NATHAN ADAM COOK, SR. v. GROVEPORT MADISON LOCAL SCHOOL DISTRICT, et. al.

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF OHIO

EASTERN DIVISION

NATHAN ADAM COOK, SR.,

Plaintiff, Case No. 2:25-cv-01117

v. District Judge Michael H. Watson

Magistrate Judge Kimberly A. Jolson

GROVEPORT MADISON

LOCAL SCHOOL DISTRICT, et. al.,

Defendants.

ORDER AND REPORT & RECOMMENDATION

Plaintiff’s Second Amended Complaint is before the Court (Doc. 11). After conducting

the required initial screen, the Undersigned concludes that Plaintiff’s claims against all

Defendants except Franklin County Children Services may proceed.

I. BACKGROUND

Plaintiff, who proceeds without the assistance of counsel, first filed this case over two

months ago. (Doc. 1). Before granting him leave to proceed in forma pauperis, the Court

ordered Plaintiff to clarify his monthly expenses and income. (Doc. 5). The next day, along

with the amended in forma pauperis application, Plaintiff filed an amended complaint that was

almost sixty pages long and asserted over twenty causes of action. (Docs. 6, 6-1). While the

Court granted him leave to proceed in forma pauperis, the Court also ordered Plaintiff to file

a streamlined complaint after observing that his Complaint made the task of conducting a

screen under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a) impossible. (Doc. 7). After several weeks, Plaintiff filed

his Second Amended Complaint. (Doc. 11).

Plaintiff brings this action “individually and as parent and next friend of N.C., a minor.”

(Doc. 11 at 1). N.C. is Plaintiff’s tracheostomy-dependent child. (Id.). Plaintiff alleges that

over the span of three years, Defendants Groveport Madison Local School District (“the

District”), Groveport Madison Board of Education (“The Board”), Franklin County Children

Services (“FCCS”), and unspecified “individual employees of the District and FCCS” denied

N.C. educational services on the basis of his disability and deprived Plaintiff of rights under

federal law. (Id. at ¶ 4).

As told by his Second Amended Complaint, the District initially denied N.C.’s school

enrollment based on his disability. (Id. at ¶¶ 5–6). And when he was eventually allowed to

enroll, the District failed to provide N.C. with a meaningful special education program. (Id. at

¶¶ 6–7). More specifically, the District “offered an inadequate one-hour daily program and

failed to secure competent nursing staff.” (Id. at ¶ 7). And, says Plaintiff, in the Summer of

2024, a nurse from the District “attempted or performed unsafe tracheostomy care.” (Id. at

¶ 8). When Plaintiff and N.C.’s mother offered to come to school and care for N.C. during the

day, Plaintiff alleges the District subjected them to “pretextual background-check demands”

and ultimately denied the request. (Id. at ¶ 7). He says District officials also “pressured

Plaintiffs toward homeschooling.” (Id. at ¶ 9). After all of this, the District allegedly produced

documents showing that one of N.C.’s parents could have accompanied him at school as an

accommodation all along. (Id.).

Plaintiff’s story does not end there. In 2024 and 2025, FCCS investigated Plaintiff

multiple times and initiated administrative procedures against him. (Id. at ¶ 10). While

Plaintiff does not state why FCCS did so, he nevertheless claims that FCCS “coordinated false

reports, perjured statements by school employees, and [conducted] inter-agency coordination

culminating in retaliatory proceedings and a harassment/stalking protection order timed with

purported CPS determinations.” (Id.).

Now, Plaintiff, on behalf of himself and N.C., asserts a variety of discrimination claims

against Defendants. (Id. at ¶ 4). Plaintiff sues the District, the Board, and their individual

employees for alleged violations of the Individuals with Disabilities in Education Act

(“IDEA”), Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act (“Section 504”), and Title II of the Americans

with Disabilities Act (“ADA”). (Id. at ¶¶ 12–14). He sues all Defendants for violations of

Procedural Due Process, Substantive Due Process, and Equal Protection under the Fourteenth

Amendment of the United States Constitution. (Id. at ¶ 11). Against all Defendants, Plaintiff

asserts civil conspiracy claims under 42 U.S.C. §§ 1983 and 1985 for Defendants’ “coordinated

CPS referrals, false allegations, and use of administrative processes” to deprive Plaintiff’s

rights. (Id. at ¶ 15). Plaintiff seeks monetary and injunctive relief for these claims. (Id. at 4–

5).

II. STANDARD

Because Plaintiff is proceeding in forma pauperis, the Court must dismiss the Complaint,

or any portion of it, that is frivolous, malicious, fails to state a claim upon which relief can be

granted, or seeks monetary relief from a defendant who is immune from such relief. 28 U.S.C.

§ 1915(e)(2). Pro se litigants’ complaints are to be construed liberally and held to less stringent

standards than those prepared by attorneys. Martin v. Overton, 391 F.3d 710, 712 (6th Cir. 2004).

But this leniency is not boundless, and “it is not within the purview of the district court to conjure

up claims never presented.” Frengler v. Gen. Motors, 482 F. App’x 975, 977 (6th Cir. 2012). At

bottom, “basic pleading essentials” are still required, regardless of whether an individual proceeds

pro se. Wells v. Brown, 891 F.2d 591, 594 (6th Cir. 1989).

These essentials are not onerous or overly burdensome. A complaint must contain “a short

and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief,” see Fed. R. Civ. P.

8(a)(2), and provide the defendant with “fair notice of what the . . . claim is and the grounds upon

which it rests,” Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007) (internal quotation omitted).

In reviewing Plaintiff’s Complaint at this stage, the Court must construe it in his favor, accept all

well-pleaded factual allegations as true, and evaluate whether it contains “enough facts to state a

claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” Id. at 570. “A claim has facial plausibility when the

plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the

defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (citing

Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556). Although this standard does not require “detailed factual

allegations, . . . [a] pleading that offers labels and conclusions” is insufficient. Id. at 678 (internal

quotation and quotation marks removed). In the end, the Court must dismiss the Complaint “if it

tenders naked assertions devoid of further factual enhancement.” Id. (internal quotation and

quotation marks omitted).

III. DISCUSSION

As an initial matter, Defendant FCCS should be dismissed from this case. FCCS, as a

department or agency of Franklin County is not sui juris and cannot be sued in its own right. Arsan

v. Keller, No. 3:17-CV-121, 2018 WL 635894, at *4 (S.D. Ohio Jan. 31, 2018) (“As a branch of

the County government, Green County Children’s Services Board lacks the capacity to be sued.”),

report and recommendation adopted, No. 3:17-CV-121, 2018 WL 3933706 (S.D. Ohio Aug. 16,

2018), aff’d, 784 F. App’x 900 (6th Cir. 2019); see also Curry v. Fed. Gov’t, No. 1:24-CV-299,

2024 WL 2988884, at *3 (S.D. Ohio June 14, 2024) (“Under Ohio law, neither a county nor its

department of job and family services is an entity capable of being sued.” (citing Lowe v. Hamilton

Cnty. Dep’t of Job & Fam. Servs., No. 1:05-cv-117, 2008 WL 816669, at *2 (S.D. Ohio Mar. 26,

2008))), report and recommendation adopted, No. 1:24-CV-299, 2024 WL 3273467 (S.D. Ohio

July 2, 2024). Nor does Plaintiff allege liability under Monell v. Department of Social Services of

the City of New York, 436 U.S. 658 (1978), against FCCS. (See generally Doc. 11). Therefore,

the Undersigned RECOMMENDS that FCSS be DISMISSED.

Having reviewed the remainder of Plaintiff’s claims, and without the benefit of briefing by

the parties, the Court concludes that all claims asserted against the District, the Board, and the

unidentified Defendants may proceed at this juncture. Notably, this is only a preliminary

determination. The Court has not ruled on the merits of Plaintiff’s claims, nor has the Court

considered any potential defenses. Defendants are not precluded from filing a motion to dismiss,

a motion for a more definite statement, or other appropriate motions under the Federal Rules of

Civil Procedure. See, e.g., Wiley v. Austin, No. 8:20-cv-220, 2020 WL 6204382, at *3 (D. Neb.

Oct. 22, 2020).

Relatedly, the Undersigned observes that Plaintiff, acting pro se, asserts a number of claims

on behalf of his minor child, N.C. (Doc. 11 at ¶¶ 11 (alleging Defendants discriminated against

N.C. in violation of the Equal Protection Clause), 12 (alleging Defendants denied N.C. a Free and

Appropriate Public Education in violation of the IDEA), 13 (alleging Defendants discriminated

against N.C. in violation of Section 504), 14 (alleging Defendants denied N.C. equal access to

education in violation of the ADA)). Ordinarily, a parent acting pro se may not sue or defend on

their minor child’s behalf. Curtis v. Hamby, No. 5:12-CV-13, 2013 WL 5220017, at *2 (W.D. Ky.

Sept. 16, 2013) (noting “the claims filed on behalf of T.H. can be dismissed” because plaintiff,

acting as next friend, may not proceed pro se on behalf of her child); Shepherd v. Wellman, 313

F.3d 963, 970 (6th Cir. 2002) (“[P]arents cannot appear pro se on behalf of their minor children

because a minor’s personal cause of action is her own and does not belong to her parent or

representative.”); see also Cavanaugh ex rel. Cavanaugh v. Cardinal Loc. Sch. Dist., 409 F.3d

753, 756 (6th Cir. 2005) (holding the IDEA provides no right for parents to proceed pro se on

behalf of their minor children), abrogated on other grounds by Winkelman ex rel. Winkelman v.

Parma City Sch. Dist., 550 U.S. 516 (2007). Recognizing Plaintiff’s efforts to secure

representation, the Undersigned declines to recommend dismissal of Plaintiff’s claims on these

grounds at this time. That said, this Order acts as notice to Plaintiff that he should secure

counsel with haste.

For this case to proceed, Defendants must be served. But Plaintiff has not submitted the

forms upon the Board. Plaintiff is ORDERED to submit a completed summons and U.S. Marshal

form for the Board within seven (7) days. Additionally, Plaintiff’s summons form for the District

lists Superintendent Jamie Grube but does not contain the District’s name. (Doc. 12 at 1). It also

does not contain Plaintiff’s name and address in between the second and third paragraphs. (Id.).

Within seven (7) days, Plaintiff is ORDERED to re-file his summons form for the District with

this information. On that form, he should indicate that the summons are to be delivered to the

District, and if he wishes for the summons to be placed in the care of Jamie Grube, he should also

make that clear. Plaintiff may refer to the Southern District of Ohio’s Guide for Pro Se Litigants

at pages 9–11 and 30–39 for more information about service and these forms. Once Plaintiff

submits the proper forms, the Court will order service.

Importantly, Plaintiff’s Second Amended Complaint does not name the thirty “individual

employees of the District and FCCS” he intends to sue. (Doc. 11 at ¶ 4). Before service may be

issued upon them, Plaintiff must file a motion to issue service setting forth their identities.

Therefore, Plaintiff is ORDERED to file a motion to issue service, including United Stated

Marshal and summons forms, when he confirms their identities through discovery. Plaintiff is

advised that no service will be issued upon them unless Plaintiff complies with this Order.

As a final note, Plaintiff previously moved for electronic filing rights. (Doc. 2). That

motion is GRANTED. Plaintiff is WARNED that the Court may revoke this permission at

any time should Plaintiff not conform filings to the Federal and Local Rules. He is specifically

REMINDED that he must refer to minor children by their initials in all filings.

Plaintiff also filed a motion to stay (Doc. 3). Because the Court conducted the present

screen, that Motion is DENIED as moot.

IV. CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, the Undersigned RECOMMENDS that FCCS be

DISMISSED. All claims against the District, the Board, and the unidentified Defendants may

proceed at this juncture. Plaintiff is ORDERED to submit a completed summons and U.S.

Marshal Form for the Board within seven (7) days. On or before that same date, Plaintiff is

ORDERED to re-file his summons form for the District, listing the District’s name and

address, as well as his own name and address.

Once Plaintiff confirms the identities of the John and Jane Doe Defendants through

discovery, he is ORDERED to file a motion to issue service that includes U.S. Marshal and

summons forms. No service will be issued upon them unless Plaintiff complies with this Order.

The Court GRANTS Plaintiff’s Motion to file electronically (Doc. 2) and DENIES as

moot his Motion to Stay (Doc 3). Finally, within thirty (30) days, Plaintiff must update the

Court on his efforts to secure counsel.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Date: December 10, 2025 /s/ Kimberly A. Jolson

KIMBERLY A. JOLSON

UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

Procedure on Objections

If any party objects to this Report and Recommendation, that party may, within fourteen

(14) days of the date of this Report, file and serve on all parties written objections to those specific

proposed findings or recommendations to which objection is made, together with supporting

authority for the objection(s). A Judge of this Court shall make a de novo determination of those

portions of the Report or specified proposed findings or recommendations to which objection is

made. Upon proper objections, a Judge of this Court may accept, reject, or modify, in whole or in

part, the findings or recommendations made herein, may receive further evidence, or may

recommit this matter to the Magistrate Judge with instructions. 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1).

The parties are specifically advised that failure to object to the Report and

Recommendation will result in a waiver of the right to have the District Judge review the Report

and Recommendation de novo and operates as a waiver of the right to appeal the decision of the

District Court adopting the Report and Recommendation. See Thomas v. Arn, 474 U.S. 140

(1985); United States v. Walters, 638 F.2d 947 (6th Cir. 1981).