Matney

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

EASTERN DISTRICT OF LOUISIANA

RAJEL JOHNSON CIVIL ACTION

VERSUS NUMBER: 24-2510

CASSANDRA MATNEY, ET AL. SECTION: “H” (5)

ORDER AND REASONS

1

Before the Court pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(c) is the Motion to Dismiss (rec. doc.

16) filed by Defendants Nurse Cassandra Matney and Captain Barry Pittman (collectively,

“Defendants”). Plaintiff has filed no opposition to the motion. Having reviewed the

pI.l eadinBgas cakngdr tohuen cdase law, the Court rules as follows.

Plaintiff, Rajel Johnson, brings this lawsuit under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 against

Defendants, Cassandra Matney and Barry Pittman, alleging they were deliberately

indifference to his medical needs and his living conditions while he was incarcerated at

Rayburn Correctional Center (“RCC”). Plaintiff alleges that on December 15, 2023, he

injured his hand while operating the prison deli slicer. (Rec. doc. 5 at 4). He informed

prison kitchen security stIadf.f about the incident and was instructed to go to the infirmary

for medical treatment. ( ). NuIrds.e Matney gave him a tetanus shot, two Tylenols, and

wrapped his hand with gauze. ( ). Matney instructed Plaintiff that his bandage would

nIede.d to be changed every two hours and issued Plaintiff a seven-day no-work duty status.

( ). Id.

Johnson called his family to report his pain. ( at 5). His family then began to call

RCC, which resulted in Plaintiff being sent to the infirmary later that same day at 3:00 p.m.

Id.

to have his hand re-wrapped. ( ). Matney infIodr.med Plaintiff that he could return to the

infirmary at 8:00 p.m. for a bandage change. ( ). Plaintiff asked to be seeInd .by another

nurse, who directed that Matney send Plaintiff to the emergency room. (Id).. Plaintiff

further alleges that Matney never notified her supervisor of Plaintiff’s injury. ( ).

Five days after the incident, Plaintiff alleges that he was seen by Defendant, Captain

Barry Pittman, who asked Plaintiff to sign a statement stating that he had been trained and

gIidv.en the meat-slicing safety test, though he alleges that he had never taken the safety test.

( ). Further, Plaintiff alleges that he should never have been assigned to the meat slicing

job because his “medical conditions deems him incapIadb.le to do so because of limited use of

right arm/no weight bearing, medical duty status.” ( ). Additionally, Plaintiff now alleges

that the blade protector/finger guard was missing froImd. the deli slicer, and no kitchen

2

security was present while he was operating the slicer. ( ).

Plaintiff makes no prayer for relief in his Complaint. (Rec. doc. 1). However, when

Plaintiff filed his ARP, which he referenced in his Complaint, he asked for “no retaliation

behind this ARP,” “that his injury be taken more serious then [sic] as is from this day

forward until it is healed,” and “justice due to the pain, suffering, mental anguish and all

damages.” (Rec. doc. 16-2 at 31). Id.

Johnson filed his ARP on January 7, 2024, which he references in his Complaint. (

at 30-31). The First Step Response to Plaintiff’s ARP, issued on February 14, 2024, which

Plaintiff attached as an exhibit to his Complaint, denied Plaintiff’s request for relief, finding

no merit to his claim. (Rec. doc. 1-2 at 1). The response detailed the following:

In a statement by Nurse Cassandra Matney, she states that she cleaned the

wound and applied a pressure dressing per orders. The on-call Healthcare

Provider was notified and orders were received to monitor bleeding and

circulation. You were given a seven day duty status until you could be re-

evaluated by the facility physician. You were also administered a tetanus

shot and Tylenol. You returned for bandage and circulation checks as

instructed with no changes until approximately 4:30 p.m. when an increase

in bleeding was noted. The on-call Health Care Provider was notified and an

order was received to send you to Our Lady of the Angels for evaluation and

treatment. At the hospital, a pressure dressing was applied and antibiotics

and Naproxen were prescribed and you were discharged back to RCC. Upon

returning to the facility, it is noted in your medical record that you were

oriented, vitals were stable and you had no complaints. You were given

instructions to return to the infirmary nightly for wound care and twice daily

for antibiotics. You were issued a voucher for Naproxen and scheduled for a

follow-up visit with the Healthcare Provider. You received appropriate

medical treatment. Medical opinion is controlling. According to our

documentation, you were properly trained to use the meat slicer on October

16, 2023, two months prior to the injury. You signed and dated an

Id. Acknowledgement of Safety Training for that specific piece of equipment.

( ). The Second Step Response to Plaintiff’s ARP, which was issued on April 22, 2024,

denied Plaintiff’s request for relief and stated the following:

Your request for an Administrative review of ARP #RCC-2024-34 had been

received and remanded for further review. We are now in receipt of the

institution’s additional documentation. Your allegations have been

considered as well as your medical record. A review of your medical record

and the documentation forwarded by RCC staff was conducted. Based on

these documents, it was found that when the unfortunate event occurred,

security staff immediately reacted and you were promptly brought to the

medical unit. You received appropriate medical care in accordance with the

DOC Health Care Policy. Medical opinion is controlling. It is with regret that

you received an injury; however, as indicated above, security staff was

present and you received appropriate medical care in a timely manner.

Lastly, the documentation forwarded by RCC staff included a copy of the

“acknowledgement of Safety Training” for the machinery you were using

when you received the injury in question. You have failed to provide any

evidence to substantiate your allegations or that would cause us to believe

otherwise. As such, this office finds no further investigation is warranted.

Id. Your request for relief is denied.

( at 3).

On October 18, 2024, Plaintiff filed this lawsuit under Section 1983 against Matney

3

and Pittman. (Rec. doc. 1) . Plaintiff’s Section 1983 claims appear to arise under the Eighth

Amendment to the Constitution, more specifically, his claims of deliberate indifference to

IhIi.s medSitcaanl dcaarred a onnd ap oMsositbiolen a tlole gDaitsimoniss sof unconstitutional conditions of confinement.

Defendants move to dismiss Plaintiff's Complaint under both Federal Rules of Civil

Procedure 12(b)(1) and 12(b)(6). A court must consider a Rule 12(b)(1) jurisdictional

attack before addressing any attack on the merits, considering that a Rule 12(b)(1) motion

to dismiss first “pIrne rvee nFtEsM aA c Tourartil ewri tFhoorumta jludreihsyddicet iPorno dfrso. mLia pbr. eLmitaigtu. rely dismissing a case

with prejudice.” Stockman v. FEC , 668 F.3d 281, 286-87

(5th Cir. 2012); , 138 F.3d 144, 151 (5th Cir. 1998). Federal courts are

courts of limited jurisdiction, and, wiFtEhoMuAt jurisdiction conferred by statute, federal courts

lack the power to adjudicate claims. , 668 F.3d at 286-87. Under Federal Rule of Civil

Procedure Rule 12(b)(1), a claim is “properly dismissed for lack of subject-matter

jurisdicItdio. n when the court lacks the statutory or constitutional power to adjudicate” the

claim.

“The standard of review applicable to motions to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(1) is

similar to that applicable to motions to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6)” except that the Rule

12(b)(1) standard permits the Court to consider a broader raTnhgeo moafs vm. Caitteyr ioafl sN eiwn

cOornlesaidnesring its subject matter jurisdiction over the claims in theW suililtia. ms v. Wynne

, 883 F. Supp. 2d 669, 676 (E.D. La. Aug. 2, 2012) (citing , 533 F.3d

360, 364-65 n.2 (5th Cir. 2008)). When considering a 12(b)(1) motion, however, “the court

3

is permitted to look at evidenceA minb trhaec or,e Icnocr.d v b. eByoosnscdl itph oBs.Ve. facts alleged in the complaint

and its Rparmopmeirn ga tvta. cUhnmiteendt sS.t”a tes , 570 F.3d 233, 238 (5th Cir.

2009); , 281 F.3d 158, 161 (5th Cir. 2001) (stating that a court

ruling on a Rule 12(b)(1) motion may evaluate “(1) the complaint alone, (2) the complaint

supplemented by undisputed facts evidenced in the record, or (3) the complaint

supplemented by undisputed facts plus the court's resolution of disputed facts.”).

Otherwise, a motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(1) is analyzeBd eunntodne rv .t hUen istaemd Set asttaensdard

as a motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6) as outlined below. , 960

F.2d 19, 21 (5th Cir. 1992). A motion to dismiss for lack of subject matter jurisdiction shall

be granted only if it appears certain that thWe apglasitnatfiff fv .c Uannnitoetd pSrtaotvees aDneyp 'ts eotf oEfd ufacc.ts in

support of his claims entitling him to relief. , 509

F.3d 661, 663 (5th Cir. 2007).

“The burCdeelne sotfin per ovo. f fTorra an sRWuoleo d1,2 (Ibn)c(.1) motion to dismiss is on the party asserting

jurisdiction.” , 467 F. App'x 317, 318 (5th Cir. 2012).

“AccordIidn. gly, the plaintiff constantly bears the burden of proof that jurisdiction does in fact

exist.” A pleading stating a claim for reliIedf. must contain “a short and plain statement of

the grounds for the court's jurisdiction[.]” In federal question caGsiebsb, ss vu.c Bhu acsk here, the

party must demonstrate a non-frivolous claim based on federal law. , 307 U.S.

66, 72 (1939). When a district court finds that it lacks subject matter jurisdiction, its

determination is not on the merits ofH tihtte vc.a sCeit ayn odf dPoaessa dneont abar the plaintiff from pursuing

the claim in a proper jurisdiction. , 561 F.2d 606, 608 (5th Cir.

1977).

Under Rule 12(b)(6), the district court “must accept all wScehlll-epslienagdeerd v .f aEcSt s& aHs, tIrnuce.

and view those facts in the light most favorable to the plaintiff.” True v. Robles ,

No. 11-cv-294, 2011 WL 390057N7,a apto *le2o (nE v.D. .S Lhao.w Sse, pCta. l2i , &2 0W11a)l s(hc,i tLin.Lg.P . , 571

F.3d 412, 417 (5th Cir. 2009)); , No. CV 20-1775,

2021 WL 5630895, at *4 (E.D. La. Dec. 1, 2021). A plaBinetlilf fA tml. uCsotr pp.l ve.a Tdw eonmobulgyh facts, if

taken as true, to state a claim that is plausible on its face. , 550 U.S.

544, 556 (2007). A “for mIdu.laic recitation of the elements of a cause of action” will not meet

this pleading standard. at 555. Plausibility does not require a showing of probability as

a well-pleaded complaint can proceed even if I“da.ctual proof of those facts is improbable, and

that a recovery is very remote and unlikely.” at 556. However, legal conclusioAnssh acrreo fnt ovt.

eIqnbtaitlled to a presumption oNf atrpuotlhe ofnor the purposes of a Rule 12P(ibtt)s( 6v). LmeoBtliaonnc.

, 556 U.S. 662 (2009); , 2021 WL 5630895, aat p*p4e; al dismissed , No. CV 22-

1983, 2023 WL 7166169, at *1-2 (E.D. La. Oct. 31, 2023), , No. 23-30811,

2II0I.2 4 WLLa w21 a5n0d3 2A5n (a5ltyhs iCsir. Feb. 7, 2024).

A. Claims Aga inst Matney and Pittman in Their Official Capacities

Plaintiff does not specify whether he sues Matney and Pittman in their official or

individual capacities. To the extent that he sues them in their official capacities, his claims

fail. It is well-established law that neither a State, nor its officials acWtiinllg vi.n M tihcehi.r D oefpfi’ct ioafl

cSataptaec iPtoielisc, eare “persons” capable of being sued under Section 1983.

4

, 491 U.S. 58, 71 (1989). The State, its agencies, and its officers in their official

4 S ee Will

This holding is an offshoot of the sovereign immunity afforded states, their agencies, and their officials

Archie v. LeBlanc

capacity are not considered “persons” for purposes of Section 1r9e8p3or. t and recommenda, tNioon.

a0d8o-CpVte-d1381, 2010 WL 33522296, at *4 (W.D. La. Jul. 29, 2010), aff’d

, No. 08-CV-1381, 2R0e1im0e Wr vL. S3m52it2h293 (W.D. La. Sept. 2, 2010), , 447 F. App’x.

591 (5th Cir. 2011) (citiFnagi rley v. Stalder , 663 F.2d 1316, 1322 n. 4 (5th Cir. 1981). As the

Fifth Circuit stated in , “‘neither a State nor its officials acting in their

official capacities are ‘persons’ under § 1983.’ As § 1983 only provides a remedy against a

‘person,’ the dismissal of Fairley’s § 1983 claims was indisputably proper.” 294 F. App’x.

805, 808-09, 2008 WL 3244022, at *3 (5th Cir. 2008) (quoting Will, 491 U.S. at 71). Thus,

“long and clearly established Supreme Court precedent on this matter,” indicates that all

claims for equitable or monetary relief under Section 1983 against DefeSnedea nFatsi rileny their

official capacities lack an arguable legal basis and are therefore dismissed. , 294

F. App’xB. .a t 808C.l aims Against Matney and Pittman in Their Individual Capacities

1. Inadequate Medical Care

To establish an Eighth Amendment violation regarding inadequate medical care,

Plaintiff must prove that Defendants’ conduct demonstrates deliberate indifference to a

prisoneWr’isl ssoenr vio. uSes itmeredical needs, constituting an “unneEcestseslalery v . aGnadm wblaenton infliction of

pain.” , 501 U.S. 294, 297 (1991) (quoting , 429 U.S. 97, 106

(1976)). A prison official may be held liable under the Eighth Amendment for acting with

deliberate indifference to inmate health or safety “only if he knows that [the] inmate[ ]

face[s] a substantial risk of seriFoaursm hear rvm. B raenndn adnisregards that risk by fail ing t o take

reasonable measures to abate it.” , 511 U.S. 825, 847 (1994).

Although the Eighth AmendmeSntte “wdaorets v n. Motu, rbpyh iyts precise words, mandate a certain

level of medical care for prisoners[,]” , 174 F.3d 530, 533 (5th Cir. 1999),

the Supreme Court has interpreted it as imFapromseinrg a duty on prison officials to ensure that

inmates receive “adequate” medical care. , 511 U.S. at 832. In the context of Section

1983 lawsuits, a showing of deliberate indifference to serious medical needs “requires the

inmate to allege that prison officials ‘refused to treat him, ignored his complaints,

intentionally treated him incorrectly, or engaged in any similaBr rceownsdteurc tv t. hDarte wtkoeuld clearly

evince a wanton disregard for anDy osmerinioou vs. mTeexd. iDcaelp ’nt eoefd Csr.’i”m . Just. , 587 F.3d

764, 770 (5th Cir. 2009) (quoting , 239 F.3d 752, 756 (5th

Cir. 2001)). The delay of medical care “can only constitute an Eighth AmendmenMt evniodolaztaio vn.

Lify tnhaeurgeh has been deliberate indifference, which results in substantial harm.”

, 989 FM.2adc 1e 9v1. , C1i9ty5 (o5f tPha Cleirs.t 1in9e93). “Mere negligence or failure to act reasonably is

not enough.” , 333 F.3d 621,H 6e2rn6a (n5dtehz Cexir. .R 2e0l.0 H3e)r. n aEnvdeenz “vg. rToesxs.

nDeegpl’itg. eonf cPer”o dteocetsiv neo &t eRsetgaubllaistho rdye Sliebrevrsa.te indifference. Conner v.

Travis Cnty. , 380 F.3d 872, 882 (5th Cir. 2004) (citing

, 209 F.3d 79, 796 M(5athce Cir. 2000)). Rather, “[Wana]g noefrfi vc.e Br amy Cuistty have the

subjective intent to cause harm.” , 333 F.3d at 626 (citing , 227 F.3d

316, 324 (5th Cir. 2000)). The Supreme Court has affirmed that “deliberate indifference is

a stringent standard of fault, requiring pBrdo. ooff ththaet aC nmtuy.n oicfi pCaolm amcto’rrs doifs rBergyaarnd eCdn aty k.,n Ookwlan. ovr.

Bobrovwionus consequence of his action.”

, 520 U.S. 397, 410 (1997). The “deliberate indifference” standard permits courts to

separate omissions that “amount to anG oinnztaenletzio vn. aYls lcehtao iIcned” efpr.o Smch othool sDei stth. at are merely

“unintentionally negligent oversights.” , 996 F.2d 745,

Rhyne v. Henderson Cnty.

756 (5th Cir. 1993) (quoting , 973 F.2d 386, 392 (5th Cir. 1992)

(alteration omitted).

“Unsuccessful medical treatment, acts of negligence, or medical malpractice do not

constitute deliberate indifference, nor does a pGroibseornte vr.’ sC adlidsawgerlelement with his medical

treatment, absent exceptional circumstances.” , 463 F.3d 339, 346 (5th

Cir. 2006). “Deliberate indifference is not established when ‘medical Brreacuonrders vin. Cdoicoadtye that

the plaintiff was afforded extensive medicNaol rctaorne vb.y D pirmisaozna noafficials.’” , 793

F.3d 493, 500 (5th Cir. 2015) (quoting , 122 F.3d 286, 292 (5th Cir.

1997)) (alterations omitted).

Plaintiff alleges that Matney “had actual knowledge of the objectively cruel

conditions that is a serious medical need, when she treated Rajel Johnson[‘s] wounded left

hand that had Plaintiff in server [sic] pain and (2) did not respond reasonably to the risk,

by not informing her supervisors the extent of Plaintiff injury to avoid sending Plaintiff to

the Hospital.” (Rec. doc. 5 at 6). However, a review of Plaintiff’s ARP shows that, on

December 15, 2023, the date Plaintiff sustained his injury, he was seen a total of five times

in the RCC infirmary by both Matney and other healthcare providers for wound care,

bleeding assessment, wound dressing changes, medication and a tetanus shot, with a

follow-up visit scheduled for three days later. (Rec. doc. 16-2 at 7-13). He was also

trIda.nsported to Our Lady of the Angels Hospital that same day when his bleeding continued.

( at 15). The record also reveals that the decision toId s.end Plaintiff to Our Lady of the

Angels had nothing to do with Plaintiff’s family calling. ( at 6). Plaintiff himself admits in

his Complaint that he was seen in the infirmary multiple times on the date of the incident,

was instructed that his bandage would need changing every two hours, and was given a

seven-dayS nteow-daurtty vs.t aMtuusr pahsy a result of his injuries. (Rec. doc. 5 at 4-5).

In , the Fifth Circuit held that prison officials did not act with

deliberate indifference when the officials cleansed and treated the inmate’s bedsores and

transferred the inmate to another hospital for examination when thRea sinpmbeartrey’ sv .s oJorhens sdoind not

significantly improve. 174 F.3d 530 (5th Cir. 1999). Similarly, in , the

Fifth Circuit held that the plaintiff-inmate who sustained a hand injury and bruised head

had failed to allege either a serious medical condition or deliberate indifference to a serious

medical condition when the injuries healed on their own, he did not suffer any broken

bones in his hand, and he was examined by medical personnel for his injuries. No. 00-

40591, 281 F.3d 1279, 2001 WL 1692S4t9e4w, aartt *1 (5thR aCsirp.b Neorrvy. 29, 2001).

Similar to the complaints in and , the facts and allegations in

Plaintiff’s Complaint are insufficient to satisfy the stringent “deliberate indifference”

standard. Plaintiff alleges no further pain and/or suffering at the time that he filed his

Complaint and alleges no permanent damage. There are certainly no allegations in his

Complaint that would evince a wanton disregard for any of Plaintiff’s serious medical

needs. Therefore, Plaintiff has not carried his burden of alleging an Eighth Amendment

violation based on deliberate indifference to his medical needs, and his claims are

dismissed with p rejudice.

2. Conditions of Confinement

Plaintiff also asserts a claim regarding his conditions of confinement at RCC. This

claim appears to be levelled at Captain Barry Pittman who, according to Plaintiff, is the

supervisor of the kitchen where Plaintiff injured his hand on the meat slicer. (Rec. doc. 5 at

5). As noted above, Plaintiff alleges that “no protection was around the blade of the deli

slicer, neither was officers preIsde.nt when the machine was in use, even with the plaintiff

suffering medical condition.” ( ). Specifically, Plaintiff alleges that

It is well established that an employer has an obligation to provide his

employees with a working place and conditions which are reasonably safe

considering the nature of work.

However, in the instant civil action Plaintiff was placed in danger due

to the machinery being unsafe to perform task. The deli slicer was designed

to be operated with a blade protector and finger guard when the equiptment

[sic] is in use, Also the deli slicer is suppose to be operation under the

supervision of kitchen security. Whereas kitchen security had known idea

the finger guard existed. Had Captin Barry Pittman ben ServSafe certified,

Plaintiff would not have been assigned that job because of his medical

conditions deems him incapable to do so because of limited use of right

arm/no weight bearing, medical duty status.

(Rec. doc. 5 at 6) (quoted Ivde.rbatim). Plaintiff further alleges that he had never taken the

meat-slicing safety test. ( at 5). This allegation is, however, belied by the documents

attached to his Complaint and his ARP referenced in his Complaint. (Rec. docs. 5-2 at 1, 16-

2 at 2, 4-5). Plaintiff’s ARP indicates that Plaintiff had received safety training for “Buffalo

Slicer Safety,” and Plaintiff signed an Acknowledgement of Safety Training form on October

16, 2023, well before the subject incident. (Rec. doc. 16-2 at 4-5).

“In order to establish an Eighth Amendment violation regarding conditions of

confinement, an inmate must establish: first, that the deprivation alleged was sufficiently

serious (i.e., an official’s act or omission must have resulted in the denial of the ‘minimal

civilized measure of life’s necessitieHs’e)r manadn sve. cHoonlidd,a tyhat the prison official possessed a

sufficienFtalrym ceurlpable state of mind.” , 238 F.3d 660, 664 (5th Cir. 2001)

(citing , 511 U.S. at 834). “In prison-conditioFnasr mcaesres, that state of mind is Woniles oonf

‘vd. eSliebieterrate indifference’ to inmate health or safety.” , 511 U.S. at 834 (citing

principle that ‘Iodn. ly the unWneiclseosnsary and wanton infliction of pain implicates the Eighth

Amendment.’” (quoting , 501 U.S. at 297).

“To meet the first requirement, the prisoner must show that the conditions, either

alone or in combination, constitute an ‘unquestioned and serious deprivation’ of his ‘basic

hHuompea nv. nHeaerdrsis’ such as food, clothing, medical care, and safe and sanitary living conditions.”

, 861 F. App’x 571, 582 (5th Cir. 202P1a)t. i n“ Evx. tLreeBmlaen dceprivations are required

to make out a conditions-of-confinement claim.” H udson v. McMilla, nNo. 11-3071, 2012 WL

3109402, at *12 (E.D. La. May 18, 2012) (citing , 503 U.S. 1, 9 (1992))

(alterations omitted). “As to the second requiremeIndt., the prisoner mFuarsmt sehrow that the

defendant acted with more than merFea nrmegelrigence.” at 583 (citing , 511 U.S. at

835). As the Supreme Court stated in :

We hold instead that a prison official cannot be found liable under the Eighth

Amendment for denying an inmate humane conditions of confinement unless

the official knows of and disregards an excessive risk to inmate health or

safety; the official must both be aware of facts from which the inference

could be drawn that a substantial risk of serious harm exists, and he must

also draw the inference. This approach comports best with the text of the

Amendment as our cases have interpreted it. The Eighth Amendment does

not outlaw cruel and unusual “conditions”; it outlaws cruel and unusual

“punishments.”

511 U.S. at 837.

Sampso“nIn v .g eKninegral, the state has a responsibility to protect Stthree estaefre tvy. Hoof piptse rprisoners.”

, 693 F.2d 566, 569 (5th Cir. 1982) (citing , 618 F.2d

1178, 1182 (5th Cir. 1980)). “In operating a prison, however, the state is not

constitutionally reqIdu.ired to observe all the safety and health standards applicable to

private industryI.”d . “Nor is it bound by the standards set by the safety codes of private

organizations.” “In certain circumstances, prison work conditions may amount to cruel

Jackson v. Cain

and unusual punishment.” , 864 F.2d 1235, 1245 (5th Cir. 1989) (holding

that working conditions, in and of themselves, did not violate the Eighth Amendment, when

plaintiff claimed that shoveling un-shucked corn in the summer heat, in contradiction to

medical doctors’ advice that he stay out of the sun due to his syphilis diagnosis, without a

mask caused nose bleeds, hair loss, and facial sores). However, “this is the case only when

prison officials knowingly compel convicts to perform physical labor which is beyond their

sHtorewnagrtdh or which constitutes a danger to their lives or health, or which is unduly painful.”

, 707 F.2d at 220. “[I]f prison officials assign an inmate to work detail and they

know that such an assignment could exacerbate aM seenrdioouzas vp.h Lyysnicaaulg ahilment, then such a

decision could constitute deliberate indifference.” , 989 F.2d 191, 194

(5th Cir. 1993). “[T]he constitutionality of a particular working condition must be

eJavcaklusoanted in light of the particular medical conditions of the complaining prisoner.”

, 864 F.2d at 1246.

Despite Plaintiff’s claim that his medical conditions rendered him incapable of

performing his job in the kitchen, Plaintiff’s Offender Duty Status, which was issued to him

on December 13, 2023, did not state that Plaintiff was unable to perform his kitchen duties.

(Rec. doc. 5-1 at 1). Specifically, Plaintiff’s duty status provided that Plaintiff “may do any

work assignment not specifically prohibited on the medIidc.al duty status form” and

“prohibited [Plaintiff] from participating in contact sports.” ( ). Plaintiff’s duty status did

not prohibit him from workinIgd h. is kitchen assignment, nor did his duty status prohibit him

from operating equipment. ( ). The ARP referenced in Plaintiff’s Complaint reveals that

Plaintiff was both trained to use the deli slicer, (rec. docs. 5-2 at 1, 16-2 at 5), and was able

to do so within the bounds of his duty status. (Rec. doc. 5-1 at 1). As such, Plaintiff’s

allegation that his kitchen job exceeded Sheies dJeuttty v s. tKaetiutsh is a conclusory statement supported

by neither his Complaint nor his ARP. , No. 15-CV-215, 2015 WL 4395042,

at *4 (W.D. La. Jul. 16, 2015) (holding that inmate’s claim that his kitchen job exceeded his

duty status was conclusory when inmate failed to provide facts indicating

when/where/how/who required him to perform labor beyonda hffi’sd duty status limitations,

and what he was required to do that exceeded the limitations), , 667 F. App’x. 465 (5th

Cir. 2016). This conclusory allegation does not rise to the requisite level to show that

Pittman acted with deliberate indifference to Plaintiff’s safety in violation of Plaintiff’s

constitutional rights in assigning him to the kitchen.

Plaintiff also asserts liability under Section 1983 due to the “machinery being unsafe

to perform task” because of the missing blade protector/finger guard. (Rec. doc. 5 at 6).

Federal courts in Louisiana and in other jurisdictions have addressed cases in which

inmates have alleged Eighth Amendment violations in tBheo wcieo nvt. ePxrto coufn iperrison safety

equipment and defective prison equipment. For example, in , the United

States Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals held that prison officials did not violate the Eighth

Amendment when the inmate lost sight in one eye when not provided safety goggles while

chopping wood, as the Eighthn Aemgleignednmt ent’s prohibition of cruel and unusual punishment

“is simply not implicated by a act of an official . . . .” 808 F.2d 1142, 1142 (5th Cir.

1987) (emphasis in original). Nevers v. Holiday

As another example, in , the plaintiff-inmate was injured while

working in the kitchen when a nozzle “jumped off” and he sustained second and third

dreepgorrete abnudr nrse ctoom hmis ehnadnadtsio. n Naod.o 0p8te-1d316, 2010 WL 1795202, at *1 (W.D. La. Apr. 1, 2010),

, No. 08-1316, 2010 WL 1812763 (W.D. La. Apr. 30,

Id.

2010). He claimed that no one had tested the pot before he used it. The United States

District Court for the Western District of Louisiana held that the facts alleged in the

plaintiff’s complaint did not support a finding that the defenIdda. nt’s conduct was sufficiently

harmful enough to deprive him of life’s basic necessities ( at *2). The plaintiff did not

allege that the defendants knew the pot and/or nozzles were defective, nor did the plaintiff

allege any facts indicating that the defendants knowingly and unnecessarily placed Ihdi.m in a

dangerous enviOrosonlminesknit vto. Kthaen eextent that his constitutional rights were violated.1

And, in , the United States Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals held that

prison officials did not violate the Eighth Amendment in failing to repair a malfunctioning

oven door, which fell off and burned the plaintiff’s arm. 92 F.3d 934, 936. 939 (9th Cir.

1996). The Ninth Circuit held that “[Ind]. ot every deviation from ideally safe conditions

amounts to a constitutional violation.” at 938. The court further noted that the plaintiff

had failed to allege any exacerbating safety hazards, like insufficient lighting, nor had the

plaintiff “pled any conditions which rendered him unable to provide for his own safety in

the sense that they precluded him from aIvdo.iding the faulty oven door or rendered him

unable to perceive its defective condition.”

Plaintiff is unable to meet either of the aforementioned requirements to establish an

Eighth Amendment violation regarding conditions of confinement. Even taking Plaintiff’s

allegations as true, Plaintiff has failed to establish that his assignment to the kitchen staff or

his operation of the deli slicer, which allegedly lacked protective equipment, rises to the

level of an “unquestioned and serious deprivation of his basic Hhuompea vn. Hneaerdriss such as food,

clothing, medical care, and safe and sanitary living conditions,” , 861 F. App’x

571, 582 (5th Cir. 2021), or establish that Pittman “kn[ew] of and disregard[ed] an

Farmer

excessive risk to [his] health or safety . . . .” , 511 U.S. at 837. First, the record

reveals that Plaintiff had, in fact, received safety training in operating the deli slicer prior to

the subject incident. (Rec. doc. 16-2 at 4-5). Second, Pittman did not act with deliberate

indifference in assigning Plaintiff to the kitchen in violation of his medical condition, as

Plaintiff’s duty status did not prohibit him from operating the deli slicer. (Rec. doc. 5-1 at

5). Third, the facts alleged by Plaintiff regarding the lack of a finger guard on the deli slicer

do not rHisoep teo such a level that would constitute a “serious deprivation of his basic human

needs,” , 861 F. App’x at 582), and support a finding of a violation of Plaintiff’s Eighth

Amendment rights. In short, Plaintiff’s allegations do not rise to the requisite level to show

that Pittman acted with deliberate indifference to Plaintiff’s safety in violation of Plaintiff’s

constitutional ri ghts, nor has Plaintiff alleged a “sufficiently serious” deprivation.

3. Injunctive Relief

While Plaintiff fails to specifically ask for injunctive relief in his Complaint, in his

ARP he asked for “no retaliation behind this ARP” and “that his injury be taken more

serious then [sic] as is from this day forward until it is healed.” (Rec. doc. 16-2 at 31).

Wi tEhx rPeagratred Y toou nagn y claim against Matney and Pittman in their official capacities,

under the doctrine, a state official in his or her official capacity may be sued

for prospective relief to stop an ongoing vioYloautinogn of the Constitution or federal law. 209

U.S. 123 (1908). To determine whether applies, “a court need only conduct a

‘straightforward inquiry into whether [the] complaint alleges an onVgeoriinzogn vMiodla., tiIonnc. , ovf.

fPeudbe. rSael rlva. wCo amnmd ’nse oefk Ms dre. lief properly characterized as prospIdeachtiov ev..’ ”C o eur d’Alene Tribe of

Idaho , 535 U.S. 635, 645 (2002) (quoting

, 521 U.S. 261, 296 (1997) (additional citation omitted)). Here, this Court has found

no violation of federal law as Defendants did not violate Plaintiff’s Eighth Amendment

constitutional rights. Accordingly, any injunctive relief against Matney or Pittman in their

official capacities would be inappropriate.

And to the extent that Plaintiff attempts to assert a retaliation claim against

Defendants in their individual capacities, he has no viable claim as he has only made

conclusory allegations. With respect to such retaliation claims, the Fifth Circuit has held:

“To prevail on a claim of retaliation, a prisoner must establish (1) a specific constitutional

right, (2) the defendant’s intent to retaliate against the prisMonceDro fnoarl dh ivs. Sotre whearr dexercise of

that right, (3) a retaliatory adverse act, and (4) causation.” , 132 F.3d

225, 231 (5th Cir. 1995). Individual capacity claims “Jmacukssto bne v p. Wleaiddneadl lwith ‘factual detail

and particularity,’ noStc hmueltreea c ov.n Wcluosoodry allegations.” , 99 F.3d 710 (5th

Cir. 1996) (quoting , 47 F.3d 1427, 1430 (5th Cir. 1T9w9o5m))b. l y“Allegations

must be enough to raise a right to relief above the speculative level.” , 550 U.S. at

555. OvTerhaolml, p“s[pon]e vr.s oSnteaell einvolvement is an essential element of a civil rights cause of

action.” , 709 F.2d 381, 382 (5th Cir. 1983). In his Complaint, Plaintiff

makes no allegations that Matney or Pittman took any retaliatory adverse action against

him for having filed his ARP or this Complaint. Such a lack of factual support is fatal to his

claim of retaliati on.

4. Leave to Amend generally

“When the dismissal of a pro se complaint is appropriate, it should be done

without prejuAdldiecers oinn vo. rCdoenr cotor diaall oPwar . thCeo rrp. laFianctiilfift yan opportunity to file an amended

complaint.” , 848 F.3d 415, 423 (5th Cir. 2017).

(emphasis added) (citation omitted).

“However, a district court may dismiss with prejudice if the plaintiff has been given

adequate opportunity to cure the inadequaciesb eisnt chaisse pleIda.ding or if the Jpalceqaudeizn gvs.

‘Pdreomcuonnisetrrate that the plaintiff has pleaded his .’” (first quoting

, 801 F.2d 789, 792-93 (5th Cir. 1986) (affirming dismissal with prejudice for

failure to state a claim when plaintiff did not file a supplemental complaint but did file an

extensive response to the defendants' motion to dismiss, alleging facts that suggested

nBeregwligsetenrc ve. Dbruett kneot deliberate indifference in a Section 1983 action) and then citing

, 587 F.3d 764, 768 (5th Cir. 2009) (parffoi rsmeing d inis fmorismsaal pwaiutphe prrise judice of

Section 1983 action brought by an inmate proceeding and who had

no opportunity to amend his complaint but who was given a questionnaire to bring his

claims into focus)).

This Court will “freely give leave [to amend] whenH ajulbsteircte v s. oC riteyq oufi rSehse,”r mFeadn. ,R T. eCxi.v. P.

15(a), but leave to amend “is by no means automatic.” , 33

F.3d 526, 529 (5th Cir. 1994) (citation omitted). In exercising its discretion, this Court may

consider such factors as “undue delay, bad faith, or dilatory motive on the part of the

movant, repeated failure to cure deficiencies by amendments previously allowed, undue

prejudice to theN ooplapno svin. gM p/aVr tSyA bNyT vEi rFtuEe of allowance of the amendment, and futGilriteyg oorf yt hve.

aMmitecnhdelml ent.” , 25 F.3d 1043 (5th Cir. 1994) (citing

, 635 F.2d 199, 203 (5th MCiarr. u1c9c8i 1Sp))o. r t“sA, Ln. La.Cm. evn. Ndmate’ln Cto ilsle fguiatitlee Aift hitle wtico uAlsds 'nfail to

survive a Rule 12(b)(6) motion.” , 751

F.3d 368, 378 (5th Cir. 2014) (citation omitted). Applying those factorsG ihlcehrree, atshee vC. oDu.Rrt.

finds that any amendment regarding Plaintiff's claims would be futile,

Horton, Inc. - Gulf Coast

, No. CV 24-358, 2024 WL 3223918, at *1 (E.D. La. May 16, 2024),

because Plaintiff has pleaded his best case under the circumstances.

With regard to any official capacity claims against Defendants, no amendment can

cure a finding that they are not “persons” under Section 1983. And with regard to any

individual capacity claims against them, Plaintiff has pleaded his best-case scenario. He has

alleged all the facts that occurred during and after his incident, and these facts still cannot

rise to the level necessary to plead justiciable claims under the Eighth Amendment.

Plaintiff filed no opposition to Defendants’ motion to dismiss in order to clarify or enlarge

any glaring deficiencies as pointed out in Defendants’ motion. Neither has he moved for

any type of discovery since Defendants appeared in this lawsuit in August of this year to

further bolster any underlying facts. In short, he has done nothing to advance his claims or

prove to this Court that he has alleged plausible claims under the Eighth Amendment. For

these reasons, the Court finds that no amendment can render Plaintiff’s claims viable under

IthVe. EighCtohn Aclmuesniodnment.

FITo rI tSh eO fRoDreEgRoEinDg reasons,

that Motion to Dismiss (recG. RdAoNc.T 1E6D) filed by Defendants Nurse

CDaIsSsManISdSrEaD M WatInTeHy PaRnEdJ UCDapICtaEin Barry Pittman is , and Plaintiff’s claims are

.

December

New Orleans, Louisiana, this day of , 2025.

MICHAEL B. NORTH

UNIT ED ST ATES M AGIST RATE JUDGE