The opinion
Filed 12/9/25 (unmodified opinion attached)
CERTIFIED FOR PUBLICATION
IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
FIRST APPELLATE DISTRICT
DIVISION ONE
MELANIE GILLILAND,
Plaintiff and Appellant,
A170666
v.
CITY OF PLEASANTON, (Alameda County
Super. Ct. No. RG18924833)
Defendant and Respondent.
ORDER MODIFYING OPINION
AND DENYING REHEARING
[NO CHANGE IN JUDGMENT]
THE COURT:
Respondent City of Pleasanton filed a petition for rehearing of our
opinion herein, which was filed on November 19, 2025. In the petition, the
City clarified that the scope of the evidence at the bench trial was a subset of
the evidence submitted on summary judgment. This clarification does not
affect the disposition of this appeal, but we order the opinion modified as
follows:
1. On page 3, footnote 3, delete the second sentence of the footnote.
Modify the footnote’s first sentence to read, “We draw the facts primarily
from Henry’s and Officer Harvey’s depositions, which were submitted both in
conjunction with the City’s unsuccessful motion for summary judgment and
at the bench trial.”
2. On page 4, delete footnote 4. Renumber the subsequent footnotes
accordingly.
3. On page 5, line 20, add “during discovery” after “admitted.”
4. On page 8, line 2, at the end of the paragraph’s last sentence
insert, “based on evidence they submitted with their trial briefs. That
evidence ultimately comprised a subset of the evidence on summary
judgment involving the pursuit issue.”
5. On page 8, line 8, insert “Having granted the City’s motion in
limine to exclude Henry’s declaration,” at the beginning of the sentence that
now begins, “The court then concluded . . .”
6. On page 8, delete footnote 7 (renumbered footnote 6). Renumber
the subsequent footnotes accordingly.
7. On page 10, footnote 9 (to be renumbered footnote 7), in the
second sentence of the footnote, insert “in his deposition” before “and his
conclusory statement.”
These modifications do not affect the judgment.
The petition for rehearing is denied. In the petition, the City insists
that the opinion “errs by referencing the self-serving crux of the Henry
declaration” and “seems to rely on [that] declaration” to reach its holding.
But the opinion clearly indicated that we did not rely on Henry’s declaration
to conclude that reversible error occurred. The City appears to believe,
incorrectly, that any reference to evidence in the opinion means we depended
on that evidence to reach our holding. In fact, the declaration is mentioned in
the opinion because, among other reasons, the parties’ briefing discussed it at
length and the trial court addressed it in the challenged order despite
excluding it from the bench trial.
2
The City also claims that the opinion’s “extensive recitation of Officer
Harvey’s assessment of whether a pursuit . . . took place” is “misplaced,”
because the question was whether Henry perceived that a pursuit was
underway. It asks that the opinion be modified to “clarify that the focus of
the inquiry under [Vehicle Code] section 17004.7 is that of the suspect’s state
of mind.” Again, the City misconstrues the point of the discussion. While the
issue here was whether a perceived pursuit occurred, the statute also
provides for immunity when an actual pursuit occurs, regardless of what a
suspect believes. The fact that Officer Harvey did not initiate a pursuit
within the meaning of the City’s pursuit policy is relevant to explain why
immunity turned solely on whether there was a perceived pursuit. It is also
relevant because it distinguishes this case from the far likelier scenario in
which immunity is sought because an officer did initiate a pursuit,
implicating the Legislature’s policy goals more strongly than did the situation
here.
As a whole, the City’s petition ignores the opinion’s holding. We held
that the trial court applied an incorrect legal standard in ruling that the City
was entitled to statutory immunity because Henry believed he was being
“pursued.” We further held that error was prejudicial because it caused the
court to discount as irrelevant evidence about Henry’s mind state—which
came from his deposition, not his declaration—that was relevant under the
proper legal standard. Ultimately, the City’s consternation about the
opinion’s discussion of Henry’s declaration and Officer Harvey’s beliefs falls
far short of providing any legitimate basis for rehearing.
Date: __________________ ___________________Humes, P.J.
3
Filed 11/19/25 (unmodified opinion)
CERTIFIED FOR PUBLICATION
IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
FIRST APPELLATE DISTRICT
DIVISION ONE
MELANIE GILLILAND,
Plaintiff and Appellant,
A170666
v.
CITY OF PLEASANTON, (Alameda County
Super. Ct. No. RG18924833)
Defendant and Respondent.
Plaintiff Melanie Gilliland was severely injured after a car driven by
18-year-old Elijah Henry ran a red light and collided with her vehicle. At the
time, Henry was being followed by Officer Matthew Harvey, a police officer
employed by defendant City of Pleasanton. Gilliland sued Henry and the
City for negligence. After a bench trial on the City’s liability only, the trial
court concluded the City was not liable under Vehicle Code1 section 17004.7,
which immunizes a public entity from liability for collisions caused by fleeing
suspects when the entity has a written policy on “vehicular pursuits” by
peace officers and provides regular training on the policy.
On appeal from the judgment entered in the City’s favor, Gilliland
contends the trial court applied an incorrect legal standard in finding that
the collision occurred during a qualifying vehicular pursuit under
section 17004.7, subdivision (b)(1) (section 17004.7(b)(1)). We agree.
1 All further statutory references are to the Vehicle Code unless
otherwise noted.
Section 17004.7(b)(1) applies when a suspect either “is being or has
been . . . pursued” (an actual pursuit) or “believes he or she is being or has
been . . . pursued” (a perceived pursuit) by a peace officer. (§ 17004.7(b)(1).)
The trial court found that the word “pursued” has two different meanings in
this provision. It ruled that Henry was not actually “pursued” because
Officer Harvey did not initiate a “pursuit” as defined in the City’s vehicular
pursuit policy. At the same time, it ruled that Henry believed he was being
“pursued” because—under the word’s broader ordinary meaning—he thought
that Officer Harvey was following him for an investigative purpose.
This case is unusual in that the City seeks statutory immunity based
on its vehicular pursuit policy even though it admits that no actual pursuit
was initiated—meaning that section 17004.7’s main purpose of freeing peace
officers to make decisions about initiating or continuing pursuits without
worrying about their employer’s potential liability does not apply here. (See
Kishida v. State of California (1991) 229 Cal.App.3d 329, 338.) Under these
narrow circumstances, we reach the commonsense holding that “pursued” in
section 17004.7(b)(1) has only one meaning. Whether a suspect was actually
pursued and whether the suspect had a perception of being pursued both
turn on the definition of “pursuit” in the public entity’s vehicular pursuit
policy. Since the trial court disregarded evidence that Henry did not believe
he was pursued within the meaning of the City’s pursuit policy, which
requires that the suspect be “attempting to avoid arrest,” Gilliland was
deprived of the opportunity to establish that section 17004.7 does not
immunize the City because no pursuit of any type occurred. We therefore
reverse and remand for the court to apply the correct legal standard.2
2 As a result, we need not reach Gilliland’s claim that the trial court
also erred by determining that the City substantially complied with
2
I.
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL
BACKGROUND3
On the afternoon of August 3, 2017, Henry drove himself and three
friends from his home in Oakland to a parking lot on Laurel Creek Drive in
Pleasanton, an access point for nearby hiking trails. Henry had smoked
marijuana earlier that day, and he claimed not to remember what he was
doing at that location.
Around 6:50 p.m., Officer Harvey entered the parking lot in his police
car to conduct “a patrol check” of the lot, because the area experienced “a lot
of vehicle break-ins.” He saw Henry’s blue Nissan Altima parked a few feet
from a dark sedan. Two people were standing between the Altima and the
dark sedan, and after seeing the police car they ran to the Altima and
entered it. Officer Harvey then noticed the dark sedan had a broken window.
Henry saw the police car enter the parking lot, after which his friends
immediately got back into the Altima. Henry was afraid of the police because
“sometimes they racially profile black people and . . . suspect us of doing
things.” He decided to leave the parking lot because he thought Officer
Harvey might try to talk to him, and he “just [did not] like being around
police officers.” Henry specifically denied that he thought the officer was
going to try to pull him over or arrest him.
Henry drove the Altima slowly through the parking lot and exited onto
Laurel Creek Drive, where the speed limit was 25 miles per hour. In doing
section 17004.7’s training requirements. We express no opinion on the merits
of this claim.
3 We draw the underlying facts primarily from Henry’s and Officer
Harvey’s depositions and other evidence submitted in conjunction with the
City’s unsuccessful motion for summary judgment. No new evidence on the
“pursuit” requirement was presented at the bench trial.
3
so, he had to drive “straight towards” Officer Harvey, who pulled his car to
the side to let the Altima pass. Suspicious that a vehicle burglary had just
occurred, Officer Harvey made a U-turn to follow the Altima out of the lot. At
this point, the officer intended “to catch up to” the Altima and perform a
“traffic stop” to “investigate further.”
Henry saw the police car make “a sudden U-turn,” which “frightened
[him] and caused [him] to accelerate[] quickly” as he drove downhill on
Laurel Creek Drive. Henry wanted to “get away” from Officer Harvey, whom
he thought “maybe . . . was trying to talk to [him],” but he was unsure if the
officer would try to pull him over because the police car “[d]idn’t have sirens
on or anything.”
Officer Harvey saw the Altima “accelerating at a high rate of speed,”
and it quickly disappeared from his sight after rounding a corner and
proceeding down the hill.4 At this point, the Altima was traveling so fast that
the officer did not believe he could “catch up to” it without endangering public
safety. He explained, “[I]t was . . . commute traffic hours. We would never
initiate a traffic pursuit or . . . drive that fast on the city streets and conduct
a pursuit at that time . . . of day. . . . [W]e would not get approved by my
supervisor. So it wouldn’t even be reasonable to do that.”
Since Officer Harvey “did not intend to initiate a vehicle pursuit,” he
“did not activate [his patrol car’s] lights . . . or siren.” He informed dispatch
that he had possibly “interrupted a vehicle burglary,” and he increased his
speed to follow the Altima. He testified that he wanted “[t]o try to determine
4 Officer Harvey estimated that the Altima was traveling over 45 miles
per hour, possibly as fast as 60 miles per hour. According to an eyewitness
whose vehicle was also involved in the collision, the Altima was driving “at
least 50 miles per hour” when it entered the intersection.
4
the location that the vehicle was traveling so [he] could put it out over the
radio. You can outrun an officer, but you can’t outrun a radio.”
After accelerating away from the police car, Henry looked in his
rearview mirror to check if it was following him. He did not see the other
vehicle again until “[r]ight before” he reached the intersection of Laurel
Creek Drive and Foothill Road, where the collision occurred. He also never
saw the police car’s lights and did not hear any sirens before the collision.
As Henry reached the intersection, the traffic light was “yellow, turning
red.” He decided to enter the intersection to “have more distance between
[himself] and the officer,” because he “[did not] like police” and did not want
to speak to them. Without slowing down, Henry drove into the intersection
and hit Gilliland’s car. The Altima continued through the intersection and
hit another vehicle before stopping.
According to Officer Harvey, he did not regain sight of the Altima until
it was “already going through the intersection.” Once he saw that a “major
collision” had occurred, he activated his vehicle’s lights and siren for the first
time and proceeded “rapidly” downhill to the intersection.5
Henry, who broke his pelvis in the crash, was eventually convicted of a
felony DUI offense. As for the possible burglary of the dark sedan, the City
admitted that it was never established that a burglary occurred, much less
that Henry or any of the Altima’s other occupants were involved in it. No one
in the Altima was ever charged in connection with any crimes involving the
dark sedan.
5 The record is unclear as to the speed at which Officer Harvey was
driving, either when he was trying to catch up to the Altima or once he saw
the collision, but there is no dispute that at one point he exceeded the speed
limit by at least 15 miles per hour.
5
Gilliland sustained serious injuries in the collision. She sued the City
in October 2018 and added Henry as a co-defendant a few months later. The
operative complaint alleged two causes of action for negligence, one against
the City based on Officer Harvey’s negligent operation of a motor vehicle and
the other against Henry based on his running a red light.6
The City answered the complaint and asserted section 17004.7
immunity as an affirmative defense. It then moved for summary judgment
on multiple grounds, including this statutory immunity. The evidence
submitted in connection with the motion included Henry’s and Officer
Harvey’s declarations, excerpts from both men’s depositions, and the version
of the Pleasanton Police Department’s vehicular pursuit policy in effect when
the collision occurred (the Policy).
The Policy defines “vehicle pursuit” as “an event involving one or more
law enforcement officers attempting to apprehend a suspect, who is
attempting to avoid arrest while operating a motor vehicle by using high-
speed driving or other evasive tactics, such as driving off a highway, turning
suddenly, or driving in a legal manner but willfully failing to yield to an
officer’s signal to stop.” The Policy permits officers “to initiate a pursuit
when it is reasonable to believe that a suspect is attempting to evade arrest
or detention by fleeing in a vehicle” and generally requires the use of
emergency lights and sirens. As noted above, Officer Harvey denied
initiating a pursuit under the Policy and admitted he never activated his
vehicle’s lights or siren. In his declaration, Henry averred that because the
patrol car’s emergency lights and siren were never activated, he “did not
6 Henry died in September 2022, and his estate was substituted as a
defendant. By stipulation, Gilliland’s action against Henry’s estate is stayed
pending this appeal’s resolution.
6
believe that the police officer . . . was pursuing [him] at any time. If the
patrol car had turned on its emergency lights or its siren, then [he] would
have stopped the blue Altima immediately.” (Some capitalization omitted.)
In December 2019, the trial court denied the City’s motion for summary
judgment. As relevant here, the court held that the City was not statutorily
immune from suit. Relying on the Policy’s definition of “vehicle pursuit,” the
court reasoned that since “Officer Harvey denie[d] he was engaged in a
vehicle pursuit of Henry’s vehicle or trying to apprehend anyone . . . , and
Henry denie[d] that he believed he was being pursued,” section 17004.7 did
not apply.
After numerous continuances, the trial was rescheduled for fall 2023.
The City filed a motion to conduct the trial in phases, with a bench trial on
whether it complied with section 17004.7’s procedural requirements and the
first phase of a jury trial on whether a qualifying vehicular pursuit occurred.
Since the City admitted that an actual pursuit did not occur because Officer
Harvey testified he did not initiate one under the Policy, the only proposed
issue for the initial jury trial was whether Henry “believed he was being, or
had been, pursued” by Officer Harvey under section 17004.7(b)(1). Gilliland
opposed the motion, noting the trial court had already denied summary
judgment to the City based on immunity under section 17004.7.
In October 2023, the trial court—a different judge than the one who
denied summary judgment—granted in part the City’s motion to try the case
in phases. After observing that “[d]enial of summary judgment based on a
defense does not mean that it cannot be raised at trial,” the court ruled that a
bench trial on the City’s compliance with section 17004.7’s procedural
requirements was appropriate because the issue was one of law. (See
7
§ 17004.7, subd. (f).) Subsequently, the parties agreed that whether a
perceived pursuit occurred could also be resolved in the bench trial.
In March 2024, after conducting the trial, a third judge issued a 12-
page final order, coming to a different conclusion than the one reached by the
judge who ruled against the City on summary judgment. This judge
concluded that the City was immune under section 17004.7. The trial court
first held that the City promulgated a compliant vehicular pursuit policy and
provided sufficient and regular training on that policy. The court then
concluded by a preponderance of the evidence that Henry believed he was
being “pursued” when the collision occurred.7 The following month, the court
entered judgment in the City’s favor.8
After observing that “[s]ection 17004.7 does not define the term
‘pursued,’ ” the trial court determined the word had to “be given its usual and
ordinary meaning.” Since there was “no evidence to suggest that Henry, or
other [B]ay [A]rea drivers, are likely to be familiar with the [Policy],” the
court decided that “the appropriate source from which to determine the
meaning of the word” was the dictionary. The court opined that it was “more
reasonable” to “[d]efin[e] ‘pursuit’ as commonly understood . . . rather than as
7 Since Gilliland does not raise the issue, we need not decide whether
the third judge had the authority to overrule the first judge’s conclusion that
section 17004.7 did not apply because Henry was not being and did not
believe he was being “pursued,” given that no new evidence on this point was
presented at the bench trial. (See Paul Blanco’s Good Car Co. Auto Group v.
Superior Court (2020) 56 Cal.App.5th 86, 99–100 [superior court judge cannot
overrule another judge’s ruling, even if erroneous].)
8 The trial court certified its written order for writ review under Code of
Civil Procedure section 166.1, and Gilliland filed a petition for peremptory or
alternative writ of prohibition and/or mandate in this court. (Gilliland v.
Superior Court, A170091.) In May 2024, we summarily denied the petition
on the basis that she failed to demonstrate that appeal was an inadequate
remedy.
8
specifically defined in a local agency’s policy manual,” since the inquiry
focused “on the belief of a suspected violator of the law, not the
understanding of a trained peace officer. Under these circumstances, it
would be odd for a state statute to define ‘pursuit’ according to a local
agency’s definition, particularly given that agency definitions could vary
among jurisdictions.”
Relying on dictionary definitions of “pursue,” including “to follow in
order to overtake, capture, kill, or defeat” and “to chase,” the trial court
determined that “[a]s commonly used, . . . the term ‘pursuit’ is not limited to
situations where a command or request to stop has previously been given.
And while it may include situations where the pursuer intends to arrest or
seize the pursued person or thing, it is not so limited.” The court also found
persuasive two cases holding that a “pursuit” under a related provision,
section 17004, “may include nonemergency, routine situations, including
where a peace officer has no intent to take the actual or suspected violator of
the law into custody.” (Citing Cruz v. Briseno (2000) 22 Cal.4th 568, 571;
Moreno v. Quemuel (2013) 219 Cal.App.4th 914, 921.) Thus, the court
concluded that “[b]oth in the colloquial sense and as applied in analogous
circumstances, a ‘pursuit’ by a peace officer may including following a suspect
for purposes of investigating, making contact, or issuing a routine citation; an
intent to stop, detain[,] or arrest the suspect is not required.”
The trial court then found that Henry believed Officer Harvey “was
engaged in a ‘pursuit’ as that term is commonly understood.” The court
relied on the following evidence. First, Henry saw Officer Harvey “perform a
sudden U-turn to follow [the Altima] out of the . . . parking lot” and “became
frightened that [the officer] ‘was going to follow [him]’ and might want to talk
to him, so he accelerated quickly to get away.” Henry “checked his rearview
9
mirror to see if the patrol car was following him[,] and as he approached the
intersection” where the collision occurred, “he could see [the] patrol car
behind him.” Finally, although Henry testified that “[a]t that point, . . . he
did not know whether [Officer] Harvey was trying to pull him over,” Henry
“was aware he was being followed” and decided to enter the intersection as
the light was turning red “to get away from the patrol car.” Thus, Henry’s
“factual admissions” as a whole established that it was “more likely than not
that he fled—and entered an intersection against a yellow-turning-red light—
because he understood he and his friends were being pursued by law
enforcement in an effort to investigate potential criminal activity.”
Given its interpretation of the word “pursued” in section 17004.7, the
trial court also found insignificant certain evidence on which Gilliland relied.
The court found it was “irrelevant” that Officer Harvey “did not signal or
activate his lights and sirens, and that [he] denied any intent [to] conduct a
traffic stop or arrest Henry,” since a “pursuit” does not require a signal for
the suspect to stop and can be undertaken merely to investigate. Likewise,
the court found “immaterial” Henry’s “testimony that he did not fear being
‘arrested’ by [the officer] . . . and . . . just wanted to avoid having contact with
the police.” Finally, the court gave “little or no weight” to Henry’s declaration
statement that he did not believe Officer Harvey was “pursuing” him,
because Henry’s “belief that he was no[t] being pursued [was] expressly
premised upon the fact that [Officer] Harvey had not activated lights and
sirens.”9 (Italics omitted.)
9 The parties discuss at length the significance of Henry’s declaration,
which was apparently prepared as part of settlement discussions with
Gilliland. But Gilliland does not claim the trial court erred by discounting
Henry’s denial of a perceived pursuit while accepting that he “testified
truthfully as to specific facts,” and his conclusory statement that he did not
10
II.
DISCUSSION
A. General Legal Standards
Unless “otherwise provided by statute,” public entities are “not liable
for an injury, whether such injury arises out of an act or omission of the
public entity or a public employee or any other person.” (Gov. Code, § 815.)
Section 17001 creates an exception to this “general tort immunity” of public
entities. (Ramirez v. City of Gardena (2018) 5 Cal.5th 995, 999.) Under
section 17001, “[a] public entity is liable for death or injury to person or
property proximately caused by a negligent or wrongful act or omission in the
operation of any motor vehicle by an employee of the public entity acting
within the scope of [the employee’s] employment.”
Section 17004.7 limits liability for injuries resulting from the operation
of a motor vehicle for public entities who elect to “adopt[] and promulgate[] a
written policy on, and provide[] regular and periodic training on an annual
basis for, vehicular pursuits.” (§ 17004.7, subds. (a), (b)(1).) If the policy and
training meet the “minimum standards” the statute specifies (§ 17004.7,
subds. (c)–(d)), then the public entity “is immune from liability for civil
damages for personal injury to or death of any person or damage to property
believe Officer Harvey was “pursuing” him does not affect our analysis in any
event.
At oral argument, the City’s counsel stated that at the bench trial, the
trial court found Henry’s declaration and “corroborating testimony about it”
not credible. To the extent counsel was suggesting the court found Henry’s
deposition testimony generally not credible, she was incorrect, as the court
explicitly accepted and relied on that testimony to reach its holding. We
disagree with any implication that our opinion’s factual background, which
summarizes the facts to which Henry testified, improperly includes evidence
the court rejected at trial.
11
resulting from the collision of a vehicle being operated by an actual or
suspected violator of the law who is being, has been, or believes he or she is
being or has been, pursued in a motor vehicle by a peace officer employed by
the public entity.” (§ 17004.7(b)(1).)
Section 17004.7 was enacted in 1987 to partially extend to public
entities the vehicle-related immunity public employees already enjoyed under
section 17004. (McGee v. City of Laguna Beach (1997) 56 Cal.App.4th 537,
542.) Under section 17004, “[a] public employee is not liable for civil damages
on account of personal injury to or death of any person or damage to property
resulting from the operation, in the line of duty, of an authorized emergency
vehicle while responding to an emergency call or when in the immediate
pursuit of an actual or suspected violator of the law, or when responding to
but not upon returning from a fire alarm or other emergency call.”
“On appeal from a judgment based on a statement of decision after a
bench trial, we review the trial court’s conclusions of law de novo and its
findings of fact for substantial evidence.” (McPherson v. EF Intercultural
Foundation, Inc. (2020) 47 Cal.App.5th 243, 257.) As the parties agree, the
proper construction of section 17004.7 is a legal issue we independently
review. (See Adolph v. Uber Technologies, Inc. (2023) 14 Cal.5th 1104, 1120.)
“In construing a statute, our task is to ascertain the intent of the Legislature
so as to effectuate the purpose of the enactment. [Citation.] We look first to
the words of the statute, which are the most reliable indications of the
Legislature’s intent. [Citation.] We construe the words of a statute in
context, and harmonize the various parts of an enactment by considering the
provision at issue in the context of the statutory framework as a whole.”
(Cummins, Inc. v. Superior Court (2005) 36 Cal.4th 478, 487.) When a
statute’s language is plain, “ ‘ “we need go no further.” [Citation.] But where
12
a statute’s terms are unclear or ambiguous, we may “look to a variety of
extrinsic aids, including the ostensible objects to be achieved, the evils to be
remedied, the legislative history, public policy, contemporaneous
administrative construction, and the statutory scheme of which the statute is
a part.” ’ ” (People v. Harrison (2013) 57 Cal.4th 1211, 1221–1222.)
B. An Individual Vehicular Pursuit Policy’s Definition of “Pursuit”
Governs Whether Suspects Believed They Were Being “Pursued.”
The trial court correctly observed that section 17004.7 does not define
“pursued.” But in deciding to apply the word’s ordinary meaning to evaluate
a suspect’s belief, the court overlooked that the statute explicitly refers to
(1) the definition of “pursuit” in individual vehicular pursuit policies and
(2) state guidelines that likewise define “pursuit.” We hold that “pursued”
has one meaning as used in section 17004.7(b)(1), and the definition of
“pursuit” in a public entity’s policy applies not just in determining whether
suspects were actually pursued but also in determining whether they
believed they were being pursued.
Section 17004.7 provides that to comply with its minimum standards, a
public entity’s pursuit policy must “[d]etermine under what circumstances to
initiate a pursuit. The policy shall define a ‘pursuit,’ articulate the reasons
for which a pursuit is authorized, and identify the issues that should be
considered in reaching the decision to pursue.” (§ 17004.7, subd. (c)(1), italics
added.) It is uncontested that an individual policy’s definition of “pursuit”
governs whether a suspect “[was] being” or “ha[d] been . . . pursued in a
motor vehicle by a peace officer,” i.e., whether there was an actual pursuit.
(§ 17004.7(b)(1).) The City has never disputed that Henry was not actually
“pursued” at any time leading up to the collision, because Officer Harvey
denied that he ever initiated a pursuit under the Policy. And on appeal, the
13
City explicitly acknowledges that a given pursuit policy’s definition of pursuit
governs whether suspects were actually being pursued.
Nonetheless, the City claims the trial court correctly determined that a
different definition of “pursuit,” the word’s “plain language, common[]sense
. . . meaning,” applies to whether suspects believed they were being “pursued”
under section 17004.7(b)(1), i.e., whether there was a perceived pursuit. We
are not convinced.
Generally, “we presume a word or phrase has the same meaning
throughout a statute,” although this “presumption of consistent usage is
rebuttable if the statute displays contrary indications of legislative intent.”
(Trejo v. County of Los Angeles (2020) 50 Cal.App.5th 129, 143–144.) The
trial court here gave two reasons for declining to rely on the Policy’s
definition of “pursuit” to determine what a suspect must believe. The first
reason was that the inquiry is subjective and members of the public are
generally unaware of local pursuit policies. The second reason was the
court’s view that “it would be odd” if “pursued” under section 17004.7 was
defined at a local level, especially since individual pursuit policies could vary.
We find neither of these reasons to be persuasive.
As to the trial court’s first reason, we do not see why unfamiliarity with
a given pursuit policy would prevent a person from forming a belief about
whether a pursuit was occurring. As we have said, the Policy defines “vehicle
pursuit” as “an event involving one or more law enforcement officers
attempting to apprehend a suspect, who is attempting to avoid arrest while
operating a motor vehicle by using high-speed driving or other evasive
tactics, such as driving off a highway, turning suddenly, or driving in a legal
manner but willfully failing to yield to an officer’s signal to stop.” Applying
this definition to the situation here, for Henry to “believe[] he . . . [was] being
14
or ha[d] been . . . pursued,” he merely had to believe that Officer Harvey was
trying to apprehend him while he was trying to avoid arrest using some type
of evasive driving tactic. (§ 17004.7(b)(1).)
As an aside, while we conclude that a suspect’s belief must be
evaluated in light of the applicable pursuit policy, we do not mean to suggest
that a perceived pursuit can take place only if all of the policy’s requirements
for conducting a pursuit are satisfied. What matters is the policy’s definition
of pursuit, not the requirements the policy may impose for conducting a
pursuit. The Policy’s definition of “vehicle pursuit” is merely one paragraph
of a 13-page document detailing numerous aspects of a pursuit, including
when a pursuit should be initiated or terminated, how police units should
communicate and interact in a pursuit, and how to address interjurisdictional
pursuits. But Gilliland mistakenly focuses on the Policy’s requirement that
police officers pursuing suspects comply with section 21055, which in turn
requires the driver of an emergency vehicle to “sound[] a siren as may be
reasonably necessary and the vehicle [to] display[] a lighted red lamp visible
from the front.” (§ 21055, subd. (b).) According to Gilliland, this means that
since Officer Harvey never activated his vehicle’s lights or siren, Henry could
not have believed he was the subject of a pursuit under the Policy. The City,
on the other hand, joined by amicus curiae League of California Cities,
contends that Gilliland’s interpretation would “categorically exclude
immunity for collisions resulting from” a perceived pursuit “unless the officer
involved has formally initiated a pursuit in compliance with [the officer’s]
employer’s policy,” including by turning on emergency lights and sirens.
We reject Gilliland’s argument, because a peace officer need not have
fully complied with the applicable pursuit policy for a public entity to be
entitled to immunity under section 17004.7. “ ‘[I]f the agency adopts a
15
pursuit policy which meets the statutory requirements, then . . . [t]he extent
to which the policy . . . was followed in the particular pursuit is irrelevant.’ ”
(Nguyen v. City of Westminster (2002) 103 Cal.App.4th 1161, 1167.) Thus, we
agree with the City that interpreting the statute to require lights, sirens, or
some other indication to the suspect to stop before there could be a perceived
pursuit would be contrary to legislative intent.10 No doubt such signals will
usually be used during a qualifying pursuit, since actual pursuits require
them and some perceived pursuits will occur where drivers mistakenly
believe themselves to be the targets of actual pursuits. But here, Officer
Harvey’s omission of a signal to stop is not determinative, since the Policy
does not define “pursuit” in relation to how an officer’s actual or perceived
intent to apprehend the suspect is conveyed.
We therefore turn to the trial court’s second reason for not applying the
Policy’s definition of “pursuit”—its concern about possible variations in local
agencies’ definitions—and find it also to be unpersuasive. This concern did
10 Senate Bill No. 719 (2005–2006 Reg. Sess.) amended section 17004.7
in response to another aspect of Nguyen, the decision’s statement that a
public entity was entitled to immunity if it merely adopted a vehicular
pursuit policy without “ ‘implement[ing] the policy through training or other
means.’ ” (Ramirez v. City of Gardena, supra, 5 Cal.5th at pp. 999–1000,
quoting Nguyen v. City of Westminster, supra, 103 Cal.App.4th at p. 1168.)
Now, an entity must “provide[] regular and periodic training on an annual
basis” on its pursuit policy and require officers to “certify in writing that they
have received, read, and understand the policy.” (§ 17004.7(b)(1)–(2).) But
this change in the law does not undermine the principle that an entity may
be entitled to immunity even if the collision occurred during a pursuit that
violated the requirements of the entity’s policy. Indeed, as the City points
out, before passing Senate Bill No. 719 “[t]he Legislature expressly
considered and rejected conditioning immunity on individual officer
compliance with a pursuit policy.” (Italics omitted; see Sen. Com. on
Judiciary, Analysis of Sen. Bill No. 719 (2005–2006 Reg. Sess.) May 10, 2005,
pp. 7–8.)
16
not prevent the trial court from accepting the City’s concession that the
Policy’s definition governed whether an actual pursuit occurred, and we do
not see why jurisdictional variations in whether a perceived pursuit occurred
would be any more objectionable. As we have indicated, a person does not
need any specialized knowledge or familiarity with a given policy to be able to
perceive the circumstances that would constitute a pursuit under the policy’s
definition.
Moreover, section 17004.7 incorporates a statewide definition of
“pursuit” that makes it unlikely the definition will vary significantly among
individual pursuit policies. A compliant policy must provide for “[r]eporting
and postpursuit analysis as required by Section 14602.1” (§ 17004.7,
subd. (c)(12)), a statute that requires local agencies to report “all motor
vehicle pursuit data” to the Department of the California Highway Patrol
(CHP) “on a paper or electronic form developed and approved by [CHP].”
(§ 14602.1, subd (a).) This requirement, as well as the requirement that a
policy define “pursuit” and the other requirements specified in subdivision (c)
of section 17004.7, “represent minimum policy standards and do not limit an
agency from adopting additional policy requirements. [They] are consistent
with the 1995 California Law Enforcement Vehicle Pursuit Guidelines
[(Guidelines)] developed by the Commission on Peace Officer Standards and
Training [(POST)] . . . that will assist agencies in the development of their
pursuit policies.” (§ 17004.7, subd. (e).)
Not surprisingly, the Policy’s definition of “vehicle pursuit” is basically
identical to that in the POST Guidelines and, in turn, the CHP form for
reporting pursuit data. In the 2022 POST Guidelines (the current version),
“vehicle pursuit” is defined as “an event involving one or more law
enforcement officers attempting to apprehend a suspect operating a motor
17
vehicle while the suspect is attempting to avoid arrest by using high-speed or
other evasive tactics such as driving off a highway, turning suddenly, or
driving in a legal manner but willfully failing to yield to the officer’s signal to
stop.” Although section 14602.1 does not define “pursuit,” form CHP 187A—
the standard form for reporting pursuits that the Policy explicitly requires to
be used—states the 2022 POST Guidelines’ definition of “vehicle pursuit” at
the top of the form’s instructions page to indicate when a report must be
submitted.11
Thus, by using the POST Guidelines’ definition of “vehicle pursuit,” the
Policy sensibly aligns with section 17004.7’s “minimum policy standards”
generally and the statute’s reporting requirements specifically. (§ 17004.7,
subds. (c)(12), (e).) Indeed, as reflected in a chart submitted at the trial
court’s request, numerous other Alameda County cities also use virtually the
same definition in their pursuit policies. Of course, a public entity is not
required to use any particular definition of “pursuit,” and section 17004.7
explicitly contemplates that an entity can adopt “a policy that limits or
restricts pursuits” or goes beyond the statute’s minimum standards.
(§ 17004.7, subd. (e).) But whatever variances there may be among
11 On our own motion, we take judicial notice of the 2022 POST
Guidelines, available at <https://post.ca.gov/portals/0/post_docs/publications/
Vehicle_Pursuit.pdf> (as of Nov. 18, 2025) and form CHP 187A, available at
<https://www.chp.ca.gov/siteassets/forms/chp187a-v2.pdf> (as of Nov. 18,
2025). (Evid. Code, §§ 452, subd. (c), 459; see Riley v. Alameda County
Sheriff’s Office (2019) 43 Cal.App.5th 492, 501, fn. 4 [taking judicial notice of
POST Guidelines]; In re Trenton D. (2015) 242 Cal.App.4th 1319, 1324, fn. 2
[taking judicial notice of Judicial Council form].) Under the same authority,
we also take judicial notice of the 1995 POST Guidelines, to which
section 17004.7 refers. The 1995 version defines “pursuit” as “the actions of a
law enforcement officer to apprehend an offender who is attempting to avoid
arrest as demonstrated by evasive driving tactics,” which echoes the main
components of the current version’s definition.
18
individual pursuit policies, they do not justify applying a different definition
of “pursuit” to perceived pursuits than to actual pursuits. In either case, an
individual policy’s definition will govern.
Finally, we agree with Gilliland that case law interpreting “pursuit”
under section 17004, governing immunity for public employees who were “in
the immediate pursuit of an actual or suspected violator of the law,” is
inapposite. Having concluded the ordinary meaning of the word should
apply, the trial court relied on Cruz v. Briseno, supra, 22 Cal.4th 568 and
Moreno v. Quemuel, supra, 219 Cal.App.4th 914 to bolster its conclusion that
a perceived pursuit requires neither a request to stop nor an intent to arrest.
It may be that as used in section 17004, the word “pursuit” is “susceptible to
more than one meaning” and requires “resort to extrinsic aids to construe it”
(Moreno, at p. 919), but section 17004.7 explicitly refers to other sources
defining the word that establish it has a specialized meaning. Moreover,
sections 17004 and 17004.7 convey immunity to different parties and in only
partially overlapping circumstances. Section 17004 broadly immunizes
public employees from liability for negligently operating an emergency
vehicle, not just driving it (much less driving it in a pursuit). (See Moreno, at
pp. 916–917, 920 [statute applied where officer opened his car door into
passing motorcyclist]; see also Cruz, at p. 572 [statute applied where officer
was attempting non-emergency traffic stop].) Immunity under
section 17004.7, however, turns on a public entity’s adopting and
implementing a pursuit policy that complies with several requirements
aimed at balancing “the apparent need for immediate capture against the
risks to peace officers, innocent motorists, and others” who might be
endangered during vehicular pursuits. (§ 17004.7, subd. (c)(1).) Thus, it is
reasonable to define suspects’ belief that they are being “pursued” under
19
section 17004.7(b)(1) more narrowly, based on the applicable pursuit policy
and not the word’s ordinary meaning.
Having determined that the trial court misinterpreted section 17004.7,
we further conclude that the misinterpretation was prejudicial because there
is a reasonable probability Gilliland would have obtained a better result had
the court used the correct legal standard. (See Orange County Water
District v. Alcoa Global Fasteners, Inc. (2017) 12 Cal.App.5th 252, 313–314;
Navigators Specialty Ins. Co. v. Moorefield Construction, Inc. (2016)
6 Cal.App.5th 1258, 1287.) The Policy’s definition of “pursuit” requires both
that a police officer be “attempting to apprehend a suspect” and that the
suspect be “attempting to avoid arrest.” Applying the ordinary meaning of
pursuit, however, the court found it irrelevant that Henry testified he did not
believe Officer Harvey was trying to arrest him. Since that testimony, if
accepted, would establish Henry did not believe he was being “pursued”
under section 17004.7(b)(1), the matter must be remanded for the court to use
the appropriate standard to decide whether the City is entitled to immunity.
In closing, we emphasize that section 17004.7 immunizes public
entities from suit in relatively narrow circumstances if they have adopted
and implemented a vehicular pursuit policy. Thus, even if a public entity is
not entitled to statutory immunity because an actual or perceived pursuit did
not occur, it hardly follows that the entity will be found liable for damages
resulting from a collision in which a peace officer might have played a role.
Here, the City may ultimately prevail on other grounds, and we hold only
that section 17004.7 does not apply merely because Henry believed Officer
Harvey was following him for some type of investigative purpose.
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III.
DISPOSITION
The judgment is reversed, and the matter is remanded for further
proceedings consistent with this opinion. Gilliland is awarded her costs on
appeal.
21
_________________________
Humes, P.J.
WE CONCUR:
_________________________
Langhorne Wilson, J.
_________________________
Smiley, J.
Gilliland v. City of Pleasanton A170666
22
Trial Court:
Superior Court of the County of Alameda
Trial Judge:
Hon. Jenna M. Whitman
Counsel:
Altair Law LLP, Craig M. Peters; Law Office of Ted W. Pelletier, Ted
W. Pelletier; Law Offices of Joseph E. Tomasik, Joseph E. Tomasik, for
Plaintiff and Appellant
Bertrand Fox Elliot Osman + Wenzel, Richard W. Osman, Sheila D.
Crawford; Miller Barondess, LLP, Nadia A. Sarkis, for Defendant and
Respondent
Cole Huber, LLP, Derek P. Cole, Tyler J. Sherman, for Amicus Curiae
in support of Defendant and Respondent
Gilliland v. City of Pleasanton A170666
23