D'Agostino

UNITESDT ATEDSI STRICCOTU RT

WESTERDNI STRIOCFTN EWY ORK

ETHAND .S MITaHn,d

JENNIFLE.DR E ES,

PlaintiffsO,R DER

-vs-

25-CV-12V6-5C-DMHA

MAED 'AGOSTIeNtaO l,. ,

Defendants.

PlainEttihffaDsn. S mitahn Jd enniLf.De erei sn ititahtiaescd t iporsnoe o n

Septem1b02e,0r 2 a5n dp aitdh fiel ifenegE. C FN o1.. T heir conmapmleaosiv netr

onheu ndred DeifenncdlauntdtwisSon,e g c ond CirctuhiCetl eJorufCkd o gueforsrt;

thSee coCnidr caufe idte;r Dails tJruidcgtse e;v eralc osujtruatdt gete hsNe;e wY ork

StaAttet orGneenye raanldt woo fh ears sisattatnotr nfievyems u;n icipaanldit ies

seleecmtp loyae secsh;o doils tarnidca t r egioendaulc atsieornvaailgc een ca y;

numboefpr r ivaattteo rlnaeewyn sf,o rcoeffimceenCrths i,Pl rdo teScetrivvieac neds

OffiocfeC hildarnedFn a miSleyr viecmepsl oyleoecbsau,ls ineasnsdie nsd,i viduals;

andt wenJtayn aen dJ ohDno ed efendIadn,r.t ,rs3.- 11A5m.o nogt hcelra itmhse,

complaailnltea gv eassR tI COc onspitroea ncryi ecnht erprise obmsetmrbuecrts ,

justriectea,l aigaatiePn lsati ntainffdds e,p rPilvaei notfit ffhsec iorn stitutiona

rigthotd sup er oceeqsuspa,rl o tecfrteiseop ne,ea cnhfad,m ilaisaslo ciIadt,r.i4 o6n9..

Fotrh ree asdoinssc ubsesleoPdwl ,a inctoimfpflsia sdi instm issussaep do nte

witlhe atvoae m enwdi th3i0dn a yfrso mt hdea toeft hiosr der.

BACKGROUND

I. ProceHdiusrtaolr y

The procedural history of this action is set forth in greater detail in the Court’s

prior order denying Plaintiffs motion for judicial recusal and a temporary restraining

order and preliminary injunction. ECF No. 19. For the purposes of the present

decision, it is sufficient to note that Plaintiffs commenced this action proceeding pro

se and paid the filing fee in the Northern District of New York on September 10, 2025.

ECF No. 1. Though not identical, the complaint involves similar claims and shares

several defendants in common with two other actions filed in the Northern District

in the past two years. See Dees and Smith v. Zurlo, et al., Case No. 24-CV-0001

(N.D.N.Y.), ECF No. 14 at 3 (noting the complaint was against “a broad spectrum of

governmental entities and private defendants including judges, attorneys, family

members, the Saratoga County Sheriffs Office, district attorneys’ offices,

departments of social service, Warren County, Saratoga County, and the City of

Mechanicville”); Smith et al v. Fisher et al., Case No. 25-CV-0199 (N.D.N.Y.), ECF

No. 12 (“Plaintiffs’ claims relate to past and ongoing state court matters and the

named Defendants are two state court judges, the Chief Clerk of the Third

Department, and three lawyers who were assigned to represent Plaintiffs or their

children in the underlying state court proceedings.”). Notably, the first action cited

above, Dees and Smith v. Zurlo, et al., was dismissed without leave to amend after

the Second Circuit dismissed Plaintiffs appeal. Case No. 24-CV-0001 (N.D.N.Y.),

ECF Nos. 19, 21.

On September 16, 2025, the Second Circuit designated this Court to perform

the duties of United States District Judge temporarily for the Northern District of

New York for this specific case. ECF No. 10.

II. Factual Allegations

The factual allegations regarding a handful of the Defendants in the instant

case give a flavor for the entirety of the complaint, which alleges a conspiracy that

involves “at its core... unlawful attorney appointments and void judicial orders,

enforced by a network of at least four married couples — state judges, bar

administrators, OCFs, clerks, and attorneys — creating a closed system where fraud

is legitimized, retaliation is routine, and justice is for sale in a pay-to-play scheme.”

ECF No. 1 at p. 2.

According to the complaint, Plaintiff Smith’s ex-wife, Defendant Veronica

Smith, initiated divorce proceedings against him in June 2020. ECF No. 1 7 128. On

August 3, 2020, Judge Paul Pelagalli, the “engineer of the racketeering scheme,”

initiated “the racketeering enterprise” when he appointed an attorney for the child.

Id. § 116. Plaintiffs claim that Judge Pelagalli’s adjudication of the matrimonial

proceedings “was not neutral adjudication but a calculated mechanism to preserve

revenue for the system while protecting an abuser.” Id. § 120. For this and other

actions between his appointment of the attorney for the child in 2020 and his

assumption of the role of Clifton Park Town Attorney in January 2024, Plaintiffs

allege Judge Pelagalli’s conduct constituted mail and wire fraud, honest services

fraud, extortion under color of law, obstruction of justice, retaliation against

witnesses, and deprivation of rights under color of law. Id. { 125.

Plaintiff alleges that “[t]he enterprise operated through Saratoga Family and

Supreme Court, Saratoga Springs City Court, county clerk offices, the AD3 [Appellate

Division, Third Department], and into federal forums.” Jd. § 161. Plaintiff claims that

defendant judges and various other judicial employees in these courts and offices

acted in concert to commit, attempt, and/or aid and abet multiple predicate

racketeering acts, including wire fraud, obstruction of justice, witness

tampering/retaliation, deprivation of rights under color of law, and RICO conspiracy.

Id. 162.

For instance, Plaintiff alleges that from August 2023 through August 2025, the

Third Department of the Appellate Division of the New York State Supreme Court

“acted not as a neutral appellate forum but as an enforcement arm of the enterprise.

Despite receiving no fewer than 10 emergency motions... . [the Appellate Division]

issued only boilerplate summary denials, without oral argument, hearings, or written

findings.” Id. { 225. Plaintiffs allege the Appellate Division’s conduct “constitutes

predicate racketeering acts” including wire fraud, obstruction of justice, retaliation

against witnesses, deprivation of rights under color of law, and conspiracy to conduct

racketeering. Id. | 233.

Plaintiffs allege that Second Circuit Judges William Nardini and Joseph

Bianco, and Second Circuit Clerk of Court Catherine O’Hagan Wolfe, “used the

Second Circuit as an instrument of the enterprise, obstructing appellate review and

laundering unlawful dismissals into precedential federal records.” Jd. § 265. The

Second Circuit’s multiple rulings in Plaintiffs’ cases “were not neutral adjudications,

but retaliatory acts designed to protect conflicted state and federal defendants,

prevent review of fraudulent attorney appointments, and foreclose federal remedies

for Plaintiffs.” Id. 271. This conduct constituted the predicate racketeering acts of

wire fraud, obstruction of justice, witness retaliation, deprivation of rights under

color of law, and RICO conspiracy. Id. 4 273.

Plaintiffs allege that ten named law enforcement defendants “engaged in a

deliberate, continuous pattern of racketeering activity and retaliation against

Plaintiffs as federal witnesses.” Id. § 281. Plaintiffs state that in the face of repeated

notice that Plaintiffs were subject to void judicial proceedings and “escalated threats,”

these defendants “refused enforcement and instead weaponized their offices to

protect enterprise actors.” Jd. Their conduct allegedly constituted obstruction of

justice, witness tampering/retaliation, conspiracy against rights, deprivation of

rights under color of law, mail and wire fraud, honest services fraud, and RICO

conspiracy. Id. § 285.

Plaintiffs allege that Defendant Letitia James, Attorney General of the State

of New York, two of her assistant attorneys general, and several local district

attorneys were “direct architects and enforcers of the racketeering enterprise,

weaponizing prosecutorial discretion as a retaliatory shield for unlawful conduct.” Id.

{ 313. Defendant James, in particular, refused to prosecute or intervene despite

Plaintiffs’ provision of notice of multiple ethical and legal violations, and “instead

direct[ed] her deputies to defend void orders... . act[ing] not as chief law enforcement

officer of the state but as chief protector of the enterprise.” Jd. □□ 319. Plaintiff claims

these defendants engaged in the predicate racketeering acts including obstruction of

justice, witness tampering and retaliation, conspiracy against rights, deprivation of

rights under the color of law, mail and wire fraud, honest services fraud, fraud upon

the court, and racketeering conspiracy. Id. J 315.

Plaintiffs further claim that several Defendants from the New York State

Office of Child and Family Services, as well as from Child Protective Services

“falsified records, prematurely closed founded cases, fabricated excuses to avoid

intervention, and obstructed compliance with subpoenas.” Id. 4 349. “These

coordinated acts were not discretionary errors. They were deliberate enterprise

tactics.” Id. | 361. Plaintiffs allege that this conduct constituted obstruction of justice,

witness tampering and retaliation, conspiracy against rights, deprivation of rights

under color of law, falsification of public records, mail and wire fraud, and

racketeering conspiracy. Id.

DISCUSSION

“District Courts do not generally conduct sua sponte reviews of actions in which

the plaintiff has paid the filing fee.” Yoo v. Rochester Gen. Hosp., No. 18-CV-6398 CJS,

2018 WL 3575660, at *2 (W.D.N.Y. July 25, 2018). Further, pro se submissions are

reviewed with “special solicitude,” and “must be construed liberally and interpreted

to raise the strongest arguments that they suggest.” Triestman v. Fed. Bureau of

Prisons, 470 F.3d 471, 474-75 (2d Cir. 2006) Gnternal quotation marks and emphasis

omitted). Nevertheless, “pro se status does not exempt a party from compliance with

relevant rules of procedural and substantive law.” Id. at 477. In that regard, the

Second Circuit has confirmed that a “district court has inherent authority to ‘dismiss

a frivolous complaint sua sponte even when the plaintiff has paid the required filing

fee.” Hariprasad v. New York, 722 F. App’x 102, 102 (2d Cir. 2018) (quoting

Fitzgerald v. First E. Seventh St. Tenants Corp., 221 F.3d 362, 364 (2d Cir. 2000)).

“TA] complaint, containing as it does both factual allegations and legal

conclusions, is frivolous where it lacks an arguable basis either in law or in fact.”

Neitzke v. Williams, 490 U.S. 319, 325 (1989). Thus, the “term ‘frivolous,’ when

applied to a complaint, embraces not only the inarguable legal conclusion, but also

the fanciful factual allegation.” Jd. A finding of frivolousness is therefore appropriate

“when the facts alleged rise to the level of the irrational or the wholly incredible,

whether or not there are judicially noticeable facts available to contradict them.”

Selby v. United States, No. 24-CV-8761 (LDH) (LB), 2025 WL 552609, at *2 H.D.N.Y.

Feb. 19, 2025) (quoting Denton v. Hernandez, 504 U.S. 25, 33 (1992)).

After reviewing all 545 paragraphs of Plaintiffs’ complaint, the Court finds

both that the facts alleged rise to the level of the irrational or the wholly incredible,

and that the complaint lacks an arguable basis in law.

I. Frivolous Factual Allegations

“A claim is frivolous when it is vague and incomprehensible, or when it is

supported by baseless factual allegations ‘describing fantastic or delusional

scenarios.” Morpurgo v. Inc. Vill. of Sag Harbor, 697 F. Supp. 2d 309, 342 (K.D.N.Y.

2010), affd, 417 F. App’x 96 (2d Cir. 2011) (quoting Bloom v. U.S. Gov’, No.

02CIV.2352DABDF, 2003 WL 22327163, *8 (S.D.N.Y. Oct. 10, 2003)). Here,

Plaintiffs’ core RICO claims are based on fantastical allegations that dozens of

“federal and state judicial officers, prosecutors, attorneys, law enforcement officials,

[child protective services agencies], school personnel, municipalities, and private

actors” entered into an immense conspiracy, the objectives of which were to “enrich

Enterprise members through fraudulent attorney appointments and

misappropriated federal funds,” obstruct justice, retaliate against Plaintiffs, and

deprive Plaintiffs of their constitutional rights. ECF No. 1 9] 467, 469.

In addition to the RICO claims, each of the dozen or so remaining claims hinges

on similarly incredible claims that the Defendants “weaponized their positions’;

convened and enforced void proceedings; issued void orders; fabricated, manipulated,

and backdated records; suppressed filings and material evidence; facilitated

abductions; and misused the legal process. Plaintiffs’ claims “are precisely the type of

fanciful or delusional allegations that warrant dismissal .. . as factually frivolous.”

Lang v. Clinton, 761 F. Supp. 3d 595, 601-02 (W.D.N.Y. 2024), appeal dismissed, No.

25-126, 2025 WL 1982319 (2d Cir. May 21, 2025) (citing, inter alia, Gladney v.

Pendleton Corr. Facility, 302 F.3d 778, 774 (7th Cir. 2002)); see also Gallop v. Cheney,

642 F.3d 364, 368 (2d Cir. 2011) (Gallop or any other plaintiff certainly may allege

that the most senior members of the United States government conspired to commit

acts of terrorism against the United States, [but] the courts have no obligation to

entertain pure speculation and conjecture.”).

IL. Frivolous Legal Claims

Besides being fantastical, Plaintiffs’ allegations are also insufficient to state a

legal claim. The complaint not only invites the Court to look past the well-settled

princiopftl heeRs o oker-FedlodcmtarYnio nuen,ga ebrs entainodin m,m uniotfy

publoifcfi cibaulitst a, l sfaoi ltsoa dequaptleelaaynd y o ft h1e4 c ausoefas c tion

alleged.

A.TheR ooker-FeDlodcmtaranin nYde o ungAebrs tention

Ast hceo urdtesa lwiint gPh lnatiiffpsr'ic oarss heav neoteadnd,t hiCso urt

hase choiendi tosrd erd eninygP laintiffs rieinlejtfuh,neR c otoikveer -Fne ldma

doctriannedt hep rinciopfYl oeusn gaebrts entpireosne nptot entiparlolnfoydu

problfoermP lsa intcoimffplasi'n Tth.eC ournto ttehse hme r et,houfignhd tshese

considearraneto itdo inssp osdiutteiot v h veea guea ncdon clusnaoturryoe fP l aint iffs'

allegatiornesg artdhisent ga tceuor todrersu nderliytcisaln igm s.

The Rooker-Fedolcdtmrabinan rfeesd e radlit sriccotu rfrtosmh earciansg e s

th aatrein, e ffetc ,appeafrloms s ttaec oujrutd gmenotnts h ge rountdhsat th e

SupremCeo uritst hoen lfyde ercauolr wti tjhru isdiocvteisrouc nhc aess.D orcve.

Cityo fN e wYork2,F . 4t82h,1 01(d 2 Cir20.2 1()c it2i8Un .gS .§C1 .2 57I)nt. h tew o

casefrso m whicthhd eo ctrtoioniket nsam e,t hSeu preCmoeu rhted lt hafte de ral

disrticcotu rctuolds n oetxe rcei sjisudicrtioovnec rl aismese ktiovn ogi tdho eu tcome

ofa stactouert j udmegnt .Id(.c itiDinsg troifCc otl umCboiuaor tfA ppeavl.s

Feldm4a60nU ,. S4.6 24,6 3(9 183(p)l ainstoiuffgsreh vte rosfsat lta ec ourdetn'isa l

ofr equefosrtw sa ivoefrb sar a dmsisirounl Reo)o;k evrF. i dteyTl riuCsot.2 ,63 U .S.

4134,44 ( 192(3p)l aisnotuigtffhoh ta vIend iajnduagm ent "edcrleandu lalndv oid")).

Followithne gmo rreec e nctaeso fE xxMoonbi Clo r vpS..a udBia sIincd usCtorripe.s,

544 U.S2.80 ( 0205th)e, S econd Cairtriccuuil fotau trre edquire tmheamntut sts be

met for Rooker-Feldman to apply:

(1) “the federal-court plaintiff must have lost in state court[;]” (2) “the

plaintiff must complain of injuries caused by a state-court judgment|;]”

(8) “the plaintiff must invite district court review and rejection of that

judgment|;]” and (4) “the state-court judgment must have been rendered

before the district court proceedings commenced.”

Dorce, 2 F.4th at 101 (quoting Hoblock v. Albany Cty. Bd. of Elections, 422 F.3d 77,

85 (2d Cir. 2005)). Where these four elements are satisfied, “[t]he Rooker-Feldman

doctrine precludes district court review as a matter of subject matter jurisdiction.”

Fraccola v. Grow, 670 F. App’x 34, 35 (2d Cir. 2016).

Whereas the Rooker-Feldman doctrine applies to complaints from a “state

court loser,” the Younger abstention doctrine and its progeny require federal courts

to refrain from exercising jurisdiction over matters concerning ongoing proceedings

in state court. See Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37, 44 (1971). “Younger abstention 1s

mandatory when: (1) there is an ongoing state proceeding; (2) an important state

interest is involved; and (3) the plaintiff has an adequate opportunity for judicial

review of his constitutional claims during or after the proceeding.” Sobel v. Prudenti,

25 F. Supp. 3d 340, 354-55 (E.D.N.Y. 2014) (citing Spargo v. N.Y. State Comm’n on

Judicial Conduct, 351 F.3d 65, 75 (2d Cir. 2003)). The Second Circuit has identified

two narrow exceptions the Supreme Court has made to Younger abstention: (1) bad

faith, i.e., “cases of proven harassment or prosecutions undertaken by state officials

in bad faith without hope of obtaining a valid conviction’; and (2) extraordinary

circumstances, i.e., where “extraordinary circumstances render the state court

incapable of fairly and fully adjudicating the federal issues before it, . . . creating an

extraordinarily pressing need for immediate federal equitable relief.” Wilson v.

Emond, 373 F. App’x 98, 100 (2d Cir. 2010) Gnternal citations and quotation marks

omitted).

In the instant case, the allegations in the complaint are so vague and

conclusory that the Court is unable to determine with precision whether the Rooker-

Feldman doctrine or Younger abstention apply. However, the Court observes —

without finding — that one or both of the doctrines likely apply to bar subject matter

jurisdiction over many of Plaintiffs’ claims. For instance, Plaintiffs allege that

“multiple judges knowingly issued custody orders after jurisdiction had been divested

or never existed — Family Court judges altering custody determinations reserved

exclusively to [the New York State] Supreme Court under DRL § 240, [New York

State] Supreme Court judges presiding over matrimonial cases that were void ab

initio, and federal judges insulating those rulings.” ECF No. 1 at § 157. Similarly,

Plaintiffs allege Family Court Judge Jeffrey Wait of Saratoga County “weaponized”

his “September 4, 2025 Criminal Court order . .. right after he signed TPO’s in family

court .... All orders are void ab initio.” Id. { 207. Plaintiffs also challenge rulings

from the Third Department of the Appellate Division of the New York Supreme Court

on “no fewer than ten emergency motions” (/d. §] 225), multiple actions from New

York State Administrative Judges Ud. § 234-241), and an order of dismissal from

New York Court of Claims Judge Zainab Chaudhry (Ud. 247-253).

Given the nature of the allegations in this case, it is nearly certain that

multiple of these orders or rulings have rendered Plaintiffs the “state court loser,”

and therefore are sufficient to invoke the Rooker-Feldman doctrine to bar this court’s

consideration of Plaintiffs’ challenges to them. See, e.g., Bobrowsky v. Yonkers

Courthouse, 777 F. Supp. 2d 692, 705 (S.D.N.Y. 2011) (discussing when an order is

sufficiently final to render the plaintiff a “state court loser”). And it is also nearly

certain that the court is required to abstain from considering challenges to other

rulings or orders based on the Younger abstention doctrine. See Falco v. Justs. of the

Matrimonial Parts of Supreme Ct. of Suffolk Cnty., 805 F.3d 425, 427 (2d Cir. 2015)

(finding Younger abstention to be warranted where “Falco’s federal lawsuit

implicates the way that New York courts manage their own divorce and custody

proceedings—a subject in which ‘the states have an especially strong interest.”’).

Nevertheless, the substance and procedural posture of the case for each of the

particular rulings that Plaintiff challenges are ambiguous at this point, and require

the Court to refrain from a definitive ruling as to the application of either doctrine.

B. Immunity

Even aside from the potentially profound problems for Plaintiffs’ complaint

raised by the Rooker-Feldman doctrine and Younger abstention, Plaintiffs’ claims

against multiple defendants are likely also barred by principles of immunity.

Decisions by the Supreme Court “consistently have held that government officials are

entitled to some form of immunity from suits for damages. As recognized at common

law, public officers require this protection to shield them from undue interference

with their duties and from potentially disabling threats of liability.” Harlow v.

Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 806 (1982). As with the Rooker-Feldman doctrine and

Younger abstention, though, the Court finds these considerations are not dispositive

due to the vague and conclusory nature of Plaintiffs’ allegations.

Judicial Immunity

As indicated above, several Defendants in the instant case are judges, either

federal or state. Nevertheless, Plaintiffs maintain that these judicial defendants are

not entitled to judicial immunity because they acted without jurisdiction. See, e.g.,

ECF No. 1 § 3-84.

The principle that judges generally have absolute immunity for suits for money

damages for their judicial actions is well-settled. Bliven v. Hunt, 579 F.3d 204, 209

(2d Cir. 2009). In addition to applying to judges, “[a]bsolute judicial immunity also

extends to those who, at the direction of a judicial officer, perform administrative

functions closely associated with the judicial process.” Dieujuste v. Sin, 125 F.4th 397,

399 (2d Cir. 2025). This includes not only clerks, but also law guardians or attorneys

for children who serve as an arm of the court. See Yapi v. Kondratyeva, 340 F. App’x

683, 685 (2d Cir. 2009); Scotto v. Almenas, 143 F.3d 105, 111 (2d Cir. 1998). However,

judicial immunity does not apply either when a judge takes action outside of the

judge’s judicial capacity, or when the judge takes action that — although judicial in

nature — is “in the complete absence of all jurisdiction.” Mireles v. Waco, 502 U.S. 9,

12 (1991).

Here, Plaintiffs allege that judicial immunity does not apply because the judge

was either unlawfully appointed (ECF No. 1 { 116), or acting in the clear absence of

all jurisdiction (id. 9{{ 157-58). They further argue that “the conduct alleged —

fabricating and backdating orders, manufacturing attorney assignments,

manipulating dockets, coordinating with clerks and attorneys, and weaponizing law

enforcement — are not protected judicial functions but administrative, conspiratorial,

and retaliatory acts undertaken to advance a racketeering enterprise.” Id. § 158.

While Plaintiffs support this position with pages and pages of assertions, such

assertions are vague and conclusory, and insufficient to divest the judge and clerk

defendants of their judicial immunity. See Butcher v. Wendt, 975 F.3d 236, 241 (2d

Cir. 2020).

Other Forms of Immunity

In addition to alleging wrongdoing by judges and their staffs, Plaintiffs also

allege wrongdoing by multiple lawyer defendants, caseworkers and law enforcement

officials. In that regard, the Second Circuit’s discussion in Cornejo v. Bell, 592 F.3d

121 (2d Cir. 2010) is instructive:

[There is] well-established precedent that “qualified rather than

absolute immunity is sufficient to protect government officials in the

exercise of their duties.” DiBlasio v. Novello, 344 F.3d 292, 296 (2d Cir.

2003) (quoting Burns v. Reed, 500 U.S. 478, 486-87 (1991)) (internal

quotation mark omitted). However, there are certain instances where

executive employees, such as prosecutors, are entitled to absolute

immunity. Imbler v. Pachtman, 424 U.S. 409, 427 (1976). The real

distinction between whether an executive employee is entitled to

absolute or qualified immunity turns on the kind of function the

employee is fulfilling in performing the acts complained of. This is what

the Supreme Court has called a “functional” analysis. Briscoe v. LaHue,

460 U.S. 325, 342. Prosecutors are entitled to absolute immunity, for

example, because their prosecutorial activities are “intimately

associated with the judicial phase of the criminal process, and thus [are]

functions to which the reasons for absolute immunity apply with full

force.” Imbler, 424 U.S. at 430.

Mutatis mutandis, absolute immunity also extends to non-prosecutor

officials when they are performing “functions analogous to those of a

prosecutor.” Butz v. Economou, 438 U.S. 478 (1978). While any analogy

between two kinds of executive employees is never perfect, such

reasoning by analogy is at the heart of judicial thinking: things that are

essentially alike should be treated essentially the same. Thus, the Butz

Court held that an agency official who decides to institute an

administrative proceeding is entitled in such circumstances to absolute

immunity, since that decision is “very much like the prosecutor’s

decision to initiate or move forward with a criminal prosecution.” Id. at

515.

This Court has previously extended absolute immunity to state and

federal officials initiating noncriminal proceedings such as

administrative proceedings and civil litigation. See Barrett v. United

States, 798 F.2d 565, 572 (2d Cir.1986) (citing Butz, 438 U.S. at 512-17).

Of particular relevance here, we have held that an attorney for a county

Department of Social Services who “initiates and prosecutes child

protective orders and represents the interests of the Department and

the County in Family Court” is entitled to absolute immunity. Walden

v. Wishengrad, 745 F.2d 149, 152 (2d Cir. 1984). The Wishengrad Court

concluded that given “the importance of the Department’s [child

protection] activities, the need to pursue protective child litigation

vigorously and the potential for subsequent colorable claims,” the

attorney must be accorded absolute immunity from § 19838 claims

arising out of the performance of her duties. Jd. We conclude that the

lawyer defendants in the instant case were fulfilling similar functions,

and that the district court thus properly extended to those defendants

absolute immunity from the § 1983 claims

Even qualified immunity, however, is sufficient to shield executive

employees from civil liability under § 1983 if either “(1) their conduct

‘did not violate clearly established rights of which a reasonable person

would have known, or (2) ‘it was objectively reasonable to believe that

[their] acts did not violate these clearly established rights.” Young v.

County of Fulton, 160 F.3d 899, 903 (2d Cir. 1998) (quoting Soares v.

Connecticut, 8 F.3d 917, 920 (2d Cir. 1998) (alteration in original)

(internal quotation marks omitted)); see also Harlow, 457 U.S. at 818.

Of relevance here, we have previously noted that the second Young

prong provides “substantial protection for caseworkers,” Tenenbaum v.

Williams, 193 F.3d 581, 596 (2d Cir.1999), which is necessary because

“Ip|rotective services caseworkers [must] choose between difficult

alternatives,” id. (second alteration in original) (quoting van Emrik v.

ChemuCnogu nDteypo 'fSt o cS.e rv9s1.F,2.1 d8 638,6 (62 Cdi r.1990)).

TheT enenbCaouumcr otn cltuhdasetud m majruyd gmsehnotut lhdu s

be" reaadvialiyl taotb hleecs aes ewoirnkp errospc ears uensd etrh e

qualiifimemdu ndiotcyt rIidna.et5 . 9"7 .

Corn5e9jF2o. ,3a dt1 27-28.

WhiCloer ndeijsoc uaststeodro nreiygsi ntahateci tnigao gnasip nlsati natsi ff,

welalsc asewowrokrekroisnnt ghc ea steh,per incsiepfotlr etishnC ornreejgoa rding

qualiifimemdu nailtseyox tetnold a ewn forceomffiecnitaS leMsec. E vvo.Sy p encer,

12F4. 39d2 9,7 ( 2Cdi r.1(9fi9n7d)ti hnagqt u aliifimemdu nsihtiye glodvse rnment

officiinacllsu,ld aiewnn gf orcoefmfiecn"etfrr oslm,i abfoirlc iitvdyia lm agienss ofar

ast heciorn dduocentso v ti olcalteea rly essttaatbuoltrcio osrnhyse tdi tutional

ofw hiacr he asonpaebrlsweoo nu hladv ken own.").

Asw itthh ej udidceifael nddainstcsu asbsoevdPe l,a inatlilffestg hea t

princoifip mlmeusn diont oyat p pbleyc aoufts hene e farimooutsi uvnedse rltyhienigr

actiSoenese,.. gE.C,FN o.1 ,r 2 84( regartdhilena gwe nforcedmeefenntd ants,

"[q]uailmimfuineipdtr yo vindoep sr otecfotrik onno winvgiloyl actlienagr ly

establriisghh.et.ds. ." N)e.v erthtehleCe osusrfi,tn dPsl ainvtaigffusae'n d

concluassosreyr tuinopnesr se uaans diinvsuffictioes nttra inpyo ft hep ublic

ofifciaeln ddaeonffit msm unity for which they may be eli

C.PleadSitnagn daGrednse,r ally

FurtherRmuol8re(e a,o) ft hFee deRrualloe fsC ivPirlo cerdeuqruei ar es

compltaoci onntt aamionn,og t htehri n"gass h,o arntpd l asitna teomfte hncetl aim

showtihnatgth p el eaidesen rt ittorl eeldi" e'f.Ts"ht ea tesmheonubtle pd l abienc ause

thper incfuinpcatlio ofpn l eaduinndgetsrh F ee deRruallie sts o g ivteh aed verse

party fair notice of the claim asserted so as to enable him to answer and prepare for

trial.” Lang, 761 F. Supp. 3d at 600 (quoting Salahuddin v. Cuomo, 861 F.2d 40, 42

(2d Cir. 1988) (citations omitted). “The statement should be short because

‘fuJnnecessary prolixity in a pleading places an unjustified burden on the court and

the party who must respond to it because they are forced to ferret out the relevant

material from a mass of verbiage.” Jd. (citation omitted). “When a complaint does not

comply with the requirement that it be short and plain, the court has the power, on

its own initiative or in response to a motion by the defendant, to strike any portions

that are redundant or immaterial... or to dismiss the complaint.” Id.

The instant complaint, running to 545 paragraphs over 98 pages, “is neither

short nor plain, but rather is bloated, rambling, and teeming with irrelevant factual

digressions and improper legal argument.” Lang, 761 F. Supp. 3d at 601. Dismissal

could be warranted on those grounds alone. See, e.g., Prezzi v. Schelter, 469 F.2d 691,

692 (2d Cir. 1972) (affirming dismissal of 88-page pro se complaint containing “a

labyrinthian prolixity of unrelated and vituperative charges that defied

comprehension [and therefore] failed to comply with the [short-and-plain-statement]

requirement of Rule 8”).

D. Plaintiffs’ Causes of Action

More to the point, dismissal is also warranted because the Court finds that

each of the 14 causes of action in Plaintiffs’ complaint fails to state a plausible claim

for relief.

“[A] complaint must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to

‘state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662,

678 (2009) (quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007)). “A claim

has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court

to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct

alleged.” Id. at 678. Where a plaintiffs factual allegations are “merely consistent

with” a defendant’s liability, those allegations “stop[] short of the line between

possibility and plausibility of entitlement to relief.” Id. (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S.

at 557). Further, a pleading will not suffice where it offers only “labels and

conclusions,” “a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action, or tenders

“naked assertion[s]” devoid of “further factual enhancement.” Id. (quoting Twombly,

550 U.S. at 555). “Determining whether a complaint states a plausible claim for relief

will... be a context-specific task that requires the reviewing court to draw on its

judicial experience and common sense.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 679.

Counts I and HI: RICO Claims

Under 18 U.S.C. § 1962(c), it is unlawful for any person employed by or

associated with any enterprise engaged in or affecting interstate or foreign commerce,

“to conduct or participate, directly or indirectly, in the conduct of such enterprises

affairs through a pattern of racketeering activity ....” Section 1961(d) further makes

it unlawful for any person to conspire to violate § 1961(c). Plaintiffs allege that each

individual defendant is liable under § 1962(c) for their own racketeering activity, and

under § 1962(d) for conspiring together in a racketeering enterprise. ECF No. 1 □□

467-82.

As it relates to a pattern of racketeering under 18 U.S.C. § 1962(c), the Court

notes that the “pattern of racketeering activity” elements “are adequately pled where

plaintiff makes factual allegations sufficient to demonstrate that defendants

committed two or more predicate acts as part of a pattern of racketeering activity.”

De Sole v. Knoedler Gallery, LLC, 974 F. Supp. 2d 274, 299 (S.D.N.Y. 20138). Further,

fraud claims must “state with particularity the circumstances constituting fraud.”

Fed. R. Civ. P. 9(b). To satisfy Rule 9(b), a complaint must “allege facts that give rise

to a strong inference of fraudulent intent.” Berman v. Morgan Keegan & Co., 455 F.

App’x 92, 95 (2d Cir. 2012) (summary order) (quoting Acito v. IMCERA Grp., Inc., 47

F.3d 47, 52 (2d Cir. 1995)).

Yet the scheme here urged by Plaintiffs is literally incredible; the notion that

so many public officials and agencies across the state would work with other private

entities and individuals to perpetuate a scheme of illegal attorney appointments and

document manipulation to generate attorney fees that would fund their enterprise

and retaliate against Plaintiffs defies belief. Moreover, with respect to the substance

of Plaintiffs’ claims, the Court notes that “conclusory, vague, and general allegations

of a criminal conspiracy do not... suffice to establish that the defendants participated

in a ‘pattern of racketeering activity’ as prohibited by RICO.” Tapia-Ortiz v. Winter,

185 F.3d 8, 11 (2d Cir. 1999). Because Plaintiffs’ allegations are vague and conclusory,

and fail to give rise to a strong inference of fraudulent intent on the part of any

Defendant, the Court finds that Plaintiffs have failed to adequately plead their RICO

claims.

Counts IIT, IV, and V: 42 U.S.C. §§ 1983, 1985, 1986

Plaintiff alleges that all Defendants in this action, with the exception of the

Federal Judicial Defendants, “jointly and severally deprived Plaintiffs of rights

secured by the Constitution and laws of the United States,” including rights under

the First Amendment, Fourth Amendment, and Fourteenth Amendment. ECF No. 1

{| 483. They also allege that all Defendants conspired to interfere with their civil

rights to federal access and equal protection in violation of 42 U.S.C. § 1985(2)-(8)

(Id. § 488), and that certain “Supervisory Defendants” violated 42 U.S.C. § 1986 when

they neglected to prevent the conspiracy (Ud. § 494).

To establish a prima facie case under 42 U.S.C. § 1988, a plaintiff must assert

that “a person” acting under color of state law deprived him of his “rights, privileges,

or immunities secured by the Constitution or laws of the United States.” Bigwarfe v.

Bresnahan, No. 818CV578GTSDJS, 2018 WL 6174188, at *3 (N.D.N.Y. June 5, 2018),

report and recommendation adopted, No. 818CV0578GTSDJS, 2018 WL 5077196

(N.D.N.Y. Oct. 18, 2018). “The essential allegations of a § 1985(2) claim of witness

intimidation are (1) a conspiracy between two or more persons, (2) to deter a witness

by force, intimidation or threat from attending [federal] court or testifying freely in

any pending matter, which (8) results in injury to the plaintiff.” Chahal v. Paine

Webber Inc., 725 F.2d 20, 23 (2d Cir. 1984); see also Haddle v. Garrison, 525 U.S. 121,

125 (1998). To establish a violation of § 1985(8), the plaintiff must allege four

elements: (1) a conspiracy motivated by racial animus; (2) for the purpose of

depriving, either directly or indirectly, any person or class of persons of the equal

protection of the laws; and (8) an act in furtherance of the conspiracy; (4) whereby a

person is either injured in her person or property or deprived of any right or privilege

of a citizen of the United States. United Broth. of Carpenters and Joiners of America,

Local 610, AFL-CIO v. Scott, 463 U.S. 825, 828~-29 (1983); Brown v. City of Oneonta,

221 F.3d 329, 341 (2d Cir. 2000).

To begin with, the factual allegations giving rise to Plaintiffs’ § 1983 and § 1985

claims do not rise to the level of the plausible. Moreover, the Second Circuit has long

held that, with respect to conspiracy claims under 42 U.S.C. §§ 1983 and 1985,

“complaints containing only conclusory, vague, or general allegations that the

defendants have engaged in a conspiracy to deprive the plaintiff of his constitutional

rights are properly dismissed; diffuse and expansive allegations are insufficient,

unless amplified by specific instances of misconduct.” Ciambriello v. Cnty. of Nassau,

292 F.3d 307, 325 (2d Cir. 2002); Dwares v. City of N.Y., 985 F.2d 94, 100 (2d Cir.

1993). Here, though Plaintiffs have alleged widespread fraud and other misconduct,

they have offered little factual detail regarding the substance of any specific act and

virtually no information, beyond their own conclusory assertions, as to when and how

the various defendants at multiple levels of government spread across much of the

state planned, communicated, cooperated, or conspired to deprive them of their First,

Fourth, or Fourteenth Amendment rights or the equal protection of the laws, or to

intimidate them to prevent their appearance in federal court. Accordingly, Plaintiffs’

allegations that Defendants are liable under 42 U.S.C. §§ 1983 and 1985 are

insufficient.

Finally, “Section 1986 does not provide substantive rights.” Meyer v. Haines,

No. 1:24-CV-00791 (AJB/DJS), 2025 WL 1651154, at *19 (N.D.N.Y. June 11, 2025).

Rather, a claim under § 1986 for neglect to prevent a conspiracy to interfere with civil

rights is contingent upon a plaintiff having a valid conspiracy claim under 42 U.S.C.

§ 1985. Mian v. Donaldson, Lufkin & Jenrette Sec. Corp., 7 F.8d 1085, 1088 (2d Cir.

1993). As Plaintiffs’ have not adequately pled a claim under § 1985, their claim that

Defendants violated § 1986 must fail.

Counts VI, VII, and VII: the ADA and the Rehabilitation Act

Plaintiffs allege that several public entity defendants are liable for

discrimination against them under Title II of the ADA (ECF No. 1 4 504-508), all

defendants are liable for retaliation under the ADA (Ud. 9 509-18), and several

federally-funded defendants are guilty of retaliation under the Rehabilitation Act (Id.

49 514-18).

Title IT of the ADA provides, in relevant part, that “no qualified individual with

a disability shall, by reason of such disability, be excluded from participation in or be

denied the benefits of the services, programs, or activities of a public entity, or be

subjected to discrimination by any such entity.” 42 U.S.C. § 12182. To state a

discrimination claim under these provisions, a plaintiff must allege “(1) that he is a

‘qualified individual’ with a disability; (2) that he was excluded from participation in

a public entity’s services, programs or activities or was otherwise discriminated

against by a public entity; and (3) that such exclusion or discrimination was due to

his disability.” Phelan v. Thomas, 439 F. App’x 48, 50 (2d Cir. 2011) (citing Hargrave

v. Vermont, 340 F.3d 27, 34-35 (2d Cir. 2003)).

Retaliation against any individual who has asserted rights under the ADA is

prohibited by Title V of that Act. See, e.g., Currytto v. Doe, 18-CV-1392, 2019 WL

2062432, at *8 (D. Conn. May 9, 2019) (citing Sarno v. Douglas Elliman-Gibbons &

Ives, Inc., 183 F.3d 155, 159 (2d Cir. 1999)). “To state a retaliation claim under [the

ADA], a plaintiff must establish that ‘(i) plaintiff was engaged in protected activity;

(ii) the alleged retaliator knew that plaintiff was involved in protected activity; (i1i)

an adverse decision or course of action was taken against plaintiff; and (iv) a causal

connection exists between the protected activity and the adverse action.” Currytto,

2019 WL 20624382, at *8 (quoting Weixel v. Bd. of Educ., 287 F.3d 139, 148 (2d Cir.

2002)). The same elements must be demonstrated for retaliation claims under the

Rehabilitation Act. See, e.g, Frantti v. New York, 414 F. Supp. 3d 257, 290 (N.D.N.Y.

2019), affd, 850 F. App’x 17 (2d Cir. 2021) (combining the analysis of retaliation

claims under the two statutes).

Among other things, the complaint in the instant case fails to plausibly allege

that Plaintiffs were excluded from participation or otherwise discriminated against

in any proceeding on the basis of their respective disabilities (ECF No. 1 {| 504-508),

or that any adverse decision or course of action taken by the defendants was causally

connected to their complaints under the ADA (Ud. 9§[ 509-518). Their allegations

regarding animus are no more than naked assertions devoid of factual enhancement.

For example, Plaintiffs state that “temporal proximity between Plaintiffs’ ADA

activity and Defendants’ retaliatory conduct demonstrates causation” (Ud. § 511), but

Plaintiffs’ allegations in this regard are so vague and conclusory as to negate their

value as circumstantial evidence of retaliation.

Counts [IX—XIV: State Law Torts

Plaintiffs allege that various defendants are liable for multiple state law torts,

including intentional infliction of emotional distress (“TIED”), fraud, conversion,

abuse of process, negligence per se, and defamation. ECF No. 1 519-45. None of

these causes of action are adequately pled or supported by plausible allegations.

At the outset, the Court notes that Plaintiffs’ cause of action for each of these

torts fails to specify a complete set of factual allegations that would satisfy the

elements of the claim, leaving the Court to sift through an array of allegations and

attempting to match them to the elements. “It is not the duty of the defendants or

this Court to sift through the Complaint and guess which factual allegations support

which claims.” Discon Inc. v. NYNEX Corp., No. 90-CV-546A, 1992 WL 193683, at

*16 (W.D.N.Y. June 238, 1992).

Further, in order to establish liability for ITED, a plaintiff must prove that the

defendants exhibited “(1) extreme and outrageous conduct” with the “(2) intent to

cause severe emotional distress,” that there was “(8) a causal connection between the

conduct and the injury,” and that “(4) severe emotional distress” resulted. Rentas v.

Ruffin, 816 F.3d 214, 227 (2d Cir. 2016) (quoting Bender v. City of New York, 78 F.3d

787, 790 (2d Cir.1996). To be sure, the conduct that Plaintiff alleges throughout the

complaint is, in many instances, extreme and outrageous. However, as discussed at

length above, their allegations are conclusory, speculative, and simply not plausible.

UndeNrew Yorlka wt,h eel emeonfat c si vfrialu cdl aairmte h at" ( 1t)he

defendmaadneta materfailsaelr epresen(t2at)th iedoenf,e ndianenntdted to

defrauthde p lainthteirffe b(y3,)t he plainrteiafsfo nareblliyeu pdo nt eh

represenatnda( t4it)oh npel, a instuieffrffe ddamagasea r esuolfst u crehl icaen."

JBCHoldNiY,n LgLCsv . Pak t2e03r1W ,L1 1490 a6* t11,3( SD..N.2Y0.31 )( uqoting

Wall vC.S XT ran Isnpc4..7,F1,. 34d1 04,15-(126Cd ir . 200).6)A clafoirmc momon

lawfr auudn deNre wY orlka wm ussta itsfyt hree quire omfte ehnh tesightened

pleadistanngd arudn deRru el 9(bof) t heF ederRualle osf CivPirlco edure.

JBCHoldinNgY,s L LC2,0 1W3L a*t 13( citLiannegsd baBnakd en-Wurt v.t ember

GoldmaSna,c &h Cso ., 478F .A pp 6'7x96,8 (1d2 C i.r2 012A)s) n.o tweitd h regard

to Plain RtICiOfc flsaiwmh,en allegifranug dR ul9e( br)eu qirtehsa " t apar tmyust

stawtiet pha rticutlh aceirruimctsyat nc e,scotnistutfraiundgo rm ista kMea.lice,

intenktn,o wleadndgo et,h ceorni ditonofsa p eorns' msinmda yb ea lleggeende rally."

Fed.R .C ivP. .9( bY)et. " []thSee co Cnidurichta csl aritfiheaadtl thoiunegntthm ay

be alleggeneedr al'wleym ,u snto mti tskaet hree alxatni ofoR ul 9e(b)s'pse cificity

requiremreegnatr dcinondgi toifom ni nfodr a lcineseto b as celaiofmfr sa uodn

speculaantdic oonn cluaslolreyg atWialordnosn.v ".M ialnaN,o .5 :10-CV-0065

GTS/DE2P013, W L2 45404a7*t,3 ( N.D.NJ.uYn.5e ,2 031)( ctiatioomnist tBeudt) .

thaitps r eciwsheatlthy cel iam asppetao bre b aesdo n i nteh instcaans step ,eculation

andc onclusaolrlye gations.

New Yorkl wa define csonverassi "thoenu nauthoraiszseudm patnid on

exercofi tsherei ghof tow nersohviegproo ds belontgoai nnogt thoet reh e xcluosfi on

the ownerri'hgsst ."T hyrvo.Nf aft ionMwuitId.nse .C o.46,0F .340d0 4,03-0(24d

Ci.r2 006)( quotViignagin lItns .Co .o fA m .v.H auAsu.t h66.0,N . E.121d2 111,62

(1995).)T o sufficipelnetaalc dly am i ofc novers aip olnan,itimfufs atlle"g(e1t:)eh

propesrubtjcyte toc onveris sai osnpi eficci dnetifiathbilne(g 2;)p lainhtaidff

ownershpoisps,e ssoircoo nnt roovelr t hpero perbteyfo rietc sno vers;ia nodn( 3)

defendaexnetr sceid anu nauthodromiizneidoo vnret eh [properttothy e] a,l rtaetion

ofi st condtiio onrt o tehe xucsiloonf t hpel natifisfr ihgtsU.l"t Draai rLyL Cv.

Kondra51t4,F .Supp.3 d4 524,5 (9N D..N.20Y2.1 ()c itaomtiitotnHe edr)eP.,l aintiffs

havfaei lteo ds uffiecnitpllye aatdl aest the secoenlde meonwtn,e rsanhdic pnot orl

over the pr ohtpeye ratlylo e wghheai vctehc onbveeedrn.t e

A valaibdu sofep r ocescsl auinmd re New Yorlakw i sc ompriosfte hdr ee

eelment"(1s):r eguliasresldupy ro ces sei,htecrvi iolr c rimi(2n)aa ln i,tn enttod o

harmw ihtou etxcuos rjuest fiicatainod (n3,u)s e o ftehp rocesisna p ervemratnende r

too btaaci olnla etr aobljectAiFvG el.o"e Innc vco.U. s heMracsh &. T ooClo N.o,1.: 10-

CV1-12G8L S/RF2T0,11 WL 459374a1 t,* 3( N.D.NSe.pY.t3. 0, 2011(q)u oting

Curinaov. S uozz6i34, 6 N9. E.123d2 (1498 4)P)l.a inatliglfaeftsii'o n tnihscs mo plaint

witrhe spteotc htse e ocnda ndt hrdi elemeanrets pse culaantdic voen cluasnodr y,

therefoirmep lausible.

UndeNre wY orkl awi,fa planitipffro vest haat s tattrouyv iolathais on

occurrehde n,ee dn optr otvheet raditneigoilngaeelne clemeofn fotress aebeildiutyty ,

an dbreabcechua siet i sconsidneergeldi gpeesnrec D.ee svo .C SXT ran Isncp..7,,90

F .Supp2d.1 , 8( N.D.N.. 2Y011)(q uontg CiaprivoC.to tni.sR oaliolr p C8.78,F .S upp.

429, 434 (N.D.N.Y. 1995)). However, the plaintiff must still show causation. Id.

Plaintiffs’ negligence per se claim fails here because they have made the conclusory

assertion that any statutory violations occurred without any necessary elaboration to

justify their claim. That is, Plaintiffs’ merely point to various provisions of New York

Social Services Law, New York Education Law, and New York Executive Law and

assert that they were violated by defendants without any explanation as to what

these statutes require or prohibit, or what constitutes a violation of those statutes.

Lastly, to state a claim for defamation under New York law, a plaintiff must

allege “(1) a written [or spoken] defamatory statement of and concerning the plaintiff,

(2) publication to a third party, (8) fault, (4) falsity of the defamatory statement, and

(5) special damages or per se actionability.” Miller v. James, 751 F. Supp. 3d 21, 35

(N.D.N.Y. 2024), aff'd, No. 24-2785, 2025 WL 1085815 (2d Cir. Apr. 9, 2025) (internal

quotation marks and citation omitted). “In an action for libel or slander, the

particular words complained of shall be set forth in the complaint[.]” Williams v.

Buffalo Pub. Sch., 758 F. App’x 59, 65 (2d Cir. 2018) (quoting N.Y. C.P.L.R. 3016(a)).

In addition, the complaint must specify “the time, manner and persons to whom the

publications were made.” Williams , 758 F. App’x at 65 (quoting Vardi v. Mut. Life

Ins. Co. of N.Y., 186 A.D.2d 453, 455 (1st Dep’t 1988)).

Here, in addition to implausible conclusory and speculative assertions

unenhanced by further factual allegations, Plaintiffs’ complaint fails to meet the level

of specificity required of defamation claims under New York law. Plaintiffs broadly

allege that defendants knowingly published false statements, but — with the

exception of judicial defendants labelling him a “narcissist” and “abuser” — fail to

identify the particular words complained of. Moreover, Plaintiffs fail to specify the

time, manner and persons to whom the publications of any defamatory statements

were made.

III. Opportunity to Amend

For all of the foregoing reasons, the Court finds that Plaintiffs’ complaint [ECF

No. 1] must be dismissed as frivolous. Nevertheless, the Second Circuit has stated

that failure to provide notice and an opportunity to be heard prior to dismissal is a

“bad practice in numerous contexts” and “reversible error” in others. Curcio v.

Abrams, No. 22-693, 2023 WL 31183, at *2 (2d Cir. Jan. 4, 2023). The usual practice

is to allow leave to replead a deficient complaint, especially where a complaint has

been submitted pro se. See Davidson v. Flynn, 32 F.3d 27, 31 (2d Cir. 1994). Therefore,

Plaintiffs may file an amended complaint, setting forth the factual and legal bases

for their claims, within 30 days of the date of this order. See Carmel v. CSH & C, 32

F. Supp. 3d 434, 435 (W.D.N.Y. 2014).

The Court recognizes there are numerous motions pending on the docket at

present, including motions to vacate entries of default, motions for enlarged pages,

and multiple motions by Plaintiffs. The Court will consider such motions in due

course, should Plaintiffs timely file an amended complaint that addresses the

multitude of deficiencies identified in this decision.

CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, it is hereby

ORDERED that Plaintiffs shall file an amended complaint within thirty (30)

days after the date of filing of this Decision and Order. Plaintiffs are advised that an

amended complaint is intended to completely replace the prior complaint in the

action. Arce v. Walker, 139 F.3d 329, 332 n.4 (2d Cir. 1998) (“It is well established

that an amended complaint ordinarily supersedes the original and renders it of no

legal effect.”) (quoting Int Controls Corp. v. Vesco, 556 F.2d 665, 668 (2d Cir. 1977)).

In other words, Plaintiffs’ amended complaint must be pled so as to stand alone as

the sole complaint in this action that Defendants must answer. Allen v. Erie Cnty.

Med. Ctr. Corp., No. 25-CV-136 (JLS), 2025 WL 641299, at *4 (W.D.N.Y. Feb. 25,

2025); and it is further ordered

ORDERED that response deadline of January 2, 2026 set for all defendants at

ECF No. 160 is hereby adjourned indefinitely. A new deadline shall be established, if

appropriate, following the Court’s review of Plaintiffs’ amended complaint, if filed.

If plaintiff fails to file an amended complaint, or files a similarly frivolous

amended complaint, this action will be dismissed with prejudice.

SO ORDERED.

Dated: December 4 2025

Rochester, New York

ENTER:

“HON MEREDITH A. VACCA

United States District Judge