Opinion

Reed

Court
District Court, E.D. Oklahoma
Filed
Dec 12, 2025
Cited by
0 cases
Authority
More cited than 37.6%

“A claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.”

How later courts described this case

  • “A claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.”
  • noting that the statute of limitations for a § 1983 action “is that which the [s]tate provides for personal-injury torts”
  • holding that claims that a sheriff's deputy gave perjured testimony and the deputy public defender and deputy district attorney failed to alert the court were properly dismissed pursuant to Heck
  • concluding plaintiff’s “claims for declaratory and injunctive relief are barred under Heck” because “his request … necessarily implies the invalidity of his conviction or sentence.”

Written by the judges who cited it.

The opinion

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE

EASTERN DISTRICT OF OKLAHOMA

CHAD WILLIAM REED,

Plaintiff,

v. Case No. 25-CV-119-RAW-GLJ

MARK D. UPTEGROVE, et al.,

Defendants.

OPINION AND ORDER

Plaintiff Chad William Reed (“Reed”), appearing pro se and proceeding in forma pauperis,

brings this federal civil rights action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Dkt. 1. Before the court is the

Motion to Dismiss submitted by Defendants McCurtain County District Judge Emily Maxwell and

Special Judge Mark Uptegrove (the “Judicial Defendants”) (Dkt. 18) and the Motion to Dismiss

submitted by Defendant McCurtain County District Attorney Mark Matloff (“Defendant Matloff”)

(Dkt. 20). Along with the motions to dismiss (Dkts. 18, 20), the court also considered Reed’s

Objection to Judicial Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss (Dkt. 32), the Judicial Defendants’ Reply in

Support of Their Motion to Dismiss (Dkt. 35), Reed’s Objection to Motion to Dismiss of

Defendant Matloff (Dkt. 24), Matloff’s Reply in Support of his Motion to Dismiss (Dkt. 28), and

Reed’s Sur-Reply (Dkt. 34). For the reasons discussed herein, the Judicial Defendants’ Motion to

Dismiss (Dkt. 18) and Defendant Matloff’s Motion to Dismiss (Dkt. 20) are granted.

BACKGROUND

Reed’s claims arise from his unsuccessful applications for post-conviction relief. Reed as

charged in 2006 with first degree murder in the District Court of McCurtain County, Case No. CF-

2006-581. See Dkt. 18-1.1 After his conviction, Reed appealed his conviction via direct appeal to

the Oklahoma Court of Criminal Appeals (the “OCCA”), Case No. F-2008-449. See Dkt. 18-2.

The OCCA affirmed Reed’s judgment and sentence. Id. at 5.2 Reed filed his first application for

post-conviction relief in 2010. Dkt. 18-1 at 14. The application for post-conviction relief was

denied in 2013. Id. at 16. The OCCA affirmed the denial of his application for post-conviction

relief the same year. Dkt. 18-3 at 2.

Subsequently, Reed filed a second application for post-conviction relief on January 18,

2023, and it was denied by the state district court on March 4, 2024. Dkt. 18-1 at 17-18. The

OCCA affirmed the denial on July 15, 2024. Dkt. 18-4. Reed, asserting a myriad of constitutional

violations, challenges the denial of his second application for post-conviction relief in the instant

suit. Relevant to this Order, Reed asserts claims against Special District Judge Mark Uptegrove,

District Judge Emily Maxwell and District Attorney Mark Matloff. Each defendant has moved to

dismiss Reed’s claims. Dkts. 18, 20.

DISCUSSION

I. Standard of review

Dismissal of claims under Rule 12(b)(6) is appropriate if the facts alleged in the complaint

fail to state a claim on which relief may be granted. To withstand a Rule 12(b)(6) motion, the

complaint must allege “enough facts to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” Bell

Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007). A claim is plausible if the facts alleged “raise a

1 The state court docket sheets for this case, and Reed’s appellate cases, are available to the public

through Oklahoma State Courts Network (oscn.net). “Federal courts may take judicial notice of

state court docket sheets, and proceedings in other courts that have direct relation to matters in

issue.” Davis v. Morgan, Case No. 21-CV-411-GKF-JFJ, 2021 WL 6298321, at *1, n.2 (N.D. Okla.

Sep. 27, 2021) (unpublished) (citing Stack v. McCotter, 79 F. App’x. 383, 391 (10th Cir. 2003),

and St. Louis Baptist Temple, Inc. v. Fed. Deposit Ins. Corp., 605 F.2d 1169, 1172 (10th Cir. 1979)).

2 The court’s citations refer to the CM/ECF header pagination.

reasonable expectation that discovery will reveal evidence” of the conduct necessary to establish

plaintiff’s claim. Id. at 556; see also Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (“A claim has

facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the

reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.”). The complaint need

not contain “detailed factual allegations,” but it must contain “more than labels and conclusions”

or “formulaic recitation[s] of the elements of a cause of action.” Bell Atl. Corp., 550 U.S. at 555.

When considering the sufficiency of the complaint, a court must accept as true all the well-pleaded

factual allegations and construe them in the plaintiff’s favor. Id. But the court may disregard legal

conclusions or conclusory statements devoid of factual support. Id.; Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678. When

analyzing a motion to dismiss, the court is limited to assessing the legal sufficiency of the

allegations contained within the four corners of the complaint. Jojola v. Chaves, 55 F.3d 488, 494

(10th Cir. 1995).

Further, when a plaintiff appears without counsel, the court must liberally construe the

complaint. Hall, 935 F.2d at 1110. But even self-represented litigants bear the burden to “alleg[e]

sufficient facts on which a recognized legal claim could be based.” Id. This is so because the facts

giving rise to the plaintiff’s claims should be known to the self-represented plaintiff even if the

plaintiff lacks knowledge of the specific legal theories that support his or her claims. The rule of

liberal construction merely aids the self-represented plaintiff by permitting the court to overlook

basic drafting errors and confusion of legal theories in determining whether the factual allegations

in the complaint can be “reasonably read . . . to state a valid claim on which the plaintiff could

prevail.” Id. But the rule of liberal construction neither permits nor requires a court to assume the

role of the unrepresented litigant’s advocate by “supply[ing] additional factual allegations to round

out a plaintiff’s complaint or construct[ing] a legal theory on a plaintiff’s behalf.” Whitney v. New

Mexico, 113 F.3d 1170, 1175 (10th Cir. 1997). At the motion-to-dismiss stage, a “well-pleaded

complaint may proceed even if it strikes a savvy judge that actual proof of [the alleged] facts is

improbable.” Straub v. BNSF Ry. Co., 909 F.3d 1280, 1287 (10th Cir. 2018) (quoting Bell Atl.

Corp., 550 U.S. at 556). Nonetheless, dismissal is appropriate “when the allegations in [the]

complaint, however true, could not raise a claim of entitlement to relief.” Bell Atl. Corp., 550 U.S.

at 558. The court now turns to Reed’s complaint.

II. Claims against McCurtain County District Judge Emily Maxwell

Concerning Defendant Maxwell, Reed requests “injunctive relief in the form of recusal of

all District 17 judges, because Judge Emily Maxwell’s husband is ex-McCurtain County Sheriff

Johnny Tadlock and one of the claims in Plaintiff’s post-conviction is that he was arrested without

probable cause[.]” Dkt. 1 at 17. Reed continues, “District Judge Maxwell can order any judge to

rule the way she wants them too to protect her husband Johnny Tadlock from a lawsuit for violating

Plaintiff’s rights.” Id.

“In order for liability to arise under § 1983, a defendant’s direct personal responsibility for

the claimed deprivation of a constitutional right must be established.” Trujillo v. Williams, 465

F.3d 1210, 1227 (10th Cir. 2006). Reed must “identify specific actions taken by particular

defendants.” Pahls v. Thomas, 718 F.3d 1210, 1226 (10th Cir. 2013) (italics in original) (quoting

Tonkovich v. Kan. Bd. of Regents, 159 F.3d 504, 532 (10th Cir. 2011)). Here, Reed fails to allege

any specific actions taken by Defendant Maxwell. Instead, Reed’s claims against Defendant

Maxwell are based on speculation alone. A complaint fails to state a claim on which relief may

be granted when it lacks factual allegations sufficient “to raise a right to relief above the speculative

level[.].” Bell Atl. Corp., 550 U.S. at 555 (citation omitted); see also Foreman v. Elam, Case No.

CIV 18-071-RAW-SPS, 2019 WL 1413755, at *5 (E.D. Okla. Mar. 28, 2019) (“speculation is

insufficient to state a claim.”). Reed has failed to state a claim against Defendant Maxwell.

Therefore, the court grants Defendant Maxwell’s Motion to Dismiss (Dkt. 18).3

III. Claims against McCurtain County Special Judge Uptegrove

Concerning Defendant Uptegrove, Reed alleges he filed a post-conviction application in

2022, it was assigned to Defendant Uptegrove, and Defendant Uptegrove “acting without

jurisdiction … applied a procedural bar and refused to rule on the merits therefore violating this

Petitioner’s due process and equal treatment of the OK post-conviction statute[.]” Dkt. 1 at 5, 9.

Reed alleges Defendant Uptegrove violated his First Amendment right to access the courts and to

address grievances against the government, his Fourteenth Amendment right to due process and

equal protection, his Eighth Amendment protections against cruel and unusual punishment and

engaged in a conspiracy pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1985. Id. at 12-13. Reed seeks damages,

injunctive relief and declaratory relief. See id. at 12-13, 19. Defendant Uptegrove argues the

claims against him are barred by Heck v. Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477 (1994), he is entitled to

immunity, Reed has failed to state a claim against him and this court lacks jurisdiction to grant

Reed’s requests for injunctive and declaratory relief. See Dkt. 18. The court agrees and dismisses

the claims against Defendant Uptegrove.

A. The Heck bar

To the extent Reed’s suit is meant to directly attack the validity of his conviction, his claims

against Defendant Uptegrove must be dismissed “as an improper use of Section 1983.” Alexander

3 Defendant Maxwell also argued the Heck doctrine, discussed below, bars Reed’s claims, she is

immune from suit and this court lacks jurisdiction over Reed’s claims requesting injunctive and

declaratory relief. See Dkt. 18. Because the court concludes Reed has failed to state a claim

against Defendant Maxwell, the court declines to address these alternative arguments as they relate

to Defendant Maxwell.

v. Lucas, 259 F. App’x 145, 147 (10th Cir. 2007).4 In Heck, the Supreme Court stated that, if

judgment in favor of the prisoner plaintiff in a Section 1983 damages suit “would necessarily imply

the invalidity of his conviction or sentence[, then] the complaint must be dismissed unless the

plaintiff can demonstrate that the conviction or sentence has already been invalidated.” 512 U.S.

at 487; see also Edwards v. Balisok, 520 U.S. 641, 648 (1997) (extending the rule in Heck to

Section 1983 claims that, like Reed’s, seek declaratory relief); Lawson v. Engleman, 67 F. App’x

524, 526 n.2 (10th Cir. 2003) (concluding plaintiff’s “claims for declaratory and injunctive relief

are barred under Heck” because “his request … necessarily implies the invalidity of his conviction

or sentence.”).

In his Complaint, Reed makes a number of arguments that would, if accepted by a court,

clearly indicate the invalidity of his conviction. For example, Reed argues his conviction was the

result of perjured testimony (see Dkt. 1 at 3), he is innocent of the offense (id. at 5) and Defendant

Uptegrove acted without jurisdiction (id. at 9). Moreover, Reed has not demonstrated that his

conviction has already been invalidated. “As such, Reed’s suit, construed in this way, has no

proper basis as a Section 1983 claim.” Alexander, 259 F. App’x at 148.

Reed argues in his Response that his claim is not barred by Heck because the exception

identified in Cohen v. Longshore, 621 F.3d 1311 (10th Cir. 2010) applies. Dkt. 32 at 1-2. In

Cohen, the plaintiff raised two allegations in a civil rights complaint: false imprisonment and

denial of access to the courts. See id. at 1315. The district court found that Heck would bar his

claims because the plaintiff had not already “invalidated his imprisonment;” however, the

plaintiff’s transfer out of custody mooted any potential for habeas relief. Id. In a case of first

4 The court cites all unpublished decisions herein for their persuasive value. See Fed. R. App. P.

32.1; 10th Cir. R. 32.1.

impression, the Tenth Circuit held that a plaintiff “who has no available remedy in habeas, through

no lack of diligence on his part, is not barred by Heck from pursuing a § 1983 claim.” Id. at 1317.

Unlike in Cohen, Reed still has an available remedy: Reed could move for authorization

from the Tenth Circuit to file a second or successive petition raising the constitutional claim

identified in this action. See 28 U.S.C. § 2244(2)(B)(i), (ii). As such, Cohen does not apply here.

See Marshall v. Lombardi, Case No. 13-CV-484-SPF-PJC, 2013 WL 5223507, at *3 (N.D. Okla.

Sept. 16, 2013) (suggesting that Cohen did not prevent Heck’s application due to the availability

of a request for permission to file a second or successive petition but denying plaintiff’s claims on

the merits without deciding). Therefore, Cohen does not apply to Reed’s claims, and they are

barred by Heck.

B. The Rooker-Feldman doctrine

To the extent Reed does not challenge the validity of his conviction but is only challenging

the Defendant Uptegrove’s application of procedural bars to dismiss his post-conviction

application (see Dkt. 1 at 136), his claims against Defendant Uptegrove are not barred by Heck but

still must be dismissed pursuant to the Rooker-Feldman doctrine. See Alexander, 259 F. App’x at

148.

Under the Rooker-Feldman doctrine, federal district courts have no jurisdiction to consider

suits “that amount to appeals of state-court judgments.” Bolden v. City of Topeka, 441 F.3d 1129,

1139 (10th Cir.2006). This doctrine applies to “cases brought by state-court losers complaining

of injuries caused by state-court judgments rendered before the [federal] district court proceedings

commenced and inviting district court review and rejection of those judgments.” Exxon Mobil

Corp. v. Saudi Basic Indus., Corp., 544 U.S. 280, 284 (2005). Reed clearly seeks review and

rejection of Defendant Uptegrove’s order denying his application for post-conviction relief. Dkt.

1 at 13 (“Plaintiff would simply like for his claims on post-conviction to be ruled upon for relief.”).

This court does not have jurisdiction to provide such relief. See Alexander, 259 F. App’x at 148.

C. Judicial immunity

Additionally, Defendant Uptegrove is entitled to immunity from suit for civil damages. It

is well established that “[a]bsolute immunity bars suits for money damages for acts made in the

exercise of prosecutorial or judicial discretion.” Andrews v. Heaton, 483 F.3d 1070, 1076 (10th

Cir. 2007) (quoting Guttman v. Khalsa, 446 F.3d 1027, 1033 (10th Cir. 2006) (citing Mireles v.

Waco, 502 U.S. 9, 13 (1991))). Reed explicitly requests damages. Dkt. 1 at 12-13, 19. Defendant

Uptegrove was “performing judicial acts and [was] therefore clothed with absolute judicial

immunity[]” when he ruled on Reed’s application for post-conviction relief. Hunt v. Bennett, 17

F.3d 1263, 1266 (10th Cir. 1994).

For all the reasons outlined above, the court grants Defendant Uptegrove’s Motion to

Dismiss (Dkt. 18).

IV. Claims against McCurtain County District Attorney Matloff

Reed also asserts several claims against Defendant Matloff. The court discerns the

following claims: a due process violation premised upon a Napue claim and a Brady claim, a

retaliation claim, and a cruel and unusual punishment claim. See Dkt. 1 at 13-17. Defendant

Matloff only addresses Reed’s Brady claim and, in passing, the retaliation claim. See Dkt. 20.5

Defendant Matloff contends Reed’s Brady claim is barred by Heck, the Rooker-Feldman doctrine

and “a Brady violation cannot arise from information the accused already knows.” Id. at 1-2.

5 Defendant Matloff did address the Napue claim in his reply brief. However, “arguments raised

for the first time in a reply brief are generally deemed waived.” United States v. Harrell, 642 F.3d

907, 918 (10th Cir.2011). Nevertheless, pursuant to the court’s obligation to screen Reed’s

complaint, the court will address all claims presented. 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B).

A. The Napue claim

To establish a Napue violation, a defendant must show that the prosecution knowingly

solicited false testimony or knowingly allowed it “to go uncorrected when it appear[ed].” Napue

v. People of State of Illinois, 360 U.S. 264, 269 (1959). If the defendant makes that showing, a

new trial is warranted so long as the false testimony “may have had an effect on the outcome of

the trial,” id. at 272,—that is, if it “‘in any reasonable likelihood [could] have affected the judgment

of the jury[.]’” Giglio v. United States, 405 U.S. 150, 154 (1972) (quoting Napue, 360 U.S. at

271). Here, Reed alleges the state’s witness, Patricia Hollingsworth (“Hollingsworth”), provided

perjured testimony at his trial. Dkt. 1 at 13-14. Reed directs the Napue claim at Defendant Matloff

for allegedly failing to “correct the perjured testimony” when Reed presented the issue in his 2023

application for post-conviction relief. Id. at 14.

As an initial matter, the court questions whether Reed can state a cognizable claim against

Defendant Matloff for a Napue violation given Reed readily admits Defendant Matloff did not

prosecute him. Id. at 13-14. The court further questions the timeliness of this claim.6 Assuming

without deciding Reed has stated a claim and it is timely, the court concludes Reed’s Napue claim

against Defendant Matloff barred by Heck.

Judgment in favor of Reed in this action would clearly imply the invalidity of his state

court action. Reed requests this court to “order DA Matloff to confess said [Napue] violation so

that [Reed] may file a new post-conviction.” Dkt. 1 at 17. Reed’s claim is essentially a

prosecutorial misconduct claim which is barred by Heck. See Baldwin v. O’Connor, 466 F. App’x

717, 717-18 (10th Cir. 2012) (affirming dismissal of prosecutorial misconduct claims under § 1983

6 In his Response to the Judicial Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss, Reed states, in his original 2010

application for post-conviction relief, he “brought forth a prosecutorial misconduct claim for using

the perjured testimony of state’s witness Patricia Hollingsworth.” Dkt. 32 at 2.

pursuant to Heck); Ramos v. Shepherd, 415 F. App’x 48, 48-49 (10th Cir. 2011) (holding that

claims that a sheriff's deputy gave perjured testimony and the deputy public defender and deputy

district attorney failed to alert the court were properly dismissed pursuant to Heck).7

Reed again argues in his Response that his claims are not barred by Heck because the

exception identified in Cohen, 621 F.3d 1311, applies. Dkts. 24 and 34 at 3. As noted above,

Reed does not fall within the Cohen exception to Heck. See supra at Section III(A). Therefore, to

the extent Reed requests damages, declaratory relief and/or injunctive relief from Defendant

Matloff, his Napue claim is barred by Heck. See Heck, 512 U.S. at 487; see also Edwards, 520

U.S. at 648; see also Lawson, 67 F. App’x at 526 n.2.

B. The Brady claim

As for the due process claim premised upon the alleged Brady violation, Reed alleges

Defendant Matloff reached an agreement with Hollingsworth, wherein she would testify against

Reed in his criminal trial in exchange for preferential treatment regarding her own criminal

charges. See, generally, Dkt. 1 at 16. Reed alleges Defendant Matloff “has still refused to tell”

Reed the contents of the alleged Matloff-Hollingsworth agreement and this constitutes a due

process violation. See id.

Defendant Matloff argues Reed’s Brady claim is also barred by Heck. Dkt. 20 at 5-6. The

court agrees. Again, assuming without deciding that any deal between the state and Hollingsworth

was material to Reed’s guilt, “a Brady claim, when successful postconviction, necessarily yields

7 Significantly, Reed previously presented a nearly identical claim against Oklahoma Attorney

General Gentner Drummond for “improperly refusing to intercede in the post-conviction

proceedings to concede a Napue violation by the prosecution and seek a new trial on [Reed’s]

behalf[.]” Reed v. Drummond, Case No. CIV-25-672-J, 2025 WL 3171867, at *3 (W.D. Okla. Sep.

29, 2025), report and recommendation adopted by 2025 WL 2992559 (W.D. Okla. Oct. 24, 2025).

The Honorable Bernard M. Jones dismissed this claim as barred by Heck. See Reed v. Drummond,

Case No. CIV-25-672-J, 2025 WL 2992559, at *2 (W.D. Okla. Oct. 24, 2025).

evidence undermining a conviction[.]” Skinner v. Switzer, 562 U.S. 521, 536 (2011).

“Accordingly, Brady claims have ranked within the traditional core of habeas corpus and outside

the province of § 1983.” Id. (citing Heck, 512 U.S. at 490); see also Beck v. Muskogee Police

Dept., 195 F.3d 553, 560 (10th Cir. 1999). And, as noted above, Cohen does not provide Reed

with a loophole to avoid the Heck bar. See supra. Therefore, any request for damages, declaratory

relief or injunctive relief from Defendant Matloff for a due process violation premised on a Brady

claim is barred. See Heck, 512 U.S. at 487; see also Edwards, 520 U.S. at 648; see also Lawson,

67 F. App’x at 526 n.2. 8

C. Retaliation claim

Concerning his retaliation claim, Reed alleges he was arrested on November 21, 2006, was

charged November 28, 2006, and in early December of 2006 had an exchange with Defendant

Matloff through the jail window wherein Defendant Matloff stated, “[y]ou talked bad about me in

the newspaper and I am personally going to make sure you spend the rest of your life in prison!”

Dkt. 1 at 14. Reed alleges “Plaintiff was charged with second degree murder in a self-defense

shooting because of his protected free speech under the 1st Amendment.” Id. at 15. Despite this

exchange admittedly occurred after Reed was charged and despite Reed acknowledging Defendant

Matloff did not prosecute him, Reed alleges the aforementioned conduct constitutes retaliation.

Defendant Matloff briefly argues he is entitled to prosecutorial immunity as it relates to

this claim. See Dkt. 20 at 10-11. The court concludes the claim is time-barred. Because § 1983

8 The court further notes Reed failed to allege any specific conduct by Defendant Matloff to

support his Brady claim. Reed explicitly alleges the Bryan County District Attorney’s Office

prosecuted his charges. Dkt. 1 at 14-15. Thus, any exculpatory information that was not provided

to Reed cannot be attributed to Defendant Matloff. Further, Reed has not alleged Defendant

Matloff had any direct personal responsibility for any claimed deprivation. Therefore, for these

additional reasons, Reed has failed to state a claim against Defendant Matloff.

does not contain a statute of limitations, federal courts “must adopt the most analogous limitations

period provided by state law.” Abbitt v. Franklin, 731 F.2d 661, 663 (10th Cir. 1984); see Wallace

v. Kato, 549 U.S. 384, 387 (2007) (noting that the statute of limitations for a § 1983 action “is that

which the [s]tate provides for personal-injury torts”). In Oklahoma, the applicable statute of

limitations is two (2) years. Okla. Stat. tit. 12, § 95(3); Titsworth v. Okla. Dep’t of Corr., 561 F.

App’x 746, 747 (10th Cir. 2014); Stevenson v. Grace, 356 F. App’x 97, 98 (10th Cir. 2009);

Alexander v. Oklahoma, 382 F.3d 1206, 1212 n.1 (10th Cir. 2004).

But federal law governs the accrual date of a § 1983 claim. Wallace, 549 U.S. at 388.

Under federal law, a § 1983 claim accrues “when the plaintiff has ‘a complete and present cause

of action.’” Id. (quoting Bay Area Laundry and Dry Cleaning Pension Trust Fund v. Ferbar Corp.

of Cal., 522 U.S. 192, 201 (1997)); see also Alexander, 382 F.3d at 1215 (“In general, under the

federal discovery rule, claims accrue and ‘[t]he statute of limitations begins to run when the

plaintiff knows or has reason to know of the existence and cause of the injury which is the basis

of his action.’” (quoting Indus. Constructors Corp. v. U.S. Bureau of Reclamation, 15 F.3d 963,

969 (10th Cir. 1994))). Thus, a plaintiff in Oklahoma ordinarily must file a § 1983 action within

two (2) years of the date when the facts supporting the plaintiff’s cause of action are or should be

apparent to the plaintiff. In some circumstances, the statute of limitations is subject to tolling, and

“state law governs the application of tolling in a civil rights action.” Alexander, 382 F.3d at 1217.

Here, Reed alleges the exchange which forms the basis of his retaliation claim occurred in

2006. The jury trial was held in February of 2008. Dkt. 18-1 at 10-11. Therefore, at the latest,

Reed was aware of the alleged retaliation and resulting injury when he was convicted in February

of 2008. Reed does not allege any facts which support tolling the applicable statute of limitations.

Therefore, this claim is untimely and must be dismissed.

D. Cruel and unusual punishment

For his final claim against Defendant Matloff, Reed alleges “Matloff[‘s] actions also

violated the Eighth Amendment against cruel and unusual punishment for leaving me illegally

incarcerated.” Dkt. 1 at 16. Defendant Matloff did not address this claim. See Dkt. 20, 28. To

the extent Plaintiff specifically invokes the Eighth Amendment in claiming his confinement

amounted to cruel and unusual punishment, his claim fails. Reed was a pretrial detainee at the

time of the incidents giving rise to his claims. Id. at 13-15. The Eighth Amendment’s protections

are not applicable to pretrial detainees. See Colbruno v. Kessler, 928 F.3d 1155, 1162 (10th Cir.

2019). Therefore, the court dismisses Reed’s Eighth Amendment cruel and unusual punishment

claim.

For all of the reasons articulated above, Reed’s claims against Defendant Matloff fail, and

the court grants Defendant Matloff’s Motion to Dismiss (Dkt. 20).

CONCLUSION

IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED that Defendants McCurtain County District Judge

Emily Maxwell and Special Judge Mark Uptegrove’s Motion to Dismiss (Dkt. 18) is granted, and

Plaintiff Chad William Reed’s claims against Defendants Maxwell and Uptegrove are dismissed

without prejudice.

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Defendant McCurtain County District Attorney Mark

Matloff’s Motion to Dismiss (Dkt. 20) is granted, and Reed’s claims against Defendant Matloff

are dismissed without prejudice.

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that a separate judgment of dismissal shall be entered.

DATED this 12th day of December, 2025.

This is a copy of a public record, reproduced as it was published. It is not legal advice, and it may not be the version a court would rely on. Check the official source before you cite it.

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