Kissy Terice Jovan MacKey v. State of Florida

FIFTH DISTRICT COURT OF APPEAL

STATE OF FLORIDA

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Case No. 5D2024-1538

LT Case No. 2021-CF-008444-A

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KISSY TERICE JOVAN MACKEY,

Appellant,

v.

STATE OF FLORIDA,

Appellee.

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On appeal from the Circuit Court for Duval County.

London Mahogany Kite, Judge.

Rick A. Sichta and Susanne K. Sichta, of The Sichta Firm, LLC,

Jacksonville, for Appellant.

James Uthmeier, Attorney General, and Charlie Lee, Assistant

Attorney General, Tallahassee, for Appellee.

December 12, 2025

HARRIS, J.

Kissy Terice Jovan Mackey appeals the judgment and

sentence entered against her. Mackey argues that the court

committed reversible error when it allowed the State to introduce

a lengthy videotape of her police interview in which the

investigating officers repeatedly expressed their personal opinions

about her guilt and that they believed she was lying. We agree and

reverse and remand for a new trial.

The State charged Mackey by amended information with

being an accessory after the fact to capital murder by knowingly

giving false information to law enforcement concerning the murder

of Mackey’s boyfriend, Kelvin Saffore.

On August 3, 2021, Detective Jeno Weaver responded to a

homicide at a residence in Jacksonville. Weaver, who was the lead

homicide detective, learned that the deceased person was Saffore,

that there was a fire at the residence, and that Mackey was an

eyewitness. Weaver subsequently developed Russell Brown as a

suspect based on evidence found at the scene. Brown was charged

and eventually convicted of first-degree murder.

Over the course of the investigation into Brown, law

enforcement learned that Mackey and Brown were in a romantic

relationship. Mackey also gave several conflicting and misleading

statements about her conduct and observations on the night

Saffore was killed. As a result, Mackey was formally interviewed

by law enforcement on two separate occasions. These interviews,

recorded and ultimately played for the jury in Mackey’s trial,

provide the basis for Mackey’s appeal.

During the interviews, the detectives made dozens of

comments to Mackey accusing her of lying and indicating that they

knew she was involved in Saffore’s murder. These comments

included statements such as, “your lies are starting to come apart,”

“you are lying,” “everything you told us is a lie,” “we can tell that

you’re lying,” “you’ve engaged in a pattern of lying,” and “we know

you are lying.” Mackey’s counsel did not object to each of these

statements, but when an objection was made, the court ruled that

the series of statements from the officers accusing Mackey of

engaging in a pattern of lying was admissible. This was error.

A jury may hear an interrogating detective’s statements

about a crime when the statements provoke a relevant response

from the defendant being questioned. See Eugene v. State, 53 So.

3d 1104, 1112 (Fla. 4th DCA 2011) (citing Jackson v. State, 18 So.

3d 1016, 1031–32 (Fla. 2009)). “When placed in ‘their proper

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context,’ an interrogating detective’s statements to a suspect could

be understood by a ‘rational jury’ to be ‘techniques’ used by law

enforcement officers to secure confessions.” Id. (quoting McWatters

v. State, 36 So. 3d 613, 637 (Fla. 2010)). However, “a witness’s

opinion as to the credibility, guilt or innocence of the accused is

generally inadmissible, [and] ‘it is especially troublesome when a

jury is repeatedly exposed to an interrogating officer’s opinion

regarding the guilt or innocence of the accused.’” Roundtree v.

State, 145 So. 3d 963, 965 (Fla. 4th DCA 2014) (quoting Jackson v.

State, 107 So. 3d 328, 339–40 (Fla. 2012)); see also Page v. State,

733 So. 2d 1079, 1081 (Fla. 4th DCA 1999) (“It is especially

harmful for a police witness to give his opinion of a [witness’s]

credibility because of the great weight afforded an officer’s

testimony.”). “Police officers, by virtue of their positions, rightfully

bring with their testimony an air of authority and legitimacy. A

jury is inclined to give great weight to their opinions. . . .” Tumblin

v. State, 29 So. 3d 1093, 1101 (Fla. 2010) (quoting Bowles v. State,

381 So. 2d 326, 328 (Fla. 5th DCA 1980)).

Mackey relies on Jackson, in which the Florida Supreme

Court reversed and remanded for a new trial based on the trial

court’s erroneous admission of a taped interrogation where the

officers repeatedly provided their opinions of guilt without eliciting

a relevant response. 107 So. 3d at 341. The Court held:

While the detectives may have intended to

secure a confession by consistently expressing

their conviction in Jackson’s guilt, they did not

secure a confession throughout their thirty-

seven minute dialogue. In addition, although the

detectives’ opinions about Jackson’s credibility,

guilt, and the weight and sufficiency of the

evidence were not expressed during in-court

testimony, admission of these statements

essentially permitted the State to improperly

elicit police opinion testimony and invade the

province of the jury.

Id. The Court found that the trial court abused its discretion in

admitting the videotaped interrogation at trial and that the error

was not harmless. Id. at 342.

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The facts here are similar to Jackson. Prior to detectives

repeatedly accusing Mackey of lying, their questions and

statements elicited relevant responses. However, once they began

stating that she was lying, Mackey repeatedly stated that she had

no reason to lie. As in Jackson, Mackey never provided a relevant

response to the detectives claims that she was lying. The objected

to comments—that the detectives could tell when someone is lying

and that Mackey engaged in a pattern of lies and was guilty of

being an accessory after the fact—were improper and it was error

to admit them.

While the detectives may have intended to secure a

confession by consistently expressing their conviction in Mackey’s

guilt, they never did. Admission of these statements “essentially

permitted the State to improperly elicit police opinion testimony

and invade the province of the jury.” Jackson, 107 So. 3d at 341;

Pausch v. State, 596 So. 2d 1216, 1219 (Fla. 2d DCA 1992) (finding

it unreasonable to expect the jury to extract admissible evidence

while disregarding the aspersions of guilt created by police officer’s

inadmissible statements).

The State argues any error was harmless because: Mackey

was resolute that she was not lying; the court’s instruction was

adequate; and the prosecutor did not mention or allude to the

officers’ comments in closing argument. We find that the State has

not met its burden in showing that the error was harmless. “[T]he

limited probative value of [Mackey’s] statements was outweighed

by the prejudicial effect of the detective’s opinion as to [Mackey’s]

guilt.” Gaines v. State, 155 So. 3d 1264, 1272 (Fla. 4th DCA 2015)

(reversing for new trial where recorded interview was published

for jury wherein detective stated that defendant was lying several

times and was guilty and finding that error was not harmless). The

comments resulted in an unfair trial where Mackey’s credibility

was a feature of the trial. See Roundtree, 145 So. 3d at 967 (“[W]e

find that the admission of the officer’s statements during the

interrogation permitted the state to elicit a police officer’s opinion

as to appellant’s guilt, thereby invading the province of the jury.”).

Accordingly, we reverse the judgment and sentence and

remand for a new trial.

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REVERSED AND REMANDED.

LAMBERT and KILBANE, JJ., concur.

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Not final until disposition of any timely and

authorized motion under Fla. R. App. P. 9.330 or

9.331.

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