Flynn

IN THE

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE CENTRAL DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS

SPRINGFIELD DIVISION

CHARLES FLYNN,

Plaintiff,

v. Case No. 3:25-cv-03218-JEH

ILLINOIS DEPARTMENT OF

CORRECTIONS, et al.,

Defendants.

Merit Review Order

Plaintiff, proceeding pro se and currently incarcerated at Lawrence

Correctional Center, filed a Second Amended Complaint under 42 U.S.C. § 1983

alleging violations of his constitutional rights at Taylorville Correctional Center

(“Taylorville”) and Jacksonville Correctional Center (“Jacksonville”). (Doc. 10).

I

This case is before the Court for a merit review of Plaintiff’s Second

Amended Complaint pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915A. The Court must “screen”

Plaintiff’s Second Amended Complaint and dismiss any legally insufficient claim

or the entire action if warranted. § 1915A. A claim is legally insufficient if it “(1) is

frivolous, malicious, or fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted; or

(2) seeks monetary relief from a defendant who is immune from such relief.” Id. In

reviewing the Second Amended Complaint, the Court accepts the factual

allegations as true, liberally construing them in the Plaintiff’s favor. Turley v.

Rednour, 729 F.3d 645, 649 (7th Cir. 2013). However, conclusory statements and

labels are insufficient. Enough facts must be provided to “state a claim for relief

that is plausible on its face.” Alexander v. United States, 721 F.3d 418, 422 (7th Cir.

2013) (citation omitted).

II

Plaintiff files suit against Jeremy Bonnett, Ryan Nothnagle, Steven

Campbell, Rich Stempinski, Correctional Counselors Yates and Lanthrop, Kristine

Hunt, Debbie Ross, Correctional Officer Stelbrink, Jonathan Van Durme, Latoya

Hughes, and unknown control officers, walk officers, mailroom processor

employees, and shift supervisors.

Plaintiff alleges Defendant Kristine Hunt, a notary public at Taylorville,

notarized three motions for reduction or revocation of fines for Plaintiff to file in

his criminal cases in Menard, Mason, and Sangamon counties on May 10, 2024.

Plaintiff alleges he paid for the postage to mail the motions from his prison trust

fund and placed the envelopes in the outgoing institutional mail receptacle at

house six control. Plaintiff states the Menard County Circuit Clerk received his

motion, but the Circuit Clerks in Mason and Sangamon counties did not.

On August 23, 2024, Plaintiff asked Defendant Hunt to notarize a motion for

reduction or revocation of fines to re-send to the Mason and Sangamon County

Circuit Clerks. Plaintiff alleges he addressed the envelopes, used standard

postage, and placed them in the institutional outgoing mail receptacle at house six

control, but once again, the Circuit Clerks did not receive his motions.

On August 23, 2024, Plaintiff also obtained an application for waiver of court

fees from Defendant Hunt. He filed the application with the Menard County

Circuit Clerk on September 6, 2024. On September 17, 2024, Menard County

Circuit Judge Michael Atterberry denied Plaintiff’s motion for reduction or

revocation of fines. Plaintiff alleges his motion was denied because Defendant

Hunt neglected to give him an order for waiver of court fees to include with his

application.

On an unspecified date, Plaintiff was transferred to Jacksonville

Correctional Center. On September 23, 2024, Plaintiff went to the law library at

Jacksonville and obtained an order for waiver of court fees from the librarian,

Defendant Debbie Ross. Plaintiff alleges he asked Defendant Ross to make copies

of a motion for reconsideration to send to the Menard County Circuit Clerk.

Plaintiff alleges Defendant Ross insisted that he did not need to include a copy of

the order would his motion for reconsideration and initially refused to give him a

copy. Plaintiff alleges he left the law library and found Defendant Correctional

Officer Stelbrink, who escorted Plaintiff back to the library so Defendant Ross

could notarize his motion. Plaintiff alleges he placed his motion for

reconsideration in the institutional outgoing mail receptacle on September 23,

2024, but the Menard County Circuit Clerk never received it.

Plaintiff filed a grievance (K12-1124-2654) on November 13, 2024. Defendant

Correctional Counselor Lanthrop allegedly informed Plaintiff the grievance was

“outside jurisdiction and should be sent to A.R.B.” (Doc. 10 at p. 5). Defendant

Correctional Counselor Yates allegedly denied any remedy. Defendant Chief

Administrative Officer (“CAO”) Campbell and Defendant IDOC Director Hughes

concurred. Defendant Administrative Review Board (“ARB”) member Nothnagle

denied the grievance stating: “There was nothing in grievant[’]s trust fund that

indicates money was taken out for postage. Per mailroom grievant did not submit

Doc 0296 form proving grievant paid for postage.” Id. at pp. 5-6.

Plaintiff also alleges he filed an emergency grievance (K17-0924-0398)

regarding the incident in the law library involving Defendant Ross. Defendant

CAO Rich Stempinski agreed that Plaintiff’s grievance was emergent and

expedited his grievance. Defendant Grievance Officer Jonathan Van Durme

denied his grievance, and Defendant Stempinski concurred. Defendant ARB

member Jeremy Bonnett denied the grievance, and Defendant Hughes concurred.

Regarding the unidentified Defendants, Plaintiff states that when the shift

officers arrive for their 11:00 p.m. to 7:00 a.m. shift at Taylorville and Jacksonville,

they open the institutional outgoing mail receptable, remove the mail, and bag it

for pick up. Unidentified walk officers pick up the mail for delivery to the

mailroom to be processed by the mailroom employees. Plaintiff alleges that the

shift supervisors are in charge of overseeing all officer duties and activities and

ensuring that all institutional policies and procedures are followed.

III

Plaintiff alleges his First Amendment right of access to the courts was

violated because mail he sent to the Mason and Sangamon County Circuit Clerks

was stolen. “The Supreme Court has recognized that prisoners have protected

First Amendment interests in both sending and receiving mail. Prison regulations

or practices that affect a prisoner’s legal mail are of particular concern because of

the potential for interference with a prisoner’s right of access to the courts.” Rowe

v. Shake, 196 F.3d 778, 782 (7th Cir. 1999) (citing Lewis v. Casey, 518 U.S. 343 (1996))

(internal citations omitted). Plaintiff names unknown walk officers, mailroom

processor employees, and shift supervisors as Defendants and describes how mail

is processed at Taylorville and Jacksonville, but it is unclear who Plaintiff believes

is responsible for stealing the mail he sent to Mason and Sangamon counties.

Plaintiff fails to state a First Amendment claim.

Plaintiff’s allegations are insufficient to state a claim against Defendants

Hunt and Ross. Plaintiff alleges Defendant Hunt gave him an application for

waiver of court fees but neglected to give him an order to include with his

application. As a result, his motion for reduction or revocation of fines was denied.

Neglecting to give Plaintiff a copy of an order is not a constitutional violation.

Plaintiff also fails to state a cognizable claim against Defendant Ross, who initially

refused to give him a copy of the order for waiver of court fees.

Plaintiff alleges Defendants Correctional Counselors Lanthrop and Yates,

Grievance Officer Van Durme, CAOs Campbell and Stempinski, IDOC Director

Hughes, and ARB members Nothnagle and Bonnett are liable for denying or

concurring with the denial of his grievances. To the extent Plaintiff is alleging that

Defendants mishandled his grievances, he fails to state a claim. The denial or

mishandling of a grievance is not enough to establish a constitutional violation.

Owens v. Hinsley, 635 F.3d 950, 953 (7th Cir. 2011). “[A] high-level official typically

cannot be roped into a constitutional claim merely by denying a grievance

concerning a ‘completed act of misconduct.’” Smith v. Engelage, 2020 WL 5369886,

at *4 (S.D. Ill. Sept. 8, 2020) (quoting George v. Smith, 507 F.3d 605, 609-10 (7th Cir.

2007)); see also Aguilar v. Gaston-Camara, 861 F.3d 626, 633 (7th Cir. 2017)

(“reject[ing] the notion that ‘everyone who knows about a prisoner’s problems will

incur § 1983 liability.”) (quoting Burks v. Raemisch, 555 F.3d 592, 595 (7th Cir. 2009)).

Plaintiff’s Second Amended Complaint is DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE

for failure to state a claim under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) and §

1915A. Any further amendment would be futile because Plaintiff has had multiple

opportunities to state an actionable claim and failed to do so.

IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED:

1) Plaintiff's Second Amended Complaint is DISMISSED WITH

PREJUDICE for failure to state a claim under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure

12(b)(6) and § 1915A. The Court finds any further amendment would be futile.

The Clerk is directed to close this case and enter judgment.

2) This dismissal may count as one of Plaintiff's three allotted strikes

pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(g). The Clerk is directed to record Plaintiff's strike

in the three-strike log.

3) Although this case has been dismissed, Plaintiff remains

responsible for paying the remainder of the $350 filing fee. (See d/e 7/24/2025).

4) If Plaintiff wishes to appeal this dismissal, he must file a notice of

appeal with this Court within 30 days of the entry of judgment. Fed. R. App. P.

4(a). A motion for leave to appeal in forma pauperis MUST identify the issues

Plaintiff will present on appeal to assist the Court in determining whether the

appeal is taken in good faith. See Fed. R. App. P. 24(a)(1)(c); see also Celske v.

Edwards, 164 F.3d 396, 398 (7th Cir. 1999) (stating that an appellant should be

allowed to submit a statement of the grounds for appealing so that the district

judge "can make a reasonable assessment of the issue of good faith"); Walker v.

O’Brien, 216 F.3d 626, 632 (7th Cir. 2000) (providing that a good-faith appeal is

an appeal that "a reasonable person could suppose . . . has some merit" from a

legal perspective). If Plaintiff does choose to appeal, he will be liable for the

$605 appellate filing fee regardless of the outcome of the appeal.

It is so ordered.

Entered: December 8, 2025

s/Jonathan E. Hawley

U.S. District Judge