Kinner

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

MIDDLE DISTRICT OF FLORIDA

JACKSONVILLE DIVISION

TIMMY KINNER,

Plaintiff,

v. Case No. 3:24-cv-445-JEP-MCR

BERNARD REED, et al.,

Defendants.

_________________________________

ORDER

Plaintiff Timmy Kinner, an inmate of the Florida Department of

Corrections (FDC), initiated this action by filing a pro se Complaint for

Violation of Civil Rights (Doc. 1). The Court gave Plaintiff two opportunities to

file amended complaints. See Docs. 8, 27. He is proceeding on a Second

Amended Complaint (SAC; Doc. 40). Plaintiff names the following Defendants:

Officer Bernard Reed; FDC Secretary Ricky Dixon; Officer. T. Rulevitch;

Officer Tyler Watson; Union Correctional Institution (UCI) Warden; Officer

John Doe 1; Officer John Doe 2; and Officer John Doe 3. See id. at 2–4.

Plaintiff alleges that on December 9, 2022, Defendant Reed entered his

cell, gassed him, and took his property. See id. at 7. According to Plaintiff,

Defendant Watson arrived at his cell “[d]ays later” and informed him that

officers would commit further acts of retaliation. See id. Thereafter, on

December 14, 2022, Defendant Watson ordered Defendants Reed, Rulevitch,

Doe 1, Doe 2, and Doe 3 to enter Plaintiff’s cell; they beat him while he “was

face down.” See id. Plaintiff asserts that he sustained serious injuries from the

assault, including contusions, bleeding, and swelling. See id. He claims

Defendants violated the Eighth Amendment when they used excessive force on

December 9th and 14th. See id. at 6. He requests monetary relief. See id. at 7.

The Prison Litigation Reform Act (PLRA) requires the Court to dismiss

this case at any time if the Court determines that the action is frivolous,

malicious, fails to state a claim upon which relief can be granted or seeks

monetary relief against a defendant who is immune from such relief.1 See 28

U.S.C. §§ 1915(e)(2)(B); 1915A. “A claim is frivolous if it is without arguable

merit either in law or fact.” Bilal v. Driver, 251 F.3d 1346, 1349 (11th Cir. 2001)

(citing Battle v. Cent. State Hosp., 898 F.2d 126, 129 (11th Cir. 1990)). A

complaint filed in forma pauperis which fails to state a claim under Federal

Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) is not automatically frivolous. Neitzke v.

Williams, 490 U.S. 319, 328 (1989). Section 1915(e)(2)(B)(i) dismissals should

only be ordered when the legal theories are “indisputably meritless,” id. at 327,

or when the claims rely on factual allegations which are “clearly baseless.”

Denton v. Hernandez, 504 U.S. 25, 32 (1992). “Frivolous claims include claims

1 Plaintiff proceeds as a pauper. See Doc. 7.

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‘describing fantastic or delusional scenarios, claims with which federal district

judges are all too familiar.’” Bilal, 251 F.3d at 1349 (quoting Neitzke, 490 U.S.

at 328). Additionally, a claim may be dismissed as frivolous when it appears

that a plaintiff has little or no chance of success. Id. As to whether a complaint

“fails to state a claim on which relief may be granted,” the language of the

PLRA mirrors the language of Rule 12(b)(6), Federal Rules of Civil Procedure,

and therefore courts apply the same standard in both contexts.2 Mitchell v.

Farcass, 112 F.3d 1483, 1490 (11th Cir. 1997); see also Alba v. Montford, 517

F.3d 1249, 1252 (11th Cir. 2008).

To state a claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, a plaintiff must allege that (1)

the defendant deprived him of a right secured under the United States

Constitution or federal law, and (2) such deprivation occurred under color of

state law. Salvato v. Miley, 790 F.3d 1286, 1295 (11th Cir. 2015); Bingham v.

Thomas, 654 F.3d 1171, 1175 (11th Cir. 2011) (per curiam); Richardson v.

Johnson, 598 F.3d 734, 737 (11th Cir. 2010) (per curiam). Moreover, under

Eleventh Circuit precedent, to prevail in a § 1983 action, a plaintiff must show

“an affirmative causal connection between the official’s acts or omissions and

the alleged constitutional deprivation.” Zatler v. Wainwright, 802 F.2d 397,

2 “To survive a motion to dismiss, a complaint must contain sufficient factual

matter, accepted as true, to ‘state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.’”

Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (citing Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S.

544, 570 (2007)).

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401 (11th Cir. 1986) (citation omitted); Porter v. White, 483 F.3d 1294, 1306

n.10 (11th Cir. 2007).

Under the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, a complaint need only

contain “a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is

entitled to relief.” Fed. R. Civ. P. (8)(a)(2). In addition, all reasonable inferences

should be drawn in favor of the plaintiff. See Randall v. Scott, 610 F.3d 701,

705 (11th Cir. 2010). Nonetheless, the plaintiff still must meet some minimal

pleading requirements. Jackson v. BellSouth Telecomms., 372 F.3d 1250,

1262–63 (11th Cir. 2004). Indeed, while “[s]pecific facts are not necessary[,]”

the complaint should “‘give the defendant fair notice of what the . . . claim is

and the grounds upon which it rests.’” Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 93

(2007) (per curiam) (quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555

(2007)). Further, the plaintiff must allege “enough facts to state a claim to relief

that is plausible on its face.” Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570. “A claim has facial

plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to

draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct

alleged.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009). While not required to

include detailed factual allegations, a complaint must allege “more than an

unadorned, the-defendant-unlawfully-harmed-me accusation.” Id.

A “plaintiff’s obligation to provide the grounds of his entitlement to relief

requires more than labels and conclusions, and a formulaic recitation of the

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elements of a cause of action will not do[.]” Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555 (internal

quotations omitted); see also Jackson, 372 F.3d at 1262 (explaining that

“conclusory allegations, unwarranted deductions of facts or legal conclusions

masquerading as facts will not prevent dismissal” (original alteration

omitted)). Indeed, “the tenet that a court must accept as true all of the

allegations contained in a complaint is inapplicable to legal

conclusions[,]”which simply “are not entitled to [an] assumption of truth.”

Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678, 680. In the absence of well-pled facts suggesting a

federal constitutional deprivation or violation of a federal right, a plaintiff

cannot sustain a cause of action against the defendant.

In assessing the SAC, the Court must read Plaintiff’s pro se allegations

in a liberal fashion. Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519 (1972). And, while “[p]ro se

pleadings are held to a less stringent standard than pleadings drafted by

attorneys and will, therefore, be liberally construed,” Tannenbaum v. United

States, 148 F.3d 1262, 1263 (11th Cir. 1998), “‘this leniency does not give the

court a license to serve as de facto counsel for a party or to rewrite an otherwise

deficient pleading in order to sustain an action.’” Campbell v. Air Jamaica Ltd.,

760 F.3d 1165, 1168–69 (11th Cir. 2014) (quoting GJR Invs., Inc. v. Cnty. of

Escambia, 132 F.3d 1359, 1369 (11th Cir. 1998) (citations omitted), overruled

in part on other grounds as recognized in Randall, 610 F.3d at 709).

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Plaintiff appears to sue Defendants Dixon and UCI Warden based on

their supervisory positions. See SAC at 6. The Eleventh Circuit has held that

“[i]t is well established in this Circuit that supervisory officials are not liable

under § 1983 for the unconstitutional acts of their subordinates on the basis of

respondeat superior or vicarious liability.” Cottone v. Jenne, 326 F.3d 1352,

1360 (11th Cir. 2003) (quoting Hartley v. Parnell, 193 F.3d 1263, 1269 (11th

Cir. 1999)). To establish individual liability for supervisory conduct, a plaintiff

must show “that the supervisor either directly participated in the

unconstitutional conduct or that a causal connection exists between the

supervisor’s actions and the alleged constitutional violation.” Keith v. DeKalb

Cnty., 749 F.3d 1034, 1047–48 (11th Cir. 2014).

Causation “may be established and supervisory

liability imposed where the supervisor’s improper

custom or policy results in deliberate indifference to

constitutional rights.” Id.[3] (alterations adopted)

(internal quotation marks omitted). “A plaintiff can

also show that the absence of a policy led to a violation

of constitutional rights.” Piazza,[4] 923 F.3d at 957.

“Either way, though, to prove that a policy or its

absence caused a constitutional harm, a plaintiff must

point to multiple incidents, or multiple reports of prior

misconduct by a particular employee.” Id. (citation

omitted). And allegations of a single incident of

unconstitutional conduct cannot state a claim for

supervisory liability, even when the conduct involves

several subordinates. Id. at 957–58.

3 Hartley v. Parnell, 193 F.3d 1263 (11th Cir. 1999).

4 Piazza v. Jefferson Cnty., 923 F.3d 947 (11th Cir. 2019).

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Ingram v. Kubik, 30 F.4th 1241, 1254 (11th Cir. 2022).

Here, Plaintiff has not alleged Defendants Dixon and UCI Warden

personally participated in the alleged violation of his rights. He also sets forth

no facts to suggest a causal connection between their actions and the incidents,

such as a history of widespread abuse or the existence of a custom or policy

that resulted in the alleged violations. Plaintiff asserts only that he “was told

by staff [th]at [Defendant UCI] Warden [and] other supervisors had given

[th]em authorization 2 [sic] do ‘w[h]atever 2 [Plaintiff].’” SAC at 6. Plaintiff

speculates that as a result, he was beaten. See id. However, speculation and

conjecture, unsupported by well-pled factual allegations, do not satisfy federal

pleading standards. See Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 679. As such, the claims against

Defendants Dixon and UCI Warden are due to be dismissed without prejudice.

Therefore, it is now ORDERED:

1. The claims against Defendants Dixon and UCI Warden are

DISMISSED without prejudice. The Clerk shall terminate them as

Defendants in this case.

2. Plaintiff’s claims against Defendants Reed, Rulevitch, and Watson

will proceed. A separate Order will enter regarding service of process on those

Defendants.

3. Plaintiff names Officer John Doe 1, Officer John Doe 2, and Officer

John Doe 3 as Defendants, but provides no identifying information that would

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allow the Court to direct service of process. In federal court, “fictitious-party

pleading is not permitted.” Richardson v. Johnson, 598 F.3d 734, 738 (11th Cir.

2010). By January 5, 2026, Plaintiff shall file a notice with additional

information to identify and serve the Doe-Defendants, such as full name and/or

any other information that may sufficiently assist in locating the Defendants

for service of process. Plaintiffs failure to comply may result in the dismissal

of the claims against the Doe-Defendants in this case.

DONE AND ORDERED at Jacksonville, Florida, this 5th day of

December, 2025.

JORDAN E. PRATT

UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

Jax-9 12/4

C: Timmy Kinner, #F91538