Betty Malia Bryant v. Shelby County Government

11/20/2025

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF TENNESSEE

AT JACKSON

June 18, 2025 Session

BETTY MALIA BRYANT v. SHELBY COUNTY GOVERNMENT, ET AL.

Appeal from the Chancery Court for Shelby County

No. CH-21-0922 Melanie Taylor Jefferson, Chancellor

___________________________________

No. W2024-00953-COA-R3-CV

___________________________________

This appeal arises from a petition for judicial review of a decision of the Shelby County

Civil Service Merit Board. The appellant worked as a cashier for the Shelby County

Trustee’s Office and was terminated after she experienced a cash shortage and attempted

to force balance. The Civil Service Merit Board conducted a review hearing and upheld

the termination. The appellant sought judicial review in the chancery court, which likewise

upheld the termination. The appellant filed this appeal claiming that her procedural due

process rights were violated, her termination was not in accordance with the policies and

procedures of Shelby County, and that the Civil Service Merit Board’s decision was

arbitrary and capricious. Discerning no error, we affirm.

Tenn. R. App P. 3 Appeal as of Right; Judgment of the Chancery Court Affirmed

CARMA DENNIS MCGEE, J., delivered the opinion of the court, in which J. STEVEN

STAFFORD, P.J., W.S., and KRISTI M. DAVIS, J., joined.

Maureen Truax Holland and Yvette H. Kirk, Memphis, Tennessee, for the appellant, Betty

Malia Bryant.

Katherine L. Frazier and R.H. “Chip” Chockley, Memphis, Tennessee, for the appellees,

Shelby County Government, and Shelby County Trustee.

OPINION

I. FACTS & PROCEDURAL HISTORY

Betty Malia Bryant was employed as the lead cashier at the Shelby County Trustee’s

Office. Ms. Bryant’s primary duty was to process tax payments submitted during the

Shelby County tax season, which runs from the beginning of October through the end of

February. During tax season, Ms. Bryant worked at “roving locations” throughout Shelby

County including locations in Whitehaven, Collierville, Bartlett, and Germantown. The

incidents leading to the present proceedings began occurring during the 2018-2019 tax

season. On February 18, 2019, Ms. Bryant received a “Disciplinary Action Form” after

she experienced a $100 cash shortage. The form stated that Ms. Bryant had engaged in

“neglect or carelessness resulting in damage to county property” and “[u]nsatisfactory

work.” She received an oral reprimand as discipline. Shortly thereafter, Ms. Bryant

received a second disciplinary form regarding two additional cash shortages that both

occurred on February 27, 2019. When combined, the shortages totaled $500. As

punishment, Ms. Bryant was issued a written reprimand and was placed on probation for

12 months. The remainder of the tax season appears to have proceeded without incident.

Subsequently, Ms. Bryant met with her superiors for a regular end-of-season review.

Ms. Bryant was asked to make suggestions that she believed would improve working

conditions. One of Ms. Bryant’s duties was to transport any cash payments accepted

throughout a workday to the bank for deposit. She informed her superiors that she believed

cashiers transporting money needed to be provided with security escorts. Conversations

regarding this topic continued throughout the following months, and eventually, police

escorts were arranged for both the Bartlett and Collierville locations. The Whitehaven

location did not require an escort because it was located inside a branch of the bank at

which the deposits were to be made. However, neither the Germantown Police Department

nor the Shelby County Sheriff’s Department would agree to provide a regular escort for

the worker at the Germantown location. Instead, Ms. Bryant’s superiors agreed to take

turns escorting her on days when she worked at the Germantown location. The 2019-2020

tax season began, and Ms. Bryant worked at the Germantown location each Monday. For

several weeks, she would communicate with her superiors regarding the escort, but none

would be provided due to scheduling conflicts or other such issues. Despite this, Ms.

Bryant continued to transport the deposits to the bank at the end of each workday.

On January 13, 2020, Ms. Bryant again worked at the Germantown location. The

manager scheduled to escort Ms. Bryant signaled she was going to leave a meeting with

her own superior in order to travel to the Germantown location. She informed her superior

that she was going to escort Ms. Bryant to the bank but was told by her superior, “[n]o, no,

you are not.” Subsequently, the parties met with the Shelby County Trustee (“the

Trustee”), and they called Ms. Bryant to inform her that no escort would be provided. Ms.

Bryant became upset, and she told the Trustee that she was concerned about her safety.

She agreed to take the deposits to the bank that day but claimed she would not do so in the

future. Shortly thereafter, Ms. Bryant was sent a letter identifying her decision to inform

leadership that she would no longer perform a regular job duty as insubordination. The

letter also noted that she “became disgruntled and insubordinate to not only [the Trustee],

but other leadership; going as far as to state what [she] would not do and what leadership

will do in a manner that lacked respect, team work [sic] and collaboration.” The letter

stated that it was a “final warning for Insubordination” and noted “any other occurrences

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of insubordination, unprofessional conduct or performance problems here after” would

subject Ms. Bryant “to disciplinary action up to and including termination.”

Unfortunately, on February 24, 2020, Ms. Bryant experienced another cash

shortage. Ms. Bryant later claimed to have “found” the missing money in her work bag.

The shortage initially appeared to be in the amount of $67.78. However, it was quickly

discovered that while Ms. Bryant had experienced a shortage of approximately $9.78, a

computer “glitch” had caused the remaining shortage. Ms. Bryant later admitted that she

had not “found” the missing money but had been attempting to “force balance” by

replacing it with her own. Ms. Bryant was suspended and shortly thereafter sent a

“Loudermill” letter informing her of “the possibility of major discipline” due to her

“inability to perform the duties of [her] position in a satisfactory manner over a course of

employment.” The letter stated that the proposed discipline stemmed from Ms. Bryant’s

“[i]nability to perform the duties of [her] position in a satisfactory manner over a course of

employment” and specifically referenced “Shelby County Policy #703, page 2, #2, ‘Acts

of incompetence’” as the description of the charges. In support of the charges, the letter

stated that multiple instances of conduct were being considered “including multiple cash

shortages, dishonesty in transaction activity, inability to follow Standard Operating

Procedures set in place when handling tax payer [sic] payments, and insubordination to

management, leadership and elected officials in the process of correcting issues.” The

letter also noted that “major disciplinary action up to and including termination [was] being

considered.”

A Loudermill hearing took place on March 9, 2020.1 During this meeting Ms.

Bryant participated in a discussion with two of her superiors regarding the charges.

Subsequently, these superiors determined that termination was the appropriate form of

discipline. Ms. Bryant appealed this decision to the Shelby County Civil Service Merit

Board (“the Board”). The Board held a hearing on the matter on April 1, 2021, in which

both Ms. Bryant and the trustee’s office were permitted to (1) examine witnesses, (2)

submit evidence, and (3) make legal arguments regarding the termination.

Ms. Stephanie Maness was the first witness to testify. Ms. Maness worked as an

operations manager in the Trustee’s office and was Ms. Bryant’s direct supervisor. She

began by explaining the incidents that led to Ms. Bryant’s termination. She recounted the

various cash shortages that occurred in 2019 and explained that these resulted in Ms. Bryant

receiving both an oral reprimand and a written reprimand. She also explained that she had

attempted to provide Ms. Bryant with certain operating techniques intended to prevent

shortages from occurring. However, Ms. Bryant refused to adopt the new operating

procedures and did not accept the instructional materials when presented with them. She

1

A Loudermill hearing has been described as “the first hearing in the grievance process, in which

the employee is given the opportunity to present reasons why he should not receive the proposed discipline.”

Thompson v. Memphis Light, Gas & Water, 416 S.W.3d 402, 408 n.7 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2011).

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noted that Ms. Bryant continued to have problems after the February 2019 incidents and

was placed on probation the following summer. Ms. Maness also detailed the events

leading to Ms. Bryant’s conflict with the Trustee. She explained that she was scheduled to

escort Ms. Bryant on the day in question and went to leave a meeting in order to do so. She

was questioned about the arrangement by her own superior, at which point they went to

discuss the matter with the Trustee. Ms. Bryant was then called and informed that she

would not be receiving an escort to make the deposits. Ms. Maness stated that Ms. Bryant

agreed to make the deposit that day but said it would be “the last time” she did so. She

stated that, during this phone call, Ms. Bryant also claimed that she had had several

traumatic experiences, which resulted in her fear of being robbed or harassed while

transporting deposits. Ms. Maness explained that this information had not been provided

beforehand and was not cited as the basis of the requested security escort during the end-

of-season meeting.

Ms. Maness stated that, shortly after these events, Ms. Bryant experienced the

$67.78 shortage. She explained that this incident was “odd” because she “was the last

person to know anything” despite being “the direct report” for such incidents. She

explained that while cashiers were out of balance on occasion, shortages of more than $20

were to be addressed immediately. The policy for that level of outage is “strict,” and Ms.

Maness explained she needed to be informed of them immediately so she could “address

it.” She stated that the day after the shortage occurred, “accounting [was] all up trying to

figure out what happened with [a] system glitch.” Meanwhile, Ms. Bryant claimed that

she had “found” the money in her work bag after returning home. Subsequently, the

computer issue was resolved, and it was determined that Ms. Bryant’s shortage had been

in the amount of $9.78 and the remainder had been caused by the computer issue. Ms.

Maness confronted Ms. Bryant about the fact that she had claimed to locate a $67.78

shortage when she had only experienced a $9.78 shortage. This indicated that she had

attempted to “force balance” which constituted a very serious offense. Ms. Maness did

later acknowledge that, in prior years, the office’s policy had been for anyone experiencing

a shortage to “make up” the difference by paying in their own money. However, this policy

had been discontinued prior to these events.

As a result of the February 2020 shortage, Ms. Maness proposed “major discipline,”

and the Loudermill notice was sent. Importantly, Ms. Maness testified that the Loudermill

notice itself served as the written form of discipline for the February 2020 shortage, rather

than the issuance of a disciplinary form as had been done previously. Ms. Maness was

asked to describe the hearing. She explained that she, Mr. Torrey Harris (a human

resources manager), and Ms. Bryant attended the meeting to discuss the incidents which

had occurred. Afterward, Mr. Harris and Ms. Maness determined that termination was the

appropriate level of discipline. Ms. Maness explained that they considered many of the

previous incidents that had occurred when determining the appropriate level of discipline.

This included the “final warning” that the Trustee sent to Ms. Bryant after the incident of

insubordination, the history of shortages, and the refusal to follow the techniques Ms.

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Maness had previously suggested as methods of avoiding future shortages. Ms. Maness

stated that she and Mr. Harris had discussed imposing “lesser discipline,” but due to the

history of “write-ups and discussions, one-on-one counseling,” and the provision of the

techniques intended to remedy Ms. Bryant’s issues, this was not possible. Ms. Maness

claimed that even if the incident of insubordination had not been considered, they still

would have terminated Ms. Bryant due to her poor job performance.

On cross-examination, Ms. Maness was asked about three end-of-year performance

reviews that pertained to Ms. Bryant. These reviews were derived from 2017, 2018, and

2019 respectively. Each performance review contained a manager evaluation. Ms. Bryant

scored in the “fully meets standards” range on each of these performance reviews. Ms.

Maness acknowledged that she had generated and signed these performance reviews.

Mr. Harris testified next. Mr. Harris explained that, after the Loudermill hearing

took place, he and Ms. Maness determined that termination was the appropriate level of

punishment for Ms. Bryant. He stated that termination was appropriate because “[Ms.

Bryant] was not capable of actually doing this role.” He further explained that there was

no lower-level position in which she could have been placed.

Mr. Harris was next asked about Shelby County Policy 703. This policy provides

that:

[e]very supervisor is expected to discuss improper or inadequate

performance with the employee in order to correct deficiencies and to avoid

the need to exercise disciplinary action. All disciplinary action shall be

documented and the original signed copy sent to the employee’s Master

Personnel File. Usually, discipline will be of an increasingly progressive

nature, the steps of progression begin:

1. Discussion and counseling

2. Oral reprimand

3. Written reprimand

4. Suspension without pay for a period not to exceed 30 days.

5. Reduction in pay within the pay range of the class or position held.

6. Demotion to a lower class

7. Dismissal

...

Disciplinary action steps have been delineated. They should be followed by

all departments and agencies in a consistent manner - “when progressive

discipline is appropriate” - in order to reduce employee grievances.

Supervisors and managers must become familiar with the sequence of steps

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to be taken in the discipline process.

Mr. Harris acknowledged that the disciplinary action steps are typically progressive in

nature but stated “[t]here are instances where you can skip a step or two.” He explained

that skipping steps in discipline is permitted so “long as it is consistent.” He acknowledged

that, in this case, certain steps of discipline had been skipped, and termination was

implemented instead. However, he stated that he had “an explanation for that.” He stated

that “there are certain reasons you would elevate to the next step [of discipline].” As an

example, he stated:

[s]ay you were an officer, and you ticketed somebody, and you got in an

argument. Yes, you get a written [form of discipline] and [would] be

suspended maybe. But if you shot ten people, then, obviously, they aren’t

going to sit there and say let’s suspend you for ten days. We are going to do

termination.

He further explained that the County is “required to follow the steps as best as possible in

the situation. Depending on that situation, you have the ability to skip a step.” He stated

that in the present situation, he believed that the circumstances warranted the skipping of

disciplinary steps.

Ms. Bryant was the final witness to testify. Ms. Bryant explained the circumstances

surrounding each of the events that led to an issuance of discipline. She began by

recounting the incident in which she experienced a $100 shortage while working at the

Trustee’s Whitehaven location. She explained that she reported the shortage, filled out

certain paperwork, and repaid the $100 in accordance with county policy at the time. She

received an oral reprimand as punishment. When asked about the circumstances

surrounding this incident, she explained that shortly before it occurred, the Trustee’s office

had stopped using “kiosk machines,” which permitted many taxpayers to pay without

interacting with a cashier. She claimed that when this stopped, there was a significant

increase in the number of customers she served per day. She stated that after “the kiosks

were taken away, the traffic was too much.”

She next discussed the two shortages that took place on February 27, 2019, and

totaled $500. She explained that this incident had occurred on an extremely busy day

during which she served approximately 180 taxpayers. She stated that “[i]t was, I believe,

the biggest day the County had ever had like that before.” She claimed that it was an

overwhelmingly busy and “chaotic” day, and this contributed to the shortage she

experienced.

Ms. Bryant next detailed the events leading to her insubordination. She first

requested security during an end-of-season review meeting with Mr. Joseph Lee and Ms.

Maness. She explained that she was concerned about her safety and transporting cash

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deposits to the bank alone. She informed them that “[she] just could not continue to do

that; it just was – it was too frightening, and it just got to be too much. It was too much

money.” She claimed that she told Mr. Lee about her anxiety and some previous muggings

of which she had been a victim. She stated that she had been mugged once when she was

19 years old and a second time in approximately 2015.2 However, she acknowledged that

she did not inform any of her other superiors of the mugging incidents until the date of the

insubordination incident. She maintained that she had been informed that she would

receive an escort while working at the Germantown location. However, when she arrived

in Germantown, she was told that no security was available. She stated that she was told

the County, “if they had someone available, that they would walk with [her] to the car.”

She called Mr. Lee to discuss the issue but nonetheless, took the payments to the bank

without an escort. At this point, it was determined that either Mr. Lee or Ms. Maness would

accompany her to the bank. For several weeks, Ms. Bryant worked each Monday at the

Germantown location and would be informed that no one was available to escort her to the

bank. Regardless, she made the deposit each day. She acknowledged that this led to the

phone call with the Trustee. She stated that she informed the Trustee she was upset about

the situation and likely cried. However, she denied having said anything inappropriate

though she acknowledged that she may have “said something loudly.” She denied having

done anything to constitute insubordination. She noted that she received an escort from

the Germantown Police Department when transporting deposits on the following four

Mondays.

Next, Ms. Bryant discussed the circumstances surrounding the February 2020

shortage. She conceded that she experienced the shortage and explained it caused her to

panic. When asked about her response, she claimed that she felt like she had nobody “to

go to” and “everybody was wanting to get rid of [her] or not wanting to help [her].” She

did not deny Ms. Maness’s account of the events and admitted she attempted to force

balance using her own money. She explained that she was informed a computer glitch had

occurred but was never told how the situation was resolved. Rather, Mr. Harris informed

her that she was being suspended while they “research[ed] the situation.”

On cross-examination, Ms. Bryant was asked whether Ms. Maness had provided her

with techniques to help her avoid incurring shortages. She agreed that she had been

provided with the techniques but claimed she had not refused to implement them. Rather,

she explained that it “took [her] awhile to get that into [her] routine of cashiering.” She

did concede that Ms. Maness wanted her to perform her job in a certain way, “but it wasn’t

for [her].” She claimed that despite preferring her own methods, she did eventually adopt

Ms. Maness’s techniques. Ms. Bryant was also asked about her conversation with the

Trustee in more detail. She was asked whether she thought an employee informing an

elected official that they “are going to do what [they] are told to do but, quote, this will be

the last time that I do it” constituted insubordination. Ms. Bryant responded, “[n]ot under

2

Ms. Bryant was 65 years old at the time of the trial.

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the circumstances at all to which I was put in.” She claimed that she had treated everyone

with respect. She pointed to the fact that she had informed them multiple times of the need

for security as the factor leading to this issue. This concluded the hearing.

The Board submitted its findings of fact on May 6, 2021. The Board determined

“that the Trustee’s Office had no lesser restrictive disciplinary action other tha[n]

termination to render to Ms. Bryant” and upheld the termination. Ms. Bryant filed a

“Petition for Judicial Review and Issuance of Writ” in the Shelby County Chancery Court

on July 2, 2021. The chancery court conducted a hearing on May 10, 2023, and

subsequently entered its written order on May 28, 2024, in which it upheld the Board’s

decision.3 Ms. Bryant filed this appeal.

II. Issues Presented

Ms. Bryant has presented the following issues on appeal, which we have slightly

reframed:

1. Whether Ms. Bryant’s procedural due process rights were violated by

insufficient notice.

2. Whether Ms. Bryant’s termination was unlawful due to the failure of the

trustee’s office to comply with the written policies and procedures of Shelby

County.

3. Whether the Board’s decision to uphold the termination was arbitrary and

capricious.

For the following reasons, the judgment of the chancery court is affirmed.

III. Discussion

A. Standard of Review

An appellate court reviews “the decision of a civil service merit board ‘affect[ing]

the employment status of a county or civil service employee’” in accordance with “the

standard of review outlined in the Uniform Administrative Procedures Act (“UAPA”).”

Moss v. Shelby Cnty. Civ. Serv. Merit Bd., 665 S.W.3d 433, 440 (Tenn. 2023) (quoting

Tenn. Code Ann. § 27-9-114(b)(1) (2000 & Supp. 2013). Importantly, “the UAPA

provides a more narrowly circumscribed standard” of review than the “‘broad standard of

review used in other civil appeals.’” Id. (quoting Tenn. Dep’t of Corr. v. Pressley, 528

S.W.3d 506, 512 (Tenn. 2017)). Under the UAPA standard of review in place at the time

that Ms. Bryant received her written notice of termination:

3

It is unclear from the record why such a long period of time elapsed between the date of the

hearing and the issuance of the chancery court’s final order.

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[t]he court may affirm the decision of the agency or remand the case for

further proceedings. The court may reverse or modify the decision if the

rights of the petitioner have been prejudiced because the administrative

findings, inferences, conclusions or decisions are:

(1) In violation of constitutional or statutory provisions;

(2) In excess of the statutory authority of the agency;

(3) Made upon unlawful procedure;

(4) Arbitrary or capricious or characterized by abuse of discretion or clearly

unwarranted exercise of discretion; or

(5)(A) Unsupported by evidence that is both substantial and material in the

light of the entire record.

(B) In determining the substantiality of evidence, the court shall take into

account whatever in the record fairly detracts from its weight, but the court

shall not substitute its judgment for that of the agency as to the weight of the

evidence on questions of fact.

Tenn. Code Ann. § 4-5-322(h)(2019).

As our Supreme Court has previously explained, “[r]eviewing courts may only

reverse, remand, or modify civil service merit board decisions ‘for errors that affect the

merits of such decision.’” Moss, 665 S.W.3d at 440 (quoting Tenn. Code Ann. § 4-5-

322(i)). Further, “the UAPA’s standard of review ‘reflects the general principle that courts

should defer to decisions of administrative agencies when they are acting within their area

of specialized knowledge, experience, and expertise.’” Id. at 441 (quoting StarLink

Logistics Inc. v. AAC, LLC, 494 S.W.3d 659, 669 (Tenn. 2016)). “Although [this Court’s]

review of the Board’s factual findings is confined to the provisions of Tennessee Code

Annotated section 4-5-322, [this Court’s] review of matters of law is de novo with no

presumption of correctness.” Davis v. Shelby Cnty. Sheriff’s Dep’t, 278 S.W.3d 256, 264

(Tenn. 2009) (citing Tenn. R. App. P. 13(d)).

B. Due Process

Ms. Bryant first claims that her procedural due process rights were violated because

“the information given to her did not properly give her notice under Loudermill.” The

United States Supreme Court decision in Cleveland Brd. of Educ. v. Loudermill established

that, in accordance with the principles of due process, a public employee who can be

discharged only for cause must be provided notice and an opportunity to respond to the

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charges against him or her prior to termination. 470 U.S. 532, 546 (1985). See also Moss

v. Shelby Cnty. Civ. Serv. Merit Bd., 597 S.W.3d 823, 824 n.3 (Tenn. 2020). As our

Supreme Court has previously explained:

[u]nder the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution,

no state may “deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due

process of law.” U.S. Const. amend. XIV, § 1. This Court has held that

Article I, section 8, of the Tennessee Constitution provides similar

protections. Lynch v. City of Jellico, 205 S.W.3d 384, 391 (Tenn. 2006)

(citing Willis v. Tenn. Dep’t of Corr., 113 S.W.3d 706, 711 n.4 (Tenn. 2003))

(recognizing that Article I, section 8 of the Tennessee Constitution “is

synonymous with the due process provisions of the federal constitution”). . .

.

The most fundamental element of due process is “the opportunity to

be heard ‘at a meaningful time and in a meaningful manner.’” Mathews v.

Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 333, 96 S.Ct. 893, 47 L.Ed.2d 18 (1976) (quoting

Armstrong v. Manzo, 380 U.S. 545, 552, 85 S.Ct. 1187, 14 L.Ed.2d 62

(1965)). “[N]otice and opportunity for [a] hearing appropriate to the nature

of the case” must precede the “deprivation of life, liberty or property.”

Mullane v. Cent. Hanover Bank & Trust Co., 339 U.S. 306, 313, 70 S.Ct.

652, 94 L.Ed. 865 (1950). Notice must be “reasonably calculated, under all

the circumstances, to apprise interested parties” of the claims against them.

Id. at 314, 70 S.Ct. 652 (citations omitted). Due process requires notice to

give affected individuals an opportunity for adequate preparation before an

impending hearing. Memphis Light, Gas & Water Div. v. Craft, 436 U.S. 1,

14, 98 S.Ct. 1554, 56 L.Ed.2d 30 (1978).

Under the standard set by Loudermill, [appellate courts] review[ ] pre-

termination and post-termination procedures “in tandem” to determine

whether the public employer satisfied the requirements of due process. See

Bailey v. Blount Cnty. Bd. of Educ., 303 S.W.3d 216, 231-32 (Tenn. 2010)

(citing Carter v. W. Reserve Psychiatric Habilitation Ctr., 767 F.2d 270, 273

(6th Cir. 1985); Case v. Shelby Cnty. Civil Serv. Merit Bd., 98 S.W.3d 167,

173 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2002)). “Elaborate procedures at one stage may

compensate for deficiencies at other stages.” Phillips v. State Bd. of Regents

of State Univ. & Cmty. Coll. Sys. of Tenn., 863 S.W.2d 45, 50 (Tenn. 1993)

(citing Bignall v. N. Idaho Coll., 538 F.2d 243, 246 (9th Cir. 1976)). The

question before us is whether [the employee] received adequate notice from

the pre-termination and post-termination procedures of the grounds on which

the Board upheld the [public entity’s] decision to terminate [her]

employment.

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Moss, 597 S.W.3d at 831. Ms. Bryant claims that the pre-termination Loudermill letter,

the Loudermill hearing, and the termination letter she received after the Loudermill hearing

were too vague to adequately notify her of the charges against her.4

Regarding the Loudermill notice, Ms. Bryant claims that it failed to place her on

notice because it did not contain the “instances of errors, issues, dishonesty in transactions,

when the alleged shortages took place, or the nature of the alleged insubordination.”

However, while the events in the letters are not associated with specific dates, enough

information was provided to alert a reasonable person of the events being referenced. See

Finney v. Franklin Special Sch. Dist. Bd. of Educ., 576 S.W.3d 663, 683 (Tenn. Ct. App.

2018) (explaining in the context of a teacher tenure matter that it is not necessary for notice

of discipline “to give a specific date or to give extensive details about” the incidents being

considered in order for the requirements of due process to be satisfied). The letter was sent

immediately following the February 2020 cash shortage. Ms. Maness testified that the

letter was intended to serve as the disciplinary notice for the incident. Further, the letter

specifically limited the additional issues being considered to those which had “occurred in

[her] work that were reviewed with [her] on multiple occasions over the [preceding] year.”

The letter also noted that several instances of conduct were being considered “including

multiple cash shortages, dishonesty in transaction activity, inability to follow Standard

Operating Procedures set in place when handling tax payer [sic] payments, and

insubordination to management, leadership and elected officials in the process of

correcting issues.” Even if the letter could have been more specific regarding the conduct

being considered, it was not so vague that a reasonable person would have been unaware

of the incidents being considered. It was sent in direct response to the February 2020

outage and described the events of the preceding year in a fashion that would apprise a

reasonable person of the likelihood of those events being discussed.

Ms. Bryant also raises issues with the Loudermill hearing itself. She points to the

lack of a record of the hearing and to the lack of testimony explaining its events. However,

Ms. Bryant has not explained how the Loudermill hearing was deficient; she has only raised

issue with the fact that little testimony was brought in regarding the details of the hearing.

She is correct that little testimony came in on the issue. However, Ms. Bryant’s counsel

was provided with the opportunity at the hearing before the Board to elicit testimony from

the three people who participated in the Loudermill hearing: Ms. Maness, Mr. Harris, and

Ms. Bryant herself. Counsel refrained from doing so. Further, Ms. Bryant never claimed

that she was unaware of the charges levied against her during the Loudermill hearing. The

only evidence on the matter indicates that she was aware. The post-hearing termination

letter states that Ms. Bryant “appeared, accepted, acknowledged, and apologized for [her]

actions and performance.” Ms. Bryant has not demonstrated that the events that took place

during her Loudermill hearing deprived her of “the opportunity to be heard ‘at a meaningful

4

The parties do not dispute the fact that Ms. Bryant held a property interest in her continued

employment.

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time and in a meaningful manner.’” Moss, 597 S.W.3d at 831 (quoting Mathews, 424 U.S.

at 333).

Ms. Bryant also claims that the termination letter she received did not include

enough detail regarding the basis for her termination. She has not explained how this letter

prevented her from forming a defense against the charges discussed at the hearing before

the Board. The letter specifically states that discipline was predicated on Ms. Bryant’s

“[i]nability to perform the duties of [her] position in a satisfactory manner over a course of

employment.” When this information is considered alongside the information provided in

the Loudermill letter, it is clear that the issues stemming from the February 2020 shortage

were those being contemplated.

Ms. Bryant has also failed to acknowledge the post-termination procedures she was

afforded. See Moss, 597 S.W.3d at 831 (“Under the standard set by Loudermill, this Court

reviews pre-termination and post-termination procedures ‘in tandem’ to determine whether

the public employer satisfied the requirements of due process.”) In this case, the post-

termination proceedings were formal and substantial. Ms. Bryant received a full hearing

before the Board. She was permitted to present evidence, testify on her own behalf, cross-

examine the witnesses called by the County, and present her legal and factual arguments

as to why she believed termination was inappropriate. Ms. Bryant was clearly prepared to

discuss both the incident serving as the basis for her termination, and each of the preceding

disciplinary incidents. See id. at 832 (noting that the employee’s “tactical decisions” during

the post-termination hearing evidenced an intent to challenge the conclusions regarding the

conduct serving as the basis for his termination). Ms. Bryant provided detailed testimony

regarding each incident. She provided additional context and details she felt were

important to explain why these incidents should not have resulted in her termination.

Further, her counsel asked pertinent questions and sought to introduce evidence relevant to

these incidents. At no time did Ms. Bryant or her counsel claim they were surprised by or

unaware of the incidents being discussed. These procedures were then reviewed by the

chancery court, and no error was discerned. Taking all the pre-termination and post-

termination procedures into account, Ms. Bryant was clearly afforded “the opportunity to

be heard ‘at a meaningful time and in a meaningful manner.’” Moss, 597 S.W.3d at 831

(quoting Mathews, 424 U.S. at 333). She was clearly prepared to argue against the charges

brought before her, and this was performed in a competent manner. Therefore, we find her

contention that her due process rights were violated to be without merit.

C. Policies and Procedures

Ms. Bryant also claims that the County failed to follow its own policies and

procedures. Specifically, she claims that the County failed to explain the deviation from

the progressive discipline procedures set out in Policy 703. Ms. Bryant acknowledges that

she received the first three levels of progressive discipline. However, she claims that any

punishment for the February 2020 shortage should have been limited to a suspension

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without pay for a period not to exceed 30 days, the fourth step of progressive discipline

listed in Policy 703.

Importantly, the policy itself states, “Usually, discipline will be of an increasingly

progressive nature[.]” (emphasis added). Mr. Harris testified that the County is permitted

to skip steps of discipline “as long as it is consistent.” Ms. Bryant’s counsel acknowledged

at oral argument for this appeal that she was “not arguing that there is no discretion under

703” but rather a “rational basis” as to why termination was justified is required. Counsel

later stated that “policy 703 allows for discretion but not arbitrary discretion and there must

be a reason to skip steps.” Ms. Bryant contends that the County did not properly explain

its reasons for skipping disciplinary steps. She acknowledges that Mr. Harris did provide

an explanation as to why disciplinary steps could be skipped but asserts his explanation

was not appropriate.5 Ms. Bryant also claims that because Mr. Harris never “confirmed

that the discipline in Ms. Bryant’s case . . . was consistent with the application of Policy

703 in other departments,” the termination was not in accordance with Policy 703. Ms.

Bryant further claims that she did not receive a “written write-up” for the February 2020

shortage in further violation of Policy 703.

First, we consider Ms. Bryant’s claim that Mr. Harris did not properly explain that

her termination was consistent with discipline meted out to other employees in similar

situations. Ms. Bryant did not raise this issue during the hearing before the Board. The

issue is mentioned nowhere in the transcript of the hearing. Additionally, the issue of

consistency does not appear to have been raised before the chancery court. The issue is

not referenced in the transcript of evidence detailing the arguments made before the

chancery court or in the writ of certiorari submitted to the chancery court.

5

Ms. Bryant also appears to claim that her receipt of both an oral reprimand and period of probation

for the February 27, 2019 shortage constituted an impermissible double punishment for one offense. See

Cope v. Tennessee Civ. Serv. Comm’n, No. M2008-01229-COA-R3-CV, 2009 WL 1635140, at *6 (Tenn.

Ct. App. June 10, 2009). However, Ms. Bryant’s probationary status is not the subject of this appeal. The

probation was not referenced in any of the notices or findings as a basis for her termination or a reason why

other progressive disciplinary steps were skipped. It is unclear from her brief what remedy she would seek

in having the probation overturned, but it would not result in the reversal of the Board’s decision as the fact

was given no weight in the written findings of fact. See Tenn. Code Ann. § 4-5-322(i) (“No agency decision

pursuant to a hearing in a contested case shall be reversed, remanded or modified by the reviewing court

unless for errors that affect the merits of such decision.”) Additionally, the probation issue was not raised

at the hearing before the Board. The underlying incident was certainly referenced as one of the incidents

considered in calculating the appropriate punishment for the February 2020 incident, but this was

permissible. See White v. Shelby Cnty. Bd. of Educ., No. W2023-01226-COA-R3-CV, 2024 WL 5153580,

at *11 (Tenn. Ct. App. Dec. 18, 2024) (considering previous acts of misconduct for which a tenured

schoolteacher had already received punishment in determining the appropriate level of punishment for a

subsequent offense); Finney, 576 S.W.3d at 689-90 (determining that a tenured schoolteacher’s restraint of

a special education student could not serve as the grounds for her later termination as she had already been

punished by a three-day suspension for the incident, but “her conduct on this and other occasions [could]

be considered when determining the appropriate disciplinary action” for a later incident).

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As our Supreme Court has previously explained, “[o]ne appearing before an

administrative tribunal must make timely objections to procedural errors and must raise the

errors at the administrative level in order to preserve them for consideration in a petition

for judicial review.” McClellan v. Bd. of Regents of State Univ., 921 S.W.2d 684, 690

(Tenn. 1996). The Court further stated that a party to an administrative proceeding was

required “to raise issues of procedural irregularity” in the same way as “a party in a judicial

proceeding” in order to provide the administrative body with “the opportunity to correct

procedural errors.” Id. Tennessee Courts have often determined that failure to do so

constitutes waiver of an issue. See Emory v. Memphis City Sch. Bd. of Educ., 514 S.W.3d

129, 152 (Tenn. 2017) (explaining that “[a]llowing a party to hide an ace up her sleeve for

appeal would undermine fair play and finality of judgment” and “our reaffirmed insistence

upon contemporaneous objections to agency errors should provide incentive for litigants

to see that all procedural deficiencies are addressed before the administrative body

completes its consideration of a dispute”); Bailey, 303 S.W.3d at 237-38 (finding that a

teaching assistant who had the opportunity to raise an “objection to the procedures

Defendants utilized in conjunction with dismissing him” at an administrative proceeding

but failed to do so until he filed a case in circuit court had waived the issue).

Here, Ms. Bryant did not address the issue of whether her discipline was consistent

with other employees before the Board. She did not provide any evidence demonstrating

that the discipline she received was inconsistent with previous disciplinary actions taken

against others being charged with similar offenses. Additionally, Ms. Bryant’s counsel had

the opportunity to question Mr. Harris and Ms. Maness about whether the discipline Ms.

Bryant received was consistent with past discipline of other employees. No testimony was

elicited on the issue. Addressing this issue on appeal would run contrary to the principle

that “[o]ne appearing before an administrative tribunal must make timely objections to

procedural errors and must raise the errors at the administrative level in order to preserve

them for consideration in a petition for judicial review.” McClellan, 921 S.W.2d at 690.

Therefore, the issue is waived.6

As for her challenge to the explanation, there was evidence submitted explaining

why certain disciplinary steps were skipped. Ms. Maness explained that several incidents

had previously taken place and noted that Ms. Bryant’s insubordination had resulted in her

being issued a “final warning.” She stated that the February 2020 error was critical, and

when considered alongside the final warning and Ms. Bryant’s failure to adopt Ms.

6

Likewise, on appeal, Ms. Bryant has not explained why the failure of Shelby County to follow its

policies and procedures should result in the reversal of her termination. This section is clearly separate

from that claiming the termination was arbitrary and capricious. Similarly, while she cities Boyd v. City of

Memphis to support her claims on this issue, she has not raised an equal protection claim as the employee

in Boyd did. No. W2023-01109-COA-R3-CV, 2024 WL 3984020, at *6 (Tenn. Ct. App. Aug. 29, 2024).

She has neither identified equal protection as the basis for her claim nor raised the various components of

such a claim.

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Maness’s techniques, warranted termination. Mr. Harris expressed a similar sentiment and

explained that there was no other role available that would have constituted a suitable

demotion. Further, while the example may have been a bit extreme, Mr. Harris explained

that certain actions warrant greater levels of discipline. Additionally, Ms. Bryant clearly

received a written disciplinary notice for the February 2020 shortage. Ms. Maness

explained that the Loudermill notice itself was intended to serve this purpose. The letter

was sent immediately after the February 2020 shortage and describes itself as a “NOTICE

OF PROPOSED MAJOR DISCIPLINE” in the subject line.

The Board clearly accepted the reasons submitted by Ms. Maness and Mr. Harris as

viable explanations for skipping levels of discipline. The Board also noted Ms. Bryant’s

refusal to implement the techniques provided by Ms. Maness as a factor indicating that

termination was appropriate. Given our standard of review, we will not substitute our

judgment for that of the Board. See StarLink Logistics Inc., 494 S.W.3d at 669.

D. Arbitrary and Capricious

Finally, Ms. Bryant claims that the decision to terminate her was arbitrary and

capricious because it was unsupported by substantial and material evidence. As our

Supreme Court has previously explained:

[a] decision of an administrative agency is arbitrary or capricious when there

is no substantial and material evidence supporting the decision. Pittman v.

City of Memphis, 360 S.W.3d 382, 389 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2011); Jackson

Mobilphone Co. v. Tenn. Pub. Serv. Comm’n., 876 S.W.2d 106, 110 (Tenn.

Ct. App. 1993). The statute does not define “substantial and material

evidence,” but it is less than a preponderance of the evidence, Wayne Cnty.

[v. Tennessee Solid Waste Disposal Control Bd., 756 S.W.2d 274, 280 (Tenn.

Ct. App. 1988)] (citing Consolo v. Fed. Maritime Comm’n, 383 U.S. 607,

620, 86 S.Ct. 1018, 16 L.Ed.2d 131 (1966)), and more than a “scintilla or

glimmer” of evidence, id. (citing Pace v. Garbage Disposal Dist., 54 Tenn.

App. 263, 390 S.W.2d 461, 463 (1965)). A decision with evidentiary support

can be arbitrary or capricious if it amounts to a clear error in judgment. City

of Memphis v. Civil Serv. Comm’n, 216 S.W.3d 311, 316 (Tenn. 2007) (citing

Jackson Mobilphone Co., 876 S.W.2d at 110). A decision is arbitrary or

capricious if it “is not based on any course of reasoning or exercise of

judgment, or . . . disregards the facts or circumstances of the case without

some basis that would lead a reasonable person to reach the same

conclusion.” Civil Serv. Comm’n, 216 S.W.3d at 316 (quoting Jackson

Mobilphone Co., 876 S.W.2d at 111). “If there is room for two opinions, a

decision is not arbitrary or capricious if it is made honestly and upon due

consideration, even though [a reviewing court] think[s] a different

conclusion might have been reached.” Bowers v. Pollution Control Hearings

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Bd., 103 Wash.App. 587, 13 P.3d 1076, 1083 (2000) (citing Buechel v. Dep’t

of Ecology, 125 Wash.2d 196, 884 P.2d 910, 915 (1994) (en banc))

(explaining the “arbitrary or capricious” standard under Washington’s

version of the Uniform Administrative Procedures Act). The “arbitrary or

capricious” standard is a limited scope of review, and a court will not

overturn a decision of an agency acting within its area of expertise and within

the exercise of its judgment solely because the court disagrees with an

agency’s ultimate conclusion. See id. (citing Buechel, 884 P.2d 910 at 915).

StarLink Logistics Inc., 494 S.W.3d at 669-70.

Ms. Bryant argues that her termination was arbitrary and capricious because the

Board did not properly consider the circumstances surrounding the instances of misconduct

that led to her termination. For clarification, the only charge for which Ms. Bryant is being

disciplined in this matter is the shortage that occurred in February 2020. However, the

discussion of the other incidents requiring discipline is pertinent and appropriate as

previous disciplinary incidents may be considered when determining the appropriate level

of punishment for a subsequent offense. See White, 2024 WL 5153580, at *11; Finney,

576 S.W.3d at 689-90. Ms. Bryant claims that she was not insubordinate to the Trustee

but had requested a “reasonable accommodation” and had merely become upset when

discussing the issue. She also points to the circumstances surrounding her various cash

shortages, including very long lines due to the removal of the kiosk system and the

computer malfunction, as mitigating factors that should have been considered. She further

claims that the Board placed undue emphasis on Ms. Maness’s claims to have provided

techniques to attempt to alleviate these issues. She also argues that the Board should have

given more weight to the positive performance reviews she received in 2017, 2018, and

2019.

Importantly, Ms. Bryant has never denied the February 2020 shortage that led to her

termination. She acknowledged that the shortage occurred and admitted she attempted to

force balance to conceal this fact. Thus, the only question is whether the circumstances

cited by Ms. Bryant rendered the Board’s determination a clear error of judgment. In our

view, the Board’s decision was clearly supported by evidence “that would lead a reasonable

person to reach the same conclusion.” Civil Serv. Comm’n, 216 S.W.3d at 316 (quoting

Jackson Mobilphone Co., 876 S.W.2d at 111).

Ms. Bryant attempted to explain each of the incidents considered in the formulation

of her punishment, but she has not demonstrated that the Board’s decision to weigh them

against her was unreasonable. Ms. Bryant claimed that the 2019 shortages were caused by

extremely busy working conditions. While we are sympathetic to these busy conditions, a

reasonable person could nonetheless deem her to have been at fault. Likewise, she has not

denied that she was out-of-balance on the dates in question. Similarly, while Ms. Bryant

stated she did not believe she was insubordinate, she admitted that she informed a direct

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superior she would not perform a job duty. She was punished for this and did not challenge

the punishment until after her termination. It was reasonable to consider this incident when

assessing the appropriate punishment. The incident is especially pertinent because it

resulted in Ms. Bryant being sent a “final warning” from the Trustee herself explaining that

any subsequent issues would result in “disciplinary action up to and including termination.”

It was also reasonable to consider Ms. Maness’s attempts to help Ms. Bryant avoid

shortages and Ms. Bryant’s unenthusiastic response.

Further, Ms. Bryant’s claim that her positive performance reviews render the

Board’s decision arbitrary and capricious is unconvincing. Two of the performance

reviews cited by Ms. Bryant were for her performance in years prior to 2019, the year

identified in the termination letter as the year in which the events being considered began

to take place. Therefore, those performance reviews are of little value to the present

proceedings. Additionally, while the 2019 performance review was positive, this does not

render the Board’s decision illogical. It is not such convincing evidence rendering the

decision to terminate Ms. Bryant unreasonable or arbitrary.

The evidence provided in this matter certainly constitutes that which is necessary to

uphold the Board’s decision given our deferential standard of review. The Board’s line of

reasoning in this matter was clear and logical. The Board was aware that the shortage took

place in February 2020 and was the basis of discipline. The Board was also aware of the

events surrounding Ms. Bryant’s employment and clearly took them into account when

reviewing her termination. Despite Ms. Bryant’s testimony, the Board decided that

termination was appropriate. This was reasonable. Therefore, we affirm.

IV. Conclusion

For the foregoing reasons, we affirm the decision of the chancery court. Costs of

this appeal are taxed to the appellant, Betty Malia Bryant, for which execution may issue

if necessary.

_________________________________

CARMA DENNIS MCGEE, JUDGE

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