and the complaint

violated the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. Doc. 12. Before a court may

dismiss a case with prejudice for failure to state a plausible claim for relief,

the court must afford a pro se litigant at least one chance to replead his

claim. Woldeab v. Dekalb Cnty. Bd. of Educ., 885 F.3d 1289, 1291 (11th Cir.

2018). Therefore, the undersigned afforded Plaintiff an opportunity to

replead. Doc. 13.

On October 23, 2025, Plaintiff filed his first amended complaint. Doc.

Doc. 14. In that amended complaint, Plaintiff seeks to add seven

Defendants and claims pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Plaintiff asserts all

claims as “the Trustee of the Evader Trust” and Plaintiff disavows

asserting any claims “individually.” Doc. 14 at 3. On November 13, 2025,

the undersigned struck Plaintiff’s first amended complaint because

Plaintiff, who is appearing pro se, impermissibly asserted claims as the

trustee of a trust. Doc. 25.

On October 24, 2025, Plaintiff filed a proposed second amended

complaint, Doc. 15, and a motion for leave to file the proposed second

amended complaint, Doc. 16. Because Plaintiff’s proposed second amended

complaint violated Rule 8 and Rule 10 of the Federal Rules of Civil

Procedure, the undersigned denied Plaintiff’s motion for leave to amend

the complaint. Doc. 17.

On October 27, 2025, Plaintiff filed a proposed third amended

complaint, Doc. 18, and a motion for leave to file Plaintiff’s proposed third

amended complaint, Doc. 20. On November 13, 2025, the undersigned

denied Plaintiff’s motion for leave to file Plaintiff’s proposed third amended

complaint because Plaintiff, who is appearing pro se, impermissibly

asserted claims as the trustee of a trust. Doc. 20; see J.J. Rissell, Allentown,

PA Tr. v. Marchelos, 976 F.3d 1233, 1236 (11th Cir. 2020) (“[A] nonlawyer

trustee has no authority to represent a trust in court.”). Thus, Plaintiff’s

original complaint remains the operative pleading.

STANDARD

Determining whether a complaint states a claim upon which relief

can be granted is governed by the standard set forth in Rule 12(b)(6) of the

Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6); Mitchell v.

Farcass, 112 F.3d 1483, 1485 (11th Cir. 1997). The court accepts all well-

pleaded factual allegations of the complaint as true and evaluates all

reasonable inferences derived from those facts in the light most favorable

to the plaintiff. Hunnings v. Texaco, Inc., 29 F.3d 1480, 1483 (11th Cir.

1994). To survive dismissal, “a complaint must contain sufficient factual

matter, accepted as true, to ‘state a claim to relief that is plausible on its

face.’” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (quoting Bell Atlantic

Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007)).

DISCUSSION

A. Plaintiff’s Complaint Violates the Federal Rules

“A district court has the ‘inherent authority to control its docket and

ensure the prompt resolution of lawsuits,’ which includes the ability to

dismiss a complaint on shotgun pleading grounds.” Vibe Micro, Inc. v.

Shabanets, 878 F.3d 1291, 1295 (11th Cir. 2018) (quoting Weiland v. Palm

Beach Cnty. Sheriff’s Off., 792 F.3d 1313, 1320 (11th Cir. 2015)). A district

court that receives a shotgun pleading must sua sponte give a plaintiff “one

chance to replead.” Id. at 1296. But once a pro se litigant has been given

that opportunity to remedy the deficiencies and squanders the opportunity

by filing another shotgun pleading, the district court has the authority to

dismiss the complaint on shotgun pleading grounds. Id. at 1295; Byrne v.

Nezhat, 261 F.3d 1075, 1133 (11th Cir. 2001); see also Foudy v. Indian River

Cnty. Sheriff’s Off., 845 F.3d 1117, 1126 (11th Cir. 2017).

On October 16, 2025, the undersigned informed Plaintiff that his

complaint was a shotgun pleading. Specifically, the undersigned informed

Plaintiff:

Plaintiff’s “factual allegations” are not set forth in numbered

paragraphs. Instead, Plaintiff’s allegations are found in a single

paragraph that spans four pages.

Plaintiff’s complaint also is “replete with conclusory [and]

vague” allegations. Plaintiff does not clearly identify the

claim(s) he intends to bring, or which facts support each claim.

Thus, the complaint violates the rules of civil procedure (Rule 8

or 10 or both) and fails to give Defendant adequate notice of the

claim(s) against it and the grounds upon which each claim rests.

Doc. 13 at 3. The undersigned included detailed instructions on how to

remedy these defects in an amended complaint and afforded Plaintiff an

opportunity to file an amended complaint that corrected these defects. Id.

at 4, 12–14. Despite this opportunity, Plaintiff filed a proposed first

amended complaint, a proposed second amended complaint, and a proposed

third amended complaint, each of which failed to correct the identified

deficiencies. Accordingly, for this reason alone, the District Court should

dismiss this civil action.

B. Plaintiff Fails to State a Claim Under RICO

There is a second, independent reason for the District Court to

dismiss this civil action: Plaintiff fails to state a claim under RICO. To state

a claim, a plaintiff must allege facts that would allow the district court to

plausibly infer that Defendant:

(1) operated, managed, or conducted the affairs of;

(2) an enterprise;

(3) through a pattern;

(4) of racketeering activity;

(5) which caused;

(6) injury to plaintiff’s business or property.

Cisneros v. Petland, Inc., 972 F.3d 1204, 1211 (11th Cir. 2020); Crawford’s

Auto Ctr., Inc. v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 945 F.3d 1150, 1158 (11th

Cir. 2019).

Furthermore, “Civil RICO claims, which are essentially a certain

breed of fraud claims, must be pled with an increased level of specificity.”

Ambrosia Coal & Const. Co. v. Pages Morales, 482 F.3d 1309, 1316 (11th

Cir. 2007); Crawford’s Auto Ctr., Inc., 945 F.3d at 1158. That is, a plaintiff

must allege: (1) the precise statements, documents, or misrepresentations

made; (2) the time and place of and person responsible for the statement;

(3) the content and manner in which the statements misled the Plaintiff;

and (4) what Defendants gained by the alleged fraud.1 Ambrosia Coal &

Const. Co., 482 F.3d at 1316; see generally United States ex rel. Atkins v.

McInteer, 470 F.3d 1350, 1357 (11th Cir. 2006) (“[p]articularity means that

‘a plaintiff must plead facts as to time, place, and substance of the

defendant’s alleged fraud, specifically the details of the defendant[’s]

allegedly fraudulent acts, when they occurred, and who engaged in

them.’”).

Plaintiff fails to state a RICO claim in at least three ways.

1. Plaintiff Fails to Allege the Existence of an Enterprise

An enterprise is defined as “any individual, partnership, corporation,

association, or other legal entity, and any union or group of individuals

associated in fact although not a legal entity.” 18 U.S.C. § 1961(4). Plaintiff

states that Defendant formed an “associated-in-fact” enterprise. See Doc. 1

at 3. An “association-in-fact enterprise is simply a continuing unit that

1 While Plaintiff is entitled to some leniency with respect to the complaint

as he is proceeding pro se, he is still required to comply with Rule 9’s

pleading standard, which requires that plaintiffs plead fraud with

particularity.

functions with a common purpose.” Cisneros, 872 F.3d at 1211. To plead an

association-in-fact enterprise, a plaintiff must allege “that a group of

persons share three structural features: (1) a purpose; (2) relationships

among those associated with the enterprise; and (3) longevity sufficient to

permit these associates to pursue the enterprise’s purpose.” Id. at 1211

(quoting Almanza v. United Airlines, Inc., 851 F.3d 1060, 1067 (11th Cir.

2017)).

Instead of providing specific facts regarding the existence of an

enterprise, Plaintiff relies on conclusions:

• “In naming United Wholesale Mortgage LLC, Latavius

Robinson has established that an enterprise exists which undeniably

affects interstate commerce.” Doc. 1 at 4;

• “Robinson has perfected a RICO claim by showing the existence

of a RICO enterprise.” Id.;

• “The enterprise to which all the defendants belong is evident to

a high degree and it is also evident to a high degree that associates

such as John Does and Jane Does 1-10, act as a continuing unit.” Id.

at 6.

A complaint that contains nothing more than mere conclusions devoid of

facts fails to state a claim for relief and cannot withstand a motion to

dismiss. Davila v. Delta Air Lines, Inc., 326 F.3d 1183, 1185 (11th Cir.

2003). Because Plaintiff provides nothing more than unadorned

conclusions that an enterprise exists, Plaintiff fails to state a RICO claim.

For this reason, too, the District Court should dismiss this civil action.

2. Plaintiff Fails to Allege a Pattern of Racketeering

Activity

RICO defines “racketeering activity” to encompass “dozens of state

and federal offenses, known in RICO parlance as predicates.” RJR Nabisco

Inc. v. European Cmty., 579 U.S. 325, 329–30 (2016). “A pattern of

racketeering activity under RICO requires” a plaintiff to allege “at least

two qualifying predicate acts, each of which must constitute a violation of

one of the state or federal laws described in 18 U.S.C. § 1961(1).”

Crawford’s Auto Ctr., Inc., 945 F.3d at 1158; see H.J., Inc. v. Nw. Bell Tel.

Co., 492 U.S. 229, 237–38 (1989).

Additionally, to “plead a pattern of racketeering activity, ‘a plaintiff

must demonstrate a relationship between the predicate acts as well as a

threat of continuing activity’—a standard known as the ‘continuity plus

relationship’ test.” Menzies v. Seyfarth Shaw LLP, 943 F.3d 328, 337 (7th

Cir. 2019) (quoting DeGuelle v. Camilli, 664 F.3d 192, 199 (7th Cir. 2011));

see H.J. Inc., 492 U.S. at 242.

Plaintiff alleges that unidentified individuals sent him

correspondence on five dates between April 11 and June 11, 2024.

According to Plaintiff “defendants have used the United States Mail

Service for purposes of fraud and extortion.” Doc. 1 at 7. This conclusory

allegation of of “fraud” and “extortion” is insufficient to state a claim.

Plaintiff also alleges that the unidentified individuals sent this

correspondence over a two-month period—which ended in June 2024.

Plaintiff, therefore, does not allege a threat of continuing activity.

“Congress was concerned in RICO with long-term criminal conduct.” H.J.

Inc., 492 U.S. at 242; Jackson v. BellSouth Telecommunications, 372 F.3d

1250, 1265 (11th Cir. 2004). Thus, predicate “acts extending over a few

weeks or months and threatening no future criminal conduct” does not

constitute a pattern of racketeering activity. H.J. Inc., 492 U.S. at 242.

True, Plaintiff alleges that a pattern “will likely continue” unless abated,

but he provides no facts to support a claim that there is ongoing criminal

conduct or a threat of future criminal conduct. Thus, he has not alleged a

threat of continuing activity. For this second, independent reason, Plaintiff

fails to state a civil RICO claim.

3. Plaintiff Fails to Allege Causation

The “RICO statute provides a cause of action for ‘[a]ny person injured

in his business or property by reason of a violation of section 1962.’” Ray v.

Spirit Airlines, Inc., 836 F.3d 1340, 1349 (11th Cir. 2016) (quoting 18

U.S.C. § 1964(c)) (emphasis added). “The Supreme Court has been clear

that a party is only entitled to recover under RICO ‘to the extent that[] he

has been injured in his business or property by the conduct constituting

the violation.’” Id. (quoting Sedima, S.P.R.L. v. Imrex Co., 473 U.S. 479,

496 (1985)). Stating a civil RICO claim, therefore, requires a plaintiff to

plead facts sufficient to give rise to a reasonable inference that the claimed

activity was the “but-for” and proximate cause of a plaintiff’s injuries.

Holmes v. Securities Investor Protection Corp., 503 U.S. 258, 268 (1992).

Here, Plaintiff again relies solely on conclusory allegations.

Specifically, he states:

• “Robinson has demonstrated that [he] has sustained injuries as

proximate result of the pattern of frauds by the defendants.” Doc. 1

at 4;

• “The cause-in-fact that but-for the chicanery of the enterprise

members including United Wholesale Mortgage, LLC, et al., Latavius

Robinson would have not been deprived of business interests,

business opportunities, and property interests and would not have

incurred tangible losses.” Id.

Plaintiff does not allege how any purported pattern of racketeering activity

injured his property or business, when it did so, or the extent to which a

pattern of racketeering activity damaged his business or property. In this

respect, too, Plaintiff fails to state a civil RICO claim.

CONCLUSION

For the reasons set forth above, the undersigned respectfully

recommends that the District Court:

1. GRANT Defendant’s motion to dismiss, Doc. 11;

2. DISMISS Plaintiff’s claims against Defendant; and

3. DIRECT the clerk of this court to close the case file.

At Pensacola, Florida, this 13th day of November 2025.

/s/ Michael J. Frank

Michael J. Frank

United States Magistrate Judge

NOTICE TO THE PARTIES

The District Court referred this case to a magistrate

judge to make recommendations regarding dispositive

matters. See N.D. Fla. Loc. R. 72.2; see also 28 U.S.C. §

636(b); Fed R. Civ. P. 72(b). Objections to this report and

recommendation must be filed within 14 days of the date

of the report and recommendation. A party who fails to

object to the magistrate judge’s findings or

recommendations contained in a report and

recommendation waives the right to challenge on appeal

the District Court’s order based on unobjected-to factual

and legal conclusions. See 11th Cir. Rule 3-1; 28 U.S.C. §

636.