The opinion
Case: 25-60020 Document: 64-1 Page: 1 Date Filed: 12/10/2025
United States Court of Appeals
for the Fifth Circuit United States Court of Appeals
Fifth Circuit
____________ FILED
December 10, 2025
No. 25-60020 Lyle W. Cayce
____________ Clerk
Debra Mays Jackson,
Plaintiff—Appellee,
versus
Tom Duff, Individual and official capacity;
Steven Cunningham, Only in his individual capacity;
Bruce Martin, Only in his individual capacity;
Jeanne Carter Luckey, Only in her individual capacity;
Chip Morgan, Only in his individual capacity;
Gee Ogletree, Only in his individual capacity;
Hal Parker, Only in his individual capacity;
J. Watt Starr, Only in his individual capacity,
Defendants—Appellants.
______________________________
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Southern District of Mississippi
USDC No. 3:23-CV-3095
______________________________
Before Smith, Stewart, and Haynes, Circuit Judges.
Jerry E Smith, Circuit Judge:
Debra Mays Jackson, Vice President of Jackson State University
(“JSU”), sued members of the Mississippi Board of Trustees of State Insti-
tutions of Higher Learning (the “Board”) in their individual capacities, alleg-
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ing equal protection sex discrimination claims, after she was not hired to be
President of JSU. Defendants moved to dismiss, invoking qualified immun-
ity (“QI”). The district court denied defendants’ motion to dismiss and the
QI defense asserted therein. Defendants appeal. Because Mays Jackson ade-
quately pleaded a clearly established Equal Protection Clause violation, we
affirm.
I.
Mays Jackson is a female senior administrator at JSU. She holds
bachelor’s, master’s, specialist, and doctorate degrees, and she has experi-
ence in university administration, having served as vice president of Hinds
Community College. The individual defendants—Tom Duff, Steven Cun-
ningham, Jeanne Carter Luckey, Bruce Martin, Chip Morgan, Gee Ogletree,
J. Walt Starr, and Hal Parker—are members of the Board, which is a state
agency charged with governing Mississippi’s public universities and vested
with the power to hire the president of each Mississippi state university,
including JSU.
Mays Jackson has served as JSU’s Vice President and Chief of Staff
since 2017. On February 10, 2020, JSU’s president, William Bynum,
stepped down from his role. The Board then appointed Bynum’s special
assistant, Thomas Hudson, a male, as JSU’s interim president, even though
he reported to Mays Jackson—and despite the Board’s knowledge that Mays
Jackson was interested in the post, as she had “regularly run JSU in Bynum’s
absence.” Mays Jackson continued as Vice President and Chief of Staff dur-
ing Hudson’s interim presidency—at Hudson’s request and acknowledg-
ment that “he was not qualified or prepared to serve.” Soon thereafter, the
Board dispensed with a national search, declined to solicit any applications,
and instead voted to appoint Hudson as JSU’s twelfth president. Mays Jack-
son filed an EEOC charge in 2021 following that incident, alleging the Board
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had “discriminated against [Mays Jackson] on account of her sex when its
policymakers” voted to hire Hudson as President “without allowing appli-
cants clearly [more] qualified” to apply for the president position.
After a turbulent tenure as president, Hudson was placed on admin-
istrative leave in March 2023. The Board members began the presidential
search process. Mays Jackson applied but was denied an interview. The
committee selected Marcus Thompson, Deputy Commissioner of the Board,
for the presidency.
Thompson never applied for the position. Mays Jackson alleges that,
based on the criteria the Board gave to an outside search committee, she “was
clearly more qualified for the President’s position” because Thompson
received his doctorate degree less than six months before he was named presi-
dent, and he had no university administrative experience before his
appointment.
Mays Jackson sued the Board and its individual members based on the
2020 and 2023 hiring decisions, alleging defendants had discriminated
against her on the basis of sex. Mays Jackson asserted violations of the Four-
teenth Amendment’s Equal Protection Clause and the First Amendment via
42 U.S.C. § 1983. She also brought sex discrimination and retaliation claims
under Title VII. Relevant to this appeal, the individual defendants moved to
dismiss, asserting QI.
The district court granted the motion in part, dismissing all claims
against the board members except for the § 1983 equal protection claim based
on the 2023 hiring decision. 1 The court first held that Mays Jackson alleged
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1
The district court further denied the motion to dismiss as to Jackson’s Title VII
claims against the Board. The only issue before this court on appeal is the denial of the
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“a prima facie case of sex discrimination for failure to promote against the
individually named defendants who voted to instate Thompson as JSU Pres-
ident in 2023.” Next, the court held that because it was clearly established
that “failure to promote an employee based on their relationship in a pro-
tected class was constitutionally proscribed [under the Fourteenth Amend-
ment] at the time of the purported misconduct,” QI was inappropriate.
Defendants appeal.
II.
The court has jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291 to review final
judgments. 28 U.S.C. § 1331. Because Mays Jackson’s claims arise under
§ 1983, and the denial of QI is a “final decision” under § 1291, 2 this court has
jurisdiction over defendants’ appeal.
This court reviews the denial of a motion to dismiss de novo. Bevill v.
Fletcher, 26 F.4th 270, 274 (5th Cir. 2022). To survive a motion to dismiss,
“a complaint must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to
‘state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.’” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S.
662, 678 (2009) (quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570
(2007)). “These standards are the same when a motion to dismiss is based
on [QI]. So, a complaint survives dismissal if it pleads facts that, if true,
would permit the inference that defendants are liable under § 1983 and would
overcome their [QI] defense. Thus, it is the plaintiff's burden to demonstrate
that [QI] is inappropriate.” Benfer v. City of Baytown, 120 F.4th 1272, 1279
_____________________
motion to dismiss Jackson’s § 1983 equal protection claim arising from the 2023 hiring
decision.
2
“[A] district court's denial of a claim of [QI], to the extent that it turns on an issue
of law, is an appealable ‘final decision’ within the meaning of 28 U.S.C. § 1291 notwith-
standing the absence of a final judgment.” Mitchell v. Forsyth, 472 U.S. 511, 530 (1985).
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(5th Cir. 2024) (citation modified), cert. denied, 145 S. Ct. 1313 (2025).
III.
“The doctrine of [QI] protects public officials from liability for civil
damages ‘insofar as their conduct does not violate clearly established statu-
tory or constitutional rights of which a reasonable person would have
known.’” Jennings v. Patton, 644 F.3d 297, 300 (5th Cir. 2011) (quoting Pear-
son v. Callahan, 555 U.S. 223, 231 (2009)). Where a defendant asserts QI,
“the burden shifts to the plaintiff to show that the defense is not available.”
Trent v. Wade, 776 F.3d 368, 376 (5th Cir. 2015).
“[A] plaintiff seeking to overcome [QI] must show: (1) that the official
violated a statutory or constitutional right, and (2) that the right was clearly
established at the time of the challenged conduct.” Carmona v. City of
Brownsville, 126 F.4th 1091, 1096 (5th Cir. 2025). “Therefore, to succeed in
opposition to QI asserted in a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss, even where
plaintiff adequately pleads the violation of a federal right, plaintiff still must
adequately plead that defendant’s conduct was objectively unreasonable in
light of clearly established law.” Id. (citation modified).
A.
Jackson alleges that defendants discriminated against her on the basis
of sex, violating the Fourteenth Amendment’s Equal Protection Clause.
“To state a claim of [sex] discrimination under the Equal Protection
Clause and section 1983, the plaintiff ‘must allege . . . that [she] received
treatment different from that received by similarly situated individuals and
that the unequal treatment stemmed from a discriminatory intent.’” Bowlby
v. City of Aberdeen, 681 F.3d 215, 227 (5th Cir. 2012) (quoting Priester v.
Lowndes Cnty., 354 F.3d 414, 424 (5th Cir. 2004)). “[D]iscriminatory intent
can be shown in the same way under § 1983 as under Title VII—by either
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direct or circumstantial evidence.” Jones v. Hosemann, 812 F. App’x 235,
238 (5th Cir. 2020) (citing Lee v. Conecuh Cnty. Bd. of Educ., 634 F.2d 959,
961–62 (5th Cir. Jan. 1981)). To establish a prima facie case of discrimination
using circumstantial evidence under the McDonnell Douglas framework at the
motion-to-dismiss stage, a plaintiff must plead that “(1) he is a member of a
protected class; (2) he was qualified and applied for the job; (3) the employer
rejected him for the job despite his qualifications; and (4) a similarly situated
applicant outside the protected class was hired.” Chhim v. Univ. of Tex. at
Austin, 836 F.3d 467, 470 (5th Cir. 2016); see also McDonnell Douglas Corp. v.
Green, 411 U.S. 792 (1973). 3
“But Title VII and § 1983 are different in at least one important way.
Critically, ‘[u]nlike Title VII, § 1983 applies to individuals.’ And since § 1983
applies to individuals, we must be keenly aware of what § 1983 requires before
plaintiffs can seek relief from individuals—namely individual causation.”
Jones, 812 F. App’x at 238 (quoting Sims v. City of Madisonville, 894 F.3d 632,
640–41 (5th Cir. 2018) (per curiam)). After all, in a § 1983 suit, “a plaintiff
must plead that each Government-official defendant, through the official’s
own individual actions, has violated the Constitution.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 676.
“Thus, while the prima facie elements of a Title VII claim may establish an
employer’s liability for intentional discrimination, a § 1983 plaintiff must addi-
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3
Defendants have not forfeited arguments related to discriminatory intent. They
contended in their motion to dismiss that Mays Jackson could not succeed under McDonnell
Douglas because she did not sufficiently plead that she was qualified for the role of President
or that she was similarly situated to Thompson. Because defendants affirmatively rebutted
elements of a discriminatory intent test before the district court, they have not waived their
argument that Jackson failed to prove discriminatory intent. “Moreover, it is quite possible
that the strictures of waiver are relaxed in the context of invoking QI because ‘[o]nce the
defense . . . has been raised, the plaintiff has the burden of demonstrating that (1) the official
violated a statutory or constitutional right, and (2) the right was ‘clearly established’ at the
time.’” Terrell v. Allgrunn, 114 F.4th 428, 440 (5th Cir. 2024) (quoting McClelland v. Katy
Indep. Sch. Dist., 63 F.4th 996, 1005 (5th Cir. 2023)).
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tionally plead and prove which actions of the individual defendant caused the
harm.” Jones, 812 F. App’x at 239 (citing Sims, 894 F.3d at 641).
Jackson has pleaded the four traditional McDonnell Douglas factors.
First, she pleaded that she is a woman, a protected class. Second, she pleaded
that she was qualified for the position based on the criteria the Board gave to
the outside search firm, providing details on her extensive professional and
academic experience. Third, she pleaded that she was not hired, an adverse
employment action. See Hamilton v. Dallas Cnty., 79 F.4th 494, 499–500 (5th
Cir. 2023). Fourth, by pleading Thompson’s lack of relevant experience, she
alleged that that she was similarly situated to Thompson, a man.
Though Mays Jackson pleaded the four traditional McDonnell Douglas
factors, she must still aver that each “official’s own individual actions[] has
violated the Constitution.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 676. This court examined the
individual causation requirement as applied to the employment context in
Jones, which, though unpublished, provides useful guidance. 4 In Jones,
812 F. App’x at 239, the court ruled that an employee did not adequately
plead individual causation after he was not promoted. The court explained
that Jones did “not allege that the [defendants] were the ones who inter-
viewed him, rejected him, or selected someone else for the job.” Id. “By not
alleging any particular actions taken by the individual defendants, Jones failed
to adequately state a § 1983 [discrimination] claim upon which relief can be
granted.” Id.
Mays Jackson pleaded what Jones did not. Mays Jackson alleged that
“JSU Search Committee members Steven Cunningham, Ormella Cum-
mings, Bruce Martin, Gee Ogletree and Hal Parker denied Mays Jackson an
interview for the President’s position.” Further, she alleged that “Steven
_____________________
4
Both briefs heavily cite Jones in support of their positions.
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Cunningham, Ormella Cummings, Tom Duff, Teresa Hubbard, Jeanne Car-
ter Luckey, Bruce Martin, Chip Morgan, Gee Ogletree, J. Walt Starr, Chip
Morgan, Gregg Rader and Hal Parker also voted to name Marcus Thompson
as President,” thus denying her the position.
Defendants assert that “Mays Jackson fails to reference the individual
actions of any of the Defendants-Appellants, and instead continues to lump
them together in their entirety based on their service on the IHL Board.” But
at the motion-to-dismiss stage we must view the pleaded facts in the light
most favorable to the plaintiff. Dorsey v. Portfolio Equities, Inc., 540 F.3d 333,
338 (5th Cir. 2008). Mays Jackson’s naming of each individual board mem-
ber and alleging that they voted to hire Thompson as President, denying
Mays Jackson’s candidacy, must be construed as asserting that each indi-
vidual member voted and therefore proximately caused the alleged constitu-
tional injury. As a result, Mays Jackson has adequately pleaded that each
defendant individually caused her alleged injury.
Because Mays Jackson asserted facts establishing a prima facie case of
sex discrimination, and she pleaded that each defendant individually caused
her alleged constitutional harm, she has adequately stated an equal protection
violation.
B.
Though Mays Jackson has pleaded a constitutional violation, she must
also allege that defendants violated clearly established law. Carmona,
126 F.4th at 1096. A government official “violates clearly established law
when, at the time of the challenged conduct, the contours of the right are
sufficiently clear that every reasonable official would have understood that
what he is doing violates that right.” Ashcroft v. al-Kidd, 563 U.S. 731, 741
(2011) (citation modified). Although a case does not have to be “directly on
point for a right to be clearly established, existing precedent must have placed
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the statutory or constitutional question beyond debate.” Kisela v. Hughes,
584 U.S. 100, 104 (2018).
“Sex discrimination . . . in public employment violate[s] the Equal
Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.” Southard v. Tex. Bd. of
Crim. Just., 114 F.3d 539, 550 (5th Cir. 1997). “[O]fficials generally are pre-
cluded from proving that intentionally discriminatory conduct is objectively
reasonable. . . . Thus, generally, where the [pleading] is sufficient to support
a claim of intentional gender or race discrimination, any immunity defense
will be foreclosed.” Piatt v. City of Austin, 378 F. App’x 466, 469 (5th Cir.
2010) (citing Southard, 114 F.3d at 550). Because Mays Jackson has ade-
quately pleaded a claim of intentional sex discrimination under § 1983, she
has pleaded a violation of clearly established law, so QI is foreclosed at this
stage of the proceeding. Lauderdale v. Tex. Dep’t of Crim. Just., Institutional
Div., 512 F.3d 157, 166 (5th Cir. 2007) (“Because we have already deter-
mined that [the defendant’s] alleged behavior is actionable under title VII
and § 1983, we have necessarily determined that such behavior was objec-
tively offensive and, therefore, not objectively reasonable. Thus, [the defen-
dant] is not entitled to [QI].”).
*****
At this early, motion-to-dismiss stage, Mays Jackson has adequately
pleaded an equal protection violation. She stated a prima facie case of sex
discrimination and averred that each defendant individually caused her
alleged constitutional harm. Further, the claimed constitutional violation, if
true, is clearly established and objectively unreasonable. The judgment
denying dismissal is AFFIRMED.
We express no view as to the ultimate merits of any claim. Any such
merits will be determined beyond the pleading stage as this case advances to
summary judgment (if sought) or trial. We view only the pleadings and take
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them as true for purposes of evaluating the ruling on the motion to dismiss.
We place no limitation on the matters that the district court, in its discretion,
may choose to address and decide as this matter progresses beyond the
pleadings stage.
10