Patel

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE MIDDLE DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA

DARSHAN H. PATEL

Petitioner, 3:25-cv-2185

: (JUDGE MARIANI)

V.

DAVID O’NEIL, Acting Field Office :

Director of Enforcement and Removal:

Operations, Philadelphia Field Office, :

Immigration and Customs :

Enforcement, KRISTI NOEM, :

Secretary of U.S. Department of

Homeland Security, PAMELA BONDI, :

U.S. Attorney General, and ANGELA - :

HOOVER, Warden of Clinton County:

Correctional Facility

Respondents. :

MEMORANDUM OPINION

I. FACTUAL BACKGROUND

On November 18, 2025, Petitioner Darshan H. Patel, a citizen of India residing in the

United States for the past seven years on a $25,000 bond, with no criminal record, a

pending asylum application, and work authorization, filed a petition for habeas corpus

pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2241. (Doc. 1). Petitioner is currently detained at the Clinton

County Correctional Facility within the Middle District of Pennsylvania. (/d., 1). The

Petition names as Respondents: David O'Neil, Acting Field Office Director of Enforcement

and Removal Operations, Philadelphia Field Office, Immigration and Customs Enforcement;

Kristi Noem, Secretary of the United States Department of Homeland Security; Pamela

Bondi, United States Attorney General; and Angela Hoover, Warden of the Clinton County

Correctional Facility. (/d., J§] 19-22).

On November 22, 2018, Petitioner entered the United States with his wife from

Mexico without inspection. (/d., 2). He was apprehended by Customs and Border Patrol

shortly thereafter and detained from November 22, 2018, through February 9, 2019. (/d.).

On February 9, 2019, he was released after posting a $25,000 bond.' (/d.). Thereafter,

Petitioner filed an I-589 Application for Asylum with the Immigration Court. (/d., 4). The

Application was denied by an Immigration Judge on July 5, 2023, and Petitioner appealed

that decision to the Board of Immigration Appeals. (/d.). That appeal remains pending and,

accordingly, Petitioner does not have a final order of removal. (/d.). As an asylum

applicant, Petitioner was provided with work authorization and a social security number.

(/d.). Since his entry into the United States, he has lived a law-abiding and productive life

and has a U.S. citizen daughter who is approximately 3 % years old. (/d.).

On November 15, 2025, Petitioner was arrested by Immigration and Customs

Enforcement at his place of employment in Bloomsburg, Pennsylvania. (/d., ] 5). Petitioner

alleges that he was not provided a pre-deprivation hearing prior to his re-detention by

1 Prior to Petitioner's release, he was issued a Notice to Appear in Immigration Court, charging him as

being an alien present in the United States without admission or parole, and as an immigrant who, at the time

of application for admission, was not in possession of a valid unexpired immigration visa—a charge Petitioner

denies and alleges is not applicable to under him the law. (Doc. 1, § 3) (citing 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(6)(A)(i); 8

U.S.C. § 1182(a)(7)(A)(i)(I); Ex. A).

Respondents. (/d.). More specifically, Petitioner alleges he “was not provided any notice

that he would be re-detained, nor notice or allegation that he had violated his immigration

bond.” (/d.).

Because Petitioner is charged with having entered the United States without

inspection, the Department of Homeland Security “has denied or will deny Petitioner release

from immigration custody, consistent with a new DHS policy issued on July 8, 2025,

instructing all Immigration and Customs Enforcement employees to consider anyone

inadmissible under § 1182(a)(6)(A)(i}—i.e., those who entered the United States without

admission or inspection—subject to detention under 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(2)(A) and therefore

ineligible to be released on bond.” (/d., ] 6). In addition, on September 5, 2025, the Board

of Immigration Appeals issued a precedential opinion holding that an Immigration Judge

“has no authority to consider bond requests for any person who entered the United States

without admission.” (/d., 7) (citing Matter of Yajure Hurtado, 29 |. & N. Dec. 216 (BIA

2025)). The Board of Immigration Appeals “determined that such individuals are subject to

detention under 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(2)(A) and therefore ineligible to be released on bond.”

(Id.).

Petitioner alleges his detention under 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(2)(A) “violates the plain

language of the Immigration and Naturalization Act.” (/d., 8). More specifically Petitioner

alleges that “Section 1225(b)(2)(A) does not apply to individuals like Petitioner who

previously entered and are now residing in the United States.” (/d.). Rather, “such

individuals are subject to a different statute, § 1226(a), that allows for release on conditional

parole or bond” and further applies to persons similarly situated to Petitioner who are

charged as inadmissible for having entered the United States without inspection. (/d.).

“Respondents’ new legal interpretation is plainly contrary to the statutory framework and

contrary to decades of agency practice applying § 1226(a) to people like Petitioner.” (/d., J

9). Petitioner seeks habeas relief requesting that he be immediately released from custody,

or in the alternative, an Order directing Respondents to provide Petitioner with a bond

hearing under § 1226(a) within seven days.

As noted, Petitioner alleges he is being unlawfully detained by Respondents without

a bond hearing in violation of the Immigration and Naturalization Act (“INA”) and the Fifth

Amendment's due process clause. (Doc. 1, J] 48-62). Specifically, Petitioner alleges he is

being unlawfully detained by Respondents without a bond hearing under the mandatory

detention provision of the INA, 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(2)(A), instead of the discretionary

detention provision of the INA, 8 U.S.C. § 1226(a). (/d., {J 8-10, 39-43). This distinction

matters because noncitizens detained pursuant to 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(2)(A) are not entitled

to a bond hearing, whereas noncitizens detained pursuant to 8 U.S.C. § 1226(a) are entitled

to a bond hearing before an Immigration Judge. See Patel v. McShane, 2025 WL 3241212,

at “2 (E.D. Pa. Nov. 20, 2025) (8 U.S.C. § 1226(a) “entitles detained individuals to a bond

hearing before an Immigration Judge’) (citations omitted).

On November 20, 2025, Petitioner filed an ex parte motion for a temporary

restraining order and brief in support seeking temporary injunctive relief. (Docs. 2-4). On

November 24, 2025, the Court denied Petitioner's motion for a temporary restraining order

as procedurally flawed. (Doc. 5). As directed by the Court, the Respondents filed a

response to the Petition on December 3, 2025. (Doc. 8). On December 5, 2025, Petitioner

filed a reply to Respondents’ response. (Doc. 9).

The Respondents do not dispute the factual allegations contained in the Petition.

(/d.). Rather, they set forth legal arguments as to why this Court lacks jurisdiction to hear

the Petition and further claim that Petitioner’s detention is lawful under 8 U.S.C. §

1225(b)(2). (Id. at 15). But, as discussed more fully below, Respondents’ interpretation of

the INA—the same one they advance here—has been consistently rejected by nearly every

federal district court to consider these issues.

ll. STANDARD OF REVIEW

Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2241, a federal district court may grant a habeas petition

where a petitioner's immigration detention is “in violation of the Constitution or laws or

treaties of the United States.” 28 U.S.C. § 2241(c)(3). It is well established that a federal

2 Respondents do dispute that Petitioner came into the United States from Mexico. (Doc. 8 at 12)

(“Petitioner is a native and citizen of India who entered the United States at an unknown location on or about

November 22, 2018.”). They also dispute that Petitioner was arrested in Bloomsburg, Pennsylvania. □□□□□

("On November 15, 2025, Petitioner was encountered in Williamsport, Pennsylvania and detained.”). Neither

dispute is material to the resolution of the Petition. Having considered the Petition and response, the Court

decides this matter without oral argument or an evidentiary hearing because there are no material factual

disputes between the parties and the question is one of legal interpretation.

habeas corpus petitioner generally has the burden of proving facts entitling him to a

discharge from custody. Goins v. Brierley, 464 F.2d 947, 949 (3d Cir. 1972) (citations

omitted); accord Patel, 2025 WL 3241212, at *2.

ll. ANALYSIS

A. This Court Has Jurisdiction Over Petitioner’s Habeas Petition.

Before addressing the merits, the Court must first address Respondents’ position

that the Court lacks jurisdiction to grant the writ. Respondents direct the Court to three

subparagraphs of the INA: 8 U.S.C. §§ 1252(g),1252(b)(9), and 1252(a)(2)(B)(il) which they

claim divest this Court of jurisdiction to hear Petitioner's habeas petition. (Doc. 8 at 15-22).

The Court need not dwell on the jurisdictional issues because, as discussed below, federal

district courts to consider this issue have almost universally held that they have jurisdiction

to consider habeas petitions like the one filed by Petitioner. In short, Section 1252(g) does

not apply since Petitioner “does not attempt by this petition to address the commencement,

adjudication, or execution of removal orders and their proceedings.”? Soumare v. Jamison,

2025 WL 3461542, at *2 (E.D. Pa. Dec. 2, 2025) (citing Reno v. Am.-Arab Anti-

Discrimination Comm., 525 U.S. 471, 482 (1999) (jurisdiction stripping under § 1252(g)(2)

applies “only to [these] three discrete actions”)); see also Demirel v. Fed. Det. Ctr.

3 Section 1252(g) of the INA provides, in relevant part, that: “no court shall have jurisdiction to hear

any cause or claim by or on behalf of any alien arising from the decision or action by the Attorney General to

commence proceedings, adjudicate cases, or execute removal orders against any alien under this sheipter.”

U.S.C. § 1252(g).

Philadelphia, 2025 WL 3218243, at *3 (E.D. Pa. Nov. 18, 2025) (Section 1252(g) does not

bar jurisdiction because the petitioner “seeks a bond hearing; he does not challenge the

commencement, adjudication, or execution of his removal (which may not even occur)’).

Section 1252(b)(9) also does not divest this Court of jurisdiction over the habeas

petition, because it “does not reach claims that are independent of, or wholly collateral to,

the removal process.”4 E.0.H.C. v. Sec’y United States Dept. of Homeland Sec., 950 F.3d

177, 186 (3d. Cir. 2020) (internal citation and quotation marks omitted). Moreover, §

1252(b)(9) “does not strip jurisdiction when aliens seek relief that courts cannot

meaningfully provide alongside review of a final order of removal.” /d. (“If ‘later’ is not an

option, review is available now.”); see also Demirel, 2025 WL 3218243, at *3 (“Later is not

an option here, because the Court of Appeals could not ‘meaningfully’ redress Demirel’s

purported unlawful denial of release on bond should his final removal be ordered.”). The

same logic applies here: later is not an option here because the Court of Appeals could not

meaningfully address Petitioner's unlawful detention without a bond hearing.

And section 1252(a)(2)(B)(ii) is inapposite because the Respondents’ “statutory

detention power is ‘not a matter of discretion’ to which § 1252(a)(2)(B)(ii) applies.”

4 Section 1252(b)(9) of the INA provides, in relevant part, that “Judicial review of all questions of law

and fact, including the interpretation and application of constitutional or statutory provisions, arising from any

action taken or proceeding brought to remove an alien from the United States under this subchapter shall be

available only in judicial review of a final order under this section.” 8 U.S.C. § 1252(b)(9). These claims must

be filed “with an appropriate court of appeals.” /d. § 1252(a)(2)(D).

5 Section 1252(a)(2)(B)(ii) of the INA provides, in relevant part, that “no court shall have jurisdiction to

review . . . any other decision or action by the Attorney General or Secretary of Homeland Security the

Soumare, 2025 WL 3461542, at *2 (quoting Zadvydas v. Davis, 533 U.S. 678, 693 (2001));

see also Demirel, 2025 WL 3218243, at *3 (“Section 1252(a)(2)(B)(ii) thus also does not

apply here.”). In sum, 8 U.S.C. §§ 1252(g),1252(b)(9), and 1252(a)(2)(B)(ii) do not divest

this Court of jurisdiction to hear Petitioner's habeas petition.

Respondents next claim the habeas petition must be dismissed because Petitioner

did not exhaust his administrative remedies before an Immigration Judge and the Board of

lmmigration Appeals. (Doc. 8 at 22-24). While habeas petitioners are “ordinarily required to

exhaust their administrative remedies,” Moscato v. Fed. Bureau of Prisons, 98 F.3d 757,

760 (3d Cir. 1996), they “need not exhaust administrative remedies where the issue

presented involves only statutory construction.” Vasquez v. Strada, 684 F.3d 431, 434-35

(3d Cir. 2012). Moreover, exhaustion of administrative remedies is also not required when

doing so would be futile. Demirel, 2025 WL 3218243, at*4. Because the Board of

Immigration Appeals in Matter of Yajure Hurtado, 29 |. & N. Dec. 216 (BIA 2025)

“predetermined the statutory issue” Petitioner “has no reasonable prospect of obtaining

relief through administrative remedies.” Demirel, 2025 WL 3218243, at *4 (internal citation

and quotation marks omitted). Accordingly, the Petition will not be dismissed for failure to

exhaust administrative remedies.

authority for which is specified under this subchapter to be in the discretion of the Attorney General or the

Secretary of Homeland Security.” 8 U.S.C. § 1252(a)(2)(B)(ii).

B. The Court Will Grant Petitioner's Habeas Petition.

Turning to the merits of the Petition, the Court will first consider the two statutory

provisions of the INA at issue. 8 U.S.C. § 1225 is statute entitled “Inspection by immigration

officers; expedited removal of inadmissible arriving aliens; referral for hearing.” It provides,

in relevant part:

(b) Inspection of applicants for admissions

(2) Inspection of other aliens

(A) In General

Subject to subparagraph (B) and (C), in the case of an alien who is an

applicant for admission, if the examining immigration officer determines

that an alien seeking admission is not clearly and beyond a doubt

entitled to be admitted, the alien shall be detained for a proceeding

under section 1229a [removal proceedings} of this title.

8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(2)(A). 8 U.S.C. § 1226, in contrast, is entitled “Apprehension and

detention of aliens.” It provides, in relevant part:

(a) Arrest, detention, and release

On a warrant issued by the Attorney General, an alien may be arrested and detained

pending a decision on whether the alien is to be removed from the United States.

Except as provided in subsection (c) and pending such decision, the Attorney

General—

(1) may continue to detain the arrested alien; and

(2) may release the alien on—

(A) bond of at least $1,500 with security approved by, and containing

conditions prescribed by, the Attorney General; or

(B) conditional parole; but

(3) may not provide the alien with work authorization (including an ‘employment

authorized’ endorsement or other appropriate work permit), unless the alien

is lawfully admitted for permanent residence or otherwise would (without

regard to removal proceedings) be provided such authorization.

8 U.S.C. § 1226(a).6 Respondents are currently detaining Petitioner pursuant to 8 U.S.C. §

1225(b)(2)(A). It is undisputed that Petitioner has not been charged with or convicted of a

criminal offense, does not have a final order of removal, and his asylum appeal is currently

pending before the Board of Immigration Appeals. (Docs. 8, 8-4).

The overwhelming majority of federal district courts that have addressed this issue

have interpreted the INA to find that persons similarly situated to Petitioner—noncitizens

who previously entered the United States and are currently residing in the United States—

are not subject to the mandatory detention provision of 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(2)(A) but instead

are subject to the discretionary detention pursuant to 8 U.S.C. § 1226(a) and accordingly

are entitled to a bond hearing. See Demirel, 2025 WL 3218243, at *1 (“Although there is no

apposite appellate authority, there are 288 district court decisions addressing this issue. □□

all but six, the Government's interpretation of the INA—the same interpretation it urges

here—was rejected.”). Indeed, every district court in the Third Circuit to consider this issue

has found that detainees similarly situated to Petitioner are not subject to the mandatory

detention provision of 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(2)(A) and that the Respondents’ interpretation of

the INA is wrong.’ These courts have further found that the statutory provisions of the INA

6 There is no evidence before the Court that the Attorney General revoked Petitioner Patel’s $25,000

bond pursuant to 8 U.S.C. § 1226(b), and Respondents do not argue otherwise.

7 See, ¢.g., Sislema v. Soto, 2025 WL 3496749 (D.N.J. Dec. 5, 2025) (Martinotti, J.); Conde v.

Jamison, 2025 WL 3499256 (E.D. Pa. Dec. 5, 2025) (Brody, J.); Perez Suspes v. Rose, 2025 WL 3492820

(E.D. Pa. Dec. 5, 2025) (Brody, J.); Lliguicota v. Cabezas, 2025 WL 3496300 (D.N.J. Dec. 5, 2025) (Semper,

J.); Perez Silva v. Soto, 2025 WL 3485658 (D.N.J. Dec. 4, 2025) (Semper, J.); Patel v. Sofo, 2025 WL

3485716 (D.N.J. Dec. 4, 2025) (Quraishi, J.); Lemu v. Soto, 2025 WL 470298 (D.N.J. Dec. 3, 20125) (Bumb,

10

that Respondents’ claim divest this Court of jurisdiction do not apply to persons similarly

situated to Petitioner and that there is no need to exhaust administrative remedies prior to

filing a habeas petition.

J.); Rudecindo v. Florentino, 2025 WL 3470299 (D.N.J. Dec. 3, 2025) (Salas, J.); Ulloa v. Bondi, 2025 WL

3470307 (D.N.J. Dec. 3, 2025) (Wingenton, J.); Velazquez v. O'Neill, 2025 WL 3473363 (E.D. Pa. Dec. 3,

2025) (Henry, J.); Nogueira-Mendes v. McShane, 2025 WL 3473364 (E.D. Pa. Dec. 3, 2025) (Slomsky, J.);

MLZ v. Noem, 2025 WL 3470046 (E.D. Pa. Dec. 2, 2025) (Baylson, J.); Yilmaz v. Warden of the Fed. Det.

Ctr. Philadelphia, 2025 WL 3459484 (E.D. Pa. Dec. 2, 2025) (Rufe, J.); Soumare, 2025 WL 3461542 (E.D.

Pa. Dec. 2, 2025) (Henry, J.); Chiquito Barzola v. Warden, 2025 WL 3443487 (D.N.J. Dec. 1, 2025) (Farbiarz,

J.); Flores Obando v. Bondi, 2025 WL 3452047 (E.D. Pa. Dec. 1, 2025) (Brody, J.); Guerra Sutuj v. Noem,

2025 WL 3461508 (D.N.J. Dec. 1, 2025) (Kiel, J.); Mejia v. Cabezas, 2025 WL 3294405 (D.N.J. Nov. 26,

2025) (Kirsch, J.); Bah v. Soto, 2025 WL 3295569 (D.N.J. Nov. 26, 2025) (Kiel, J.); Morocho v. Jamison,

2025 WL 3296300 (E.D. Pa. Nov. 26, 2025) (Gallagher, J.); Diallo v. O'Neill, 2025 WL 3298003 (E.D. Pa.

Nov. 26, 2025) (Savage, J.); Ochoa-Molina v. Soto, 2025 WL 3281820 (D.N.J. Nov. 25, 2025) (Padin, J.);

Ibarra v. Warden of the Fed. Det. Ctr. Philadelphia, 2025 WL 3294726 (E.D. Pa. Nov. 25, 2025) (Rufe, J.);

Henriquez-Hernandez v. Rose, 2025 WL 3284447 (M.D. Pa. Nov. 25, 2025) (Neary, J.); Garcia-Alvarado v.

Warden, 2025 WL 3268606 (D.N.J. Nov. 24, 2025) (Wigenton, J.); Velasquez-Gomez v. Soto, 2025 WL

3251443 (D.N.J. Nov. 21, 2025) (Martinotti, J.); Valerio v. Joyce, 2025 WL 3251445 (D.N.J. Nov. 21, 2025)

(Quraishi, J.); Ramos v. Soto, 2025 WL 3251447 (D.N.J. Nov. 21, 2025) (Shipp, J.); Vasquez-Lucero v. Soto,

2025 WL 3240895 (D.N.J. Nov. 20, 2025) (Cox Arleo, J.); Singh Sandhu v. Tsoukaris, 2025 WL 3240810

(D.N.J. Nov. 20, 2025) (Martinotti, J.); Patel, 2025 WL 3241212 (E.D. Pa. Nov. 20, 2025) (Brody, J.); Perez

v. Lyons, 2025 WL 3238540 (D.N.J. Nov. 19, 2025) (Kiel, J.); Ndiaye v. Jamison, 2025 WL 3229307 (E.D.

Pa. Nov. 19, 2025) (Sanchez, J.); Illescas v. Chu, 2025 WL 3216850 (D.N.J. Nov. 18, 2025) (Padin, J.);

Benitez Castro v. Bondi, 2025 WL 3213829 (D.N.J. Nov. 18, 2025) (Neals, J.); Sandoval v. Rokosky, 2025

WL 3204746 (D.N.J. Nov. 17, 2025) (Wigenton, J.); Demirel, 2025 WL 3218243 (E.D. Pa. Nov. 18, 2025)

(Diamond, J.); Kashranov v. Jamison, 2025 WL 3188399 (E.D. Pa. Nov. 14, 2025) (Wolson, J.); da Silva v.

LaForge, 2025 WL 3173859 (D.N.J. Nov. 13, 2025) (Padin, J.); Cantu-Cortes v. O'Neill, 2025 WL 3171639

(E.D. Pa. Nov. 13, 2025) (Kenney, J.); Guaman Naula v. Noem, 2025 WL 3158490 (D.N.J. Nov. 12, 2025)

(Wigenton, J.); Vicens-Marquez v. Soto, 2025 WL 3097496 (D.N.J. Nov. 6, 2025) (Hayden, J.); Lopez v.

Noem, 2025 WL 3101889 (D.N.J. Nov. 5, 2025) (Wigenton, J.); Mboup v. Field Office Dir. of New Jersey

Immigr. & Customs Enf't, 2025 WL 3062791 (D.N.J. Nov. 3, 2025) (Farbiarz, J.); Ramos v. Rokosky, 2025

WL 3063588 (D.N.J. Nov. 3, 2025) (Padin, J.); Ayala Amaya v. Bondi, 2025 WL 3033880 (D.N.J. Oct. 30,

2025) (Kiel, J.); Patel v. Almodovar, 2025 WL 3012323 (D.N.J. Oct. 28, 2025) (Wigenton, J.); Del Cid v.

Bondi, 2025 WL 2985150 (W.D. Pa. Oct. 23, 2025) (Haines, J.); Lomeu v. Soto, 2025 WL 2981296 (D.N.J.

Oct. 23, 2025) (Padin, J.); Lopez v. Soto, __ F. Supp. 3d. __, 2025 WL 2987485 (D.N.J. Oct. 23, 2025)

(Farbiarz, J.); Maldonado v. Cabezas, 2025 WL 2985256 (D.N.J. Oct. 23, 2025) (Semper, J.); C.B. v. Oddo,

2025 WL 2977870 (W.D. Pa. Oct. 22, 2025) (Brown, MJ.); Bethancourt Soto v. Soto, _ F. Supp. 3d __, 2025

WL 2976572 (D.N.J. Oct. 22, 20525) (O’'Hearm, J.); Buestan v. Chu, 2025 WL 2972252 (D.N.J. Oct. 21, 2025)

(Farbiarz, J.); Castillo v. Lyons, 2025 WL 2940990 (D.N.J. Oct. 10, 2025) (Farbiarz, J.); Zumba v. Bondi,

2025 WL 2753496 (D.N.J. Sept. 26, 2025) (Hayden, J.).

11

The Court finds that the near universal rejection of Respondents’ interpretation of the

INA by federal district courts to be highly persuasive and will adopt the same approach.

Petitioner's detention under 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(2)(A) is unlawful under the INA because the

plain language of this provision and the statutory framework of the INA compels a finding

that § 1225(b)(2)(A) applies only to noncitizens who are affirmatively seeking admission to

the United States, not noncitizens like Petitioner who have resided in the United States for

years.8 See Bethancourt Soto, __ F. Supp. 3d __, 2025 WL 2976572, at * 7 (“For all these

reasons, the Court concludes that § 1225(b)(2)(A) applies only to noncitizens who are

actively, i.e., affirmatively, ‘seeking admission’ to the United States. Accordingly, it does not

apply to individuals like Petitioner, who has been residing in the United States ‘for over

seven years.”); see also Patel, 2025 WL 3241212, at *2 (“As for the merits of Mr. Patel’s

Petition, the principal issue is whether his mandatory detention pursuant to 8 U.S.C. §

1225(b)(2)(A) is unlawful. | concur with my colleagues that it is. Both the plain meaning of

the text of Section 1225(b)(2)(A) and the statutory framework of the INA support the

8 The Supreme Court has also acknowledged that 8 U.S.C. § 1226 “generally governs the process of

arresting and detaining ... aliens already in the country pending the outcome of removal proceedings.”

Jennings v. Rodriguez, 583 U.S. 281, 288-89 (2018) (emphasis added); /d. at 303 (“As noted, § 1226 applies

to aliens already present in the United States.”).

In addition, despite the Board of Immigration Appeals holding in Matter of Yajure Hurtado, 29 |. & N.

Dec. 216 (BIA 2025), that 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(2)(A) applies to noncitizens like Petitioner, “[t}his Court owes

no deference to an agency's interpretation that conflicts with the statute’s unambiguous text.” Bethancourt

Soto v. Soto, __ F. Supp. 3d __, 2025 WL 2976572, at *7 (D.N.J. Oct. 22, 2025) (citing Loper Bright Enters.

v. Raimondo, 603 U.S. 369, 400-01 (2024)).

12

conclusion that the provision does not apply to noncitizens residing within the United

States.”),

Like other Courts to address this issue, the Court finds that Respondents’

interpretation of the phrase “seeking admission’ violates the rule against surplusage, would

negate the plain meaning of the text, and make redundant Section 1226(c) mandatory

detention of noncitizens who have committed or are charged with certain specified crimes.

See Centeno Ibbara, 2025 WL 3294726, at *5-6 (“The government's interpretation of §

1225(b)(2) violates the rule against surplusage. If ‘an applicant seeking admission’ is the

same as ‘an applicant for admission,’ then ‘seeking admission’ is surplusage. Congress has

also recently adopted provisions in § 1226 that would be made superfluous under the

government's interpretation. If a noncitizen enters the country illegally and is subsequently

convicted or charged with certain crimes, these new provisions require that noncitizens be

detained without a bond hearing. Under the government's interpretation, § 1225 would

require such mandatory detention regardless of criminal charges or conviction. If this was

the case, Congress would have no need to create additional requirements for mandatory

detention."). Here, Petitioner Patel is not affirmatively “seeking admission” into the United

States. He did so in 2018 and was released into the United States on $25,000 bond which

has not been revoked. Because Petitioner is not currently “seeking admission” into the

United States, Section 1225(b)(2)(A) does not apply to him.

13

As for Petitioner's constitutional arguments, it is undisputed that Petitioner is entitled

to the protections of the Fifth Amendment's due process clause.? See Zadvydas, 533 U.S.

at 693 (“But once an alien enters the country, the legal circumstances change, for the Due

Process Clause applies to all ‘persons’ within the United States, including aliens, whether

their presence here is lawful, unlawful, ternporary, or permanent.”).

Applying the balancing test of Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 325 (1976) to the

mandatory detention without a bond hearing at issue here, the Court must weigh three

factors: (1) the “private interest that will be affected by the official action”; (2) “the risk of an

erroneous deprivation of such interest through procedure used, and the probable value, if

any, of additional or substitute procedural safeguards”; and (3) “the Government's interest,

9 Respondents further argue that the Petitioner's petition should be denied “as Petitioner is challenging

a lawfully enacted regulation (8 C.F.R. § 1003.19(i)(2)) authorizing his detention through an automatic stay,

but critically, that automatic stay merely implements detention Congress authorized under 8 U.S.C. §

1225(b)(2).” (Doc. 8, at 2). The Court disaicrees because the automatic stay provision does not apply here.

As of the date of this writing, Respondents “have provided no evidence of the mandated certification by

ICE/DHS officials, as required by 8 C.F.R. § 1003.19(i)(2) to invoke the automatic stay.” Herrea v. Knight,

__F. Supp. 3¢__, 2025 WL 2581792, at *1 (D. Nev. Sept. 5, 2025). And, in any event, this Court agrees

with the district courts who have addressed this issue: Respondents’ irterpretation of this regulation as

applied to Petitioner would violate due process. See Leal-Hernandez v. Noem, __ F. Supp, ___, 2025 WL

2430025, at “13-14 (D. Md. Aug. 24, 2025) ("The court likewise concludes the automatic stay as applied to

Petitioner violates his Fifth Amendment right to procedural due process. . . .The automatic stay is a violent

distortion of proper, legitimate process whereby the Government, as though by talisman, renders itself at

once prosecutor and adjudicator.”); s2e also Mohammed H. v. Trump, 786 F. Supp. 3d 1146, 1158 (D. Minn.

2025) (“Prior to being released by this Court’s May 5, 2025 Order, Petitioner remained in custody only

because the Government invoked the automatic stay provision in 8 C.F.R. § 1003.19(i)(2). Although the

Immigration Judge had ordered Petitioner to be released on bond, the Government stayed that order without

making any showing of dangerousness, flight risk, or any other factor justifying detention. Simply by fiat—

without introducing any proof and without immediate judicial review—the Government effectively overruled

the bond decision and kept Petitioner detained. In doing so, the automatic stay renderad Petitioner's

continued detention arbitrary and gave him no chance to contest the Government's case for detention.”).

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including the function involved and the fiscal and administrative burdens that the additional

or substitute procedural requirements would entail.” /d. 424 U.S. at 335. The first factor

weighs heavily in Petitioner's factor, as the “official action” has deprived him of his physical

liberty. See Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507, 529 (2004) (noting “the most elemental of

liberty interest—the interest in being free from physical detention.”). As for the second

factor, the Court further finds this factor weighs heavily in Petitioner's favor “as he is

presently and erroneously detained under the mandatory detention provisions of § 1225,

without an opportunity for a bond hearing.” Bethancourt Soto, __ F. Supp. 3d __, 2025 WL

2976572, at *8 (emphasis in original). Lastly, the Court notes the Government has an

interest in detaining noncitizens to ensure “the appearance of aliens at future immigration

proceedings” and “preventing danger to the community.” Zadvydas, 533 U.S. at 690.

However, this factor still weighs in Petitioner's favor because Respondents do not dispute

that he has no criminal record, he has already posted a $25,000 bond, and the

Respondents have not claimed that Petitioner poses a danger or is a flight risk.

Accordingly, the Court further finds that Petitioner's mandatory detention without a bond

hearing pursuant to 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(2)(A) further violates his procedural due process

rights under the Fifth Amendment. See Bethancourt Soto, __ F. Supp. 3d __, 2025 WL

2976572, at *8 (“Taken together, the Court finds the Mathews factors weigh decisively in

Petitioner's favor, and as such his mandatory detention under § 1225(b)(2)(A) violates his

procedural due process rights.”) (citations omitted).

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Under the Respondents’ approach, Petitioner and those noncitizens residing in the

United States who have not committed, or been charged with, a specified crime under the

INA could be lawfully detained without a bond hearing consistent with constitutional

requirements from the time the Immigration Judge denied Petitioner’s asylum application in

July of 2023 until some future date when the Board of Immigration Appeals rules on his

pending appeal. (Doc. 8 at 2-3). And likely for a period much longer, despite Respondents’

claims that the detention is only “temporary.” (/d., at 43-48). This prolonged and indefinite

detention would continue if Petitioner appealed the forthcoming Board of Immigration

Appeals decision to the Third Circuit Court of Appeals and potentially to the Supreme Court,

should he file a petition for writ of certiorari. Further, Respondents’ approach would be

inconsistent with the Supreme Court's decision in Zadvydas (which considered the indefinite

detention of the petitioner after a final removal order and finding fewer than six months

detention is presumed to be constitutional) and would violate both the INA and Petitioner's

due process rights by depriving him of his liberty without due process of law. Importantly,

Respondents do not dispute that there is no final removal order for Petitioner because his

appeal remains pending with the BIA. (Doc. 8 at 12-13). Nor do Respondents dispute that

Petitioner, as of February 2019, was released into the United States on $25,000 bond which

has not been revoked, was granted work authorization and a social security card, and stil

has a pending asylum application and thus no final order of removal exists. Accordingly, the

Court will grant Petitioner's habeas petition because his detention under § 1225 is unlawful.

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The Court declines to address Petitioner’s request for fees and costs under the Equal

Access to Justice Act. Petitioner may re-file this request with the appropriate court at the

conclusion of Petitioner's immigration proceedings.

IV. CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, Petitioner's habeas petition will be granted because his

mandatory detention under 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(2)(A) without a bond hearing is unlawful and

violates both the INA and the Fifth Amendment’s procedural due process clause. Because

the Respondents maintain that a bond hearing is not required and the Respondents’

interpretation is inconsistent with the INA, Respondents will be directed to immediately

release Petitioner Patel from the custody of Respondent Angela Hoover, Warden of Clinton

County Correctional Facility, and file a declaration or affidavit pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1746

confirming that Petitioner Patel has been released from custody. See Boumediene v. Bush,

593 U.S. 723, 779 (2008) (acknowledging that a habeas court has “the power to order the

conditional release of an individual unlawfully detained—though release need not be the

exclusive remedy and is not the appropriate one in every case in which the writ is granted.”):

see also Bethancourt Soto, 2025 WL 2976572, at *9 (ordering immediate release); Patel,

2025 WL 3241212, at *3 (same); Flores Obando, 2025 WL 3452047, at *3 (same);

Kashranov, 2025 WL 3188399, at *8 (same).

Respondents will further be permanently enjoined from detaining Petitioner under 8

U.S.C. § 1225. See Bethancourt Soto, 2025 WL 2976572, at *9 (permanently enjoining

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respondents from detaining petitioner under § 1225 where petitioner did not file a motion for

temporary restraining order or motion for preliminary injunction); see also Maldonado, 2025

WL 2985256, at *7 (“The Court grants the writ of habeas corpus and orders Respondents to

release Petitioner within 24 hours. . . . Following Petitioner's release, Respondents are

permanently enjoined from rearresting or otherwise detaining Petitioner under §

1225(b)(2).”). If Respondents elect to later detain Petitioner Patel under 8 U.S.C. § 1226,

the Respondents must provide Petitioner Patel with notice and an opportunity to be heard at

a timely individualized bond hearing, where an Immigration Judge will assess whether he is

a danger or flight risk. Pate/, 2025 WL 3241212, at *3. A separate Order follows.

A \1talih

RobertD.. Mariani

United States District Judge

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