Oats

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS

RODERICK S. OATS, JR., )

)

Plaintiff, )

)

vs. ) Case No. 3:23-CV-3037-MAB

)

CODY SOWELS and )

ROBERT HOFFMAN, )

)

Defendants. )

MEMORANDUM AND ORDER

BEATTY, Magistrate Judge:

Plaintiff Roderick S. Oats, Jr., an inmate in the Illinois Department of Corrections

(“IDOC”), filed this lawsuit pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for alleged deprivations of his

constitutional rights at Menard Correctional Center (Doc. 1). The lawsuit stems from an

incident on July 17, 2021, where Plaintiff was attacked by another inmate in the

segregation yard at Menard (Doc. 1). Following a threshold review of the complaint

pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915A, Plaintiff was permitted to proceed on an Eighth

Amendment failure to protect claim against two correctional officers, who were later

identified as Robert Hoffman and Cody Sowels (Doc. 7; Docs. 28, 37).

Defendants Hoffman and Sowels filed a motion for summary judgment, arguing

that Plaintiff failed to exhaust his administrative remedies prior to filing suit as required

by the Prison Litigation Reform Act (PLRA), 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(a) (Doc. 52; see also Doc.

56). The Court previously denied Defendants’ motion after concluding that an issue of

fact existed as to whether Plaintiff submitted a timely appeal to the ARB that went

missing through no fault of his own (Doc. 70). Defendants, however, were provided the

opportunity to continue pursuing the affirmative defense of exhaustion by requesting an

evidentiary hearing to resolve the issue of fact identified by the Court (Doc. 70). See Pavey

v. Conley, 544 F.3d 739 (7th Cir. 2008). Defendants made a timely request for a hearing

(Doc. 71), and it was held on December 4, 2025 (Doc. 80). After careful consideration of

the documentary and testimonial evidence, the Court finds that Defendants have failed

to carry their burden of proof on the affirmative defense of exhaustion and Plaintiff may

proceed with his claim.

LEGAL STANDARD

The Prison Litigation Reform Act provides that a prisoner may not bring a lawsuit

about prison conditions unless and until he has exhausted all available administrative

remedies. 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(a); Pavey v. Conley, 663 F.3d 899, 903 (7th Cir. 2011). In order

to exhaust administrative remedies, the prisoner must “file complaints and appeals in the

place, and at the time, the prison’s administrative rules require.” Pozo v. McCaughtry, 286

F.3d 1022, 1025 (7th Cir. 2002); see also Woodford v. Ngo, 548 U.S. 81, 90 (2006). Relevant to

the issue here, the Illinois Administrative Code provides that, within 30 days after the

warden denies the grievance, the inmate has 30 days after the warden denies their

grievance to appeal to the Administrative Review Board (“ARB”) for a final

determination by the Director of the IDOC. 20 ILL. ADMIN. CODE § 504.850(a), (d), (e).

While the Seventh Circuit “take[s] a ‘strict compliance’ approach to exhaustion . .

. a prisoner need not exhaust remedies that are unavailable.” Hernandez v. Lee, 128 F.4th

866, 869 (7th Cir. 2025) (citations omitted). Administrative remedies become

“unavailable” when, for example, prison officials altogether fail to respond to a properly

filed grievance, fail to respond in a timely fashion, or otherwise use affirmative

misconduct to thwart a prisoner from exhausting. Pyles v. Nwaobasi, 829 F.3d 860, 864 (7th

Cir. 2016); Dole v. Chandler, 438 F.3d 804, 809 (7th Cir. 2006); Lewis v. Washington, 300 F.3d

829, 833 (7th Cir. 2002).

“[F]ailure to exhaust is an affirmative defense, and as such the burden of proof is

on the defendants to establish that administrative remedies were not exhausted, and not

on the prisoner to show that administrative remedies were unavailable.” Breyley v. Fuchs,

156 F.4th 845, 848 (7th Cir. 2025) (citation omitted).

DISCUSSION

As the Court stated in its previous Order, there is only one relevant grievance:

emergency grievance #233-8-21, dated August 2, 2021 (Doc. 70, p. 2; see also Doc. 56, pp.

16–20 (copy of grievance and responses)). Records show, and the parties do not dispute,

that the grievance was denied by the warden on September 23, 2021, and returned to

Plaintiff the following day (Doc. 56, p. 20; Doc. 56-1). The only disputed issue of fact that

required resolution was whether Plaintiff submitted a timely appeal to the ARB that went

missing through no fault of his own, thus rendering the grievance process unavailable

(Doc. 70, p. 8).

Plaintiff testified at the evidentiary hearing, as did Administrative Review Board

(ARB) Chairperson Clayton Stephenson, Menard Correctional Center Grievance Officer

Jeffrey Olson, and Menard Correctional Center Mail Room Office Assistant Courtney

Buskirk (see Doc. 79, Doc. 80). The relevant portions of their testimony are recounted here.

Plaintiff asserted in his written submissions to the Court, and maintained at the

evidentiary hearing, that he appealed to the ARB on September 25, 2021—two days after

the warden denied the grievance (Doc. 1, pp. 4, 11 (complaint); Doc. 54, p. 2 (MSJ

response); see also Doc. 56, p. 20 (grievance)). Specifically, he testified that he put the

grievance in an envelope addressed to the ARB, then put the envelope in the bars of his

cell to be picked up by a correctional officer and mailed out (see also Doc. 54, p. 2). When

asked if he recalled seeing the envelope get taken, he firmly and assuredly said yes but

then candidly admitted that he could not remember who the correctional officer was who

took the envelope (see also id.).

Grievance Officer Olson testified that he worked as a correctional officer at

Menard “for a couple years” beginning in January 2015. He confirmed that during his

time as a correctional officer, inmates sent out mail by putting it in the bars of their cell

for correctional officers to collect each night. Defendants did not present any evidence

that the procedure changed at any time prior to September 2021 or that this method of

collection was no longer a legitimate way for inmates to send out their mail.

Ms. Buskirk testified that after the outgoing mail is collected in the cellhouse, a

correctional officer brings the bag of mail to the mail room, where it is processed and sent

out. Any outgoing mail addressed to the ARB is considered legal mail, regardless of

whether it is labeled as such. Legal mail gets priority; it is run through the postage

machine and sent out the same day that it is received in the mail room.

Plaintiff stated in his written submissions and during his live testimony that, after

putting his appeal in the outgoing mail on September 25, 2021, he did not hear anything

from the ARB over the course of the next approximately eight and half months, so he

followed-up on June 16, 2022, by writing a letter to the ARB asking about the status of his

appeal (Doc. 1, p. 11; Doc. 54, p. 2). Plaintiff further testified that he sent this letter to the

ARB as legal mail so there was a record showing it was mailed out (see also Doc. 54, p. 2).

Specifically, he filled out a voucher form titled “Offender Authorization for Payment,”

agreeing to have payment of postage for the letter deducted from his trust fund account,

copies of which were submitted to the Court (Doc. 1, p. 17; Doc. 54, p. 7).1 The writing on

the voucher is largely illegible, but the Court can still make out a stamp indicating that it

was received by the Mail Room at Menard sometime in June 2022, that 53 cents in postage

was applied to the letter, and another stamp indicating that the letter was mailed out (see

id.). ARB Chairperson Stephenson testified, however, that the ARB never received this

letter (see also Doc. 56-2). And Plaintiff insinuated in his written submissions and during

his live testimony that he never received a response to this letter (see also Doc. 1, p. 11;

Doc. 54, p. 2).

Plaintiff testified that he wrote a second letter to the ARB on July 18, 2022, which

included another copy of the grievance and the facility’s response (see also Doc. 1, p. 11;

Doc. 54, p. 2). Plaintiff testified that he submitted a money voucher with the July letter

1 Plaintiff seems to be under the impression that he designated the letter as legal mail by submitting a

money voucher for postage with it. That Court does not believe that to be the case because, as Ms. Buskirk

testified, all mail addressed to the ARB is treated as legal mail. As the Court understands it from Ms.

Buskirk’s testimony, a money voucher is only used if the inmate does not have sufficient funds to pay the

postage for their legal mail at the time they send it out. In this instance, it seems that Plaintiff used the

voucher as a means of creating a record that he submitted his mail and that it was sent out. The Court does

not know whether it was necessary for Plaintiff to use a voucher; that is, whether he had enough money in

his trust fund account to cover the postage for his June 2022 letter.

(see also Doc. 54, p. 2), and he submitted a copy of the it to the Court (Doc. 1, p. 18; Doc.

54, p. 8). A stamp on the voucher indicates that it was received by the Mail Room at

Menard (but the date is illegible), that $2.57 in postage was applied to the letter, and

another stamp indicates that the letter was mailed out on July 20, 2022 (Doc. 1, p. 18; Doc.

54, p. 8).

Records show, and ARB Chairperson Stephenson confirmed, that the ARB

received Plaintiff’s letter on July 22, 2022 (see Doc. 56, pp. 17–20). Stephenson responded

on behalf of the ARB on July 27, 2022, acknowledging Plaintiff’s statement that he had

submitted his appeal on September 25, 2021, but countering that the ARB had no record

of receiving it (Doc. 56, p. 16). Stephenson confirmed at the evidentiary hearing that the

ARB did not receive anything from Plaintiff in 2021. The ARB indicated that July 2022

was the first time they had seen the grievance, and they rejected it for being untimely

(Id.).

ARB Chairperson Stephenson testified that he was never asked to destroy an

inmate’s appeal or to delay or withhold a response, nor is he aware of anyone else doing

so. Similarly, Ms. Buskirk testified that she was unaware of any mail being lost,

destroyed, or intentionally withheld. Grievance Officer Olson likewise testified that he

was unaware of any grievance being destroyed, intentionally held in the mail room, or

lost in the mail.

After carefully considering all of the evidence, the Court finds Plaintiff credible in

his testimony that he submitted his appeal to the ARB on September 25, 2021, but it went

missing through no fault of his own. The Court notes that Plaintiff’s story has remained

consistent since the inception of this lawsuit. There were no apparent internal

inconsistencies in his story. At the Pavey hearing, he stuck to the facts and made no

attempt to embellish or tack on any new or additional details that he had not previously

shared. Moreover, Defense counsel's questioning of Plaintiff at the Pavey hearing did not

discredit, contradict, or cast doubt on Plaintiff's story in any meaningful way. Nor did

the testimony of Defendants’ witnesses.

Furthermore, despite Defendants’ witnesses disclaiming any knowledge of

grievances or mail being destroyed, going missing, or being withheld, the evidence

clearly shows that something to that effect occurred in June 2022 with Plaintiff’s first letter

to the ARB. There is documentation that the letter was mailed out from Menard (Doc. 1,

p. 17; Doc. 54, p. 7), but the ARB has no record of ever receiving it. If that letter went

missing, then it is also very possible that Plaintiff’s original appeal went missing.

For these reasons, the Court concludes that Plaintiff attempted to fully and

properly exhaust his administrative remedies but his appeal to the ARB went missing

through no fault of his own. The grievance process was thus rendered unavailable to

Plaintiff, and he is therefore deemed to have exhausted his administrative remedies.

CONCLUSION

Defendants failed to carry their burden of proof to show that Plaintiff failed to

exhaust available administrative remedies. The Court finds that the administrative

grievance process was rendered unavailable to Plaintiff, and therefore he is deemed to

have exhausted his administrative remedies.

The matter of exhaustion of administrative remedies now being fully and finally

resolved in Plaintiff’s favor, he may proceed with his Eighth Amendment claim against

Defendants Hoffman and Sowels. The stay previously imposed on merits discovery, (see

Doc. 47), is LIFTED. A new schedule setting forth discovery and dispositive motion

deadlines will be entered by separate order.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

DATED: December 9, 2025

s/ Mark A. Beatty

MARK A. BEATTY

United States Magistrate Judge