Landry

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

MIDDLE DISTRICT OF LOUISIANA

LEAGUE OF WOMEN VOTERS OF

LOUISIANA, ET AL.

CIVIL ACTION

VERSUS

NO. 25-413-JWD-SDJ

NANCY LANDRY, ET AL.

RULING AND ORDER

This matter comes before the Court on Defendants’ Motion to Stay Proceedings (“Motion

to Stay”) (Doc. 46) filed by Defendants Nancy Landry, David Matlock, Bruce Greenstein,1 Cade

Brumley, Susana Schowen, and Misti Cordell (collectively, “Defendants”). Plaintiffs League of

Women Voters of Louisiana, League of Women Voters of Louisiana Education Fund, Voice of

the Experienced, NAACP Louisiana State Conference, and Power Coalition for Equity and Justice

(collectively, “Plaintiffs”) oppose this motion. (Doc. 49.) Defendants filed a reply. (Doc. 52.)

Subsequently, Defendants also filed a Notice of Supplemental Authority (“Notice”) (Doc. 53).

Plaintiffs responded to this Notice, (Doc. 54), and Defendants filed a reply, (Doc. 55).

Oral argument is not necessary. The Court has carefully considered the law, the facts in the

record, and the arguments and submissions of the parties and is prepared to rule. For the following

reasons, Defendants’ Motion to Stay is denied.

I. RELEVANT BACKGROUND

A. Factual Background

The National Voter Registration Act (“NVRA”), 52 U.S.C. § 20501 et seq., allows

registration via a “mail voter registration application form” (“Federal Form”) or a state-developed

equivalent (“State Form”), see id. § 20505(a)(1)–(2). The Federal Form includes state-specific

1 In March 2025, Defendant Michael Harrington retired, and Bruce Greenstein assumed the role of Secretary of the

Louisiana Department of Health. (Doc. 46 at 1 n.1.) Greenstein has therefore been substituted for Harrington.

instructions, which “must be approved” by the Election Assistance Commission (“EAC”). Arizona

v. Inter Tribal Council of Ariz., Inc., 570 U.S. 1, 5–6 (2013) [hereinafter ITCA]. The Federal Form

“does not require documentary evidence of citizenship,” just attestation, “under penalty of perjury,

that [the applicant] is a citizen.” Id. at 4–5; accord 52 U.S.C. § 20508(b)(1)–(2). The State Form

“may require information the Federal Form does not.” ITCA, 570 U.S. at 12. But the State Form

“may require only such identifying information . . . as is necessary to enable the appropriate State

election official to assess” an applicant’s eligibility to register to vote. 52 U.S.C. § 20508(b)(1).

Recently, Louisiana’s Act 500 amended Louisiana Revised Statutes § 18:104 to require

applicants for voter registration to “include with [their] application[s] proof of United States

citizenship.” See La. R.S. § 18:104(D)(2). “Louisiana was required to inform the EAC” of this

change. (Doc. 46-1 at 2 (citing 11 C.F.R. § 9428.6(c)).) Louisiana (via Defendant Landry) has

therefore requested that the EAC approve revisions to the state-specific instructions included in

the Federal Form. (Id. (citing Doc. 46-3 at 2).) In her letter to the EAC, Defendant Landry

“explained that it would be extremely inefficient and burdensome for Louisiana to maintain dual

voter registration implementation and verification practices”—that is, to use different forms for

federal versus state elections. (Doc. 46-1 at 3 (citing Doc. 46-3 at 2); see also Doc. 49 at 3 (“To

avoid administering a complex, bifurcated registration and elections process, most states, including

Louisiana, accept and use the Federal From to register voters for state elections in addition to

federal elections.”).) She added that “it will be more efficient to amend the State [F]orm following

the approval by the EAC” of the requested revisions to the Federal Form. (Doc. 46-3 at 2.)

B. Procedural Background

Act 500 was approved on June 11, 2024. 2024 La. Sess. Law Serv. Act 500 (S.B. 436).

Consistent with the NVRA’s notice requirement, see 52 U.S.C. § 20510(b)(1)–(2), Plaintiffs sent

a letter to Defendant Landry on January 28, 2025, notifying her that Act 500’s requirement of

“documentary proof of citizenship to register and vote . . . violates the [NVRA],” (Doc. 1-1 at 3

(citing La. R.S. § 18:104(D)(2))). On January 30, 2025—two days after receiving notice, but more

than 200 days after Act 500 was approved—Louisiana requested that the EAC consider revisions

to the state-specific instructions included in the Federal Form. (See Doc. 46-3 at 2.)

Below is a timeline of relevant events since Louisiana’s initial request to the EAC:

▪ February 24, 2025: Louisiana modified its request to the EAC to include additional

revisions. (Doc. 46-4 at 5.)

▪ May 14, 2025: Plaintiffs filed their Complaint, alleging violation of the First and

Fourteenth Amendments, as well as NVRA Sections 6, 7, 8, and 9 (52 U.S.C.

§§ 20505(a)(1)–(2), 20506, 20507(a)(1), 20508(b)). (Doc. 1 at 42–48, ¶¶ 179–221.)

▪ May 17, 2025: Louisiana asked the EAC to pause review of the requested revisions “to

provide an opportunity for the State to submit additional [relevant] evidentiary

information.” (Doc. 46-4 at 5.)

▪ June 25, 2025: Louisiana asked the EAC to resume its review—and to review

additional requested revisions. (Id.)

▪ July 24, 2025: Defendants filed their Motion to Stay, arguing that the Court should stay

proceedings for 60 days in order to give the EAC time to respond to Louisiana’s

requested revisions. (Doc. 46-1 at 5.)

▪ September 11, 2025: The EAC informed Louisiana that it had rejected the requested

revisions. (Doc. 53 at 1.)

▪ September 12, 2025: Defendants filed their Notice of the EAC’s rejection. (Id.)

▪ September 26, 2025: Plaintiffs filed a response to Defendants’ Notice, arguing that the

EAC’s rejection effectively mooted Defendants’ Motion to Stay. (Doc. 54 at 2.) On the

same day, Louisiana requested that the EAC reconsider its rejection of one of the

requested revisions (Option 1(B)). (Doc. 55-1 at 2.)

▪ November 10, 2025: Louisiana asked the EAC to pause its review. (Doc. 58-1 at 2.)

▪ November 20, 2025: Louisiana requested that the EAC reconsider its rejection of the

other requested revision (Option 1(A)), citing new information “demonstrat[ing] the

[revision’s] necessity.” (Id. at 3.) The State also asked the EAC to resume review of

Option 1(B) and to render decisions as to both options. (Id.)

II. STANDARD

“The district court has a general discretionary power to stay proceedings before it in the

control of its docket and in the interests of justice.” McKnight v. Blanchard, 667 F.2d 477, 479

(5th Cir. 1982); accord Landis v. N. Am. Co., 299 U.S. 248, 254 (1936); Clinton v. Jones, 520 U.S.

681, 706 (1997). When deciding whether to grant a stay of proceedings, a court must “weigh

competing interests.” Landis, 299 U.S. at 254–55. Specifically, it must consider: (1) the hardship

and inequity which the movant will suffer if the stay is not granted, (2) the prejudice which the

non-movant will suffer if the stay is granted, and (3) judicial economy. Abrams v. Ochsner Clinic

Found., No. 17-1755, 2018 WL 2746046, at *3 (M.D. La. June 7, 2018) (citing Scott v. N. La.

Med. Ctr., No. 16-376, 2016 WL 8470184, at *13 (W.D. La. Sept. 9, 2016)); accord Falgoust v.

Microsoft Corp., No. 00-779, 2000 WL 462919, at *2 (E.D. La. Apr. 19, 2000).

A court must also be mindful of its “‘paramount’ obligation to timely hear the cases on its

docket.” SP Plus Corp. v. IPT, LCC, No. 16-2474, 2017 WL 1423882, at *2 (E.D. La. Mar. 23,

2017) (quoting Cherokee Nation of Okla. v. United States, 124 F.3d 1413, 1416 (Fed. Cir. 1997));

see also Ohio Env’t Council v. U.S. Dist. Ct., S. Dist. of Ohio, E. Div., 565 F.2d 393, 396 (6th Cir.

1977) (“[A] court must tread carefully in granting a stay of proceedings, since a party has a right

to a determination of its rights and liabilities without undue delay.”).

The movant bears the burden of showing that a stay is warranted. Magana v. Shore Constr.,

LLC, No. 17-1896, 2017 WL 2911353, at *3 (E.D. La. July 6, 2017) (citing, inter alia, Ruiz v.

Estelle, 666 F.2d 854, 856 (5th Cir. 1982)); see also Landis, 299 U.S. at 255; Wedgeworth v.

Fibreboard Corp., 706 F.2d 541, 545 (5th Cir. 1983); Coastal (Berm.) Ltd. v. E.W. Saybolt & Co.,

Inc., 761 F.2d 198, 203 n.6 (5th Cir. 1985) (“Generally, the moving party bears a heavy burden to

show why a stay should be granted absent statutory authorization . . . . Where a discretionary stay

is proposed, something close to genuine necessity should be the mother of its invocation.”).

Lastly, a stay must be of a moderate and definite duration. See McKnight, 667 F.2d at 479

(“[S]tay orders will be reversed when they are found to be immoderate or of an indefinite duration.”

(emphasis added)); see also In re Ramu Corp., 903 F.2d 312, 318 (5th Cir. 1990) (citing McKnight,

667 F.2d at 479).

III. DISCUSSION

A. Parties’ Arguments

1. Defendants’ Motion to Stay (Doc. 46)

Defendants have requested a stay of proceedings “to allow a reasonable amount of time for

the EAC administrative process to be completed.” (Doc. 46-1 at 5.) They argue that a stay “best

serves the interests of judicial economy” and that Plaintiffs will suffer no hardship or prejudice as

a result of a stay. (Id.)

Under the “hardship and inequity” prong, Defendants contend that, without a stay, they

“will be placed in the stange position of waiting for a determination from the EAC . . . while

simultaneously litigating the same EAC-contin[g]ent revisions.” (Id. at 8.) “That would burden

both the State Defendants and this Court.” (Id. (citing Strong ex rel. Tidewater, Inc. v. Taylor, No.

11-392, 2013 WL 818893, at *4 (E.D. La. Mar. 5, 2013)).)

Under the “prejudice” prong, Defendants aver that “Plaintiffs will not be prejudiced by a

60-day stay” because (1) it was “reasonably foreseeable” that Defendants would seek a stay

pending the EAC’s decision of the requested revisions to the state-specific instructions included

in the Federal Form, (id. at 9 (citing United States v. FEDCON Joint Venture, No. 16-13022, 2017

WL 897852, at *3 (E.D. La. Mar. 7, 2017))), and (2) “short delays are not prejudicial,” (id. (citing

Falgoust, 2000 WL 462919, at *2)). Defendants add that, since the effective date for the requested

revisions is January 15, 2026, Plaintiffs are not currently suffering any injury. (Id.) In other words,

Defendants say, “a stay does nothing more than preserve the status quo.” (Id.)

Lastly, under the “judicial economy” prong, Defendants note that Louisiana “has asked for

a quick decision” from the EAC, “as ‘[i]t is not feasible for [the State] to maintain a dual voter

registration system.’” (Id. at 7 (quoting Doc. 46-3 at 2).) Defendants expect that the EAC’s “quick

decision” will resolve some issues underlying the instant case, such that “[f]orcing litigation at this

point would waste everyone’s time and resources.” (Id. (citing, inter alia, FEDCON, 2017 WL

897852, at *3).) Defendants argue that the “public interest would be better served by conserving

judicial and party resources” here. (Id. at 8 (quoting Order (Doc. 752) at 1, Clark v. Edwards, No.

3:86-cv-00435 (M.D. La. July 17, 2025) (deGravelles, J.)).) They also suggest that a stay would

be “consistent with” this Court’s approach in other cases where the legal landscape is shifting or

may soon shift. (Id. at 7–8 (citing, inter alia, Order (Doc. 752) at 1, Clark, No. 3:86-cv-00435).).

2. Plaintiffs’ Opposition (Doc. 49)

Plaintiffs counter that the three prongs “all weigh strongly against a stay of proceedings.”2

(Doc. 49 at 2 (emphasis added).) Under the “hardship and inequity” prong, Plaintiffs note that

Defendants’ requested revisions are “unlikely to change anything” and “may not be resolved”

2 Plaintiffs also posit that the Court should consider a fourth factor—the public interest—“in determining whether a

stay of proceedings is appropriate.” (Doc. 49 at 10 (citing La. State Conf. of NAACP v. Louisiana, 495 F. Supp. 3d

400, 419 (M.D. La. 2020) (deGravelles, J.)).) For their part, Defendants fold “public interest” into the “judicial

economy” prong. (See Doc. 46-1 at 8.) Notably, the case which Plaintiffs have cited in support of their position dealt

with a stay pending appeal. See La. State Conf. of NAACP, 495 F. Supp. 3d at 419. A four-factor test—which includes

public interest—governs motions for stay pending appeal. See, e.g., Hilton v. Braunskill, 481 U.S. 770, 776 (1987)

(reciting the test). But “courts do not customarily employ this ‘four-factor test’ in evaluating motions for stays of

entire proceedings.” SP Plus, 2017 WL 1423882, at *2. Rather, “courts use a similar but distinct balancing test.” Id.

The Court agrees, however, that “public interest” can sometimes, as here, surface in the context of one or another

relevant factor. See, e.g, Ohio Env’t Council, 565 F.2d at 396 (“[T]he burden is on the party seeking the stay to show

that there is pressing need for delay, and that neither the other party nor the public will suffer harm from entry of the

order.” (emphasis added)); Rodriguez v. Grand Prairie Indep. Sch. Dist., No. 13-1788, 2014 WL 4055364, at *2 (N.D.

Tex. Aug. 15, 2014) (considering the public interest in a speedy resolution of a Voting Rights Act case).

within 60 days. (Id. at 10.) They stress that the EAC will probably deny Defendants’ requests, (id.

(citing, inter alia, Kobach v. U.S. Election Assistance Comm’n, 772 F.3d 1183, 1189 (10th Cir.

2014))), and that, regardless, the EAC’s decision “has no bearing on Defendants’ ability to respond

to Plaintiffs’ Complaint or proceed with discovery,” (id. at 10–11). At most, Plaintiffs say, the

EAC’s decision “only affects some of Plaintiffs’ claims.” (Id. at 11 & n.6.) Thus, there is no risk

of premature litigation. (Id. at 11.)

Under the “prejudice” prong, Plaintiffs explain that a delay would hamper their “ability to

prepare for upcoming elections.” (Id.) Specifically, “Plaintiffs have already diverted”—and are

continuing to divert—resources away from their “core activities” and toward (1) “gather[ing]

information from registrars and other public officials about what Act 500 requires” and

(2) “educat[ing] constituents and other community members about how to register to vote under

Act 500’s new proof of citizenship requirement.” (Id. (citing Doc. 49-1 at ¶¶ 5, 7, 10).) Plaintiffs

also contend that Defendants have not demonstrated that they will suffer some particular hardship

(or prejudice) if the Court denies the Motion to Stay. (Id. at 12–13.) There is not even a risk of

unnecessary litigation, because the EAC’s decision cannot resolve many of Plaintiffs’ claims. (Id.)

Finally, Plaintiffs suggest that whatever hardship Defendants’ endure is at least partly self-inflicted

because Defendants delayed submitting—and then stalled—their request to the EAC. (Id. at 13

(citing, inter alia, State v. Biden, 10 F.4th 538, 558 (5th Cir. 2021)).)

Plaintiffs reiterate that “[a]ny action by the EAC will not obviate Plaintiffs’ claims. Indeed,

were the EAC to grant Defendants’ request, it would only spur further litigation.” (Id. at 14

(internal citations omitted) (citing League of Women Voters of U.S. v. Newby, 838 F.3d 1, 9–12

(D.C. Cir. 2016)).) Plaintiffs warn that a stay “would not only prolong [their] injuries” but could

also “impair this [C]ourt’s ability to issue effective relief later.” (Id. (quoting Order on Motion to

Stay (Doc. 40) at 3, Petteway v. Galveston Cnty., No. 3:22-cv-00057 (S.D. Tex. May 24, 2022)

(citing Merrill v. Milligan, 142 S. Ct. 879, 879 (2022) (Kavanaugh, J., concurring))).) Plaintiffs

note the approaching deadlines for state and federal elections occurring in 2026. (Id. at 14–15.)

They explain that they “will have been prejudiced well before Defendant Landry’s proposed

effective date of January 15, 2026[,] for the Federal Form changes,” because they need to “plan

and expend resources for their voter registration activities . . . well in advance.” (Id. at 15 (citing

Doc. 1 at ¶¶ 19, 36; Doc. 49-1 at ¶¶ 7, 9, 11).)

Lastly, under the “judicial economy” prong, Plaintiffs emphasize once more that, because

the EAC’s decision will not resolve the issues underlying the instant case, a delay will merely

prolong litigation and, in the process, waste judicial resources. (Id. at 16.) Plaintiffs fault

Defendants for “creat[ing] a parallel forum to complicate proceedings in this [Court].” (Id. at 18.)

They add that “public interest” weighs in favor of denying the stay, because “‘compressing the

amount of time available to litigate this case will only make it more difficult for both the [C]ourt

and the parties to ultimately achieve a just and lawful result’ ahead of the next federal election.”

(Id. (quoting Order on Motion to Stay (Doc. 40) at 3, Petteway, No. 3:22-cv-00057).)

3. Defendants’ Reply (Doc. 52)

Defendants note that Louisiana only requested that the EAC consider including “additional

requirements of a ‘unique immigration identifier’ number” or, alternatively, “‘sex’ and ‘mother’s

maiden name’” in the state-specific instructions included in the Federal Form. (Doc. 52 at 2.) They

argue that “a short 60-day stay makes especially good sense to see the result of [this] request” to

the EAC, because the result “will substantially alter the landscape of this case.” (Id. at 3.)

Defendants add that, if approved, the EAC revisions likely will not become effective until January

15, 2026. (Id.) “To litigate—and worse, to adjudicate—this case on dual-track contingencies

would risk misleading the public about what requirements do (or do not) exist yet . . . .” (Id.; see

also id. at 4 (“[T]he purpose of a short, status-quo stay is not to end the case; it is to avoid

duplicative tracks while the EAC has the opportunity to . . . clarify or narrow what warrants

adjudication now.”).)

Defendants repeat that “all factors support a stay.” (Id.) They insist that Plaintiffs’ asserted

hardship and prejudice “are overstated,” because Defendants will not require prospective voters to

include proof of U.S. citizenship in their applications for registration during the stay. (Id. at 5–6.)

On the other hand, Defendants claim that they will suffer hardship and prejudice if forced to

“litigate Federal Form questions while the EAC considers the same subject.” (Id. at 6.) On this

note, Defendants contend that the “judicial economy” prong also weighs in their favor, maintaining

that “[a]ny agency response . . . fixes the posture, focuses what is fit for decision, and reduces the

risk of re-briefing.” (Id.) Thus, Defendants say, a “modest and definite” stay of 60 days is

warranted. (Id. at 7 (citing, Landis, 299 U.S. at 254–55; McKnight, 667 F.2d at 479).)

4. Parties’ Exchange re: Defendants’ Notice (Docs. 53–55)

In September 2025, the EAC notifed Defendant Landry that it had rejected the requested

revisions to the state-specific instructions included in the Federal Form. (Doc. 53 at 1.)

Specifically, the EAC found that the requested revisions imposed additional requirements for

registration using the Federal Form. (See Doc. 54-1 at 6.) In a 2–2 vote, the EAC rejected the first

requested revision (Option 1(A)) and “did not independently consider” the second requested

revision (Option 1(B)). (Id.) The EAC allowed Louisiana to request independent consideration of

Option 1(B). (Id.)

Plaintiffs argue that, because the EAC has now rendered a decision, Defendants’ request

for a stay is effectively moot. (See Doc. 54 at 2 (“Defendants’ sole purported justification for

asking this Court to stay proceedings was that it would serve judicial economy . . . . The EAC has

now made a decision.”).) Defendants respond that, while the EAC rejected the requested revisions,

it “did not independently consider” Option 1(B) and even “invited” Louisiana to request

independent consideration. (Doc. 55 at 1 (quoting Doc. 54-1 at 6).) Louisiana so requested on

Sepember 26, 2025—the same day as Plaintiffs responded to the Notice. (Id. at 2 (citing Doc. 55-

1 at 2–3).) Defendants argue that the 60-day stay is warranted given the EAC’s reconsideration of

Option 1(B). (Id.) Separately, on November 20, 2025, Louisiana lodged another request for

consideration of Option 1(A). (Doc. 58 at 1.)

B. Law & Analysis

Preliminarily, the Court notes that the EAC’s rejection of the requested revisions, (see Doc.

54-1 at 5–6), did not moot Defendants’ stay request, (cf. Doc. 54 at 2), because the EAC did not

independently consider Option 1(B) and even allowed Louisiana to request independent

consideration of this option, (see Doc. 54-1 at 6). Louisiana did so. (Doc. 55-1 at 2–3.) But because

Defendants have not met their burden of showing that a stay of proceedings is warranted here, the

Court now denies the Motion to Stay. See Magana, 2017 WL 2911353, at *3.

For the most part, Defendants’ arguments rely on the assertion that the EAC’s decision to

approve or reject Louisiana’s requested revisions will simplify the issues underlying the instant

case. Crucially, though, Defendants cannot guarantee that the EAC will decide Louisiana’s

requested revisions within the proposed 60-day stay period. (See Doc. 46-1 at 4–5 (expressing

uncertainty about when the EAC would decide Louisiana’s initial request)); see also Magana,

2017 WL 2911353, at *4 (“[E]ven if the Court were to grant a stay for a limited period of time,

there would still be no guarantee that a settlement with the [Department of Labor] would be

reached during that specific time period.”). Nor can Defendants guarantee that the EAC will decide

Louisiana’s requested revisions in a way that simplifies litigation here. (See Doc. 54-1 at 6

(rejecting Louisiana’s requested revisions but explaining that the EAC “did not independently

consider Option 1(B)”); Doc. 55-1 at 2–3 (requesting reconsideration of Option 1(B)); Doc. 58-1

at 2–3 (requesting reconsideration of Option 1(A))); see also Kobach, 772 F.3d at 1189 (noting

that the EAC rejected similar requests for revisions from Arizona and Kansas). Thus, the Court is

not persuaded that the proposed stay will be fruitful.3

1. Hardship and Inequity Imposed on Movant if Stay Denied

But, having weighed the competing interests, see Landis, 299 U.S. at 254–55; see also

Abrams, 2018 WL 2746046, at *3, the Court finds that a stay would not be warranted even if

Defendants could guarantee a definitive answer from the EAC within 60 days, (cf. Doc. 46-1 at 4–

5). First, Defendants have not adequately demonstrated that they will suffer hardship and inequity

if the Court denies their Motion to Stay. (See Doc. 46-1 at 8.) They have merely voiced a general

concern about being “burden[ed]” by litigating “EAC-contin[g]ent revisions” while “waiting for a

determination from the EAC.”4 (Doc. 46-1 at 8.)

3 The Court also observes that Defendants have already gotten more than they initially requested. That is, more than

60 days have elapsed since the briefing on Defendants’ Motion to Stay. Given this fact, and given Defendants’ inability

to guarantee a timely response from the EAC, their continued insistence that a 60-day stay is warranted begs the

question whether they are really seeking a moderate and definite stay. See Wedgeworth, 706 F.2d at 545 (“[B]efore

granting a stay pending the resolution of another [matter], the court must carefully consider the time reasonably

expected for resolution . . . in light of the principle that ‘stay orders will be reversed when they are found to be

immoderate or of an idefinite duration.’” (quoting McKnight, 667 F.2d at 479)).

4 Defendants cite Strong ex rel. Tidewater, Inc. v. Taylor in support of their argument under the “hardship and inequity”

prong. (Doc. 46-1 at 8 (citing Strong, 2013 WL 818893, at *4).) Strong was a markedly different case, dealing with

shareholder derivative litigation. Strong, 2013 WL 818893, at *1. It was also in a markedly different posture: The

court had already dismissed the plaintiff’s claims without prejudice. Id. But most notably, Strong’s reasoning and

result are antithetical to Defendants’ argument here. Despite substantial hardships, including the possibility that the

plaintiff would have to file another action and that such action might be time-barred, the court in Strong denied the

plaintiff’s motion to stay proceedings pending the results of a board investigation. Id. at *3. The court found that, prior

to dismissal of the case, the plaintiff “had significant time” to demand an investigation by the board and failed to do

so. Id. It also found that “allowing th[e] suit to languish” while the board considered the plaintiff’s demand would

prejudice the defendants. Id. at *4. Lastly, the court determined that a stay pending the board’s investigation—the

effect of which was uncertain—would “disserve[]” judicial economy. Id. at *5.

This argument is non-specific. See, e.g., Ashford Inc. v. Unite Here., No. 15-262, 2015 WL

11121019, at *2 (N.D. Tex. May 12, 2015) (denying a motion to stay proceedings pending decision

of, inter alia, a Rule 12(b)(1) motion, explaining that the movant “ha[d] not carried its burden of

showing it w[ould] suffer hardship or inequity . . . and instead ha[d] only detailed the usual

inconveniences and costs that are associated with discovery practice”); see also Magana, 2017

WL 2911353, at *5 (“Defendants have not carried their burden to demonstrate that the incurrence

of litigation expenses associated with the instant action while cooperating with the [Department of

Labor’s] investigation constitutes undue hardship . . . .”); Gibbs v. Plain Green, LLC, 331 F. Supp.

3d 518, 527 (E.D. Va. 2018) (“[T]he near-certainty of re-litigating complex matters does not alone

justify a stay.”). It also does not account for the fact that this case is still in its infancy,5 or that

narrower remedies (e.g., a stay of certain discovery) exist. (See also Doc. 49 at 10–11.) Lastly, the

Court observes that Defendants’ argument under the “hardship and inequity” prong is

indistinguishable from its argument about judicial economy. See also Brunswick TKTKonnect,

LLC v. Kavanaugh, No. 22-4, 2023 WL 8582592, at *2 (W.D. Ky. Dec. 11, 2023) (“Defendants’

motion puts forth little in the way of showing undue hardship or inequity, and rests almost entirely

on the notion that judicial economy warrants a stay of proceedings.”).

2. Judicial Economy

The Court will therefore address the “judicial economy” prong next. While Defendants

insist that the EAC’s decision will simplify litigation here, they do not explain how they expect it

to do so.6 (See Doc. 46-1 at 6–8; Doc. 52 at 5); see also Magana, 2017 WL 2911353, at *3

5 Defendants have not even filed their Answer to the Complaint. (See Doc. 40 (extending the time to file to July 24,

2025, on which date Defendants filed this Motion to Stay).)

6 Defendants comment on the inefficiency of maintaining different federal and state registration forms and systems,

but they nowhere suggest, for example, that they will not seek to revise the State Form if the EAC rejects their

requested revisions to the Federal Form. (See, e.g., Doc. 46-1 at 7.)

(explaining that the movant “bears the burden to show that a stay is warranted”). Indeed, Plaintiffs

are adamant that “the proceedings . . . do not depend on the EAC’s determination,” because any

decision by the EAC will not affect the bulk of Plaintiffs’ claims (i.e., the vagueness challenge and

the challenges to the State Form). (See Doc. 49 at 10–11); see also Magana, 2017 WL 2911353,

at *5 (Where the Department of Labor was already investigating the defendants for compliance

with the Fair Labor Standards Act: “Defendants have not presented any evidence of the DOL’s

findings or the contents of a potential settlement. Moreover, Defendants have not shown that the

DOL settlement would render most, much less all, of the potential opt-in plaintiffs’ claims moot

such that it would be inefficient to proceed with the instant litigation at this time.”). Having

reviewed the Complaint, the Court is inclined to agree with Plaintiffs. (See Doc. 1 at 42–48,

¶¶ 179–221.)

Relatedly, the Court disagrees with Defendants’ assertion that granting a stay here would

be “consistent with” granting a stay in a case where the legal landscape is shifting or may soon

shift. (See Doc. 46-1 at 7–8 (citing, inter alia, Order (Doc. 752) at 1, Clark, No. 3:86-cv-00435).)

Defendants have not shown that the EAC is likely to deviate from its past decisions. See, e.g.,

Kobach, 772 F.3d at 1189 (noting that the EAC rejected similar requests for revisions from Arizona

and Kansas). Nor have Defendants explained how deviation would affect the instant case. See also

Wrenn v. District of Columbia, 179 F. Supp. 3d 135, 139 (D.D.C. 2016) (deeming arguments about

the effects of a pending appellate court decision “highly speculative”). For their part, Plaintiffs

anticipate that, “were the EAC to grant Defendants’ request, it would only spur further litigation.”

(Doc. 49 at 14.)

Plaintiffs also express concern that a stay will “undermine” judicial economy by

prolonging inevitable litigation. (Id. at 16.) The Court agrees. See also Gibbs, 331 F. Supp. 3d at

526 (“Although denying a stay can risk waste, the opposite can also be true: [G]ranting a stay may

waste judicial resources.”).

3. Prejudice to Non-Movant if Stay Granted

Third, the Court considers the “prejudice” prong. Plaintiffs explain that they “have already

diverted”—and are continuing to divert—resources away from their “core activities” and toward

ascertaining what Act 500 will require. (Doc. 49 at 11.) Likewise, they are currently using

resources to “educate constituents and other community members” about registration “under Act

500’s new proof of citizenship requirement.” (Id. (citing Doc. 49-1 at ¶¶ 5, 7, 10).) Planning voter

registration activities and allocating resources to such activities must occur “well in advance” of

Louisiana’s proposed effective date for the Federal Form revisions—January 15, 2026. (Id. at 15

(citing Doc. 1 at ¶¶ 19, 36; Doc. 49-1 at ¶¶ 7, 9, 11).) The fact that no new registration requirements

will go into effect before January 15, 2026, is therefore irrelevant. (Cf. Doc. 52 at 5–6.)

The Court disagrees with Defendants’ argument that a stay would not be prejudicial

because it was reasonably foreseeable that Defendants would seek it. (See Doc. 46-1 at 9 (citing

FEDCON, 2017 WL 897852, at *3).) The fact that a defendant’s litigation strategy is foreseeable

does not make its effects any less prejudicial. And the only authority which Defendants cite in

support of their contention—United States v. FEDCON Joint Venture—is easily distinguishable.

See 2017 WL 897852, at *1–3. In that case, the parties had entered a sub-contract, the terms of

which “explicitly provide[d] for a stay of all litigation” in order to allow for a dispute resolution

process to run its course. Id. at *2. In granting the stay, the court noted that delay was prejudicial

but not “unduly” so, because it was contemplated by the parties when they entered into the sub-

contract. See id. at *3. Here, by contrast, Plaintiffs did not agree to a stay ahead of time, and the

prejudice extends beyond mere delay.

The Court also disagrees with Defendants’ argument that, ipso facto, “short delays are not

prejudicial.” (See Doc. 46-1 at 11 (citing Falgoust, 2000 WL 462919, at *2).) Notably, Falgoust

v.Microsoft Corp. does not support Defendants’ position. See 2000 WL 462919, at *2. There, the

court acknowledged that the “slight delay” was prejudicial. Id. It just was not so prejudicial as to

tip the balance in the plaintiffs’ favor. See id. (“Plaintiffs have failed to show any significant

prejudice they would suffer, beyond the slight delay pending the [Judicial Panel on Multidistrict

Litigation’s] decision.” (emphasis added)).

Lastly, the Court notes its agreement with Plaintiffs that a stay would “prolong” Plaintiffs’

injuries and could “impair this [C]ourt’s ability to issue effective relief later.” (Doc. 49 at 14

(quoting Order on Motion to Stay (Doc. 40) at 3, Petteway, No. 3:22-cv-00057)); see also Voice

of the Experienced v. Ardoin, No. 23-331, 2023 WL 7367541, at *2 (M.D. La. Oct. 6, 2023) (In

the context of a motion to stay discovery: “With such a relatively short time before the relevant

election, any delay in litigation could harm Plaintiffs’ ability to obtain relief . . . .”). Altogether,

then, Defendants have not shown that the “hardship and inequity” and “judicial economy” prongs

militate in favor of a stay. Plaintiffs, on the other hand, have shown that they would be prejudiced

by a stay. Thus, the “competing interests” weigh against a stay. See Landis, 299 U.S. at 254–55.

IV. CONCLUSION

Accordingly,

IT IS ORDERED that Defendants’ Motion to Stay Proceedings (Doc. 46) is DENIED.

Signed in Baton Rouge, Louisiana, on December 8, 2025.

S

JUDGE JOHN W. deGRAVELLES

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

MIDDLE DISTRICT OF LOUISIANA