Davis

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF OHIO

WESTERN DIVISION

TED K. DAVIS JR., Case No. 1:25-cv-624

Plaintiff, Barrett, J.

Bowman, M.J.

v.

JUDGE CHARLES CHAMBERLAIN,

Defendant.

REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION

On August 26, 2025, Plaintiff Ted K. Davis, Jr. proceeding pro se, paid the requisite

filing fee and filed suit against Judge Charles Chamberlain, a visiting state court judge

who briefly presided over his divorce case in the Butler County Court of Common Pleas,

Domestic Relations Division – Case No. DR13-12-1277. On the date he filed his federal

complaint, Plaintiff also filed a motion seeking “emergency termination of income

withholding order (TWO)” relating to the garnishment of Plaintiff’s social security disability

income (“SSDI”) benefits by Butler County CSEA, a non-party. Pursuant to local practice,

Plaintiff’s motion, hereby construed as a motion for preliminary injunctive relief, has been

referred to the undersigned for initial consideration and a Report and Recommendation

(“R&R”). For the following reasons, the undersigned recommends that Plaintiff’s

construed motion for preliminary injunctive relief be DENIED.

I. Factual and Procedural Background

Defendant did not file a response to Plaintiff’s construed motion for preliminary

injunctive relief, nor did he answer the complaint. Instead, on September 18, 2025,

Defendant timely filed a motion to dismiss this entire case. Defendant’s motion asserts

that this Court lacks jurisdiction over Plaintiff’s claims under the Burrus abstention

doctrine, the Rooker-Feldman doctrine, and/or the Younger abstention doctrine.1 In

addition to the jurisdictional barriers, Defendant’s motion seeks dismissal based on

judicial and sovereign immunities.

Although the motion to dismiss has not been referred, the undersigned

acknowledges that some of the same issues presented therein are relevant to the

recommended disposition of Plaintiff’s construed motion for preliminary injunctive relief.

Specifically, the arguments presented in the pending motion to dismiss have been briefly

considered in evaluating the likelihood of Plaintiff’s success on the merits of his underlying

claims – a showing that is required for Plaintiff to obtain preliminary injunctive relief.

A. Allegations of Complaint and Prior Court Proceedings

This Court may take judicial notice of state and federal cases related to the instant

complaint. The undersigned begins by summarizing the background of the underlying

state court divorce proceeding over which Judge Chamberlain briefly presided.

1. The Underlying Divorce Proceeding

Plaintiff and his ex-wife, Kim, were twice married and divorced. Kim filed for divorce

the second time in 2013. Following a contested divorce hearing, Butler County Court of

Common Pleas Judge Barbara Schneider Carter, Domestic Relations Division, ordered

Plaintiff to pay Kim spousal support. See generally, Davis v. Davis (“Davis I”), 12th Dist.

Butler No. CA2018-01-018, 2018-Ohio-4935, ¶ 2, 2018 WL 6445597 (Ohio Court App.,

12th Dist., Dec. 10, 2018), discretionary appeal denied, 155 Ohio St.3d 1414, 2019-Ohio-

1See, e.g., In re Burrus,136 U.S. 586 (1890); District of Columbia Court of Appeals v. Feldman, 460 U.S.

462, 486, 103 S.Ct. 1303 (1983); Rooker v. Fidelity Trust Co., 263 U.S. 413, 416, 44 S.Ct. 149 (1923);

Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37, 40-41 (1971).

1205, 120 N.E.3d 31. During the course of proceedings in the trial court, in 2014, Plaintiff

and Kim entered into a mediation agreement (“Agreement”) that was adopted by the trial

court in an agreed entry. See Davis v. Davis (“Davis II”), 2022-Ohio-3179, ¶ 3, 2022 WL

4125934, at *1 (Ohio App. 12 Dist., 2022). The parties later moved to modify that

Agreement. Judge Carter entered a final judgment on the modification issues on January

19, 2018. Plaintiff appealed, but in Davis I, the Twelfth District Court of Appeals rejected

Plaintiff’s assertions of error and affirmed the January 2018 entry of judgment.

Thereafter, Kim moved the trial court to find Davis in contempt for failing to pay her

attorney fees and costs. “In February 2019, the parties reached an agreement resolving

Kim's motion for contempt.” Davis II, 2022-Ohio-3179, ¶ 7, 2022 WL 4125934, at *1.

Over the following year, Davis and Kim filed numerous motions and filings

with the trial court. Davis also filed related lawsuits against Kim and her

counsel in other Ohio counties and in federal court, as well as two federal

lawsuits against then-presiding Judge Barbara Carter. Davis additionally

filed four affidavits of disqualification with the Ohio Supreme Court, each

attempting to disqualify Judge Carter from presiding over the trial court

proceedings. Notably, the four affidavits were determined to be meritless

and the federal lawsuits involving Judge Carter were ultimately dismissed.

Davis II, at ¶ 8, 2022 WL 4125934, at *2. After Davis filed a fifth affidavit to disqualify

Judge Carter, Judge Carter recused herself. Id.

On April 2, 2020, visiting Judge Chamberlain was appointed to preside over the

case, which remained contentious. On January 6, 2021, Kim moved for an order directing

Davis to show cause why he should not be held in contempt. Hearings were scheduled

in February and March 2021 but were continued due to a lack of service on Davis. Davis

II recounts Judge Chamberlain’s multiple efforts to ensure that Davis was properly served,

culminating in a pretrial conference on August 10, 2021 at which Davis and his counsel

participated by telephone, and Davis “gave his counsel authorization to accept service of

Kim’s motions on his behalf.” Davis II, 2022-Ohio-3179, ¶ 13. Davis’s counsel also filed a

Notice on September 2, 2021 confirming service. Id.

At the final hearing date of September 24, 2021, Davis appeared with counsel and

indicated his understanding of what motions were being addressed at the hearing,

including contempt, despite also denying receiving or seeing a copy of the summons

through his counsel. Davis II, 2022-Ohio-3179, ¶ 14. He indicated he understood the

penalties for contempt and that he did not wish to speak with counsel privately before

proceeding with the hearing. Id. After the hearing, Judge Chamberlain found Davis to be

in contempt and ordered Davis to pay $500, serve 60 days in jail, and pay Kim’s attorney’s

fees. Id., ¶ 15. Davis appealed.

Among the many errors raised by Davis on appeal in state court in Davis II were

due process issues relating to service and a challenge to Judge Chamberlain’s exercise

of jurisdiction. The Ohio Court of Appeals rejected all arguments. With respect to the

service issue, the state court noted that the record reflected Davis’s receipt of Kim’s

motions through counsel, notwithstanding Davis’s later denial of the same. Davis II, supra,

¶ 52; see also, generally, id., ¶¶ 51-54.. The Ohio Court of Appeals further held that even

if Davis had not been properly served, Davis had waived the issue. Id., ¶¶ 53-54. Similarly,

the state court found no merit to Plaintiff’s challenge to Judge Chamberlain’s exercise of

jurisdiction to consider the contempt motion. “[T]he trial court clearly had jurisdiction in

the instant matter, as Kim's post[-]decree show-cause motion invoked both the inherent

power of a domestic relations court to enforce its prior orders and the court's continuing

jurisdiction pursuant to Civ. R. 75(J).” Id., ¶ 59.

2. Prior Related Federal Cases

At this point, it is worth noting that Plaintiff previously filed suit against Judge Carter

in this Court over her prior rulings in the same case. See Davis v. Carter, No. 1:19-cv-

414-TSB-SKB. Plaintiff initially filed suit in forma pauperis. But after the undersigned

recommended dismissal of that case on initial screening, Plaintiff sought to voluntarily

dismiss his case without prejudice under Rule 41(a)(1). On the same day, he paid the

filing fee and filed a new case against Judge Carter, his ex-wife, and Kim’s attorneys. See

Davis v. Carter, No. 1:19-cv-614-TSB-SKB. The district court permitted Plaintiff to dismiss

his first case without prejudice under Rule 41(a)(1), but agreed with the undersigned’s

recommendation that the second case should be dismissed sua sponte with prejudice for

lack of subject matter jurisdiction, and because Judge Carter was absolutely immune from

suit. See Davis v. Carter, No. 1:19-cv-614-TSB-SKB, 2020 WL 467683 (S.D. Ohio Jan.

29, 2020). The Sixth Circuit affirmed the dismissal with prejudice of all claims against

Judge Carter, as well as the dismissal with prejudice of claims against the attorneys for

failure to state a claim under 42 U.S.C.§ 1983. The appellate court also affirmed the

dismissal of claims against Plaintiff’s ex-wife Kim, but modified that dismissal to be without

prejudice based on a lack of diversity jurisdiction. See Davis v. Carter, No. 20-3186, 2020

WL 8575594 (6th Cir. Sept. 22, 2020).

II. Analysis

The preliminary injunctive relief sought by Plaintiff should be denied. The purpose

of a preliminary injunction is to preserve the status quo. Procter & Gamble Co. v. Bankers

Trust Co., 78 F.3d 219, 227 (6th Cir. 1996). In EOG Resources, Inc. v. Lucky Land

Management, LLC, 134 F.4th 868 (6th Cir., 2025), the Sixth Circuit recently restated the

factors that a plaintiff must establish in order to be entitled to such extraordinary relief.

To secure a preliminary injunction, a plaintiff “must establish that he is likely

to succeed on the merits, that he is likely to suffer irreparable harm in the

absence of preliminary relief, that the balance of equities tips in his favor,

and that an injunction is in the public interest.” Winter v. Nat. Res. Def.

Council, Inc., 555 U.S. 7, 20, 129 S.Ct. 365, 172 L.Ed.2d 249 (2008).

Because a preliminary injunction “is an ‘extraordinary’ equitable remedy that

is ‘never awarded as of right,’” the plaintiff must make a “clear showing” that

these factors favor him. Starbucks Corp. v. McKinney, 602 U.S. 339, 345–

46, 144 S.Ct. 1570, 219 L.Ed.2d 99 (2024) (quoting Winter, 555 U.S. at 24,

129 S.Ct. 365).

Id., 134 F.4th at 874.

The appellate court reversed the trial court in EOG Resources, Inc. in part because

the lower court had referred to the factors as a balancing test without considering any

factor to be a prerequisite. Id., at 883 (citing the trial court’s reliance on the abrogated

formulation of the balancing test set out in Leary v. Daeschner, 228 F.3d 729, 736 (6th

Cir. 2000)).

That was erroneous. Any of our old cases that might have endorsed that

approach were abrogated by the Supreme Court in Winter v. Natural

Resources Defense Council, 555 U.S. 7, 129 S.Ct. 365, 172 L.Ed.2d

249; see also D.T., 942 F.3d at 328–29 (Nalbandian, J., concurring)

(explaining how). Irreparable harm is the core of the preliminary injunction,

as we and the Supreme Court have made clear before. It's true that courts

“balance” the four factors, but while “the extent of an injury may be balanced

against other factors, the existence of an irreparable injury is

mandatory.” D.T., 942 F.3d at 327 (majority opinion).

Id., 134 F.4th at 884.

Here, the lack of an irreparable injury alone warrants the denial of preliminary

injunctive relief. Plaintiff primarily seeks the restoration of his full SSDI benefits without

garnishment resulting from the state court’s orders. But a temporary loss of income that

may be later recovered through a monetary damage award is almost never sufficient to

show irreparable injury. See Sampson v. Murray, 415 U.S. 61, 90 (1973) (finding that

“the temporary loss of income, ultimately to be recovered, does not usually constitute

irreparable injury”); Overstreet v. Lexington-Fayette Urban Cty. Gov't, 305 F.3d 566, 579

(6th Cir. 2002) (“The fact that an individual may lose his income for some extended period

of time does not result in irreparable harm, as income wrongly withheld may be recovered

through monetary damages in the form of back pay.”).

In addition, Plaintiff is highly unlikely to succeed on the merits of his claims against

Judge Chamberlain. As the undersigned previously explained in recommending the

dismissal of similar claims filed by Plaintiff against Judge Carter, Judge Chamberlain is

absolutely immune from suit. In addition, the application of the Burrus and Rooker-

Feldman jurisdictional doctrines appears highly likely. And neither equitable

considerations nor the public interest favor interfering with the prior orders of the state

court in Plaintiff’s underlying domestic relations case.

III. Conclusion and Recommendation

For the reasons stated, IT IS RECOMMENDED THAT Plaintiff’s motion for an

“emergency termination of income withholding order” (Doc. 4), hereby construed as a

motion seeking preliminary injunctive relief, be DENIED.

s/Stephanie K. Bowman

Stephanie K. Bowman

United States Chief Magistrate Judge

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF OHIO

WESTERN DIVISION

TED K. DAVIS JR., Case No. 1:25-cv-624

Plaintiff, Barrett, J.

Bowman, M.J.

v.

JUDGE CHARLES CHAMBERLAIN,

Defendant.

NOTICE

Pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P 72(b), any party may serve and file specific, written

objections to this Report and Recommendation (“R&R”) within FOURTEEN (14) DAYS of

the filing date of this R&R. That period may be extended further by the Court on timely

motion by either side for an extension of time. All objections shall specify the portion(s) of

the R&R objected to, and shall be accompanied by a memorandum of law in support of

the objections. A party shall respond to an opponent’s objections within FOURTEEN (14)

DAYS after being served with a copy of those objections. Failure to make objections in

accordance with this procedure may forfeit rights on appeal. See Thomas v. Arn, 474 U.S.

140 (1985); United States v. Walters, 638 F.2d 947 (6th Cir. 1981).