In re D.T. CA3

Filed 12/10/25 In re D.T. CA3

NOT TO BE PUBLISHED

California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for publication or

ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for

purposes of rule 8.1115.

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

THIRD APPELLATE DISTRICT

(San Joaquin)

----

In re D.T., a Person Coming Under the Juvenile

Court Law.

SAN JOAQUIN COUNTY HUMAN SERVICES C103202

AGENCY,

(Super. Ct. No. STK-JD-DP-

Plaintiff, 2024-0000108)

v.

D.T. et al.,

Defendants;

M.O.,

Objector and Appellant.

Appellant Melina Oropeza, a social worker in this juvenile dependency matter,

told minor D.T.’s grandmother that she could take minor to Mexico. After issuing an

order to show cause, the juvenile court sanctioned Oropeza under Code of Civil

Procedure section 177.5 for violating a court order prohibiting minor from being taken

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outside the state without court permission.1 Oropeza appeals, arguing that the court did

not make adequate factual findings to justify the sanctions order, violated her due process

rights, and was precluded from imposing sanctions because of various immunities

enjoyed by public officials. She also challenges the court’s rejection of her peremptory

challenge under section 170.6. We find no error in the sanctions order and conclude that

the denial of Oropeza’s peremptory challenge is not appealable. Accordingly, we affirm

the sanctions order.

BACKGROUND

In April 2024, the juvenile court issued detention orders removing minor from his

parents’ custody and placing him in the care of his maternal grandmother (grandmother).

No reporter’s transcript of the hearing appears in the record, but the court’s minute order

states: “Minor(s) not to leave the State without a Court Order.”

At the May 2024 jurisdictional and dispositional hearing, the juvenile court

adjudged minor a dependent and removed him from his parents’ custody. Again, no

reporter’s transcript of the hearing appears in the record, but the minute order reflects that

the court authorized grandmother to obtain a passport for minor. The order did not

mention any specific travel plans.

Oropeza, a social worker with the San Joaquin Human Services Agency (Agency),

was subsequently assigned to the case. At about 3:00 pm on July 3, 2024, Oropeza filed

an ex parte travel request asking that grandmother be permitted to take minor to Mexico

on July 6, 2024 and stay until July 29, 2024.2 The request, which was signed under

penalty of perjury, stated that it had been discussed with the parties and that there was no

opposition to it. The request and its accompanying attachments reflected that:

1 Undesignated statutory references are to the Code of Civil Procedure.

2 The travel requests that Oropeza submitted are not included in the clerk’s transcript, but

the juvenile court described each of them in its order imposing sanctions.

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(1) minor’s counsel had informed Oropeza that she (minor’s counsel) did not oppose the

request; (2) Oropeza emailed father’s counsel about the proposed travel but received no

response; (3) Oropeza did not attempt to contact father because he was incarcerated;

(4) mother did not return Oropeza’s phone call; and (5) mother’s counsel stated that she

would try to contact her client and, if her client agreed to the travel request, counsel had

no opposition to it. Oropeza spoke with grandmother in the evening of July 3 and told

her that she could take minor on the trip, “but if the order was denied she would need to

return from Mexico.”

The juvenile court did not see Oropeza’s request until July 5, 2024, the day after

the Fourth of July holiday. Noting the lack of affirmative consent from all parties, the

court denied the request.

On July 16 or 17, 2024, Oropeza filed a second ex parte request to allow minor to

travel to Mexico on the same dates proposed in the first travel request (July 6 through

July 29). The second request was again signed under penalty of perjury and again stated

that there was no opposition to it. The request noted that Oropeza had not received

responses from mother’s counsel or father’s counsel. It also stated that grandmother was

“currently in Mexico with the minor.”

After reviewing the request, the juvenile court issued an order to show cause why

Oropeza and the Agency should not be sanctioned “for violating the rule that juvenile

court authorization is required for a child to travel to another country for any reason.” At

a July 23, 2024 hearing, the court explained its belief “that without good cause or

substantial justification, Ms. Oropeza allowed the foster parent to take the minor to

another country, to wit, Mexico . . . [a]fter she knew that the travel request . . . submitted

on July the 5th, 2024 was denied by this Court.” The court set forth the conduct and

sequence of events giving rise to its belief that a court order had been violated. The court

also stated that it intended to call Oropeza to testify. The Agency requested a

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continuance, and the court set a continued hearing. The court provided all parties with

copies of the relevant reporter’s transcripts and travel requests.

Agency counsel declared a conflict as to Oropeza, and the Agency retained new

counsel to represent her. Oropeza’s new counsel first appeared on September 10, 2024

and filed a peremptory challenge under section 170.6 to disqualify the assigned judge.

The court rejected the challenge as untimely. The court reasoned that Oropeza was not a

new party because she had previously appeared in the case as an employee of the Agency

and the Agency had already filed a peremptory challenge concerning a different judge.

The court further concluded that, even if Oropeza had become a new party when the

Agency declared a conflict, her challenge was still untimely.

Oropeza’s counsel asked for Agency documents related to the matter, and the

Agency agreed to produce them. The juvenile court also provided Oropeza’s counsel

with the documents and transcripts it had previously given to the other parties. The court

set the order to show cause hearing for October 25, 2024.

Oropeza filed a petition for writ of mandate in this court seeking review of the

juvenile court’s rejection of her peremptory challenge. The petition was denied without

prejudice to refiling “with adequate supporting documents, including the challenged

order and proof of service showing that the petition is timely.” Oropeza filed a new

petition, and this court denied it.

On October 25, 2024, Oropeza filed a motion to disqualify the juvenile court judge

under section 170.1. The court ordered the motion stricken under section 170.4,

subdivision (b). The court continued the matter to December 20, 2024.

At the start of the December 20, 2024 hearing, Oropeza’s counsel requested a

continuance on the grounds that Oropeza was “visibly not well,” was feeling nauseous,

and “has been fidgeting” since arriving at court. Counsel noted that the Agency had

placed Oropeza on administrative leave, causing “some physical and emotional distress

for her.” After confirming that Oropeza did not have a doctor’s note, the juvenile court

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denied the request, noting that the matter had already been continued multiple times. It

said, “at some point, we have to move this hearing along.”

The parties then announced that they had agreed to three factual stipulations:

First, that if called to testify, grandmother would say “that on the evening of July 3rd,

Social Worker Oropeza called her and told her that she could go on the trip with [minor],

but if the order was denied she would need to return from Mexico.” Second, as to the

second ex parte travel request, Oropeza sent an email to father’s counsel, mother’s

counsel, minor’s counsel, and Agency counsel acknowledging that minor was already in

Mexico. Third, at the time of the email, Agency counsel was on vacation. The juvenile

court asked the parties if they would be calling any witnesses, and each responded in the

negative. Oropeza’s counsel renewed his request to continue the matter, saying that

Oropeza had seen a doctor and “they were in the process of preparing and submitting a

note that being in this environment today, given the administrative leave, is unduly

stressful to her.” The court denied the request.

The parties then presented argument on the issues. The Agency argued that

Oropeza was solely responsible for the violation of the court’s orders and only she should

be sanctioned. Oropeza’s counsel acknowledged that Oropeza had made mistakes but the

Agency should bear ultimate responsibility. He acknowledged that, if Oropeza told

grandmother she could take minor out of the country without a court order, it would be

sanctionable, but he argued there was not sufficient evidence to find that she had done so.

He asserted that Oropeza is a “layperson who doesn’t understand the impact of legal

pleadings” and “misled the Court unintentionally.” In response to questioning by the

court, Oropeza’s counsel acknowledged that Oropeza had been a social worker for

11 years, had made travel requests “[m]any times” in that capacity, and was familiar with

the process for obtaining a court order.

Oropeza’s counsel discussed the possibility of Oropeza testifying to address the

court’s questions, and the juvenile court stated that it would need to advise her of her

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constitutional right against self-incrimination. Counsel said that Oropeza could not

testify because she was not feeling well, and he had never planned on having her testify.

He declined to call her to testify.

The Agency offered to enter into a stipulation as to how Oropeza’s supervisor

would testify. The parties stipulated that, if the supervisor were called, “she would testify

that on or around, approximately, July 9th, late in the day, she had a conversation with

Ms. Oropeza. Ms. Oropeza advised her of the minor being in Mexico. That – or they

discussed that the minor was in Mexico. That Ms. Oropeza had told [grandmother] to

return from Mexico and to book those tickets. And that she was going to seek an order to

enable [minor] to be able to safely return. [¶] . . . [¶] That [Oropeza’s supervisor] agreed

with the plan as presented to her, and advised Ms. Oropeza that she needed to let all

counsel know about what was going on with [minor] and the plan to get him home

safely.”

Oropeza’s counsel argued that the juvenile court had “sufficient information[,]

although, there is more that mitigates,” and offered that the parties could return to provide

“other evidence, and other witnesses, or other stipulations.” The court took the matter

under submission, and Oropeza personally objected, urging that the court had not allowed

her “a continuance or right for trial based on everything that’s been discussed here.” The

court noted the objection.

The juvenile court issued a written order imposing sanctions on both Oropeza and

the Agency. With respect to Oropeza, the court found that she violated a court order

“when she gave the caretaker permission to take the minor to Mexico before securing a

court order to authorize said travel. In fact, it is undisputed (per stipulation) that on

July 3, 2024, prior to obtaining a court order to do so, Ms. Oropeza told the caretaker she

could take the minor to Mexico, but also told her that if the travel request was denied, she

would have to bring the minor back to California. In reliance thereon, the caretaker took

the minor to Mexico without court approval. This conduct by Ms. Oropeza is a clear

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violation of the longstanding existing and well-established court order the Juvenile Court

authorization is required before a dependent child can travel out of the country.”

The juvenile court also found fault with Oropeza’s statements in the first travel

request. “With the knowledge that a court order is required before a dependent minor is

allowed to travel out of the country, and with the knowledge that she has already told the

caretaker that she could take the minor to Mexico, Ms. Oropeza still proceeded to submit

a travel request to the court under penalty of perjury, asking for permission from the court

for the foster mother to travel to Mexico with the minor.” The court found it

“particularly notable that Ms. Oropeza failed to mention to any of the parties on the case,

or to the court, that she had already told the caretaker she could take the minor to Mexico.

Ms. Oropeza failed to mention this to anyone because she clearly knew she needed court

authorization before allowing a child to travel out of the country.”

The juvenile court further reasoned that Oropeza’s actions in filing the second

travel request compounded the improper conduct. Although the request acknowledged

that minor was in Mexico, it failed to mention that Oropeza had given grandmother

permission to travel there. The court found that Oropeza’s unilateral approval of the trip

to Mexico was “egregious and done without good cause or substantial justification.”

“Even more concerning is that Ms. Oropeza submitted a second travel request when she

knew the first request had been denied and she knew the minor was already in Mexico.”

The juvenile court also determined that the Agency acted in violation of the

court’s orders. The court found that the Agency “became complicit in Ms. Oropeza’s

continued violation of the court order” by failing to take timely and appropriate action to

inform the court and other parties about the situation and to assure minor’s return to

California. The Agency’s conduct, moreover, was “without good cause or substantial

justification.” The court ordered Oropeza and the Agency each to pay $750 in sanctions

to the court.

Oropeza filed a timely notice of appeal.

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DISCUSSION

Under section 177.5, a court may “impose reasonable money sanctions, not to

exceed fifteen hundred dollars ($1,500), . . . for any violation of a lawful court order by a

person, done without good cause or substantial justification. . . . [¶] Sanctions pursuant

to this section shall not be imposed except on notice contained in a party’s moving or

responding papers; or on the court’s own motion, after notice and opportunity to be

heard. An order imposing sanctions shall be in writing and shall recite in detail the

conduct or circumstances justifying the order.” Section 177.5 does not require that a

person acted in bad faith or “a willful violation, but merely one committed without ‘good

cause o[r] substantial justification,’ that is, without a valid excuse.” (Seykora v. Superior

Court (1991) 232 Cal.App.3d 1075, 1081.) “ ‘[T]he scope of a hearing on an application

for sanctions is within the trial court’s discretion.’ ” (Ibid., italics omitted.)

An order imposing sanctions under section 177.5 is reviewed for an abuse of

discretion. (20th Century Ins. Co. v. Choong (2000) 79 Cal.App.4th 1274, 1277.)

“ ‘[A]n abuse of discretion will be found on appeal if a sanctions order rests on incorrect

legal premises [citation] or violates due process, matters we decide exercising our

independent review. Alternatively, an abuse of discretion will be found if the findings

underlying the order under review are factually unsupported [citation], which requires us

to “assess[] the record for substantial evidence to support the court’s express or implied

findings” [citation].’ ” (People v. Edwards (2023) 88 Cal.App.5th 1259, 1266-1267.)

I.

Oropeza contends that the juvenile court failed to make sufficient findings of fact

or identify specific sanctionable conduct, neglected to consider her good faith belief that

the travel did not violate the court’s orders, and erroneously relied on stipulated

testimony without affording her the opportunity to cross-examine witnesses. We find no

merit in these contentions.

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The juvenile court’s written order contains a detailed recitation of the conduct

justifying sanctions. The order explains that Oropeza told minor’s grandmother that she

could take minor to Mexico, notwithstanding a standing court order forbidding such

travel without court permission. In both travel requests, Oropeza made

misrepresentations about which parties she had contacted and their respective positions.

After hearing from all parties, the court explained that it saw no good cause or substantial

justification for these actions, given Oropeza’s experience as a social worker and

repeated failures to notify anyone that she had already unilaterally authorized the travel

without court permission. These findings were supported by substantial evidence. The

parties stipulated that grandmother would testify that Oropeza authorized her to travel

with minor before any court approval. And the court had before it the travel requests

containing Oropeza’s statements.

We are also unpersuaded by Oropeza’s argument that the juvenile court failed to

consider mitigating circumstances, such as her good faith belief that she was not violating

any court order. First, Oropeza’s good faith, or lack thereof, is not relevant to the issue of

sanctions under section 177.5. (Seykora v. Superior Court, supra, 232 Cal.App.3d at

p. 1081.) Second, Oropeza identifies no facts in the record showing that she had good

cause or substantial justification for failing to comply with the court’s order forbidding

travel without judicial authorization. Oropeza declined the opportunity to testify and did

not call grandmother or her supervisor as witnesses, even though both were present at the

order to show cause hearing. Oropeza’s argument at the hearing as to good cause was

that the Agency should have had a better procedure in place and she did not understand

“the nature of legal proceedings.” The juvenile court noted, however, that Oropeza had

been a social worker for 11 years. We see no indication the court ignored any mitigating

circumstances.

Oropeza also argues that the juvenile court erred by relying on stipulated

testimony that was not subject to cross-examination. This contention is forfeited because

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Oropeza stipulated to the testimony below and did not make any hearsay objection.

(Evid. Code, § 353, subd. (a); In re Clara B. (1993) 20 Cal.App.4th 988, 1000.)

Moreover, both grandmother and Oropeza’s supervisor were present at the hearing and

Oropeza could have called them as witnesses and cross-examined them, but declined to

do so.

II.

Oropeza additionally contends that the juvenile court’s procedures violated her

due process rights by failing to give her adequate notice and opportunity to be heard. We

disagree.

To comply with due process guarantees, a court “may raise the issue of sanctions

on its own motion but, in doing so, it must give notice of its intent to impose sanctions.

[Citation.] That ‘notice must be given before findings are made and at a time preceding

the trial judge’s decision whether, in fact, to impose sanctions.’ [Citation.] ‘[The]

adequacy of notice should be determined on a case-by-case basis to satisfy basic due

process requirements. The act or circumstances giving rise to the imposition of expenses

must be considered together with the potential dollar amount.’ ” (Barrientos v. City of

Los Angeles (1994) 30 Cal.App.4th 63, 70.) An opportunity to be heard requires “ ‘an

objective hearing at which the person is permitted to address the lawfulness of the order,

the existence of the violation, and the absence of good cause or substantial justification

for the violation.’ ” (People v. Hundal (2008) 168 Cal.App.4th 965, 970.)

The juvenile court’s procedures in this case satisfied these standards. The court

first notified the parties that it was contemplating sanctions at a hearing on July 23, 2024.

The court identified the specific conduct it believed violated a court order, then granted a

continuance and provided the parties with the relevant reporter’s transcripts and filings.

The matter was continued multiple times, and Oropeza was given independent counsel

and additional time to collect documents. The court also provided her counsel with the

documents it had previously provided to the other parties. Oropeza’s counsel first

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appeared on September 10, 2024, and the matter was not heard until December 20, 2024.

Oropeza thus had nearly six months of notice that sanctions could be imposed—more

than three months of which she was represented by independent counsel. This was

adequate notice.

For these same reasons, we see no abuse of discretion in the juvenile court’s denial

of Oropeza’s requests for a continuance at the hearing, sought on the ground that she was

experiencing emotional distress. “ ‘Trial courts generally have broad discretion in

deciding whether to grant a request for a continuance.’ ” (J.M. v. W.T. (2020)

46 Cal.App.5th 1136, 1139; see also In re D.N. (2020) 56 Cal.App.5th 741, 756 [juvenile

court’s denial of continuance reviewed for abuse of discretion].) The court granted

Oropeza multiple continuances sufficient for new counsel to be appointed and for her

counsel to receive and review relevant documents. Under these circumstances, the

juvenile court did not abuse its discretion in finding that Oropeza failed to show good

cause for another continuance.

Oropeza also received an adequate opportunity to be heard. At the order to show

cause hearing, the juvenile court allowed her to testify and call witnesses, but she

declined. Her counsel addressed the court and made extensive arguments in opposition to

a sanctions order. While the court relied on stipulated testimony, Oropeza joined those

stipulations and could have contested them if she wished.

In sum, we conclude that Oropeza received the process she was due.

III.

Oropeza further claims that she could not be sanctioned because, as a county

social worker, she is protected by federal qualified immunity and various statutory

immunities under Government Code sections 820.2, 820.4, and 821.6. This contention is

forfeited because she did not raise the issue in the juvenile court. (Phillips v. Campbell

(2016) 2 Cal.App.5th 844, 853; cf. Gomez v. Toledo (1980) 446 U.S. 635, 640 [official

seeking qualified immunity bears burden of invoking it]; Quigley v. Garden Valley Fire

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Protection Dist. (2019) 7 Cal.5th 798, 807, 809, 815-816 [permitting forfeiture of

immunities under Government Claims Act].) In any event, Oropeza cites no authority

supporting her contention that these immunities, which generally shield public officials

from suits for damages, apply to a state court’s sanctions order in a state juvenile

dependency matter. (E.g., Pearson v. Callahan (2009) 555 U.S. 223, 231 [qualified

immunity protects government officials from “suit” for “ ‘civil damages’ ”]; County of

Santa Clara v. Superior Court (2023) 14 Cal.5th 1034, 1049 [Government Claims Act “is

concerned with shielding public entities from tort claims seeking money damages”].)

IV.

Oropeza additionally maintains that the juvenile court erred when it rejected her

peremptory challenge under section 170.6. Section 170.3, subdivision (d) provides that

“[t]he determination of the question of the disqualification of a judge is not an appealable

order and may be reviewed only by a writ of mandate.” This statute applies to

peremptory challenges under section 170.6. (People v. Hull (1991) 1 Cal.4th 266, 276.)

Accordingly, the order denying Oropeza’s section 170.6 motion is not appealable. (In re

Sheila B. (1993) 19 Cal.App.4th 187, 195.)

DISPOSITION

The order imposing sanctions under section 177.5 is affirmed.

/s/

FEINBERG, J.

We concur:

/s/

DUARTE, Acting P. J.

/s/

RENNER, J.

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