E. Smith v. PBPP & the PA DOC

IN THE COMMONWEALTH COURT OF PENNSYLVANIA

Edward Smith, :

Petitioner :

: No. 322 M.D. 2023

v. :

: Submitted: April 8, 2025

Pennsylvania Board of Probation :

and Parole and the Pennsylvania :

Department of Corrections, :

Respondents :

BEFORE: HONORABLE MICHAEL H. WOJCIK, Judge

HONORABLE CHRISTINE FIZZANO CANNON, Judge

HONORABLE LORI A. DUMAS, Judge

OPINION BY

JUDGE DUMAS FILED: December 9, 2025

Edward Smith (Petitioner) has filed pro se a petition for relief in the

nature of a writ of habeas corpus (Petition) in this Court’s original jurisdiction.

Petitioner seeks his immediate release from incarceration. In response, the

Pennsylvania Parole Board (Board) and the Department of Corrections (Department)

(collectively, “Respondents”) have filed preliminary objections asserting

Petitioner’s failure to (1) exhaust administrative remedies and (2) state a claim upon

which relief can be granted.1 After careful review, we conclude that we lack

jurisdiction over Petitioner’s claim and, consequently, transfer this matter to the

Court of Common Pleas of Allegheny County (Common Pleas) for disposition.

1

The Board also objected to improper service, which this Court sustained. See Order, 11/1/23.

The Court directed Petitioner to effectuate proper service and indicated that it would withhold

ruling on the remaining preliminary objections pending compliance with the order. See id.

Petitioner subsequently complied. See id.

I. BACKGROUND2

Petitioner is an inmate currently incarcerated at the State Correctional

Institution at Greene (SCI-Greene). On July 17, 2023, Petitioner filed the instant

Petition, naming the Board and the Department as respondents. In his Petition,

Petitioner seeks his immediate release from custody, averring that his current

sentence has been calculated incorrectly, resulting in him remaining incarcerated

beyond the expiration of his lawful maximum term.

Petitioner was originally sentenced to two consecutive terms of

imprisonment: one of 5 years, 10 months to 11 years, 8 months, and another of 10

to 20 years. After being released on parole, the Court of Common Pleas of

Allegheny County granted his Post Conviction Relief Act (PCRA)3 petition on

January 25, 2002, which vacated his original sentence. The court resentenced him

to an aggregate term of 10 to 20 years, with an effective date of October 8, 1985.

See Ex. H-1, Order of Sentence – PCRA Order of June 9, 1983, is Vacated, Docket

No. CP-92-CR-0009321-1982.

Following his resentencing and subsequent parole, Petitioner incurred

multiple technical and criminal parole violations, resulting in numerous

recalculations of his sentence. After several instances of reparole and

reincarceration, the Board issued a modified action that, according to Petitioner,

2

Unless stated otherwise, we derive this background from those alleged in the Petition. See

Pet. for Writ of Habeas Corpus, 7/17/23. Additionally, Petitioner attached exhibits to his petition;

any citations to said exhibits are specifically noted. See Foxe v. Pa. Dep’t of Corr., 214 A.3d 308,

310 n.1 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2019) (observing that courts reviewing preliminary objections may not only

consider the facts pleaded in the petition for review, but also any documents or exhibits attached

to it).

3

42 Pa.C.S. §§ 9541-9546.

2

recalculated his maximum sentence date.4 He contends that, based on this

modification, subsequent sentence calculations imposed on him by the Department

should have been adjusted accordingly and that his sentence should have concluded

on March 29, 2013. Although Petitioner was later arrested and received a new

sentence, he maintains that the Department should have given him credit for

additional periods of time served. He argues that this new sentence should have

expired on March 29, 2023, based on the expiration of his prior sentence.

Petitioner further asserts that the Department has acknowledged errors

in his sentence computation. In support, he cites a memo dated November 21, 2017,

from the Department’s Records Administrator, which he interprets as an admission

that his maximum date was miscalculated. See Dep’t of Corr. Memo, 11/21/17.5

When the Board failed to act on the Department’s “recalculation,” Petitioner

contacted the Department again. In response, the Department issued another memo

on April 25, 2023, which, according to Petitioner, confirmed that the Board should

recalculate his sentence.6 See Dep’t of Corr. Memo, 4/25/23. Despite these

communications, Petitioner avers that the Board has taken no corrective action, and

4

We note that Petitioner has not attached any Board decisions in support of his claims to his

Petition. See generally Pet. for Rev., 7/17/23.

5

In this memo, the Department seemingly summarizes Petitioner’s contentions, reciting his

timeline, and offering an opinion that “the Board would I believe have to rescind the last Board

action reflecting a PV maximum date of 7/5/2016 since that is no longer the maximum. . . .” See

Dep’t of Corr. Memo, 11/21/17, at 2.

6

In relevant part, the letter states: “It appears that the Parole Violation calculations were not

recalculated on at [sic] JV3900, as such MX9169 has not been recalculated either. The [Board]

will need contacted [sic] on this. I have attached your 03/29/2023 request and documents and have

forwarded them to the [Board] for review/possible recalculation.” Dep’t of Corr. Memo, 4/25/23.

3

he is now unlawfully detained beyond his maximum term. Accordingly, Petitioner

seeks immediate habeas relief and requests his immediate release from custody.7

On October 26, 2023, the Board filed preliminary objections, asserting

improper service and failure to exhaust all administrative remedies. See Bd.’s

Prelim. Objs., 10/26/23, at 1-2. The Board contends that Petitioner is challenging

the calculation of his parole violation maximum date, a matter within this Court’s

appellate jurisdiction only after all administrative remedies have been exhausted and

cannot be addressed in its original jurisdiction. See id. Following the Board’s filing,

this Court issued an order on November 1, 2023, directing Petitioner to serve his

Petition on the Board, the Department, and the Attorney General’s Office. See

Order, 11/1/23. Petitioner effectuated service on all parties on December 19, 2023.

See Certificate of Serv. Filed, 12/19/23.

On December 20, 2023, the Department filed its own preliminary

objections under Pa.R.Civ.P. 1028(a)(7), asserting that Petitioner failed to pursue

available administrative remedies before seeking judicial relief. See Dep’t’s Prelim.

Objs., 12/20/23. The Department also raised a demurrer, contending that Petitioner

failed to state a claim upon which relief could be granted. Specifically, the

Department maintains that the Petition is more appropriately characterized as a

request for mandamus relief, and Petitioner has not demonstrated a clear legal right

to such relief. See id. at 4-6. The Department further contends that Petitioner’s

challenge is directed at the Board’s parole-related decisions, not the Department’s

7

Specifically, Petitioner states that he “is being held beyond his maximum prison term and

that [Respondents] ha[ve] failed to take any action to correct this illegality,” and “[a]s a result of

their failure to act, the Petitioner . . . is entitled to immediate . . . release from custody.” See Pet.

for Rev., 7/21/23, at 4.

4

sentence computation, and that Petitioner has not established any error in sentence

recalculation. See id. at 6.

On January 19, 2024, this Court ordered Respondents to file briefs on

or before February 20, 2024, and directed Petitioner to file his brief on or before

March 21, 2024. Respondents timely filed their briefs; however, Petitioner failed to

submit a brief.

II. DISCUSSION

Generally, we would consider the merits of Respondents’ preliminary

objections. However, we cannot do so in this instance because we lack original or

ancillary jurisdiction to consider this matter.8

The original jurisdiction of this Court is unique, as it is wholly statutory

and narrowly circumscribed. See 42 Pa.C.S. § 761; see also id. §§ 762-764.

Specifically, Section 761(a)(1)(i) of the Judicial Code provides that the

Commonwealth Court shall have original jurisdiction of all civil actions or

proceedings “[a]gainst the Commonwealth government, including any officer

thereof, acting in his official capacity, except [] actions or proceedings in the nature

of applications for a writ of habeas corpus or post-conviction relief not ancillary to

proceedings within the appellate jurisdiction of the court.” See 42 Pa.C.S.

§761(a)(1)(i). Ancillary jurisdiction is defined as the “[p]ower of a court to

adjudicate and determine matters incidental to the exercise of its primary jurisdiction

of an action.” Kester v. Pa. Bd. of Prob. & Parole, 609 A.2d 622, 625 (Pa. Cmwlth.

1992) (quoting Black’s Law Dictionary, 5th ed. 1979). A matter is not ancillary

8

The Department and the Board have not expressly challenged our original jurisdiction over

Petitioner’s claim. But see Bd.’s Prelim. Objs. at 1-2 (recognizing that we lack original jurisdiction

over its parole decisions); Bd.’s Br. at 5 (noting that this Court cannot entertain habeas corpus

petitions); Dep’t’s Br. at 1 (same). Nevertheless, we may address our jurisdiction sua sponte.

Pennhurst Med. Grp., P.C. v. Dep’t of Pub. Welfare, 796 A.2d 423, 425 n.2 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2002).

5

until the court’s jurisdiction is actually being exercised—hypothetical appellate

authority does not render the matter incidental. See Kester, 609 A.2d at 625. If a

matter is filed in a court lacking proper jurisdiction, the case should be transferred

to the proper tribunal, not dismissed. See 42 Pa.C.S. § 5103; see also Brown v. Pa.

Dep’t of Corr., 81 A.3d 814, 815-16 (Pa. 2013) (criticizing this Court’s dismissal of

a habeas corpus petition for lack of jurisdiction, holding that the appropriate action

would have been to transfer the case to the court of record from which the inmate’s

judgment of sentence originated). Matters of habeas corpus lie in the jurisdiction

and venue of the court of record from which the order of detention came. 42 Pa.C.S.

§ 6502;9 42 Pa.C.S. § 5301(a).10

A writ of habeas corpus is an extraordinary remedy that aims to

evaluate the legality of one’s detention and “is available after other remedies have

been exhausted or are ineffectual or nonexistent.” Dep’t of Corr. v. Reese, 774 A.2d

1255, 1260 (Pa. Super. 2001);11 Wilson v. Pa. Bureau of Corr., 480 A.2d 392, 393

9

Any judge of a court of record is empowered to issue the writ. 42 Pa.C.S. § 6502(a). All

the courts of common pleas are courts of record. 42 Pa.C.S. § 321.

10

Specifically, that section of the Judicial Code states:

If an appeal or other matter is taken to or brought in a court or magisterial district

of this Commonwealth which does not have jurisdiction of the appeal or other

matter, the court or magisterial district judge shall not quash such appeal or dismiss

the matter, but shall transfer the record thereof to the proper tribunal of this

Commonwealth, where the appeal or other matter shall be treated as if originally

filed in the transferee tribunal on the date when the appeal or other matter was first

filed in a court or magisterial district of this Commonwealth.

42 Pa.C.S. § 5103(a).

11

Although decisions of the Superior Court are not binding on this Court, they may provide

persuasive authority where they address analogous issues. See Lerch v. Unemployment Comp. Bd.

of Rev., 180 A.3d 545, 550 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2018); 210 Pa. Code § 65.37; Pa.R.A.P. 126(b) (“‘[N]on-

precedential decision’ refers to an unpublished non-precedential memorandum decision of the

Superior Court filed after May 1, 2019 . . . . Non-precedential decisions . . . may be cited for their

persuasive value.”).

6

(Pa. Cmwlth. 1984); Cook v. Garman, (Pa. Cmwlth., No. 58 C.D. 2021, filed Feb.

28, 2022); Kester 609 A.2d at 625 (“[h]abeas corpus is the recognized means for

testing the legality of detention”). “An application for a writ of habeas corpus

requests the applicant’s release from prison.” See Warren v. Dep’t of Corr., 616

A.2d 140, 142 (Pa. Cmwlth. 1992); McNair v. Owens, 576 A.2d 95, 99 (Pa. Cmwlth.

1990); Reese, 774 A.2d at 1260 (citing Commonwealth v. Isabell, 467 A.2d 1287,

1291 (Pa. 1983)),12 for the proposition that habeas corpus is a “remedy for

deliverance from illegal confinement,” which includes an “illegal detention resulting

from an incorrect computation of [an] appellant’s sentence by prison officials”);

Brown v. Dep’t of Corr., 601 A.2d 1345 (Pa. Cmwlth. 1992) (holding that a petition

directly challenging the legality of an inmate’s continued detention, on grounds

beyond an administrative calculation, properly sounded in habeas corpus); habeas

corpus, Black’s Law Dictionary (10th ed. 2014) (defining habeas corpus as a writ

“used to test the legality of an arrest or commitment”); but see Wilson v. Com.,

Bureau of Corr., 480 A.2d 392 (Pa. Cmwlth. 1984) (holding that a petition seeking

12

In Isabell, 467 A.2d 1287, our Supreme Court held that a petition brought pursuant to the

Post-Conviction Hearing Act (a precursor to the PCRA) was improper for challenging a decision

from the department that imposed a parole revocation sentence consecutive to a prior sentence,

because the petitioner did not attack the lawfulness of the sentence itself but instead the legality of

his continued detention under that sentence. Id. at 1291. The Isabell Court concluded that such a

challenge should instead proceed via habeas corpus, since it relates to the lawfulness of

confinement, not the legitimacy of the sentence itself. Id.

This principle was later distinguished in Gillespie v. Department of Corrections, 527 A.2d

1061 (Pa. Cmwlth. 1987), where this Court refused to extend habeas relief to a petition challenging

the Board’s aggregation of consecutive sentences. In Gillespie, the petitioner did not dispute the

legality of either sentence or their consecutiveness; rather, he challenged the Board’s authority to

combine them administratively. Id. at 1063-64. This Court held that such a claim fell outside the

scope of habeas corpus. Id. Where Isabell involved an attack on the legality of detention imposed

administratively, Gillespie sought relief from administrative aggregation, not his actual detention

per se. Isabell, 467 A.2d at 1291; Gillespie, 527 A.2d at 1063-64.

7

the correction of the Board’s action in aggregating a defendant’s two sentences does

not sound in habeas corpus).

Furthermore, Section 6503 of the Judicial Code, 42 Pa.C.S. § 6503,

generally provides that “an application for habeas corpus to inquire into the cause of

detention may be brought by or on behalf of any person restrained of his liberty

within this Commonwealth under any pretense whatsoever.” However, “[w]here a

person is restrained by virtue of sentence after conviction for a criminal offense, the

writ of habeas corpus shall not be available if a remedy may be had by post-

conviction hearing proceedings authorized by law.” Id. The General Assembly has

established a distinct statutory process for addressing petitions for habeas corpus or

post-conviction relief. The PCRA serves as the exclusive method for “obtaining

collateral relief and encompasses all other common law and statutory remedies for

the same purpose . . . including habeas corpus and coram nobis.”13 42 Pa.C.S. §

9542. Original jurisdiction over a habeas petition “shall be in the court of common

pleas. No court shall have authority to entertain a request for any form of relief in

anticipation of the filing of a petition” for habeas corpus. See 42 Pa.C.S. § 9545.

Typically, a petition challenging the recalculation of a maximum

sentence date by the Board is based on a dispute over the Board’s calculation of

sentence credit for, e.g., time spent at liberty on parole, time spent in a halfway

house, time spent in custody on a Board detainer, or time spent in custody without

bail while awaiting trial. Such a petition is presented to the Board in the first instance

and, if the petitioner is unsatisfied with the Board’s disposition, review is sought in

13

See also Commonwealth v. Larkin, 235 A.3d 350, 355 (Pa. Super. 2020), which highlights

habeas corpus as an extraordinary remedy only appropriate where no other legal remedy exists

(noting that the PCRA subsumes the remedy of habeas corpus with respect to the remedies offered

under the PCRA). We cite this case for its persuasive value. See Lerch, 180 A.3d at 550; 210 Pa.

Code § 65.37; Pa.R.A.P. 126(b).

8

this Court’s appellate jurisdiction. See, e.g., Carmichael v. Pa. Parole Bd., 338 A.3d

275, 278 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2025).

What takes this case out of that typical scenario and into the realm of

habeas relief is that, here, the gravamen of Petitioner’s claim is that one of his

sentences was vacated and altered, such that it was to be served concurrently with

another sentence rather than consecutively. See Pet. for Writ of Habeas Corpus

(Petition), 7/17/23. That change, perforce, reduced Petitioner’s aggregate sentence.

However, Petitioner avers, the Board’s various recalculations of his maximum

sentence date failed to reflect that fundamental alteration. Stated differently,

Petitioner does not allege that the Board erred in its arithmetic or in deciding what

credit to give him in recalculating his sentence. Rather, he contends that the Board

failed to comply with the change in Petitioner’s sentence itself when recalculating

his maximum sentence dates.

Specifically, the Department noted in its memo that the sentencing

court’s order vacating one of Petitioner’s original sentences and resentencing to

reflect concurrent sentences “was not received into the Department until a later

time.” Dep’t of Corr. Memo, 11/21/17 at 1. Once the vacate order was received,

the Department apparently adjusted Petitioner’s sentence record accordingly, but the

Board’s subsequent minimum and maximum recalculations failed to reflect or

comply with the Department's adjustment. Id. at 2.

In Isabell, the dispute centered on whether the sentencing court had

imposed consecutive or concurrent sentences. 467 A.2d 1287. The petitioner was

challenging the Department’s interpretation of the sentence, rather than the

lawfulness of that sentence. Id. at 1291. The Pennsylvania Supreme Court observed

that “[n]either a motion challenging the propriety of the sentence nor a direct appeal

9

from the judgment of sentence properly challenges the discrepancy between the

signed sentence and the [Department’s] interpretation of it.” Id. Such a discrepancy,

the Supreme Court held, is properly addressed through a petition for a writ of habeas

corpus. Id. Moreover, “[s]uch habeas corpus petitions are properly brought in the

court which initially imposed the sentence.” Id.

In McNair, this Court considered what it termed “a jurisdictional

puzzle” involving a habeas petition. 576 A.2d at 96. The petitioner, McNair, was

released from prison in 1972 because of his mother’s illness, but several months

later, a district attorney filed a complaint against McNair alleging escape after he

allegedly failed to return to custody. Id. at 97. Apparently, no further action was

taken on the complaint. Some 15 years later, and 11 years after the expiration of

McNair’s maximum sentence date in 1976, a common pleas court dismissed the

escape charge for lack of prosecution, but the following week, McNair was taken

into custody, and his sentence was recalculated, purporting to add 5,428 days onto

his sentence maximum as escape time. See id.

McNair filed a habeas petition in the common pleas court, alleging that

he had been released and had never escaped, and that taking him into custody more

than 10 years after the expiration of his original sentence was improper. Id. at 96.

The common pleas court dismissed the action, reasoning that it was not a true habeas

claim and should have been brought in this Court either as a mandamus action in our

original jurisdiction or as an administrative appeal of McNair’s sentence

recalculation. Id. at 97-98. McNair, continuing to assert that the action was properly

brought as a habeas petition, appealed the dismissal to the Superior Court, which

has jurisdiction over appeals from dismissals of habeas petitions. Id. at 98. The

Superior Court transferred the matter to this Court.

10

Notably, McNair was not challenging the lawfulness of his original

sentence, nor was he seeking judicial review of a recalculation of his maximum

sentence date, as such. Id. at 98. Rather, he was challenging the legality of his

continued custody based on an allegedly incorrect determination that he had not

completed his sentence because of his alleged escape. Id. Relying on our Supreme

Court’s decision in Isabell, this Court observed that the “well known remedy [of

habeas relief] for deliverance from illegal confinement is particularly suited to the

wrong [of] illegal detention resulting from an incorrect computation of [a

petitioner’s] sentence by prison officials.” Id. at 99 (quoting Isabell, 467 A.2d at

1291 (cleaned up; emphasis added)). Having determined, therefore, that “the only

meaningful method” to challenge the Department’s improper continuation of

custody was through a habeas petition, the court remanded for a factual hearing on

the petition. Id. at 99.

In Reese, the Superior Court consolidated two cases for appeal. Both

cases involved “whether the respective trial courts had jurisdiction to hear and grant

. . . [p]etitions for writs of habeas corpus.” 774 A.2d at 1259. Ultimately, however,

the two cases presented a contrast that is significant here.

The first petitioner, Reese, alleged that he was being held after the

expiration of his maximum sentence date although no new maximum date had been

determined. The Superior Court held that,

[u]nder these circumstances, . . . the trial court properly

exercised jurisdiction of Reese’s [p]etition for writ of

habeas corpus. Even though Reese had challenged the

. . . calculation of [his] release date as improper, Reese was

being held beyond that date when he filed his habeas

corpus [p]etition. Thus, the trial court had the authority to

hear and rule on Reese’s [p]etition. See Brown, 601 A.2d

at 1347 (holding that a petition which challenges a

11

continued detention, not on the basis of an administrative

calculation, is in the nature of habeas corpus).

Id. at 1260-61.

By contrast, the second petitioner, Richart, who had not yet reached his

maximum sentence date, had merely attempted to appeal a recalculation of his

sentence. Id. at 1261. After that appeal was dismissed as untimely, Richart filed a

habeas petition. Id. The Superior Court held that such a petition was not a proper

mechanism for review of a sentence recalculation, explaining that

[u]nder these circumstances, it appears that Richart was

using his [p]etition for habeas corpus relief to challenge

the Board’s recalculation of his maximum release date.

This is not a proper use of the writ of habeas corpus. See

Wilson, 480 A.2d at 393 (holding that the correction of a

Board action is not a proper use of the writ). At the time

he filed his [p]etition for a writ for habeas corpus,

Richart’s maximum sentence, as calculated by the Board,

had not expired. Thus, the trial court did not have

jurisdiction to hear Richart’s [p]etition.

Id.

Significantly, the distinction drawn in Reese was between the situation

of Richart, who was merely challenging a Board recalculation, and the contrasting

situation of Reese, who was alleging improper continuation of custody due to the

Board’s failure to follow his sentence as imposed. Likewise, in Isabell, the

petitioner was challenging the application of his sentences, not merely a

recalculation. See Isabell, 467 A.2d 1287. Moreover, in McNair, the petitioner was

not challenging a mere recalculation, but rather, was alleging that his continued

custody based on an alleged previous escape was improper where the escape charge

had been dismissed. See McNair, 576 A.2d at 96, 98.

12

As in the cases cited above, Petitioner here is not challenging a

recalculation of his maximum sentence date, as such. Rather, he is alleging that

the Board is failing to comply with his sentence as imposed, in that the Board

failed or refused to correct his maximum sentence date after the original sentence

had been vacated and a new, shorter sentence was imposed by the sentencing court.

See Pet., at 2, 3, Nos. 10-11. Further, because he believes his maximum sentence

date has already passed under the new sentence, he is not requesting a

recalculation, but rather, his release. See Pet. at 4 (alleging that he “is being held

beyond his maximum prison term and that [Respondents’] [have] failed to take

any action to correct this illegality,” expressly requesting “immediate habeas

corpus relief resulting in his release from custody”).

Notably, this case is distinguishable from Wilson on two bases. In

Wilson, the Department failed to correct its records, in which it had erroneously

aggregated two consecutive, but actually separate criminal sentences, into one

sentence. 480 A.2d at 393. As a result, the petitioner was not considered for parole

once the minimum sentence date on the first sentence had passed. Thus, the

petitioner in Wilson was not alleging legal entitlement to immediate release, but

only asserting that the Department erred in aggregating the two sentences. Id.

Here, however, Petitioner alleges his entitlement to immediate release because the

maximum sentence has allegedly been served, rather than consideration for a

discretionary parole. See Pet., at 2-3. Petitioner’s assertions suggest that the

Department has updated records to reflect his altered sentence, but the Board is

nonetheless refusing to recognize the alteration in the sentence. See generally Pet.

The distinction between a petition challenging a recalculation and one

challenging illegal ongoing confinement can readily be seen in a hypothetical

example. In a case where no post-sentencing events occur that would require

13

recalculating the maximum sentence, such as new convictions, parole violations, or

adjustments for street time credit on parole, what remains is the original sentence,

with its original maximum sentence date. If the sentencing court later vacated that

original sentence and replaced it with a shorter sentence, if the Department updated

its records to reflect the new sentence, and if the Board then refused to comply with

the new and shorter sentence as reflected in the Department’s records, habeas relief

would be an appropriate mechanism for the petitioner to obtain his release once the

maximum sentence date had arrived. Calculation or recalculation of the maximum

sentence date, as such, would be no part of the legal issue before the court

considering the habeas petition.

Like the petitioners in Isabell and McNair, Petitioner here is seeking

habeas relief from what he avers is illegally continued confinement after his

maximum sentence date. See McNair, 576 A.2d at 98-99; Isabell, 467 A.2d at 1291.

Calculation or recalculation comes into play only because the maximum sentence

date here has been affected not only by the replacement of the original sentence,

but also by intervening recalculations triggered by post-sentencing events.

However, the legal challenge at issue here is to the illegal confinement itself, rather

than to any underlying sentence recalculation. The illegal confinement is the sine

qua non of habeas corpus relief. See, e.g., Brown, 601 A.2d at 1347 (observing

that inmates’ challenge to the legality of their continued detention was “grounded

not merely on an administrative calculation, but on the theory that [the Department]

had been deprived of the authority to continue [their] incarceration” and concluding

that “we can scarcely imagine a clearer example of a proceeding in the nature of an

application for a writ of habeas corpus”) (internal quotation marks omitted).

Accordingly, because habeas corpus relief would provide the only

meaningful avenue of relief for Petitioner, see McNair, 576 A.2d at 97-98,

14

jurisdiction lies exclusively with the court of common pleas. See 42 Pa.C.S. § 9545.

The statutory framework explicitly limits this Court’s jurisdiction over habeas

corpus petitions and post-conviction relief that are not ancillary to proceedings

within our appellate jurisdiction. See 42 Pa.C.S. § 761(a)(1)(i). Petitioner does not

have any current proceedings within our appellate jurisdiction. Therefore, we lack

original and ancillary jurisdiction over the Petition and must transfer it to Common

Pleas. See 42 Pa.C.S. §§ 761(a)(1), 5103(a); Brown, 81 A.3d at 815-16.

III. CONCLUSION

Petitioner claims that he is incarcerated unlawfully and seeks his

immediate release. For the reasons set forth above, we lack original or ancillary

jurisdiction to consider this petition for review and, therefore, transfer it to the Court

of Common Pleas of Allegheny County for disposition, which shall treat it as a

complaint filed in its original jurisdiction. See Brown, 81 A.3d at 815; 42 Pa.C.S.

§§ 761(a)(1), 5103(a).

LORI A. DUMAS, Judge

15

IN THE COMMONWEALTH COURT OF PENNSYLVANIA

Edward Smith, :

Petitioner :

: No. 322 M.D. 2023

v. :

:

Pennsylvania Board of Probation :

and Parole and the Pennsylvania :

Department of Corrections, :

Respondents :

ORDER

AND NOW, this 9th day of December, 2025, it is hereby ORDERED

that Petitioner Edward Smith’s Petition for Review is TRANSFERRED to the Court

of Common Pleas of Allegheny County (Common Pleas) because this Court lacks

original and ancillary jurisdiction.

The Commonwealth Court’s Prothonotary shall transmit the record of

the above-captioned proceedings to Common Pleas’ Prothonotary, together with a

copy of this Opinion and Order, as well as a certified copy of this matter’s docket

entries. Subsequent to transfer, the assigned Common Pleas judge shall rule upon

the preliminary objections filed by the Department of Corrections and Pennsylvania

Parole Board (Respondents) within 45 days of the transmission of the documents

listed above. However, subject to the approval of the assigned Common Pleas judge,

Respondents may file amended preliminary objections within 30 days, and Petitioner

Edward Smith may respond within 30 days, and then the Common Pleas shall issue

its ruling within 45 days.

LORI A. DUMAS, Judge