J. Mancini v. County of Northampton

IN THE COMMONWEALTH COURT OF PENNSYLVANIA

Jill Mancini, :

:

v. : No. 1062 C.D. 2024

: Submitted: November 6, 2025

County of Northampton, :

Appellant :

BEFORE: HONORABLE RENÉE COHN JUBELIRER, President Judge

HONORABLE PATRICIA A. McCULLOUGH, Judge

HONORABLE LORI A. DUMAS, Judge

OPINION NOT REPORTED

MEMORANDUM OPINION BY

PRESIDENT JUDGE COHN JUBELIRER FILED: December 10, 2025

County of Northampton (County) appeals from the Order of the Court of

Common Pleas of Northampton County (common pleas) that, relevantly, vacated the

April 8, 2022 Decision of the Northampton County Personnel Appeal Board (Board)

and scheduled an evidentiary hearing on damages in a personnel grievance action

filed by Jill Mancini alleging that she was unlawfully terminated from her County

position. Also before the Court is Mancini’s Motion to Quash Appeal (Motion), in

which Mancini asserts the County’s appeal should be quashed because common

pleas’ Order is not appealable at this time as it is neither a final order nor a collateral

order that is immediately appealable. Upon careful review, we grant the Motion and

quash the County’s appeal for lack of jurisdiction because the Order is not final and

does not fall within one of the exceptions to the final order doctrine.

I. BACKGROUND

The present matter is one more chapter in the ongoing litigation between

Mancini and the County that has now spanned over a decade in both the state and

federal court systems. Previously, this Court set forth the background of this matter

as follows:

Mancini began working for the County as a full-time assistant solicitor

in February 2007. . . . In January 2014, Mancini learned that her

position had been eliminated and that her employment with the County

would be terminated effective February 17, 2014. . . . In response

thereto, Mancini filed a grievance with the County, alleging, inter alia,

that she was a career service employeeFN2 who had been wrongfully

discharged without just cause and discriminated against due to her

political party affiliation. . . . Following an informal hearing, the

County denied Mancini’s grievance. . . .

FN2 The County’s elected officials, officers, and employees are

members of either the career service or the exempt service. (. . .

Section 802 of the County’s Home Rule Charter.) The County’s

exempt service employees include:

(1) all elected officials;

(2) the heads of agencies immediately under the direction

and supervision of the [c]ounty [e]xecutive;

(3) one confidential or clerical employee for each of the

above officials, except for members of the [c]ounty

[c]ouncil;

(4) the [c]lerk of [c]ouncil and the staff of the [c]ounty

[c]ouncil;

(5) the members of authorities, boards, and commissions;

(6) permanent, part-time professional employees;

(7) provisional, probationary, and temporary employees;

(8) officers and employees required to be included in a

state merit or civil service system; and

(9) officers and employees whose inclusion in the career

service would be prohibited by the law of Pennsylvania.

2

(Id.) All other County officers and employees are members of

the career service. (Id.) Career service employees have certain

rights relative to their employment with the County as

established by the County’s Career Service Regulations and

Employee Policies Manual. One of those rights relates to

disciplinary action and termination of employment: “Any

disciplinary action, suspension, demotion, or termination of

employment . . . of any employee in the [c]areer [s]ervice for

disciplinary reasons or unsatisfactory job performance, shall be

for just cause only . . . .” (. . . Career Service Regulation No.

13.01.)

Mancini appealed the County’s denial to the Board.[] . . . . The Board

held hearings on May 13, 2014, and June 4, 2014. . . . Thereafter, by

letter dated August 19, 2014, the Board’s solicitor notified the parties’

counsel that the Board had reached a deadlock; two members of the

Board had voted in favor of the County, and two members of the Board

had voted in favor of Mancini. . . . By letter dated November 19, 2014,

the Board’s solicitor confirmed to Mancini’s counsel that, “after an

extensive review of the transcripts and exhibits, the Board is hopelessly

deadlocked in its decision.” . . . . In that same letter, the Board’s

solicitor invited Mancini’s counsel to offer “suggestions on how . . .

Mancini’s matter should be handled.”

....

Approximately two years later, after the conclusion of a federal lawsuit

that Mancini had filed against the County, the County’s executive, and

the County’s solicitor,[1] Mancini filed a mandamus action against the

1

Mancini filed an action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 in United States District Court for

the Eastern District of Pennsylvania (district court), alleging she was a career service employee

who was wrongfully terminated without just cause and due to her political affiliation in violation

of the First and Fourteenth Amendments of the United States Constitution, U.S. CONST. amends.

I, XIV. See Mancini v. Northampton County, 836 F.3d 308, 312-13 (3d Cir. 2016) (Mancini I).

The County asserted, as a defense to these claims, that Mancini was not a career service employee

and, therefore, did not have an interest in her position protected by due process. Id. Following a

five-day trial, a federal jury found that Mancini’s position was a career service position and that

her due process rights were violated by the County’s actions, and the jury awarded damages. Id.

at 313. After the district court denied the County’s post-trial motions, the County appealed to the

United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit, which affirmed. Id. at 313, 321. Notably,

the Third Circuit observed that the County did not challenge the sufficiency of the evidence that

(Footnote continued on next page…)

3

Board with common pleas (Mandamus Action).[] . . . . In the Mandamus

Action, Mancini requested that common pleas enter an order directing

the Board to: (1) perform its mandatory duty to issue a written decision

and findings in connection with her grievance appeal as required by

Career Service Regulation No. 15.025 and Employee Policy No. 3.15;[]

(2) provide copies of the written decision to Mancini and the County;

(3) certify the written decision to the County’s Human Resources

Department; and (4) provide timely notice to Mancini and the County

of their right to appeal from the written decision. . . . On March 25,

2019, after review of the parties’ briefs and the stipulated facts and

record, common pleas entered an order finding in favor of Mancini and

directing the Board to “render a written decision regarding [Mancini’s]

appeal; provide copies of its decision to [Mancini] and the County . . . ;

certify its decision to the . . . County[’s] Department of Human

Resources; and provide timely notice to [Mancini] and to the County

. . . of their respective rights of appeal from its decision and findings”

(Mandamus Order). . . .

In response to the Mandamus Order, the Board held a meeting on May

8, 2019, at which time, the Board heard argument from Mancini and the

County. . . . Thereafter, on June 17, 2019, the Board issued a written

decision denying Mancini’s appeal. . . . In so doing, the Board issued

factual findings limited to Mancini’s termination from her employment

with the County, Mancini’s appeal to the Board, the prior Board

members’ deadlock, the Mandamus Action, the change in the

composition of the Board members between the time of the prior Board

members’ deadlock and the Mandamus Order, and the Board’s May 8,

2019 meeting.

Mancini v. County of Northampton (Pa. Cmwlth., No. 1841 C.D. 2019, filed Jan. 27,

2021), slip op. at 1-5 (Mancini II). Mancini appealed the Board’s decision to

common pleas, which vacated that decision due to it not containing any relevant

factual findings or conclusions of law as to the issues before it and reflected that the

Board “completely abdicated its duty to issue a decision on the merits of Mancini’s

grievance.” Id., slip op. at 6. We vacated common pleas’ order, concluding that the

supported the jury’s finding that Mancini’s position was a career service position but nevertheless

the court reviewed the evidence and held that the jury’s finding had sufficient evidentiary support.

Id. at 314-15. It also found the evidence sufficient to support the jury’s finding that the County

violated Mancini’s due process rights. Id. at 315.

4

Board had not properly discharged its responsibility to adjudicate Mancini’s appeal,

but that common pleas exceeded its appellate authority by substituting its decision,

and remanded for the Board to issue a new decision. Id., slip op. at 11-12.

The present matter is the result of the Board’s remand decision, in which the

Board unanimously denied Mancini’s appeal based on the existing record.2 The

Board found that it was bound by collateral estoppel to conclude that Mancini was a

career service employee based on Mancini v. Northampton County, 836 F.3d 308,

313 (3d Cir. 2016) (Mancini I). (Reproduced Record (R.R.) at 686a-88a.) It further

held that the reorganization of the Solicitor’s Office was not pretextual or politically

motivated, but was valid and independently vetted by the County Council’s

Personnel Committee and approved by the County Council. (Id. at 686a, 689a.) The

Board then concluded that Mancini’s claim that the County failed to provide Mancini

with a pretermination hearing, and therefore violated Mancini’s due process rights,

had been adjudicated in federal court in Mancini I. (Id. at 686a, 690a.) Finally, the

Board found that the County provided Mancini the notice required by the Home Rule

Charter and County Policies, and that as to the recall opportunities contained therein,

“Mancini failed to meet her burden that there were other positions available for her

to exercise any career service rights. And there’s a lack of evidence of any positions

to which she had any entitlement, and that she would have accepted.” (Id. at 686,

690a-91a.) The Board explained that the evidence established that there were no

available full-time assistant solicitor positions after the layoff and the remaining

positions were part-time, exempt (not career service) positions. (Id. at 691a.)

Mancini appealed to common pleas, asserting that the Board erred in

concluding that the reorganization was not pretextual and that the County had fully

2

The Board’s Decision begins on page 675a of the Reproduced Record.

5

complied with its policies and requirements for laying off career service employees.

Acknowledging that a complete record had been made before the Board, common

pleas reviewed the Board’s Decision to determine if any error of law or violation of

constitutional rights occurred or if the factual findings made were not supported by

substantial evidence. (Common Pleas’ Statement of Reasons (SOR) at 6-7 (citing

Section 754(b) of the Local Agency Law, 2 Pa.C.S. § 754(b)).) Common pleas

agreed with the Board that Mancini had to be considered a career service employee

based on Mancini I and found that substantial evidence supported the Board’s

finding that the reorganization was not pretextual. (Id. at 8-9, 12-13.) Common

pleas held, however, that the Board erred in concluding that the County followed its

policies in laying off Mancini and that the Board’s finding in this regard was not

supported by substantial evidence. (Id. at 14-15.) In particular, common pleas

concluded that, under the County’s policies,

the County ha[d] the burden of notifying a career service employee

facing layoff, in writing of their displacement and recall rights. This

includes not only displacement opportunities in either a lateral

movement or a lower-titled job within that department, but such

employees are entitled to “accept employment in an equivalent or lower

job title vacancy in another County department.” See Employee Policy

Manual § 3.525 [(R.R. at 166a-69a)].

While the record shows that Mancini was afforded notice by the County

Director of Human Services of her layoff, the only notice regarding her

displacement rights in terms of alternative employment opportunities

stated “[t]here are no full[-]time positions presently existing within the

. . . County Solicitor’s Office.” ([R.R. at 54a.])[] This notice can only

be deemed deficient, as it fails to mention whether any suitable

positions were vacant in another County department as required by

Section 3.525 of the Employee Policy Manual. Per the policy, a career

service employee can only exercise their displacement rights if the

County adequately notifies them of possible lateral transfers, lower job

titles, or vacancies. See Employee Policy Manual § 3.525 (emphasis

added). Thus, the County’s failure to adequately notify Mancini

6

deprived her of the ability to fully exercise her displacement rights as a

career service employee when she was terminated.FN8

FN8 The [c]ourt is equally unpersuaded by the County’s

argument that Mancini is not entitled to the sought damages

because the only positions supposedly available were the newly

created part-time assistant solicitor positions that were not

entitled to career service benefits. As explained, the County’s

failure to properly notify Mancini as to whether any possible

vacancies existed in any County department wholly deprived her

of the displacement rights conferred to every County career

service employee facing layoffs. Thus, Mancini is entitled to the

damages sought.

The Board’s denial of Mancini’s appeal because she purportedly failed

“to present competent evidence that any such opportunities were

available either at the time of the layoff or within the applicable recall

period,” essentially turns the unambiguous language of Section 3.525

on its head by imposing the County’s failure to comply with its own

policies onto Mancini. Moreover, the Board’s finding that no credible

evidence of any other positions to which Mancini was entitled to, and

would have accepted, in accordance with her career services rights is

not based on substantial evidence, as Mancini was never properly

afforded the opportunity to do so.

(SOR at 15-16 (emphasis in original).) Based on this reasoning, common pleas

sustained Mancini’s appeal as to this issue, vacated the Board’s Decision, ordered

that Mancini was “entitled to reinstatement and backpay, as well as fringe benefits,

from the date of her termination, February 18, 2014, through October 23, 2018,” and

scheduled an evidentiary hearing on damages for December 5, 2024. (SOR Order

at 1-2.)

The County appealed and, at common pleas’ direction, filed a Statement of

Errors Complained of on Appeal pursuant to Pennsylvania Rule of Appellate

Procedure 1925(b), Pa.R.A.P. 1925(b). (R.R. at 693a-96a.) Therein, the County

argued common pleas erred and/or abused its discretion in finding that Mancini was

7

a career service employee who was entitled to all the protections applicable to those

employees and concluding that there was insufficient evidence to support the

Board’s finding that the County complied with its policies when it dismissed

Mancini. (Id. at 693a-94a.) The County further asserted common pleas erred and

abused its discretion when it vacated the Board’s Decision because the Board’s

findings were supported by substantial evidence, and common pleas exceeded its

authority by making contrary findings of fact and conclusions of law. (Id. at 694a.)

The County challenged common pleas’ ordering reinstatement and back pay because

the position no longer exists and the court cannot order the County to create a

position that had been eliminated by the County’s executive branch, making the

relief impossible to perform. (Id.) An additional error was made, the County asserts,

by common pleas not finding that Mancini’s claims were barred by the doctrine of

election of remedies based on the federal action filed pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983

and resolved in Mancini I. Alternatively, the County asserted common pleas should

have remanded the matter to the Board “if there [was] a finding that the [Board’s]

Decision did not contain sufficient findings of fact or conclusions of law” so that the

Board could issue a new decision with additional findings of fact and conclusions of

law. (Id. at 695a-96a.) Common pleas issued a Rule 1925(a) opinion, in which it

stated that the County’s appeal should be quashed because its Order was not final

and was not otherwise appealable at this time. (Id. at 698a-99a.) If not quashed,

common pleas pointed to its prior reasoning as support for its Order. (Id. at 699a.)

Mancini filed the Motion with this Court, requesting that we quash the

County’s appeal, to which the County filed an answer. By Order dated November

4, 2024, we directed the parties to address the Motion in their principal briefs. The

8

parties have done so, and we will first consider whether we have jurisdiction to

consider the present appeal.

II. THE MOTION

Mancini asserts this Court lacks jurisdiction because common pleas’ Order is

not final or otherwise appealable at this time. According to Mancini, the Order,

which leaves the issue of damages unresolved, is not final because it does not dispose

of all claims and all parties, as required by Pennsylvania Rule of Appellate Procedure

341, Pa.R.A.P. 341. See Blackman v. Katz, 568 A.2d 642, 644 (Pa. Super. 1990)

(holding that an order that leaves damages unresolved is not final).3 Mancini further

asserts the Order is not an appealable collateral order under Pennsylvania Rule of

Appellate Procedure 313, Pa.R.A.P. 313 because it does not meet any of the

requirements of that rule, including that the County would be prejudiced by waiting

for review, so as to allow appellate review at this time.

The County argues this Court has jurisdiction to consider its appeal because

the Order qualifies as an appealable collateral order since one of the arguments on

appeal is that common pleas erred by not remanding the matter to the Board for

additional fact finding. It asserts “[t]he issue of remand is separable from the cause

of action related to the underlying employee grievance matter,” and common pleas’

failure to remand to the Board denies “both parties the right to appeal the decision

of the [B]oard to . . . [c]ommon [p]leas.” (County’s Answer to Application (Appl.)

¶¶ 6-7.) The County maintains that if this issue is not decided now, and common

pleas sits as a fact-finding body, the right of both parties to have this matter

3

“In general, Superior Court decisions are not binding on this Court, but they offer

persuasive precedent where they address analogous issues.” Lerch v. Unemployment Comp. Bd.

of Rev., 180 A.3d 545, 550 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2018).

9

determined by the Board in the first instance is irreparably lost. Therefore, the

County argues, this Order can be reviewed now.

On the topic of an appellate court’s jurisdiction, our Supreme Court has

recently explained that

[a]s a general rule, “an appellate court’s jurisdiction

extends only to review of final orders.” Shearer v. Hafer,

. . . 177 A.3d 850, 855 ([Pa.] 2018); see also Pa.R.A.P.

341(a) (“[A]n appeal may be taken as of right from any

final order of a . . . trial court.”). A final order is an order

that “disposes of all claims and of all parties” or “is entered

as a final order” pursuant to a determination of finality by

a trial court or other government unit. Pa.R.A.P.

341(b)(1), (3). As we have previously stated, “[t]he final

order rule reflects the long-held limitation on review by

both federal and state appellate courts[,]” and

“[c]onsidering issues only after a final order maintains

distinctions between trial and appellate review, respects

the traditional role of the trial judge, and promotes

formality, completeness, and efficiency.” Shearer, 177

A.3d at 855. Nonetheless, the collateral order doctrine,

which has been codified in Rule 313, “permit[s]

immediate appellate review of certain [non-final]

collateral orders.” Id. at 856; see also Rae v. Pa. Funeral

Dirs. Ass’n, . . . 977 A.2d 1121, 1125 ([Pa.] 2009).

J.C.D. v. A.L.R., . . . 303 A.3d 425, 429-30 ([Pa.] 2023).

Under Rule 313, an “appeal may be taken as of right from a collateral

order of a trial court or other government unit.” Pa.R.A.P. 313(a). Rule

313 defines a collateral order as “an order separable from and collateral

to the main cause of action where the right involved is too important to

be denied review and the question presented is such that if review is

postponed until final judgment in the case, the claim will be irreparably

lost.” Pa.R.A.P. 313(b). Thus, Rule 313 involves three elements:

1) the order is separable from and collateral to the underlying action;

2) the right involved is too important to be denied review; and 3) if

review is postponed until final judgment, the claim will be lost.

MFW Wine Co., LLC v. Pa. Liquor Control Bd., 318 A.3d 100, 112 (Pa. 2024).

10

“As an exception to the rule of finality, the collateral order doctrine is to be

interpreted narrowly, and each prong of the doctrine must be clearly present before

an order may be considered collateral.” In re Est. of Rowley, 84 A.3d 337, 340 (Pa.

Cmwlth. 2013) (citation omitted). “A narrow construction of the doctrine not only

avoids piecemeal determinations and protraction of litigation but also furthers

judicial accuracy because an appellate court is more likely to decide an issue

correctly in the context of a complete adjudication and a full development of record.”

Northumberland Cnty. Child. & Youth Servs. v. Dep’t of Pub. Welfare, 2 A.3d 794,

797 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2010) (citation omitted).

As to whether an order was separable under the first prong, courts consider

whether the order was fully distinct from the underlying issues and resolvable

without addressing the merits of the underlying dispute. MFW Wine Co., LLC, 318

A.3d at 113. An order is separable if it involves “a pure legal question that did not

require any analysis of the underlying . . . claim.” Id. An issue is important, for

purposes of the second prong, if the interests that would potentially go unreviewed

absent immediate appellate consideration are significant relative to the efficiency

interests that are advanced by adhering to the final judgment principle.

Commonwealth v. Watson, 952 A.2d 541, 552 (Pa. 2008) (internal quotations marks

omitted). As the Supreme Court has explained: “it is not sufficient that the issue be

important to the particular parties. Rather it must involve rights deeply rooted in

public policy going beyond the particular litigation at hand.” Geniviva v. Frisk, 725

A.2d 1209, 1214 (Pa. 1999).

Finally, “[u]nder the third prong, we determine whether a right is adequately

vindicable or effectively reviewable.” S. Hills Cath. Acad. v. Dep’t of Hum. Servs.,

308 A.3d 915, 922 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2024) (internal quotation marks and citation

11

omitted). “This question cannot be answered without a judgment about the value

interests that would be lost through rigorous application of a final judgment

requirement.” Id. (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). We have held

that “the substantial cost a party would incur in defending a claim may equate to an

irreparable loss of a right to avoid the burden entirely.” Id. at 922-23 (internal

quotation marks and citation omitted).

We must also be mindful that “the collateral order rule’s three-pronged test

must be applied independently to each distinct legal issue over which an appellate

court is asked to assert jurisdiction pursuant to Rule 313.” Rae, 977 A.2d at 1130.

See also In re Sheriff’s Excess Proceeds Litig., 98 A.3d 706, 718 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2014)

(same); Northumberland Cnty. Child. & Youth Servs., 2 A.3d at 797 (same). The

Supreme Court explained, in Rae, that

[w]hile considering an additional issue on collateral review might

streamline the adjudication of a particular case, applying the whole

order approach as a rule would diminish judicial economy by

encouraging advocates to find creative ways to obtain collateral review

on one, however meritless, issue so as to obtain review of an entire

litany of claims. Further, judicial accuracy is better promoted by

postponing claims—except those directly fitting under Rule 313—for

post-judgment review.

Id. Thus, “even if the collateral order test ‘is satisfied with respect to one [appellate]

issue,’ this Court does not have ‘jurisdiction to consider every issue within the ambit

of the appealed order.’” In re Sheriff’s Excess Proceeds Litig., 98 A.3d at 718 n.12

(quoting Rae, 977 A.2d at 1123).

An order that leaves the resolution of damages to a later date is not a final,

appealable order because it does not finally dispose of the case as to all parties,

Blackman, 568 A.2d at 644, and the County does not appear to argue otherwise.

12

Rather, the County argues common pleas’ interlocutory order is appealable now

because one of the issues on appeal involves whether the matter should have been

remanded to the Board for a new decision, which it claims meets all of the

requirements of obtaining immediate appellate review under Rule 313.

As an initial matter, we observe that, under Rae, the County must establish

that each issue presented for appellate review meets the three prongs of Rule 313

in order for us to have jurisdiction to review that issue at this time. 977 A.2d at

1130. Reviewing the County’s arguments,4 however, it has only attempted to do so

with regard to its contention that common pleas should have remanded the matter to

the Board for additional findings of fact and conclusions of law. (See County’s

Answer to Appl. ¶ 4; County’s Brief (Br.) at 26-27; 1925(b) Statement at 3-4, R.R.

at 695a-96a.) Thus, this is the only issue that can be considered for potential

immediate appellate review under Rule 313.5

4

The County argues that: Mancini did not establish that she was a career service employee

entitled to the protections of that position; common pleas exceeded its authority as an appellate

court because the Board’s Decision contained sufficient findings of fact and conclusions of law to

support denial of Mancini’s appeal; the County’s Council has the authority to eliminate County

positions and there is no County position into which common pleas could order Mancini’s

reinstatement; Mancini is barred by the doctrine of election of remedies; and the matter should

have been remanded for additional findings of fact and for the County to have the opportunity to

raise new defenses. (County’s Br. at i-ii.)

5

That the parties have briefed all of the issues the County raised in its appeal does not

mean they can be resolved at this time. As our Supreme Court stated in Rae, “[w]hether an order

is appealable as a collateral order under Rule 313 is an issue of this Court’s jurisdiction to entertain

an appeal of such an order. . . . A purely prudential concern, such as whether the parties have

briefed the issue, cannot invest an appellate court with jurisdiction which is otherwise lacking.”

977 A.2d at 1130 n.16. Moreover, because the remaining issues raised by the County relate

directly to the merits of the underlying employee grievance matter, and would require appellate

review of those merits, they cannot meet the separability prong of Rule 313. See In re Sheriff’s

Excess Proceeds Litigation, 98 A.3d at 720 (holding that although an issue may be “practically

intertwined with the merits,” the issue is separable from the merits only if it “is conceptually

distinct from the merits” and “raises a question that is significantly different from the questions

(Footnote continued on next page…)

13

Beyond citing the three prongs of Rule 313, the County does not cite any

specific support for its contention that the Order is immediately appealable or

explain why it has met those three prongs. Instead, it argues:

The Order under appeal in this matter has listed the matter for a non-

jury trial to establish damages. If this hearing occurs, [common pleas]

will no longer be considering a full and complete record from the

[Board] because the records will contain supplementary material. Once

[common pleas] takes testimony, it is no longer sitting as an appellate

court and the parties will have lost their right to appeal any decision of

the [Board].

The Pennsylvania Supreme Court has recognized an exception

permitting review of an otherwise interlocutory order when “(1) it is

separable from and collateral to the main cause of action; (2) the right

involved is too important to be denied review; and (3) the question

presented is such that if review is postponed until final judgment in the

case, the claimed right will be irreparably lost.” Pugar v. Greco, 394

A.2d 542 (Pa. 1978). In the instant matter, failure to consider this

appeal will result in the parties losing the right to have this matter heard

in the first instance by the [Board].

(County’s Br. at 26-27.) The County’s answer is similarly conclusory, stating:

6. The issue of remand is separable from the cause of action related to

the underlying employee grievance matter.

7. Failing to remand this matter to the Board will deny both parties the

right to appeal the decision of the [B]oard to . . . [c]ommon [p]leas.

8. If this matter is not decided by this court and . . . [c]ommon [p]leas

sits as a fact finding body rather than an appellate body the right of both

underlying [the party’s] claim on the merits”) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted);

McGrogan v. First Com. Bank, 74 A.3d 1063, 1077 (Pa. Super. 2013) (stating that an appellate

court “clearly does not have jurisdiction to consider any appellate issue relating to the merits of

claims . . . , as [they] are not ‘separable from and collateral to the main cause of action.’ Pa.R.A.P.

313(b).”). Thus, we lack jurisdiction to consider any issues raised that relate to the merits of

Mancini’s underlying employee grievance claims.

14

parties to have this matter determined by the Board and reviewed by

. . . [c]ommon [p]leas will be irreparably lost.”

(County’s Answer to Appl. at 2.)

Regarding the first prong, the County argues the remand issue is separable

from the underlying employee grievance matter. (Id. ¶ 6.) Although the County

does not explain why this is so, because a decision on the remand issue might not

touch on the merits of Mancini’s arguments that the County failed to abide by its

policies, it appears that the two may be distinct and, therefore, are separable. This

is akin to the order in question in South Hills Catholic Academy, which denied a

motion to dismiss that asserted the Department of Human Services (DHS) lacked

jurisdiction over a private, parochial school, and which this Court found was

separable from a decision on the merits of whether the school violated DHS

regulations. 308 A.3d at 923. Accordingly, the County has satisfied the first prong

as to this issue.

Examining the County’s filings, we discern no argument as to why the Order

meets the second prong of Rule 313. The County does not explain the importance

of the remand issue or why it is more significant than the efficiency interests served

by the final order doctrine, as is required to meet this prong. Watson, 952 A.2d at

552. Narrowly construing the collateral order doctrine “avoids piecemeal

determinations and protraction of litigation” and allows for the appellate court “to

decide an issue correctly in the context of a complete adjudication.”

Northumberland Cnty. Child. & Youth Servs. 2 A.3d at 797. See also Rae, 977 A.2d

at 78 (“In adopting a narrow construction, we endeavor to avoid piecemeal

determinations and the consequent protraction of litigation. . . . Such piecemeal

litigation imposes a substantial burden on the orderly administration of justice.”)

(internal quotation marks and citations omitted). Cognizant of the piecemeal and

15

protracted nature of the present litigation, and in the importance of resolving these

issues “in the context of a complete adjudication,” Northumberland County Children

& Youth Services, 2 A.3d at 797, reviewing common pleas’ non-final order, as the

County requests, is not consistent with the purpose final order doctrine, which is to

ensure the efficient resolution of cases, MFW Wine Co., LLC, 318 A.3d at 112.

Therefore, there is nothing presented that persuades us that the County has clearly

established the second prong of Rule 313 so as to allow immediate review of this

issue.

Finally, as to the third prong, the County asserts the right to have the Board

resolve the underlying matter in the first instance, and for common pleas to review

any such resolution only on the Board’s record, is irreparably lost if appellate review

is delayed until after the damages determination. We are not persuaded that this

right would be irreparably lost if common pleas’ Order is not immediately reviewed.

The right asserted can be adequately vindicated and effectively reviewed even if we

wait for a final order in this matter, as there is no impediment to the Court ordering

a remand to the Board if we conclude one is necessary. Indeed, we have done so

before. In Mancini II, we vacated a final order by common pleas and remanded the

matter where the Board made no findings of fact relevant to the disputed issues. The

County does not suggest that the very purpose of its asserted right would be violated

or that there would substantial costs associated with the damages hearing that would

effectively result in their claim being irreparably lost. Thus, this is unlike the

situation in MFW Wine Co., LLC, where the Pennsylvania Liquor Control Board

appealed an interlocutory order denying that it was entitled to sovereign immunity

from a claim for monetary damages. The Supreme Court held this issue would be

irreparably lost if appellate review was delayed because, absent a decision at that

16

time, the government agency would be forced to undergo discovery and unnecessary

litigation, which undermined the very purpose of sovereign immunity. MFW Wine

Co., LLC, 318 A.3d at 115. Nor is this situation akin to that in South Hills Catholic

Academy, where delaying review of the order denying the motion to dismiss meant

the private school would have to litigate the entire merits of the underlying claim

that it was violating DHS regulations, which would require the school to spend

substantial monies and lose its right to avoid doing so based on its contention that

DHS lacked jurisdiction. 308 A.3d at 923. Accordingly, we are not convinced that

the County has clearly established the third prong of Rule 313 so as to allow

immediate review of this issue.

Because all three prongs of Rule 313 must be established in order for this

Court to have jurisdiction to review common pleas’ non-final order, and the County

has not done so, we grant Mancini’s Motion and the County’s appeal is quashed for

lack of jurisdiction.

III. CONCLUSION

Because the County has not established all of the three prongs required to

allow for appellate review of common pleas’ non-final order under Rule 313, we

grant Manicini’s Motion and quash the County’s appeal for lack of jurisdiction.

MFW Wine Co., LLC, 318 A.3d at 112; Shearer, 177 A.3d at 855.

__________________________________________

RENÉE COHN JUBELIRER, President Judge

17

IN THE COMMONWEALTH COURT OF PENNSYLVANIA

Jill Mancini, :

:

v. : No. 1062 C.D. 2024

:

County of Northampton, :

Appellant :

ORDER

NOW, December 10, 2025, the Motion to Quash Appeal filed by Jill Mancini

is GRANTED, and the appeal filed by the County of Northampton is QUASHED

for lack of jurisdiction in accordance with the foregoing opinion.

__________________________________________

RENÉE COHN JUBELIRER, President Judge