Scott

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

EASTERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK

ODAINE SCOTT and LISA SAMUELS,

Plaintiffs,

-against- MEMORANDUM AND ORDER

24-CV-8406 (NRM) (VMS)

THE CITY OF NEW YORK; NEW YORK

POLICE DEPARTMENT OFFICER

MICHAEL CATANZARO, individually

and in his official capacity; NEW YORK

POLICE DEPARTMENT OFFICERS

JOHN DOES, individually and in their

official capacities,

Defendants.

NINA R. MORRISON, United States District Judge:

Plaintiffs Odaine Scott and Lisa Samuels bring this action under 42 U.S.C.

§ 1983 and New York state law against the City of New York, New York Police

Department (“NYPD”) Officer Michael Catanzaro, and other unnamed NYPD officers,

alleging false arrest, false imprisonment, malicious prosecution, and abuse of process.

Plaintiffs’ claims revolve around what they contend was the police officers’ failure to

conduct further investigation to establish probable cause before arresting Plaintiffs

when the circumstances known to the officers raised specific grounds to doubt the

complainant’s veracity.

Defendants requested a pre-motion conference (“PMC”) in anticipation of filing

a motion to dismiss, which the Court granted. At the PMC, pursuant to Individual

Rule 5.1.4, the Court construed the parties’ PMC letters as the motion to dismiss

itself. Min. Entry dated Aug. 28, 2025. The Court then conditionally denied

Defendants’ motion to dismiss Plaintiff Scott’s false arrest and malicious prosecution

claims, and further conditionally denied, without prejudice, Defendants’ claim that

Officer Catanzaro was entitled to qualified immunity. Id. The Court gave

Defendants leave to file a letter brief with additional authorities they wished the

Court to consider before making a final ruling on the motion. Id.

For the reasons below, the Court DECLINES to disturb its conditional ruling

and DENIES Defendants’ motion to dismiss as to Plaintiff Scott’s false arrest and

malicious prosecution claims. The Court further finds that, based on the allegations

in the Complaint, Defendant Catanzaro is not shielded from liability on grounds of

qualified immunity, without prejudice to his ability to reassert that defense at

summary judgment or at trial.

FACTUAL BACKGROUND

Plaintiffs’ Complaint asserts the following facts, which the Court accepts as

true for purposes of Defendants’ motion to dismiss. See Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S.

662, 678 (2009).

Plaintiffs Scott and Samuels were in a vehicle in Brooklyn when Police Officer

John Does stopped the car and approached them. Compl. ¶¶ 14–16, ECF No. 1. The

police officers detained and arrested Scott on an outstanding warrant. Id. ¶ 17.

Officer Catanzaro and other John Doe police officers charged Scott with three

felonies. Id. ¶ 30. The charges and the arrest were based on a complaint by a woman

named Crystal, a former girlfriend with whom Scott had been in a serious

relationship for many years. Id. ¶ 31. Scott and Crystal also lived together during

their relationship. Id. Crystal had complained to Officer Catanzaro and other John

Doe police officers that she had been a victim of an assault and burglary in her

apartment in Queens by Scott in July 2023. Id. ¶ 32. Crystal reported the incident

several weeks after it allegedly occurred. Id. ¶¶ 34, 43.

Crystal informed Officer Catanzaro that Scott was her “former boyfriend.” Id.

¶ 33. Catanzaro was also aware that Crystal was making her complaint several

weeks after the alleged incident. Id. ¶ 34. Catanzaro and the other police officers

“took no investigative steps to sufficiently corroborate the veracity of [Crystal’s]

statements and allegations.” Id. ¶ 35. They did not conduct additional interviews or

search for evidence of the alleged assault and burglary, but “only relied on the

unverified word of Crystal.” Id. ¶ 43. Plaintiffs claim the officers did not engage in

the requisite due diligence and investigation to formulate probable cause to arrest

Scott or justify the issuance of a warrant for his arrest. Id. ¶ 36.

PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

Plaintiffs initiated this action on December 6, 2024. Compl. Thereafter,

Defendants requested a PMC in anticipation of filing a motion to dismiss. Def. Letter

Mot. for PMC, ECF No. 10; see also Pl. Letter in Opp’n to PMC, ECF No. 12.

The Court held a PMC and construed the parties’ PMC letters (ECF Nos. 10,

12) as the motion to dismiss itself pursuant to the Court’s Individual Rule 5.1.4. Min.

Entry dated Aug. 28, 2025. The Court conditionally denied Defendants’ motion to

dismiss Plaintiff Scott’s false arrest claim; Plaintiff Samuel’s false arrest claim;

Defendants’ arguments on qualified immunity grounds, without prejudice to

Defendants’ ability to raise the qualified immunity defense at summary judgment

and trial; and Plaintiff Scott’s malicious prosecution claim.1 Id.

The Court allowed Defendants to file a letter brief if they wished the Court to

consider additional authorities before making its final ruling on the motion. Id.

Defendants filed a supplemental letter brief in support of their motion on September

29, 2025. Def. Letter Br. (“Letter”), ECF No. 16. Defendants argue that the Court

should reconsider its conditional ruling as to Plaintiff Scott’s false arrest and

malicious prosecution claims based on probable cause and qualified immunity and

grant the motion to dismiss, or, in the alternative, issue a schedule for further briefing

on the motion.2 Letter at 1, 4.3

1 At the PMC, Plaintiffs withdrew Plaintiff Samuel’s malicious prosecution

claim and both plaintiffs’ abuse of process claims. Min. Entry dated Aug. 28, 2025.

Plaintiffs also withdrew their Monell claims, without prejudice to their ability to seek

leave to amend to raise them as the case progresses through discovery. Id. Finally,

Plaintiffs clarified that they do not raise any failure to intervene claim in this action.

Id.

2 Defendants do not contest the Court’s conditional denial of Defendants’

motion to dismiss Plaintiff Samuels’s false arrest claim. See Min. Entry dated Aug.

28, 2025; Letter at 1. Accordingly, the Court now construes Defendants’ PMC letter

as the motion itself and, for the reasons stated on the record at the August 28, 2025

PMC, denies Defendants’ motion to dismiss Plaintiff Samuels’s false arrest claim.

3 All page references use Electronic Case Filing System (“ECF”) pagination

except where noted.

LEGAL STANDARD

“To survive a motion to dismiss, a complaint must contain sufficient factual

matter, accepted as true, to ‘state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.’”

Ashcroft, 556 U.S. at 678 (quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570

(2007)). “A claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that

allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the

misconduct alleged.” Id. Courts “must construe [a complaint] liberally, accepting all

factual allegations therein as true and drawing all reasonable inferences in the

plaintiffs’ favor.” Sacerdote v. N.Y. Univ., 9 F.4th 95, 106–07 (2d Cir. 2021). However,

courts must also “disregard conclusory allegations, such as ‘formulaic recitation[s] of

the elements of a cause of action.’” Id. at 107 (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555).

DISCUSSION

For the reasons discussed below, Defendants’ renewed argument that the

Court should grant their motion to dismiss Plaintiff Scott’s false arrest and malicious

prosecution claims based on probable cause and qualified immunity is unpersuasive.

I. Probable Cause

“Probable cause ‘is not a high bar.’”4 D.C. v. Wesby, 583 U.S. 48, 57 (2018)

(quoting Kaley v. United States, 571 U.S. 320, 338 (2014)). As a general matter, “a

4 Although “[t]he probable cause determination relevant to a malicious

prosecution claim differs from that relevant to a false arrest claim, . . . a lack of

probable cause to believe the plaintiff committed the crime in question necessarily

entails a lack of probable cause to commence a proceeding against him or her.” Mejia

v. City of New York, 119 F. Supp. 2d 232, 254 (E.D.N.Y. 2000) (citing Posr v. Court

Officer Shield # 207, 180 F.3d 409, 417 (2d Cir.1999)). Because Crystal’s complaint

law enforcement official has probable cause to arrest if he received his information

from some person, normally the putative victim or eyewitness.” Panetta v. Crowley,

460 F.3d 388, 395 (2d Cir. 2006) (quoting Martinez v. Simonetti, 202 F.3d 625, 634

(2000)). “Once a police officer has a reasonable basis for believing there is probable

cause, he is not required to explore and eliminate every theoretically plausible claim

of innocence before making an arrest.” Ricciuti v. N.Y.C. Transit Auth., 124 F.3d 123,

128 (2d Cir. 1997). For example, even when there may be conflicting accounts of a

physical altercation, the Second Circuit has “found probable cause where a police

officer was presented with different stories from an alleged victim and the arrestee.”

Curley v. Vill. of Suffern, 268 F.3d 65, 70 (2d Cir. 2001).

The Second Circuit has explained that “[w]hen information is received from a

putative victim or an eyewitness, probable cause exists, unless the circumstances

raise doubt as to the person’s veracity.” Id. at 70 (citation omitted) (emphasis added);

see also Miloslavsky v. AES Eng’g Soc’y, Inc., 808 F. Supp. 351, 355 (S.D.N.Y. 1992),

aff’d, 993 F.2d 1534 (2d Cir. 1993) (“The veracity of citizen complaints who are the

victims of the very crime they report to the police is assumed.”).

As the Court discussed at the pre-motion conference, while probable cause is a

“low bar,” see Dorsey v. Gannon, No. 22-2735, 2024 WL 1338772, at *2 (2d Cir. Mar.

29, 2024) (summary order)), it is also well established that “the failure to make a

further inquiry when a reasonable person would have done so may be evidence of lack

was the basis for both Plaintiff’s arrest and the charges subsequently filed, the Court

addresses probable cause for false arrest and malicious prosecution jointly.

of probable cause,” id. (quoting Manganiello v. City of New York, 612 F.3d 149, 161

(2d Cir. 2010)).

Indeed, several courts in this Circuit have found that, in certain circumstances,

a complaining witness’s bare allegations were insufficient to establish probable cause

as a matter of law, or that the information known to the officer(s) otherwise gave rise

to a duty for police officers to further investigate before making an arrest. In Hart v.

City of New York, for example, the court emphasized that, “where a ‘bitter prior

relationship exists’ that is ‘known to the arresting officer before the arrest is made, a

complaint from the complaining victim alone may not be enough to constitute

probable cause; the officer may need to investigate further.’” No. 11-CV-4678 (RA),

2013 WL 6139648, at *5 (S.D.N.Y. Nov. 18, 2013) (quoting Sankar v. City of New

York, 867 F. Supp. 2d 297, 306 (E.D.N.Y. 2012)). The Court found that “[t]he officers’

further inquiry and corroboration of the facts are sufficient to dispel concerns about

[the complainant’s] veracity.” Id. Similarly, in Torino v. Rieppel, the court found that

the complainant’s “seven-month delay in reporting the alleged crime to the police . . .

can of course be a factor for the officers to consider in assessing a complainant’s

truthfulness.” No. 07-CV-1929 (JFB) (ETB), 2009 WL 3259429, at *5 (E.D.N.Y. Oct.

8, 2009).

In Foster v. Diop, the court found plaintiff’s allegation that the police officer

“admitted that she knew the accusations against plaintiff were false” to be most

critical to its finding that there was a lack of probable cause. No. 11-CV-4731 (KAM)

(JMA), 2013 WL 1339408, at *11–12 (E.D.N.Y. Mar. 31, 2013). In Wong v. Yoo, the

court found that the placement of someone’s foot on the plaintiff’s neck when police

arrived on the scene, the “plaintiff’s visible injuries, the lack of any threat of

immediate harm, and the presence of eyewitnesses eager to provide statements in

plaintiff’s favor were circumstances that called into doubt [the defendant’s] version

of events and required further investigation.” 649 F. Supp. 2d 34, 60 (E.D.N.Y. 2009).

As these cases illustrate, when “[t]he defendants fail to account for the myriad indicia

of unreliability cited by the plaintiffs and which are presumed to be true on a motion

to dismiss[,] . . . [t]he factual allegations of the plaintiffs undermine the defendants’

assertion of unambiguous probable cause.” Bullard v. City of New York, 240 F. Supp.

2d 292, 298–99 (S.D.N.Y. 2003).

Here, taking all well-pled facts in the Complaint in the light most favorable to

Plaintiff Scott, he has stated a claim for false arrest. Id. at 299. The arresting officer’s

knowledge of the fact that Crystal and Scott had been intimate partners, combined

with Crystal’s several-week delay in reporting the alleged burglary and the lack of

any corroboration at the scene suggesting Scott had burglarized or assaulted Crystal,

are sufficient to state a claim that the officers had a duty to investigate further before

concluding probable cause to arrest Scott existed based on Crystal’s complaint alone.

See id. (“The Court cannot find, in light of the allegations in the Complaint to the

contrary, that as a matter of law the defendants had probable cause to arrest and

prosecute [the plaintiff.]”).

In their supplemental briefing, Defendants principally rely on the presumption

of probable cause that arises from an alleged victim’s complaint in that “the

information provided by the complainant provided clear probable cause that an

assault may have occurred.” Letter at 3.5 Defendants analogize to the facts of Curley

and Bridgeforth v. City of New York, No. 16-CV-273 (WHP), 2018 WL 3178221, at *5–

6 (S.D.N.Y. June 28, 2018), to argue that “the facts of this case present even stronger

support for a finding of probable cause” because “[P]laintiff makes no allegation that

the complainant was objectively unreliable based on intoxication or obviously

disprovable fabrication.” Letter at 2–3. According to Defendants, “[P]laintiff’s

[C]omplaint simply argues that the arresting officer should have investigated every

possible avenue of innocence based on information that said officer could not possibly

have known when arresting [P]laintiff.” Id. at 3.

The additional arguments that Defendants raise in their supplemental briefing

do not affect the Court’s conditional ruling that a reasonable police officer should have

conducted further investigation to establish probable cause. Min. Entry dated Aug.

28, 2025. Plaintiff does not argue — and this Court certainly does not hold — that

the arresting officer(s) “should have investigated every possible avenue of innocence”

before arresting him. But here, the officers had specific reasons to question the

5 Defendants further argue that “[t]he information that the complainant

committed to writing in the Domestic Incident Report established classic probable

cause.” Letter at 3. Contrary to Defendants’ assertion, the Court cannot consider the

Domestic Incident Report (“DIR”) detailing the complainant’s allegations to find that

probable cause or arguable probable cause existed to arrest Plaintiff because these

facts do not appear on the face of the Complaint. It cannot be said that Plaintiff’s

Complaint “relies heavily upon [the DIR’s] terms and effect,” and, thus, “the

document [is not] ‘integral’ to the [C]omplaint.” Chambers v. Time Warner, Inc., 282

F.3d 147, 153 (2d Cir. 2002) (quoting Int’l Audiotext Network, Inc. v. Am. Tel. & Tel.

Co., 62 F.3d 69, 72 (2d Cir. 1995)).

veracity of Crystal’s claims. See Curley, 268 F.3d at 70. “[O]fficers are not absolutely

privileged to arrest upon a charge by any private individual who claims to be a

victim.” Mistretta v. Prokesch, 5 F. Supp. 2d 128, 133 (E.D.N.Y. 1998). “Thus, there

is a caveat to the general rule: victim complaints ordinarily establish probable cause

‘absent circumstances that raise doubts as to the victim’s veracity.’” Id. (quoting

Singer v. Fulton Cnty. Sheriff, 63 F.3d 110, 119 (2d Cir.1995), cert. denied, 517 U.S.

1189 (1996)).

That caveat applies here for several reasons. First, Crystal informed the police

officer that Plaintiff was her “former boyfriend.” Compl. ¶ 33. Mistretta recognized

the “common-sense principle”:

The most common situation in which such doubts arise is when there

exists a prior relationship between the victim and the accused that gives

rise to a motive for a false accusation. When such a relationship exists,

and is known to the arresting officer before the arrest is made, the

complaint alone may not constitute probable cause; the officer may need

to investigate further.

5 F. Supp. 2d at 133. Second, Officer Catanzaro was also aware that Crystal waited

to make her complaint until several weeks after the alleged incident. Compl. ¶ 34.

See Torino, 2009 WL 3259429, at *6 (finding that “the long period of delay in reporting

the crime” undermined the presumption of probable cause).

Defendants do not engage with the cases that the Court discussed with the

parties at the PMC and relied upon in its conditional ruling. Their central argument

that “the facts of this case present even stronger support for a finding of probable

cause” than those in Curley and Bridgeforth is unpersuasive. For example,

Defendants emphasize that, in Curley, the complainants were drunk and the officers

were presented with conflicting accounts, Letter at 2 — yet Defendants fail to

mention additional factors that were crucial to the Court’s probable cause

determination. The Curley Court listed eight undisputed “facts [that] establish

probable cause for plaintiff’s arrest for assault,” which offer much more support for

the complainant’s veracity than in this case. Curley, 268 F.3d at 69. For instance,

the plaintiff in Curley admitted to the officer that he struck one of the complainants

during a struggle, and another of the complainants had blood on his lip. Id.

Here, by contrast, Defendants only had the benefit of Crystal’s bare account

that “she had been the victim of an assault and burglary in her apartment . . . several

weeks after the alleged incident.” Compl. ¶¶ 32, 34. Plaintiff made no admissions,

and Crystal produced no evidence corroborating her claims. Given the entirety of the

circumstances pled in the Complaint, Scott has plausibly alleged that the officers had

a duty to conduct at least a limited further investigation before placing him under

arrest. See Mistretta, 5 F. Supp. 2d 128 at 134 (stating that “[t]he risk of a false

accusation was apparent” when one spouse “assert[ed] that [another spouse] had

committed the crime of breaking and entering, or perhaps even burglary” amidst

divorce proceedings).

Likewise, in Bridgeforth, even though the complainant was intoxicated and

fabricated an “outlandish tale,” substantial additional evidence supported the

officer’s probable cause determination. 2018 WL 3178221, at *5. The complainant

alleged “kidnapping and forced prostitution possibly involving an underage woman.”

Id. The complainant “had swelling on her lip and left eye,” and at the plaintiff’s

apartment, officers found “flyers for hotels known for prostitution” as well as a toddler

that matched the complainant’s description, “providing credence to her assertion of

having been there earlier that evening.” Id. The Court found that probable cause

existed even though “not everything [the complainant] had alleged was found in [the

plaintiffs’] apartment.” Id. Those facts make Bridgeforth readily distinguishable

from Scott’s case, as his arresting officers took no investigative steps, nor did they

have any additional evidence supporting probable cause, before placing Plaintiff

under arrest.

Accordingly, this Court declines to disturb its conditional ruling, and denies

Defendants’ motion to dismiss Scott’s false arrest claim.

II. Qualified Immunity

“Even if probable cause to arrest is ultimately found not to have existed, an

arresting officer will still be entitled to qualified immunity from a suit for damages if

he can establish that there was ‘arguable probable cause’ to arrest.” Escalera v. Lunn,

361 F.3d 737, 743 (2d Cir. 2004). “Arguable probable cause exists ‘if either (a) it was

objectively reasonable for the officer to believe that probable cause existed, or (b)

officers of reasonable competence could disagree on whether the probable cause test

was met.’” Id. (quoting Golino v. City of New Haven, 950 F.2d 864, 870 (2d Cir. 1991)).

“Thus, the analytically distinct test for qualified immunity is more favorable to the

officers than the one for probable cause; ‘arguable probable cause’ will suffice to confer

qualified immunity for the arrest.” Id.

The Second Circuit has made clear that “advancing qualified immunity as

grounds for a motion to dismiss is almost always a procedural mismatch.”

Chamberlain v. City of White Plains, 960 F.3d 100, 111 (2d Cir. 2020) (citing Jacobs

v. City of Chicago, 215 F.3d 758, 775 (7th Cir. 2000) (Easterbrook, J., concurring)). A

motion to dismiss based on qualified immunity therefore “faces a formidable hurdle .

. . and is usually not successful.” Id. (citation modified) (quoting Field Day, LLC v.

Cnty. of Suffolk, 463 F.3d 167, 191–92 (2d Cir. 2006)). The Second Circuit has

explained that:

a defendant presenting an immunity defense on a Rule 12(b)(6) motion

instead of a motion for summary judgment must accept the more

stringent standard applicable to this procedural route. Not only must

the facts supporting the defense appear on the face of the complaint, but,

as with all Rule 12(b)(6) motions, the motion may be granted only where

it appears beyond doubt that the plaintiff can prove no set of facts in

support of his claim that would entitle him to relief. Thus, the plaintiff

is entitled to all reasonable inferences from the facts alleged, not only

those that support his claim, but also those that defeat the immunity

defense.

McKenna v. Wright, 386 F.3d 432, 436 (2d Cir. 2004) (citation modified).

In their supplemental briefing, Defendants make two main arguments in

support of their claim that Officer Catanzaro6 is entitled to qualified immunity at the

pleading stage. First, they argue that “there was at least ‘arguable probable cause’

6 Defendants appear to argue only that Officer Catanzaro is entitled to

qualified immunity. See Letter at 4 (“[T]he individual defendant is entitled to

qualified immunity on [P]laintiff’s false arrest claim.”); Def. Letter Mot. for PMC at 3

(“[T]he arresting officer is entitled to qualified immunity.”). To the extent Defendants

also argue that the John Doe police officers are entitled to qualified immunity based

on the allegations against them in the Complaint, however, this argument is

unpersuasive for the same reasons.

to arrest [P]lantiff, which is a lower standard than actual probable cause based on

the complainant’s Domestic Incident Report.” Letter at 3. Second, they urge the

Court “not to define clearly established law at a high level of generality.” Id. (quoting

Plumhoff v. Rickard, 572 U.S. 765, 779 (2014). Defendants argue that “[i]n the

absence of [] specific precedent by either the Supreme Court or the Second Circuit

[holding that the specific information known to Defendants did not provide probable

cause to arrest plaintiff], the individual defendant is entitled to qualified immunity

on plaintiff’s false arrest claim.” Id.at 3–4.

Defendants have not surmounted the formidable hurdle of prevailing on a

claim for qualified immunity at the motion to dismiss stage, and their new arguments

do not alter the Court’s conditional ruling.7 First, as discussed, the Court cannot

consider the DIR detailing the complainant’s allegations to find that probable cause

or arguable probable cause existed to arrest Plaintiff because these facts do not

appear on the face of the Complaint, nor can they fairly be said to be incorporated by

reference into to the Complaint. See Chambers, 282 F.3d at 153. Furthermore,

Plaintiff is “entitled to reasonable inferences . . . that defeat the immunity defense.”

McKenna, 386 F.3d at 436. Here, the only basis for probable cause was Crystal’s

several-weeks delayed report against a former boyfriend. Against this backdrop, it

7 The Court found that, in light of the factual allegations in the Complaint and

the caselaw on circumstances giving rise to a limited duty to investigate, Plaintiffs

have plausibly alleged that the officers lacked arguable probable cause. Min. Entry

dated Aug. 28, 2025. This denial was without prejudice to Defendants’ ability to raise

qualified immunity as a defense based on facts established at the summary judgment

stage and at trial. Id.

cannot be said, as a matter of law, either that “it was objectively reasonable for the

officer to believe that probable cause existed” or that “officers of reasonable

competence could disagree on whether the probable cause test was met.” Escalera,

361 F.3d at 743.

Defendants’ second argument — that the Court should not define clearly

established law at a high level of generality — is equally unpersuasive. Defendants

argue that there is no case on all fours “hold[ing] that the specific information known

to defendants did not provide probable cause to arrest plaintiff.” Letter at 3. The

right to be free of arrest without probable cause, however, was clearly established at

the time of Plaintiff’s arrest. See Soukaneh v. Andrzejewski, 112 F.4th 107, 124 (2d

Cir. 2024) (stating that the Second Circuit has “made clear that ‘a constitutional right

to be free from arrest without probable cause’” is a “clearly established right[]”)

(quoting Gilles v. Repicky, 511 F.3d 239, 247 (2d Cir. 2007)). Moreover, it is Second

Circuit precedent that when “circumstances raise doubt as to the [putative victim’s]

veracity,” probable cause does not exist. Curley, 268 F.3d at 70.

Thus, as it was clearly established in the Second Circuit at the time of Scott’s

arrest that police officers have a limited duty to conduct further investigation in

certain circumstances before proceeding to make an arrest, this Court declines to

disturb its conditional ruling and denies Defendants’ motion to dismiss based on

qualified immunity. This ruling, of course, is without prejudice to the individual

officer Defendants’ ability to raise a defense of qualified immunity based on arguable

probable cause (or otherwise) at summary judgment and/or at trial.

CONCLUSION

For the reasons discussed above, the Court DENIES Defendants’ motion to

dismiss as to Plaintiff Scott’s false arrest and malicious prosecution claims, and

DENIES, without prejudice, Defendant Catanzaro’s motion to dismiss based on

qualified immunity.

SO ORDERED.

/s/ Nina R. Morrison

NINA R. MORRISON

United States District Judge

Dated: December 11, 2025

Brooklyn, New York