RHYME

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF INDIANA

INDIANAPOLIS DIVISION

DARRELL RHYME a/k/a JARRELL RANDLE, )

)

Plaintiff, )

)

v. ) Case No. 1:23-cv-00469-TWP-TAB

)

NICULY POLLEY, )

KAITLIN JACKOWICZ, )

UNKNOWN DEFENDANTS, )

COUNTY OF DECATUR, )

CITY OF GREENSBURG, )

)

Defendants. )

ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANTS' MOTIONS FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT AND

DISMISSING CLAIMS AGAINST UNKNOWN DEFENDANTS

This matter is before the Court on a Motion for Summary Judgment (Filing No. 66) filed

by Defendants Niculy Polley ("Deputy Polley") and the County of Decatur (together, the "Decatur

Defendants") and a Motion for Summary Judgment (Filing No. 69) filed separately by Kaitlin

Jackowicz ("Officer Jackowicz") and the City of Greensburg (together, the "Greensburg

Defendants"). Plaintiff Darrell Rhyme ("Mr. Rhyme"), also known as Jarrell Randle, initiated this

§ 1983 action alleging illegal seizure, excessive force, failure to intervene, and Monell claims. He

alleges officers violated his constitutional rights when he was pulled over, pursued, tased, and

beaten on the night of March 3, 2023. For the following reasons, both Motions are granted. In

addition, the claims against the Unknown Defendants are dismissed.

I. LEGAL STANDARD

The purpose of summary judgment is to "pierce the pleadings and to assess the proof in

order to see whether there is a genuine need for trial." Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio

Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 587 (1986). Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56 provides that summary

judgment is appropriate when there is no genuine dispute as to any of the material facts, and the

moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Id.; Pack v. Middlebury Cmty. Schs., 990

F.3d 1013, 1017 (7th Cir. 2021). A "genuine dispute" exists when a reasonable factfinder could

return a verdict for the nonmoving party. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248

(1986). "Material facts" are those that might affect the outcome of the suit. Id.

When reviewing a motion for summary judgment, the court views the record and draws all

reasonable inferences from it in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party. Khungar v. Access

Cmty. Health Network, 985 F.3d 565, 572–73 (7th Cir. 2021). The court cannot weigh evidence or

make credibility determinations on summary judgment because those tasks are left to the

factfinder. Miller v. Gonzalez, 761 F.3d 822, 827 (7th Cir. 2014). The court is only required to

consider the materials cited by the parties, see Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c)(3); it is not required to "scour

the record" for evidence that is potentially relevant. Grant v. Trs. of Ind. Univ., 870 F.3d 562, 572

(7th Cir. 2017).

"[A] party seeking summary judgment always bears the initial responsibility of informing

the district court of the basis for its motion, and identifying those portions of 'the pleadings,

depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any,'

which it believes demonstrate the absence of a genuine issue of material fact." Celotex Corp. v.

Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323 (1986). "[T]he burden on the moving party may be discharged by

'showing'—that is, pointing out to the district court—that there is an absence of evidence to support

the nonmoving party's case." Id. at 325.

Mr. Rhyme failed to respond to the summary judgment motions. Accordingly, the facts

alleged in the motions are "admitted without controversy" so long as support for them exists in the

record. S.D. Ind. L.R. 56-1(f); see S.D. Ind. L.R. 56-1(b) (stating that a party opposing judgment

must file response brief and identify disputed facts). However, "even where a nonmovant fails to

respond to a motion for summary judgment, the movant still ha[s] to show that summary judgment

[is] proper given the undisputed facts." Robinson v. Waterman, 1 F.4th 480, 483 (7th Cir. 2021)

(citation modified).

II. BACKGROUND

The designated evidence consists primarily of deposition testimony, affidavits, and video

evidence. As noted, Mr. Rhyme defaulted on filing a response to the Defendants' motions for

summary judgment, and no statement of disputed facts is a part of this record. Therefore, the Court

accepts as true the uncontested facts put forth by Defendants in their statement of facts and

construes those facts and the inferences drawn therefrom in Mr. Rhyme's favor to determine

whether summary judgment is appropriate in this case. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(e).

A. Initial Traffic Stop

On March 3, 2023, Mr. Rhyme was a passenger in a vehicle driven by Jamesha McChristine

("Ms. McChristine") (Filing No. 69-1 at 8). Officer Jackowicz, an officer with the Greensburg

Police Department, was in her assigned patrol vehicle that evening when she observed the vehicle

driven by Ms. McChristine commit several traffic violations: the vehicle used the right-hand turn

lane with the left turn signal on, weaved within the lane, rolled through a stop sign, and, upon

entering the interstate, traveled in the left lane at approximately 58–59 miles per hour when the

speed limit was 70 miles per hour (Filing No. 66-1 at 25:24–26:1). Officer Jackowicz turned on

her red and blue emergency lights to conduct a traffic stop. When she turned on her lights, her

synced vehicle dashcam and body-worn camera automatically came on. Id. at 4, 35. The driver of

the vehicle failed to yield to the right side of the road and instead stopped in nearly the middle of

the left lane on the interstate. Id. at 4, 8. Officer Jackowicz directed the driver to park the vehicle

on the safer right side of the interstate.

Officer Jackowicz approached the passenger side and knocked on the window (Filing No.

66-1 at 45:1–3; Filing No. 66-12 0:04:48–0:04:53). When the window was rolled down, Officer

Jackowicz detected "a very strong odor" of burnt marijuana (Filing No. 66-1 at 45:20–46:12). She

asked the female driver and the male passenger for their names and identification. Ms.

McChristine, the driver, provided a different name and birthdate. However, she did not have a

driver's license on her person and stated she could not remember her social security number (Filing

No. 66-1 at 46:23–47:7; Filing No. 66-12 0:06:25–0:06:49). Mr. Rhyme, the passenger, identified

himself as Jarrell Randle and gave Officer Jackowicz a date of birth (Filing No. 66-12 0:07:02–

0:07:26).

Officer Jackowicz asked the driver and Mr. Rhyme to stay where they were while she

returned to her vehicle. Because she had smelled the odor of burnt marijuana, Officer Jackowicz

requested backup upon reaching her patrol vehicle (Filing No. 66-1 at 49:8–10). Officer

Jackowicz's system returned no match for the name Ms. McChristine gave. Id. at 49:11–13.

However, the name Mr. Rhyme gave—Jarrell Randle—returned results revealing a temporary

protective order against him involving a protected female. Id. at 49:13–18. Because the protected

female was of a similar age to the driver, Officer Jackowicz suspected that the driver had given a

false name and was, in fact, the protected female (Filing No. 66-1 at 122:8–123:11). Based on the

marijuana odor and her belief that Mr. Rhyme might have a protective order against him, Officer

Jackowicz decided to search the vehicle Id. at 123:15–25. She also decided to separate Mr. Rhyme

and the driver as a precaution in case the driver was the protected person. Id.

Deputy Polley from the Decatur County Sheriff's Department arrived as backup. Officer

Jackowicz informed him that the female driver did not give her a correct name; the vehicle smelled

of Marijuana; the male Jarrell Randel returned with a protection order; the protected female had a

similar date of birth to the one given from the driver; and she was going to get the occupants out

of the vehicle to begin a search (Filing No. 69-2). The officers discussed searching the vehicle

(Filing No. 66-1 at 49:9–21; Filing No. 66-12 0:09:24–0:12:27).

The two officers returned to the stopped vehicle, and Officer Jackowicz asked Mr. Rhyme

to step out of the car (Filing No. 66-1 at 52:20–25). He refused and asked why. Id. at 53:20–24.

Officer Jackowicz repeated her command and opened the car door. Id. at 53:24–54:3. Mr. Rhyme

again refused. Officer Jackowicz threatened to drag him out of the car. Id. at 54:3–5; Filing No.

66-12 at 0:13:35–0:13:44. Mr. Rhyme still did not exit the vehicle. Officer Jackowicz observed the

driver shift the car into drive (Filing No. 66-1 at 54:6–7). Officer Jackowicz instructed the driver

to put the car back into park. Mr. Rhyme yelled "go, go, go" to the driver, and the vehicle sped off

(Filing No. 66-12 at 0:13:59–0:14:01; Filing No. 66-1 at 54:8).

B. High Speed Pursuit and Taser Use

Deputy Polley and Officer Jackowicz returned to their patrol vehicles, and a vehicle chase

ensued. Officer Jackowicz pursued because the driver fled, the car smelled like burnt marijuana,

and she believed a protective order involved Mr. Rhyme which possibly protected the driver (Filing

No. 66-2 at 211:25–212:1, 213:10–17, 220:5–13). The vehicle driven by Ms. McChristine reached

a rate of speed of about 126 miles per hour on I-74 (Filing No. 66-1 at 58:15–17). Assisting officers

joined in the pursuit and deployed stop sticks, which eventually deflated the vehicle's tires. Id. at

59:19–60:9. The pursuit lasted about nine minutes before the vehicle exited the highway and

stopped at a BP gas station (Filing No. 66-11 at 0:14:24–0:23:11). BP surveillance footage captured

all events after the stop (Filing No. 66-19, Filing No. 66-20).

After coming to a stop, Mr. Rhyme and the driver both fled on foot in opposite directions.

Officer Jackowicz observed Mr. Rhyme run from Deputy Polley (Filing No. 66-1 at 62:24–25).

Deputy Polley pursued Mr. Rhyme on foot then deployed his taser once for 2.8 seconds before

deactivating it (Filing No. 69-5; Filing No. 69-2 at 7; Filing No. 69-4 at 99:25–100:13). The prongs

struck Mr. Rhyme in the back of the head and the elbow (Filing No. 69-4 at 111:9–11). Officer

Jackowicz heard the taser and observed Mr. Rhyme's body lock up, then fall forward to the ground

(Filing No. 66-1 at 63:15–65:1, 71:2–8). Deputy Polley reported that the taser caused a

neuromuscular incapacitation, which caused Mr. Rhyme to fall forward onto the pavement (Filing

No. 69-2 at 8; Filing No. 69-4 at 72:20–73:12). As Mr. Rhyme fell forward, Officer Polley

observed that he landed on his face and slid on the pavement. Id.

Deputy Polley placed Mr. Rhyme in handcuffs and asked if he was okay. Mr. Rhyme did

not respond, and Deputy Polley saw that Mr. Rhyme was injured, so he began to render aid and

radioed for Emergency Medical Services (Filing No. 69-4 at 74:3–8, 75:14–18). Mr. Rhyme

suffered face, body, and hand injuries, including a broken jaw, broken nasal cavities, broken orbital

sockets, eight missing teeth, and severe facial bleeding (Filing No. 1 ¶ 18; Filing No. 66-26 at

23:23–25).

C. Procedural History

Mr. Rhyme initiated this lawsuit on March 13, 2023 (Filing No. 1). Subsequently, in an

underlying criminal case, he was convicted by a jury of two charges related to the incident on

March 3, 2023—identity deception and resisting law enforcement (Filing No. 66-10). On February

18, 2025 an Amended Case Management Plan—which contained a dispositive motions deadline

of August 1, 2025—was approved (Filing No. 56), and this matter is scheduled for trial by jury on

March 9, 2026 (Filing No. 57). The Greensburg Defendants filed for summary judgment on July

31, 2025 (Filing No. 66). The Decatur Defendants filed their Motion for Summary Judgment on

August 1, 2025 (Filing No. 69). Mr. Rhyme did not timely file a response.

On November 18, 2025—nearly three months after his response was due—Mr. Rhyme

filed a Motion for Extension of Time to File a Response (Filing No. 78). Both the Greensburg

Defendants and the Decatur Defendants objected and because of the age of this case, the Court

denied the extension of time (Filing No. 86). The summary judgment motions are therefore ripe

for the Court's review.

III. DISCUSSION

Mr. Rhyme's Complaint asserts eight counts and alleges several constitutional violations

and state law claims. Count I - 42 U.S.C. § 1983 – Illegal Seizure against Deputy Polley, Officer

Jackowicz, and Unknown Defendants; Count II - 42 U.S.C. § 1983 – Excessive Force against

Deputy Polley, Officer Jackowicz and Unknown Defendants; Count III - 42 U.S.C. § 1983 – Illegal

Seizure-Failure To Intervene against Deputy Polley, Officer Jackowicz, and Unknown Defendants;

Count IV - 42 U.S.C. § 1983 - Excessive Force - Failure to Intervene against Deputy Polley, Officer

Jackowicz, and Unknown Defendants; Count V – 42 U.S.C. § 1983 – Monell Claim-Illegal Seizure

against City of Greensburg and County of Decatur; Count VI – 42 U.S.C. § 1983 – Monell Claim-

Excessive Force against City of Greensburg and County of Decatur; Count VII – State Law

Respondeat Superior against City of Greensburg and County of Decatur; and Count VIII - State

Law Indemnification against City of Greensburg and County of Decatur (Filing No. 1 at 5–12).

Mr. Rhyme claims that the initial stop was pretextual because, historically, the City of Greensburg

and Decatur County have racist policies that implicitly allow racial profiling, and officers still

routinely profile, illegally stop, and use excessive force against African Americans driving through

the area (Filing No. 1 ¶¶ 21–24). He further alleges that after he was stopped, he was "brutally

beat[en]" and repeatedly kicked by officers while he was laying on the ground (Filing No. 1 at ¶¶

17, 36).

The Greensburg Defendants argue that Officer Jackowicz had reasonable suspicion to

initiate the traffic stop, and indications of criminal conduct permitted her to extend the traffic stop

and request that Mr. Rhyme exit the vehicle. They argue that Officer Jackowicz did not use any

force against Mr. Rhyme; that the force used by Deputy Polley was objectively reasonable; and

that Officer Jackowicz had no realistic opportunity to intervene. Without any underlying

constitutional violation by its officers, the Greensburg Defendants argue that the City of

Greensburg is not liable, and that no municipal action was taken with "deliberate indifference" nor

was the City of Greensburg the "moving force" behind Mr. Rhyme's injury.

The Decatur Defendants argue that Deputy Polley's seizure and force were reasonable

because Mr. Rhyme was fleeing, or alternatively, that Deputy Polley is entitled to qualified

immunity. They also argue that there was no conduct requiring the Decatur Defendants to intervene

and that the County of Decatur is not liable where its employees are not at fault.

The Court will first address the claims against the Unknown Defendants before turning to

claims against the named defendants.

A. Claims against the Unknown Defendants

Mr. Rhyme names Unknown Defendants in his Complaint and states that these defendants

were law enforcement officers. Although there is no prohibition against filing suit against unknown

defendants, unknown defendants, like any other defendant, must be served within 90 days of the

commencement of the action against them. Fed. R. Civ. P. 4(m) ("If a defendant is not served

within 90 days after the complaint is filed, the court—on motion or on its own after notice to the

plaintiff—must dismiss the action without prejudice against that defendant or order that service be

made within a specified time."); Redd v. Dougherty, 578 F. Supp. 2d 1042, 1048 (N.D. Ill. 2008)

(holding that "John Doe" defendants must be served within the same time as other defendant under

Rule 4); Aviles v. Village of Bedford Park, 160 F.R.D. 565, 567 (N.D.Ill.1995) (same).

Moreover, bringing suit against unnamed or "John Doe" defendants in federal court is

generally disfavored by the Seventh Circuit. Strauss v. City of Chi., 760 F.2d 765, 770 n.6 (7th

Cir. 1985). The Seventh Circuit has found that "it is pointless to include lists of anonymous

defendants in federal court; this type of placeholder does not open the door to relation back . . . nor

can it otherwise help the plaintiff." Wudtke v. Davel, 128 F.3d 1057, 1060 (7th Cir. 1997) (internal

citations omitted).

This case has been pending for nearly three years, and Mr. Rhyme had ample opportunity

through pretrial discovery to learn the names of the Unnamed Defendants, to seek leave to add

claims against them, and to perfect service. He has not done so. In addition, more than 90 days

have passed since the filing of Plaintiff's complaint, and the unknown defendants have not been

identified or served. Accordingly, all claims against the Unknown Defendants are dismissed for

failure to perfect service and prosecute claims against them.

B. Illegal Seizure (Count I)

A claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for a seizure in violation of the Fourth Amendment will

succeed where the plaintiff establishes that: (1) the government's conduct constituted a seizure,

and (2) that seizure was unreasonable. Bentz v. City of Kendallville, 577 F.3d 776, 779 (7th Cir.

2009) (citing Bielanski v. County of Kane, 550 F.3d 632, 637 (7th Cir. 2008)).

Mr. Rhyme alleges illegal seizure at three points: (1) when Officer Jackowicz stopped the

vehicle without probable cause that Mr. Rhyme or the driver had committed or were committing

any traffic violations or other crimes; (2) when Officer Jackowicz ordered Mr. Rhyme out of the

vehicle during the traffic stop without a warrant or probable cause; and (3) when Deputy Polley

ordered him to stop after he exited the vehicle (Filing No. 1 ¶¶ 12, 26–29). For the following

reasons, reasonable suspicion or probable cause existed in each instance in which Mr. Rhyme was

seized; thus, the illegal seizure claim fails.

1. The Traffic Stop

Mr. Rhyme alleges that because Officer Jackowicz lacked a warrant and probable cause to

stop the vehicle, the stop violated the Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution. The

Fourth Amendment protects the "right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers,

and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures." U.S. Const. amend. IV. Traffic stops

constitute "seizures" under the Fourth Amendment and must therefore be reasonable under the

circumstances. Whren v. United States, 517 U.S. 806, 809 (1996). Warrantless stops are reasonable

when officers reasonably believe the driver has committed a traffic violation, even a minor one.

United States v. Radford, 39 F.4th 377, 384 (7th Cir. 2022); see United States v. Phillips, No. 23-

1692, 2024 WL 3842092, at *2 (7th Cir. Aug. 16, 2024). "Because traffic stops are typically brief

detentions, more akin to Terry stops than formal arrests, they require only reasonable suspicion of

a traffic violation—not probable cause." United States v. Cole, 21 F.4th 421, 427 (7th Cir. 2021)

(citing Rodriguez v. United States, 575 U.S. 348, 354 (2015)).

Reasonable suspicion to support a traffic stop requires "more than a hunch but less than

probable cause" and is determined under the totality of the circumstances known to the officer at

the time of the stop. United States v. Mays, 819 F.3d 951, 955 (7th Cir. 2016). This is an objective

standard; an officer's subjective motivations for detaining a suspect are irrelevant. United States v.

Jackson, 962 F.3d 353, 357 (7th Cir. 2020). However, if the officer is mistaken in his belief that

the suspect committed an offense, then the court asks whether that mistake was objectively

reasonable, "still without regard to 'the subjective understanding of the particular officer

involved.'" Id. (citing Heien v. North Carolina, 574 U.S. 54, 66 (2014)). An officer's objectively

reasonable mistake of law can provide reasonable suspicion for a traffic stop. See id.

Officer Jackowicz observed the vehicle—driven by Ms. McChristine—commit at least two

moving traffic violations and observed unusual driving behavior (Filing No. 67 at 15). Specifically,

the driver entered the right-turn lane with the left turn signal on, switched turn lanes, and did not

stop at a stop sign before turning onto the road (Filing No. 66-11 at 0:00:00–0:00:58). Not stopping

at a stop sign is a traffic violation under Ind. Code § 9-21-8-32. Then the driver used her turn signal

for an extended period and used the turn signal on a single-lane road with no turns (Filing No. 66-

11 0:01:12–0:01:36). Finally, the driver moved to the left lane on the highway driving at least ten

miles per hour under the posted speed limit (Filing No. 66-11 at 0:02:45–0:03:38). There were no

obstructions in the roadway causing the driver to move into the left lane, and, contrary to the

allegation in the Complaint (Filing No. 1 ¶ 10), there was not a severe snowstorm in the area

explaining the slow driving speed. Driving in the left lane at a speed lower than the posted limit is

a traffic violation under Indiana Code § 9-21-5-9(d).

Officer Jackowicz's personal observation of the vehicle driving well below the speed limit

in the left lane is, alone, sufficient to support the initial traffic stop, but Officer Jackowicz's also

observed other traffic violations and unusual driving behavior. Based on the totality of these

circumstances, the observations at the time of the stop support reasonable suspicion. The traffic

stop was not an illegal seizure.

The Court acknowledges Mr. Rhyme's subjective intent allegations about the historical

context and subjective racial motivation for the stop, but for reasonable suspicion, the Court must

proceed under an objective analysis. In addition, Mr. Rhyme has designated no evidence to support

these allegations. Accordingly, the Court does not delve into his subjective intent allegations.

2. Officer Jackowicz Ordering Mr. Rhyme Out of the Vehicle at the Traffic Stop

"[U]nder the Fourth Amendment, information suggesting possible criminal activity that an

officer lawfully discovers during a valid traffic stop can justify lengthening the stop in order to

conduct a reasonable investigation." Buchanan v. Kelly, 592 F. App'x 503, 506 (7th Cir. 2014).

After a lawful stop, an officer can order occupants out of a car. United States v. Jackson, 103 F.4th

483, 490 (7th Cir. 2024) (citing Pennsylvania v. Mimms, 434 U.S. 106, 111 (1977)). The Seventh

Circuit recently confirmed that the smell of marijuana alone will justify a Fourth Amendment

seizure. Id. at 488; see also United States v. Kizart, 967 F.3d 693, 698 (7th Cir. 2020) (holding that

"the smell of burnt marijuana plus other suspicious activity may provide probable cause for the

search of an entire vehicle").

As part of a traffic stop, officers may ask the vehicle's occupants a moderate number of

questions and request their identification. United States v. Muriel, 418 F. 3d 720, 726 (7th Cir.

2005). Here, "Jarrell Randle," the name falsely given by Mr. Rhyme to Officer Jackowicz, returned

in the system with a protective order for a female around the driver's age. Based on her suspicion

that the driver might be the protected female, Officer Jackowicz wanted to separate Mr. Rhyme

and the driver. Accordingly, there was probable cause to order Mr. Rhyme to exit the vehicle after

the traffic stop was initiated.

Officer Jackowicz's decision to search the vehicle was based in part on the odor of

marijuana she smelled when the passenger rolled down the window. Mr. Rhyme alleges that neither

the driver nor Mr. Rhyme had committed or was committing any crimes at the time of the stop,

however the designated evidence shows that there were several already smoked marijuana roaches

and .08 grams of marijuana in the vehicle (Filing No. 66-3 at 85:17–86:7). Whether the odor of

marijuana alone would be sufficient to justify a search of the vehicle is not relevant, because no

search occurred at that time. What is relevant is that the smell of burnt marijuana and the totality

of the circumstances gave Officer Jackowicz a reasonable basis for extending the stop and asking

Mr. Rhyme to step out of the vehicle.

3. Deputy Polley Ordering Mr. Rhyme to Stop after Exiting the Vehicle

Decatur Defendants admit that Deputy Polley's conduct was a seizure but argue that the

undisputed evidence establishes it was reasonable (Filing No. 71 at 7). The Court agrees, noting

that Mr. Rhyme fled the traffic stop at over 120 miles per hour and continued to evade law

enforcement for over nine minutes at that speed. Given this conduct, there was clear cause for Mr.

Rhyme's arrest. Therefore, when Deputy Polley ordered Mr. Rhyme to stop after another attempted

flight, there was no illegal seizure.

In sum, summary judgment is granted with respect to Count I because Officer Jackowicz's

stop and both officer's seizures were reasonable.

C. Excessive Force (Count II)

"Although police officers may use force to seize another person under appropriate

circumstances, the Fourth Amendment protects against the use of excessive force." Taylor v. City

of Milford, 10 F.4th 800, 806 (7th Cir. 2021). "The question whether a particular use of force has

crossed the constitutional line is governed by the Fourth Amendment, which prohibits

unreasonable seizures." Weinmann v. McClone, 787 F.3d 444, 448 (7th Cir. 2015). Courts analyze

excessive force cases under an objective reasonableness standard. Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S.

386, 395 (1989).

The Fourth Amendment's "reasonableness" test is "not capable of precise definition or

mechanical application." Id. at 396 (citation omitted). "'[T]he question is whether the officers'

actions are "objectively reasonable" in light of the facts and circumstances confronting them,

without regard to their underlying intent or motivation.'" Taylor, 10 F.4th at 806 (quoting Graham,

490 U.S. at 397) (alteration in original). "Such an analysis is inherently fact-dependent, requiring

consideration of such factors as the severity of the crime at issue, whether the person posed an

immediate threat to the safety of the officers or others, and whether the person was actively

resisting the officers." Williams v. Ind. State Police Dep't, 797 F.3d 468, 472–73 (7th Cir. 2015)

(citing Graham, 490 U.S. at 396). "Whether a particular use of force was objectively reasonable

'is a legal determination rather than a pure question of fact for the jury to decide.'" Dockery v.

Blackburn, 911 F.3d 458, 464 (7th Cir. 2018) (quoting Phillips v. Cmty. Ins. Corp., 678 F.3d 513,

520 (7th Cir. 2012)).

In addition, the reasonableness of an officer's actions must be assessed from the perspective

of a reasonable officer on the scene, not based on the "20/20 vision of hindsight." Graham, 490

U.S. at 396. That assessment must include a recognition that officers are often forced to make split

second judgments in tense, uncertain, and rapidly evolving situations as to the amount of force

necessary in a particular situation. Id. at 396–97. Mr. Rhyme alleges that both Officer Jackowicz

and Deputy Polley used excessive force against him in violation of his constitutional rights. The

Court will examine each officers' use of force in turn.

1. Officer Jackowicz

Mr. Rhyme alleges that Officer Jackowicz physically battered him while he was on the

ground and used excessive force (Filing No. 1 ¶ 36–37). The Greensburg Defendants argue that

Officer Jackowicz never apprehended Mr. Rhyme or used force against him (Filing No. 67 at 14).

Officer Jackowicz's conduct was captured on body camera and on her patrol vehicle's dash camera

both before and after Mr. Rhyme was tased (Filing No. 66-12 at 0:22:59–0:23:12; Filing No. 66-

11 at 0:23:23–0:23:30). BP gas station surveillance footage also documented these events. The

designated evidence clearly shows that Officer Jackowicz did not use any force against Mr. Rhyme

at any point before or after the tasing.

2. Deputy Polley

Mr. Rhyme alleges that Deputy Polley used greater force than necessary when he tased him

in the back of the head and the elbow (Filing No. 1 ¶¶ 34–35). In addition, he claims that he was

"brutally beat[en]" and kicked and hit by officers while he was on the ground after being

"repeatedly" tased. Id. ¶¶ 14, 36. For the reasons stated below, the Court finds that Deputy Polley's

use of the taser was reasonable given that Mr. Rhyme was fleeing and that no force was used on

Mr. Rhyme after he was on the ground.

a. Taser Use was Reasonable

It is "clearly established that more force may be used for fleeing suspects than for suspects

that are at most passively resisting arrest." Becker v. Elfreich, 821 F.3d 920, 929 (7th Cir. 2016).

Determining whether an officer's deployment of a taser amounts to a reasonable use of force "is

an objective inquiry that turns on how a reasonable officer would have perceived the

circumstances." Dockery, 911 F.3d at 466 (internal citation omitted). An officer's use of a taser is

constitutionally reasonable against an "actively resisting subject." Id.

Alternatively, Deputy Polley asserts a qualified immunity defense to the excessive force

claim against him. The qualified immunity doctrine is an affirmative defense, and once the defense

is raised, it becomes the plaintiff's burden to defeat it. Smith v. Finkley, 10 F.4th 725, 737 (7th Cir.

2021) (citation omitted). Therefore, Mr. Rhyme bears the burden of overcoming Deputy Polley's

qualified immunity defense by establishing that: (1) Deputy Polley violated the Fourth Amendment

by using a taser on Mr. Rhyme; and (2) as of March 3, 2023, it was clearly established that an

officer using a taser against a suspect in circumstances similar to those presented in this case

violates the Fourth Amendment.

Case law in the Seventh Circuit suggests that attempting to evade arrest by flight, and

specifically by running, may justify the use of force. See Smith, 10 F.4th at 736. The Decatur

Defendants argue:

The law is clearly established that officers may use more force against fleeing

suspects than those who are passively resisting arrest. Becker v. Elfreich, 821 F.3d

920, 929 (7th Cir. 2016) (emphasis added). The matter at hand is similar to Johnson

v. Scott, in which officers used reasonable force when allowing their police dog to

bite a suspect who had "used every method at his disposal to flee from police." 576

F.3d 658, 660 (7th Cir. App. 2009).

(Filing No. 71 at 17). They also point out that "this Court previously determined that a police

officer was entitled to qualified immunity where he used a taser on an unarmed, fleeing suspect."

Id. at 17 (citing Wynn v. City of Indianapolis, No. 1:20-cv-1638-JMS-MJD, 2022 U.S. Dist. LEXIS

69871, at *33 (S.D. Ind. Apr. 14, 2022)). Id. at17-18.

The precise details of the circumstances under which Officer Polley deployed his taser are

undisputed based on the designated evidence. Deputy Polley's decision to use his taser was

objectively reasonable because Mr. Rhyme attempted to evade arrest by fleeing on foot. This was

Mr. Rhyme's second attempt to evade law enforcement, following a high-speed chase. Although

the Complaint contends that Mr. Rhyme complied with orders to stop by surrendering, video

evidence unequivocally shows that Mr. Rhyme did not submit to Deputy Polley's authority and

was attempting to flee. Deputy Polley deployed his taser only once, and for less than the default

setting, ensuring that the force used was no greater than necessary to detain Mr. Rhyme. Under the

totality of these circumstances, Deputy Polley's deployment of the taser was objectively

reasonable.

Accordingly, the Court concludes that Mr. Rhyme has failed to meet his burden of

demonstrating that it was clearly established as of March 3, 2023 that an officer violates the Fourth

Amendment by deploying a taser against a suspect under the circumstances in which Deputy

Polley deployed his taser against Mr. Rhyme. Deputy Polley is therefore entitled to qualified

immunity on Mr. Rhyme's excessive force claim based on his deployment of his taser against a

fleeing suspect.

b. No Force Used While Mr. Rhyme was on the Ground

The video surveillance footage from the BP gas station, the body-worn camera of Officer

Jackowicz and another officer, and dash camera footage do not support Mr. Rhyme's assertion that

any force was used while he was on the ground, let alone excessive force. The evidence does not

show any officers beating, kicking, or hitting him. Moreover, Mr. Rhyme testified in his deposition

that he does not remember anything after being tased. He testified that after he tried to run to the

gas station, all he remembered was waking up in the hospital (Filing No. 66-26 at 23:6–9). Mr.

Rhyme has no independent recollection of being beaten, kicked, or hit by Deputy Polley or any

other officer. He has offered no evidence to support this allegation.

Mr. Rhyme's injuries are unfortunate and severe, but the record indicates that they resulted

from a fall onto the pavement following Deputy Polley's reasonable use of his taser rather than

excessive force. The designated evidence, which includes numerous depositions, body camera

footage, and surveillance footage, provides clear and undisputed evidence that the force used

against Mr. Rhyme was no greater than necessary. Therefore, the Greensburg and Decatur

Defendants' motions for summary judgment are granted with respect to Count II.

D. Failure to Intervene (Counts III and IV)

"An officer who is present and fails to intervene to prevent other law enforcement officers

from infringing the constitutional rights of citizens is liable under § 1983 if that officer had reason

to know: (1) that excessive force was being used, (2) that a citizen has been unjustifiably arrested,

or (3) that any constitutional violation has been committed by a law enforcement official; and the

officer had a realistic opportunity to intervene to prevent the harm from occurring." Yang v. Hardin,

37 F.3d 282, 285 (7th Cir. 1994). "In sum, an officer must know that a citizen's rights are being

infringed, and he must have a 'realistic opportunity' to intervene." Doxtator v. O'Brien, 39 F.4th

852, 864–65 (7th Cir. 2022).

The undisputed evidence shows that no violation of Mr. Rhyme's constitutional rights

occurred. Consequently, Mr. Rhyme's failure to intervene claims fail as a matter of law. See

Abdullahi v. City of Madison, 423 F.3d 763, 767–68 (7th Cir. 2005) ("Though legally distinct, the

fate of plaintiff's failure to intervene claim is closely linked to that of her excessive force claim

since, by definition, if there was no excessive force then there can be no failure to intervene.").

Similarly, there was no illegal seizure, so there was no realistic opportunity to intervene. Summary

judgment is granted on Counts III and IV, Mr. Rhyme's failure to intervene claims.

E. Monell Claims Against City of Greensburg and County of Decatur (Counts V–VII)

Municipalities may be liable for 42 U.S.C. § 1983 claims when they are directly responsible

for a constitutional deprivation. Ruiz-Cortez v. City of Chi., 931 F.3d 592, 598 (7th Cir. 2019)

(citing Monell v. Dep't of Sec. Servs., 436 U.S. 658, 691–94 (1978)). Because both Officer

Jackowicz and Deputy Polley's seizures of Mr. Rhyme were reasonable and there was no excessive

force, the claims against their respective law enforcement agencies fail. Without underlying

constitutional violations by officers in the scope of their employment there can be no Monell or

respondeat superior claims against the agencies. The state law indemnification claim also fails for

the same reason. Accordingly, summary judgment is granted as to Counts V—VII.

IV. CONCLUSION

For the reasons discussed above, Defendants City of Greensburg and Kaitlin Jackowicz's

Motion for Summary Judgment (Filing No. 66)is GRANTED, and Defendants County of Decatur

and Niculy Polley's Motion for Summary Judgment (Filing No. 69) is GRANTED.

Mr. Rhyme's claims against the Unknown Defendants are DISMISSED without prejudice,

for failure identify and effectuate service and failure to prosecute. Mr. Rhyme's Motion for

Extension of Time to Extend Deadlines in Case Management Order (Filing No. 81) is DENIED

as moot. Final judgment will issue under separate order.

SO ORDERED.

Date: _ 12/9/2025 O Watton rath

Hon. Tanya Walton Pratt, Judge

Distribution: United States District Court

, Southern District of Indiana

Allissa Aardema

Kightlinger & Gray ,LLP

aaardema@k-glaw.com

Christine L. Bartlett

FERGUSON & FERGUSON

clb@ferglaw.com

Pfenne Peter Cantrell

Kightlinger & Gray, LLP

peantrell@k-glaw.com

David L. Ferguson

FERGUSON & FERGUSON

dif@ferglaw.com

Gigi Gilbert

Gigi Gilbert

gigigilbert@gigigilbert.com

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