Jackson v. Ohio Dept. of Rehab. & Corr.

[Cite as Jackson v. Ohio Dept. of Rehab. & Corr., 2025-Ohio-5504.]

IN THE COURT OF CLAIMS OF OHIO

CLIFFORD D. JACKSON, III Case No. 2023-00396JD

Plaintiff Magistrate Gary Peterson

v. DECISION OF THE MAGISTRATE

OHIO DEPARTMENT OF

REHABILITATION AND CORRECTION

Defendant

{¶1} Plaintiff, an inmate in the custody and control of defendant, the Ohio

Department of Rehabilitation and Correction (ODRC), brought this action alleging that

defendant’s employees used excessive force on him and that the medical treatment he

received following the use of force was inadequate or substandard. The case was

referred to the undersigned magistrate and proceeded to trial.

{¶2} Plaintiff testified that on June 24, 2021, defendant’s corrections officers at the

Ohio State Penitentiary (OSP), approached his cell and ordered him out of his cell to be

transferred to the Southern Ohio Correctional Facility (SOCF). Plaintiff explained to the

corrections officers that he was not to be transferred to SOCF and refused to exit his cell

for the transfer. A negotiator identified as T. Evans attempted to convince plaintiff to exit

his cell; however, plaintiff refused all orders to exit his cell. As a result, the corrections

officers executed a planned cell extraction of plaintiff. Plaintiff testified that during the cell

extraction, he suffered injuries to his body as a result of the use of force.

{¶3} Following the use of force, plaintiff received periodic medical treatment for his

wounds. Plaintiff testified, however, that his wounds did not heal properly and that he

continues to experience pain associated with the use of force. Plaintiff related that his

wounds were not properly bandaged and that doctors removed dead skin so that the

wounds could heal properly. Plaintiff added that he believed poor blood circulation

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contributed to his wounds not healing properly and that he was not provided pain

medication. Finally, plaintiff testified that a deputy warden eventually informed him that

he was not to be transferred to SOFC at that time. Plaintiff offered exhibits 1-8, which are

photographs of injuries, exhibit 9, which is an incident report noting what appears to be

abrasions to plaintiff’s arms, and exhibit 10, which is a medical record regarding wound

care, wherein it is noted that plaintiff’s abdominal dressings are not done properly and

that he has had similar wounds in the past. No other witnesses testified, and no other

exhibits were entered into evidence.

{¶4} After plaintiff completed his presentation of evidence, defendant moved for

dismissal of plaintiff’s claims under Civ.R. 41(B)(2). As explained below, the motion was

well-taken.

{¶5} Civ.R. 41(B)(2) states, in part:

{¶6} “After the plaintiff, in an action tried by the court without a jury, has completed

the presentation of the plaintiff’s evidence, the defendant, without waiving the right to offer

evidence in the event the motion is not granted, may move for a dismissal on the ground

that upon the facts and the law the plaintiff has shown no right to relief. The court as trier

of the facts may then determine them and render judgment against the plaintiff or may

decline to render any judgment until the close of all the evidence. . . .”

Inadequate Medical Care

{¶7} “In order to sustain an action for negligence, a plaintiff must show the

existence of a duty owing from the defendant to the plaintiff or injured party, a breach of

that duty, and that the breach was the proximate cause of resulting damages.” Sparre v.

Ohio Dept. of Transp., 2013-Ohio-4153, ¶ 9 (10th Dist.).

{¶8} “Under Ohio statutory law, a ‘medical claim’ is defined in part as ‘“‘any claim

that is asserted in any civil action against a physician, . . . hospital, . . . or residential

facility, . . . and that arises out of the medical diagnosis, care, or treatment of any

person.’”’ Skaggs v. Ohio Dept. of Rehab. & Corr., 2022-Ohio-2034, ¶ 29 (10th Dist.),

quoting Foy v. Ohio Dept. of Rehab. & Corr., 2017-Ohio-1065, ¶ 15 (10th Dist.), quoting

R.C. 2305.113(E)(3). “[A]n inmate’s claim against ODRC based on the negligent acts or

omissions of ODRC’s medical staff sound in ordinary negligence, rather than medical

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malpractice, where the claimed negligence occurs in a medical context but does not arise

in the course of medical diagnosis, care, or treatment of the inmate.” Gibson v. Ohio

Dept. of Rehab. & Corr., 2019-Ohio-4955, ¶ 15 (10th Dist.), citing Foy at ¶ 23; see also

R.C. 2305.113(E)(3). However, plaintiff’s complaint regarding the quality of the medical

care he received is “uniquely within the purview of a medical expert and outside the

general knowledge of a layperson.” See Gibson at ¶ 18 (“Medical skill and judgment was

necessary to determine the proper course of treatment . . . and determine whether any

medication should have been prescribed . . . .”); see also Kester v. Brakel, 2007-Ohio-

495, ¶ 26 (10th Dist.).

{¶9} In Ohio, “‘an inmate is under no different burden than any other plaintiff in a

medical malpractice claim.’” Gibson at ¶ 10, quoting Nicely v. Ohio Dept. of Rehab. &

Corr., 2009-Ohio-4386, ¶ 9 (10th Dist.). Prevailing on a claim for medical malpractice

requires that “a plaintiff must prove: (1) the existence of a standard of care within the

medical community; (2) the defendant’s breach of that standard; and (3) proximate cause

between the medical evidence and the plaintiff’s injuries.” Hernandez v. Ohio Dept. of

Rehab. & Corr., 2017-Ohio-8646, ¶ 13 (10th Dist.), citing Adams v. Kurz, 2010-Ohio-

2776, ¶ 11 (10th Dist.). The appropriate standard of care is proven by expert testimony

that explains “what a medical professional or ordinary skill, care, and diligence in the

same medical specialty would do in similar circumstances.” Schwind v. Ohio Dept. of

Rehab. & Corr., 2022-Ohio-3995, ¶ 17 (10th Dist.), citing Bruni v. Tatsumi, 46 Ohio St.2d

127, 130 (1976). Failure to provide expert testimony establishing the standard of care is

“fatal to the presentation of a prima facie case of medical malpractice.” Id., citing Gibson

at ¶ 10.

{¶10} Because plaintiff testified that he received inadequate medical care that

resulted in his wounds not healing properly for several years, requiring subsequent

medical procedures to repair past medical mistakes, plaintiff was required to establish the

standard of care and proximate cause of any such damage with expert medical testimony.

No such testimony was presented. The mechanisms of plaintiff’s wounds healing and

any scar tissue that may have arisen, along with poor blood circulation and infections and

any proximate cause thereof are internal, elusive, and not sufficiently observable,

understandable, or comprehensible to a layperson. See Corwin v. St. Anthony Med. Ctr.,

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80 Ohio App.3d 836, 840-841 (10th Dist. 1992) (“[W]here an injury is not obvious, there

must be expert evidence as to the damage sustained, the probability of future pain and

suffering or the permanency of the injury.”). While plaintiff argues that the medical records

establish a causal connection, the only medical record submitted does not establish any

breach of the standard of care or proximate cause of any injuries. Moreover, the law is

clear that expert testimony is required. See Davie v. Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co., 2015-

Ohio-104, ¶ 9 (8th Dist.) (expert testimony must be expressed to a degree of medical

certainty and medical records generally do not meet that standard).

{¶11} Given the absence of expert testimony in this action, plaintiff has shown no

right to relief regarding his medical claim. Accordingly, it is recommended that plaintiff’s

medical claim be dismissed pursuant to Civ.R. 41(B)(2).

Use of Force

{¶12} “Allegations of use of unnecessary or excessive force against an inmate may

state claims for battery and/or negligence.” Brown v. Dept. of Rehab. & Corr., 2014-Ohio-

1810, ¶ 13 (10th Dist.). “To prove battery, the plaintiff must prove that the intentional

contact by the defendant was harmful or offensive. . . . Ohio courts have held that, in a

civil action for assault and battery, the defendant has the burden of proving a defense of

justification, such as the exercise of lawful authority.” Miller v. Ohio Dept. of Rehab. &

Corr., 2012-Ohio-3382, ¶ 11 (10th Dist.). “A defendant may defeat a battery claim by

establishing a privilege or justification defense.” Brown at ¶ 13. “However, ‘the use of

excessive force by one privileged to use force on another may constitute battery.’”

Russell v. Ohio Dept. of Rehab. & Corr., 2019-Ohio-4695, ¶ 11 (10th Dist.), quoting

Shadler v. Double D. Ventures, Inc., 2004-Ohio-4802, ¶ 19 (6th Dist.).

{¶13} “To prevail on a negligence claim, a plaintiff must establish the existence of

a duty, a breach of the duty, and an injury resulting proximately therefrom.” Woodbridge

v. Ohio Dept. of Rehab. & Corr., 2020-Ohio-891, ¶ 30 (10th Dist.). “Ohio law imposes a

duty of reasonable care upon the state to provide for its prisoners’ health, care, and well-

being.” Ensman v. Ohio Dept. of Rehab. & Corr., 2006-Ohio-6788, ¶ 5 (10th Dist.).

{¶14} “The use of force is sometimes necessary to control inmates.” Jodrey v.

Ohio Dept. of Rehab. & Corr., 2013-Ohio-289, ¶ 17 (10th Dist.). “Correctional officers

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considering the use of force must evaluate the need to use force based on the

circumstances as known and perceived at the time it is considered.” Brown, 2014-Ohio-

1810, at ¶ 15, citing Ohio Adm.Code 5120-9-01(C). “[T]he precise degree of force

required to respond to a given situation requires an exercise of discretion by the

corrections officer.” Ensman at ¶ 23. “In Ohio Adm.Code 5120-9-01, the Ohio

Administrative Code sets forth the circumstances under which correctional officers are

authorized to use force against an inmate.” Id. at ¶ 6.

{¶15} Ohio Adm.Code 5120-9-01 provides, in part:

(C) Guidelines regarding the use of force. . . .

...

(2) Less-than-deadly force. There are six general circumstances in which

a staff member may use force against an inmate or third person. A staff

member may use less-than-deadly force against an inmate in the following

circumstances:

(a) Self-defense from physical attack or threat of physical harm.

(b) Defense of another from physical attack or threat of physical attack.

(c) When necessary to control or subdue an inmate who refuses to obey

prison rules, regulations or orders.

(d) When necessary to stop an inmate from destroying property or engaging

in a riot or other disturbance.

(e) Prevention of an escape or apprehension of an escapee; or

(f) Controlling or subduing an inmate in order to stop or prevent self-inflicted

harm.

{¶16} “Pursuant to Ohio Adm.Code 5120-9-01(C)(1)(a), correctional officers ‘may

use force only to the extent deemed necessary to control the situation.’” Brown, 2014-

Ohio-1810, at ¶ 16. “Additionally, correctional officers ‘should attempt to use only the

amount of force reasonably necessary under the circumstances to control the situation

and shall attempt to minimize physical injury.’” Id., quoting Ohio Adm.Code 5120-9-

01(C)(1)(b). “‘Excessive force’ means ‘an application of force which, either by the type of

force employed, or the extent to which such force is employed, exceeds that force which

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reasonably appears to be necessary under all the circumstances surrounding the

incident.’” Russell, 2019-Ohio-4695, at ¶ 14, quoting Ohio Adm.Code 5120-9-01(B)(3).

{¶17} Here, there is no dispute that plaintiff refused direct orders to exit his cell and

prepare for a transfer to SOCF. Accordingly, under the guidelines set forth above,

corrections officers may use force when necessary to control or subdue an inmate who

refuses to obey direct orders.

{¶18} Plaintiff argues that because the order was given in error, that he was

justified in refusing to exit his cell and submit to a transfer to SOCF. However, the 10th

District Court of Appeals has previously addressed such an argument. Brown v. Ohio

Dept. of Rehab. & Corr., 2014-Ohio-1810, ¶ 28 (10th Dist.). In Brown, the plaintiff refused

an order to report for a work shift, apparently believing that if the order was based on

wrong information, then the corrections officer did not have any basis for using force to

enforce the order. Id. The court in Brown rejected that premise noting that a corrections

officer may use less-than-deadly force to control an inmate who refused to obey a direct

order. Id. In Brown, like here, the plaintiff indisputably refused a direct order. Id. The

court then went on to note that “[w]hether or not Brown was actually scheduled to work

does not affect the validity of [the corrections officer’s] orders or excuse Brown’s

noncompliance. [The corrections officer] was, therefore, justified in the use of force in

these circumstances.” Id.

{¶19} Here, plaintiff likewise refused direct orders that he believed were based on

wrong information, i.e., that he should not be transferred to SOCF. Whether or not plaintiff

was not to be transferred to SOCF does not affect the validity of the corrections officers’

direct orders. In short, an inmate does not have the discretion to refuse a direct order

even when the inmate believes that the order was based on incorrect information. Id.

Furthermore, there was no evidence that the force used was excessive or unreasonable

under the circumstances. Therefore, the only reasonable conclusion is that the

corrections officers were justified in using force during the planned cell extraction because

of plaintiff’s refusal to comply with direct orders.

{¶20} Accordingly, it is recommended that plaintiff’s claim arising out of the use of

force be dismissed pursuant to Civ.R. 41(B)(2).

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{¶21} Based upon the foregoing, it is recommended that plaintiff’s claims be

dismissed pursuant to Civ.R. 41(B)(2).

{¶22} A party may file written objections to the magistrate’s decision within 14 days

of the filing of the decision, whether or not the court has adopted the decision during that

14-day period as permitted by Civ.R. 53(D)(4)(e)(i). If any party timely files objections,

any other party may also file objections not later than ten days after the first objections

are filed. A party shall not assign as error on appeal the court’s adoption of any factual

finding or legal conclusion, whether or not specifically designated as a finding of fact or

conclusion of law under Civ.R. 53(D)(3)(a)(ii), unless the party timely and specifically

objects to that factual finding or legal conclusion within 14 days of the filing of the decision,

as required by Civ.R. 53(D)(3)(b).

GARY PETERSON

Magistrate

Filed November 21, 2025

Sent to S.C. Reporter 12/11/25