Sampson

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

NORTHERN DISTRICT OF OHIO

EASTERN DIVISION

RAYMOND EDWARD VINCENT SAMPSON, ) CASE NO. 1:25-CV-1712

)

Plaintiff, ) JUDGE CHARLES E. FLEMING

)

v. )

)

LAKE COUNTY DOMESTIC RELATIONS ) MEMORANDUM OPINION AND

COURT, et al., ) ORDER

)

Defendant.

I. INTRODUCTION

Pro se plaintiff Raymond Edward Vincent Sampson filed this action against the Lake

County Domestic Relations Court, Domestic Relations Court Judge Colleen A. Falkowski,

Domestic Relations Court Magistrate Laurie Koerner, Lake County Job and Family Services, and

the Lake County Sheriff’s Office. (ECF No. 1). The complaint stems from proceedings in the

Lake County Domestic Relations Court concerning Plaintiff’s parental rights. (ECF No. 1,

PageID #2; ECF No. 1-3, PageID #9). Plaintiff seeks judgment in his favor, an order restoring

Plaintiff’s parental contact and prohibiting further interference from the defendants, declaratory

relief, and monetary relief. (ECF No. 1, PageID #3).

Also before the Court is Plaintiff’s emergency motion for preliminary injunction and

motion to expedite all proceedings “due to the ongoing and irreparable harm to Plaintiff’s minor

children and the continued deprivation of Plaintiff’s fundamental constitutional rights.” (ECF No.

4, PageID #39; ECF No. 5). Plaintiff further moves the Court to grants his registration for

electronic filing notifications (i.e., e-filing access) as a pro se litigant. (ECF No. 3).

II. FACTUAL BACKGROUND

On July 9, 2025, Plaintiff filed a civil rights action against the Lake County Domestic

Relations Court, Domestic Relations Court Judge Colleen A. Falkowski, Domestic Relations Court

Magistrate Laurie Koerner, Lake County Juvenile Court Magistrate Janette Bell, Domestic

Relations Court Magistrate Jeffrey Black, and Lake County Job and Family Services. See

Sampson v. Lake Cnty. Domestic Rels. Ct., Case No. 1:25 CV 1440 (N.D. Ohio filed July 9, 2025).

Plaintiff’s complaint stemmed from state court proceedings concerning a domestic violence

protection order filed against Plaintiff. (Pl’s Compl. Dkt. No. 1). The Court dismissed Plaintiff’s

complaint, finding the Court lacked jurisdiction to review the state court judgments against

Plaintiff pursuant to the Rooker-Feldman doctrine; Plaintiff’s claims were barred by res judicata;

the Court must abstain from interfering in the state court proceedings to the extent the action was

still pending, under the Younger abstention; and Plaintiff failed to state a claim against any of the

defendants, even if the Court had jurisdiction over his claims. (Mem. Op. and Order. Dkt. No. 6).

Plaintiff now files this action, also seeking relief from state court proceedings. In an

attempt to differentiate the two actions, Plaintiff states that the prior action addressed only the

domestic violence protection order issued by the Lake County Domestic Relations Court; this

action concerns “federal and constitutional violations occurring during and surrounding

proceedings in the Domestic Relations Court” and “does not seek to overturn, vacate, or appeal

the [domestic violence protection order] itself.” (ECF No. 1–3, PageID #8–9). In this complaint,

Plaintiff makes the following claims: Defendants demonstrated bias against him during his

parental rights proceedings; Magistrate Koerner did not conceal her intent to predetermine the

outcome of the proceedings; Judge Falkowski made statements from the bench that revealed her

intent to disregard Plaintiff’s rights; the Lake County Domestic Relations Court (presumably

through Magistrate Koerner) falsely stated that Plaintiff had refused to be transported from the jail

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for a court hearing; Plaintiff was unable to cross-examine his son; and there was no “coordination

between court officials and opposing party’s counsel.” (See ECF Nos. 1-1, 1-3).

Plaintiff generically alleges that the defendants’ conduct constituted an unlawful seizure in

violation of his Fourth Amendment rights, a violation of his Fourteenth Amendment Due Process

and Equal Protection rights, and retaliation “for [e]xercising [p]rotected [r]ights.” (ECF No. 1-1,

PageID #5). He also alleges that Defendants conspired to deprive Plaintiff of his civil rights under

42 U.S.C. §1985. (See Doc. Nos. 1, PageID #2–3; ECF No. 1-1, PageID #5).

III. STANDARD OF REVIEW

Pro se pleadings are liberally construed. Boag v. MacDougall, 454 U.S. 364, 365 (1982)

(per curium); Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519, 520 (1972). The Court, however, is required to

dismiss an in forma pauperis action under 28 U.S.C. §1915(e) if it fails to state a claim upon which

relief can be granted, or if it lacks an arguable basis in law or fact. Neitzke v. Williams, 490 U.S.

319, 328 (1989); Lawler v. Marshall, 898 F.2d 1196, 1198 (6th Cir. 1990). A claim lacks an

arguable basis in law or fact when it is premised on an indisputably meritless legal theory or when

the factual contentions are clearly baseless. Neitzke, 490 U.S. at 327.

A cause of action fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted when it lacks

plausibility in the complaint. Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 564–69 (2007). A pleading

must contain a “short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief.”

Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 677–78 (2009). The factual allegations in the pleading must be

sufficient to raise the right to relief above the speculative level on the assumption that all the

allegations in the complaint are true. Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555. The plaintiff need not include

detailed factual allegations but must provide more than “an unadorned, the-Defendant-unlawfully-

harmed-me accusation.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678. A pleading that offers legal conclusions or a

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simple recitation of the elements of a cause of action will not meet this pleading standard. Id. In

reviewing a complaint, the Court must construe the pleading in the light most favorable to the

plaintiff. Bibbo v. Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc., 151 F.3d 559, 561 (6th Cir. 1998).

IV. DISCUSSION

Plaintiff’s attempt to distinguish between his prior federal complaint and this one fails.

Whether he objects to the state court’s issuance of a domestic violence protection order or

challenges other decisions rendered in the Lake County Domestic Relations Court proceedings,

this Court lacks jurisdiction to review those decisions. Even if the Court had jurisdiction over

Plaintiff’s claims, Plaintiff fails to state a claim against any defendant.

A. Jurisdiction

Plaintiff is asking this Court to overturn a state court judgment and issue judgment in his

favor. The Court lacks jurisdiction to do so.

The Rooker-Feldman doctrine prohibits federal court review of a of a state-court judgment

that a party claims violated his federal rights. Berry v. Schmitt, 688 F.3d 290, 298–99 (6th Cir.

2012). Federal appellate review of state court judgments can only occur in the United States

Supreme Court. See Dist. of Columbia Court of Appeals v. Feldman, 460 U.S. 462, 486 (1983);

Rooker v. Fidelity Tr. Co., 263 U.S. 413, 415–16 (1923).

The Rooker-Feldman doctrine applies only where a party losing his case in state court

initiates an action in federal district court complaining of injury caused by a state court judgment

itself and seeks review and rejection of that judgment. Berry, 688 F.3d 298–99; In re Cook, 551

F.3d 542, 548 (6th Cir. 2009). To determine whether Rooker-Feldman bars a claim, the Court

must look to the “source of the injury the plaintiff alleges in the federal complaint.” McCormick

v. Braverman, 451 F.3d 382, 393 (6th Cir. 2006); see Berry, 688 F.3d at 299. If the source of the

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plaintiff’s injury is the state court judgment itself, then the Rooker-Feldman doctrine bars the

federal claim. McCormick, 451 F.3d at 393. “If there is some other source of injury, such as a

third party’s actions, then the plaintiff asserts an independent claim.” Id.; see Lawrence v. Welch,

531 F.3d 364, 368–69 (6th Cir. 2008). In conducting this inquiry, the Court also considers the

plaintiff’s requested relief. Evans v. Cordray, 424 Fed. App’x. 537, 439–40 (6th Cir. 2011).

Here, the source of Plaintiff’s alleged injury appears to be Judge Falkowksi’s and

Magistrate Koerner’s orders concerning Plaintiff’s parental rights and his ability to visit his minor

children, and he asks this Court to enter judgment in his favor. (ECF No. 1, PageID #3). Under

Rooker-Feldman, this Court lacks jurisdiction to review the judgments of the Lake County

Domestic Relations Court and grant Plaintiff’s requested relief.

To the extent Plaintiff is seeking to relitigate the child custody or visitation matter already

decided in the Lake County Domestic Relations Court, his claims are barred by res judicata. The

doctrine of res judicata bars duplicative litigation based on the same event or events. Montana v.

United States, 440 U.S. 147, 153–54 (1979); Parklane Hosiery Co., Inc. v. Shore, 439 U.S. 322,

326 (1979). The term “res judicata” literally means “a thing [already] adjudicated.” Res Judicata,

Black’s Law Dictionary (9th ed. 2022). When one court has already resolved the merits of a case,

another court will not revisit them. Montana, 440 U.S. at 153; Parklane Hosiery Co., Inc., 439

U.S. at 326. The doctrine of res judicata therefore precludes a party from bringing a subsequent

lawsuit on the same claim or from raising a new defense to defeat the prior judgment. Gargallo v.

Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., 918 F.2d 658, 660 (6th Cir. 1990). The doctrine bars

re-litigation of every issue actually brought before the Court and every issue or defense that should

have been raised in the previous action. Id. at 661. Furthermore, res judicata bars Plaintiff from

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relitigating in federal court claims and issues that were previously decided by a state court.

Montana, 440 U.S. at 147–48.

Here, Plaintiff is challenging the judgment of the Lake County Domestic Relations Court

concerning Plaintiff’s ability to have contact with his minor children. (ECF No. 1, PageID #2;

ECF No. 5, PageID #40). Plaintiff raised, or could have raised, his federal claims in the state court

proceedings. Plaintiff cannot relitigate those issues here in the hope of obtaining a different result.

The Court also lacks jurisdiction to consider child custody issues. Generally, the Constitution and

Congress have given federal courts authority to hear a case only when diversity of citizenship

exists between the parties or when the case raises a federal question. Caterpillar Inc. v. Williams,

482 U.S. 386, 392 (1987). The first type of federal jurisdiction, diversity of citizenship, applies to

cases of sufficient value between “citizens of different states.” 28 U.S.C. § 1332(a)(1). The second

type of federal jurisdiction relies on the presence of a federal question. This type of jurisdiction

arises where a “well-pleaded complaint establishes either that federal law creates the cause of

action or that the Plaintiff’s right to relief necessarily depends on resolution of a substantial

question of federal law.” Franchise Tax Bd. v. Construction Laborers Vacation Tr., 463 U.S. 1,

27–28 (1983).

Diversity of citizenship does not exist in this case. Even if it did, child custody issues fall

under the domestic relations exception to diversity jurisdiction. See Ankenbrandt v. Richards, 504

U.S. 689, 704 (1992); Chevalier v. Est. of Barnhart, 803 F.3d 789, 794–98 (6th Cir. 2015). If

federal jurisdiction exists here, it must be based on federal law. Child custody determinations,

however, are a matter of state law. Ankenbrandt, 504 U.S. at 704. The Court therefore lacks

subject matter jurisdiction to make a child custody determination.

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Finally, to the extent Plaintiff’s state court proceedings are still pending, the Court must

abstain from hearing challenges to those state court proceedings. See Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S.

37, 41–45 (1971). When an individual is the subject of an ongoing state action involving important

state matters, he cannot interfere with the pending state action by maintaining a parallel federal

action involving claims that could have been raised in the state case. Watts v. Burkhart, 854 F.2d

839, 844–48 (6th Cir. 1988). If the state litigant files such a case, the Younger abstention requires

the federal court to defer to the state proceeding. Id.; see also Pennzoil Co. v. Texaco, Inc., 481

U.S. 1, 15 (1987).

Based on these principles, abstention is appropriate where: (1) the state proceedings are

ongoing, (2) the state proceedings implicate important state interests, and (3) the state proceedings

afford the plaintiff with an adequate opportunity to raise federal questions. Leveye v. Metro. Pub.

Def. Off., 73 F. App’x 792, 794 (6th Cir. 2003) (citing Younger, 401 U.S. at 43–45). Abstention

is mandated where federal court intervention “unduly interfere[s] with the legitimate activities of

the [s]tates.” Younger, 401 U.S. at 44. Additionally, the principles expressed in Younger apply to

ongoing state civil and criminal proceedings. Watts, 854 F.2d at 844.

As to the third requirement of Younger, the relevant inquiry is whether the state

proceedings afford an adequate opportunity to raise the federal claims. Moore v. Sims, 442 U.S.

415, 430 (1979). The plaintiff bears the burden of demonstrating that state procedural law bars

presentation of his claims. Pennzoil Co., 481 U.S. at 14. When a plaintiff has not attempted to

present his federal claims in the state court proceedings, the federal court should assume that state

procedures will afford an adequate remedy, in the absence of “unambiguous authority to the

contrary.” Id. at 15; see also Szarell v. Summit Cty. Ct. of Common Pleas, No. 5:18 CV 2975,

2019 WL 3946191, at *3 (N.D. Ohio Aug. 21, 2019) (the third factor of the Younger abstention

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was satisfied where the plaintiff failed to allege in the pleadings that the state court proceedings

did not or could not provide her with an opportunity to present her federal claim).

Here, if the state court proceedings in the Lake County Domestic Relations Court are still

pending, all three factors supporting abstention are present. State court proceedings involving

domestic relations and child custody, visitation, or support matters implicate important state

interests. See Butterfield v. Steiner, No. C2-01-1224, 2002 WL 31159304, at *6 (S.D. Ohio Sept.

5, 2002) (“Federal courts have consistently recognized that matters relating to domestic relations

cases and child custody disputes implicate important state interests[.]”) (citing Moore v. Sims, 442

U.S. 415 (1979)). There is no suggestion in the complaint that any purported claim in this federal

lawsuit is barred in the state action. The Court must therefore abstain from interfering with

Plaintiff’s pending state court proceedings in the Lake County Domestic Relations Court.

B. Failure to State a Claim

Even if the Court had jurisdiction over Plaintiff’s claims, Plaintiff fails to state a plausible

claim against any of the defendants. Judge Falkowski and Magistrate Koerner are immune from

suit. Generally, judicial officers are absolutely immune from civil suits for money damages.

Mireles v. Waco, 502 U.S. 9, 9 (1991); Barnes v. Winchell, 105 F.3d 1111, 1115 (6th Cir. 1997).

They are accorded this broad protection to ensure that the independent and impartial exercise of

their judgment in a case is not impaired by the exposure to damages by dissatisfied litigants.

Barnes, 105 F.3d at 1115. For this reason, absolute immunity is overcome only when (1) the

conduct alleged is performed at a time when the defendant is not acting as a judge, or (2) the

conduct alleged, although judicial in nature, is taken in complete absence of all subject matter

jurisdiction of the court over which he or she presides. Mireles, 502 U.S. at 11–12; Barnes, 105

F.3d at 1116. A judge will be not deprived of immunity even if the action at issue was performed

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in error, done maliciously, or exceeded his or her authority. Stump v. Sparkman, 435 U.S. 349,

356 (1978).

Here, neither exception to immunity applies. Plaintiff’s allegations against Judge

Falkowski and Magistrate Koerner concern decisions they made in connection with the

proceedings in the Lake County Domestic Relations Court. Specifically, Plaintiff alleges that

Judge Falkowski and Magistrate Koerner demonstrated bias during the state court proceedings,

predetermined the outcome of the proceedings, disregarded Plaintiff’s rights during the

proceedings, falsely stated that Plaintiff refused to be transported to a court hearing, and denied

Plaintiff’s right to cross-examine a witness. (See ECF Nos. 1-1, 1-3). Judge Falkowski and

Magistrate Koerner were acting as judicial officers when they rendered their decisions and issued

their judgments in the state court proceedings. There is no suggestion in the complaint that the

decisions rendered by these judicial officers were taken in complete absence of all subject matter

jurisdiction of the court over which they preside. Judge Falkowski and Magistrate Koerner are

therefore absolutely immune from suit.

Nor are the remaining defendants sui juris, meaning they are not legal entities that can sue

or be sued in their own right. See Bey v. S. Euclid Mun. Ct., No. 1:25-CV-01157, 2025 WL

2605418, at *2 (N.D. Ohio Sept. 9, 2025) (citing Malone v. Ct. of Common Pleas of Cuyahoga

Cnty., 45 Ohio St. 2d 245, 248 (1976) (“Absent express statutory authority, a court can neither sue

nor be sued in its own right.”) (quotation omitted)); Rose v. Dep’t of Children & Fam. Servs., No.

19-CV-127, 2019 WL 2123067, at *2 (N.D. Ohio May 15, 2019) (Cuyahoga County Department

of Children and Family Services is not sui juris and cannot be sued in its own right) (collecting

cases); Wilson v. Trumbull County Dep’t of Job & Fam. Servs., No. 4:12-CV-02163, 2013 WL

5820276, at *3 (N.D. Ohio Oct. 29, 2013) (finding that “numerous district courts” have found that

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county agencies are not sui juris and granting motion to dismiss defendant Trumbull County Adult

Protective Services because the county agency lacks the capacity to be sued) (collecting cases);

Carmichael v. City of Cleveland, 571 F. App’x 426, 435 (6th Cir. 2014) (finding that “under Ohio

law, a county sheriff’s office is not a legal entity that is capable of being sued”) (citations omitted).

The claims against the Lake County Domestic Relations Court, the Lake County Job and Family

Services, and the Lake County Sheriff’s Office therefore fail as a matter of law.

The Younger abstention generally requires a federal court to stay rather than dismiss a

damages action. See Gray v. Bush, 628 F.3d 779, 785 (6th Cir. 2010) (“In the context of a

complaint seeking ‘both equitable [relief] and money damages,’ . . . ‘a federal court’s discretion

to abstain from exercising jurisdiction does not extend so far as to permit a court to dismiss or

remand, as opposed to stay, an action at law.’”) (quoting Superior Beverage Co., Inc. v. Schieffelin

& Co., 448 F.3d 910, 913–14 (6th Cir. 2006); Moore v. City of Garfield Heights, No. 1:12-cv-

17000, 2012 WL 5845369, at *5 (N.D. Ohio Nov. 19, 2012)). However, a court may dismiss such

an action rather than hold it in abeyance when the plaintiff has failed to state a viable claim for

relief. See Moore, 2012 WL 5845369, at *5 (citing Wheat v. Jessamine J. Newspaper, No. 96-

6426, 1996 WL 476435 (6th Cir. Aug. 20, 1996) (stating that dismissing a case rather than staying

it is appropriate under Younger where a plaintiff fails to state a viable claim for relief)). In light

of the foregoing, Plaintiff’s claims are dismissed; Plaintiff’s emergency motion for preliminary

injunction and his motion for expedited proceedings are denied as moot.

V. CONCLUSION

Accordingly, the Court GRANTS Plaintiff’s application to proceed in forma pauperis

(Doc. No. 2) but DISMISSES this action pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2). Given the case is

dismissed, the Court DENIES Plaintiff’s motion for e-filing access. The Court further DENIES

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Plaintiffs emergency motion for preliminary junction and motion for expedited proceedings as

moot. The Court CERTIFIES, under 28 U.S.C. §1915(a)(3), that an appeal from this decision

could not be taken in good faith.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Date: December 9, 2025

CHARLES E. FLEMING

UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

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