Risper

IN THE

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE CENTRAL DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS

SPRINGFIELD DIVISION

BRODERICK RISPER,

Plaintiff,

v. Case No. 3:24-cv-03092-JEH

LATOTA HUGHES, et al.

Defendants.

Order

Plaintiff, proceeding pro se and presently incarcerated at Western Illinois

Correctional Center, brought the present lawsuit alleging a claim pursuant to the

Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act, 42 U.S.C. § 2000cc–1(a), and

a First Amendment free exercise claim pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. The matter

comes before this Court for ruling on the Defendants’ Motion for Summary

Judgment. (Doc. 20). For the reasons stated, infra, the motion is granted in part and

denied in part.

I

Summary judgment should be granted “if the movant shows that there is

no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment

as a matter of law.” FED. R. CIV. P. 56(a). All facts must be construed in the light

most favorable to the non-moving party, and all reasonable inferences must be

drawn in his favor. Ogden v. Atterholt, 606 F.3d 355, 358 (7th Cir. 2010). The party

moving for summary judgment must show the lack of a genuine issue of material

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fact. Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323 (1986). In order to be a “genuine”

issue, there must be more than “some metaphysical doubt as to the material facts.”

Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 586 (1986). “Only

disputes over facts that might affect the outcome of the suit under the governing

law will properly preclude the entry of summary judgment.” Anderson v. Liberty

Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986).

II

Plaintiff has been incarcerated at Western Illinois Correctional Center

(“Western”) since December 29, 2021. UMF 1. Defendants worked at the facility in

the following capacities: Defendant Greene was the warden; and, Defendant

Llewellyn was the chaplain. UMF 3, 4.

Plaintiff practices the Baptist faith. UMF 7. As part of his religious practice,

he obtained a chain and a religious medallion while incarcerated at Menard

Correctional Center. UMF 5. Plaintiff testified that the medallion depicted the

“Virgin Mary, Mother of Jesus,” which he has “always recognized as a symbol of

my Christian religion.” Pl.’s Dep. 15:21; (Doc. 25 at 2). Because Menard officials

would not permit Plaintiff to wear the chain and medallion on the transfer bus, he

placed the items in his property box in preparation for his transfer to Western. Pl.’s

Dep. 12:10-15.

The applicable rules1 permit inmates to possess “up to two traditionally

accepted religious symbols or religious symbols which have been authorized by

the Religious Practice Advisory Board and which represent their designated

1 Defendants reference rules in a facility handbook. UMF 10. Defendants did not provide a copy

of that handbook, and Defendant Llewellyn’s recitation of the contents of that handbook is not

admissible. Fed. R. Evid. 802. Therefore, the Court’s reference to the applicable rules is limited to

the Illinois Administrative Code. Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c)(4).

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faith,” including medals, medallions, scapulas, or prayer beads. 20 Ill. Admin.

Code § 425.90. Officials maintain authority to prohibit otherwise permissible items

they deem a threat to safety or security. Id. § 425.90(c). Medals or medallions must

comply with size requirements, may not exceed a designated value, may not

contain precious gems or stones, and “shall not be of a design that could be used

as a weapon or to conceal contraband.” Id.

The medallion and chain were not in Plaintiff’s property box when he

retrieved it at Western. UMF 11. Defendant Llewellyn refused to authorize

Plaintiff’s possession of the medallion and chain in July 2022 because he opined

that the medallion depicted an image traditionally associated with the Catholic,

not Baptist, faith. UMF 12; Pl.’s Dep. 37:13-14. When he had ordered it, Plaintiff

was unaware of the medallion’s association with Catholicism. UMF 15. Plaintiff

voluntarily exchanged the medallion for a cross in August 2022; he did not seek

Defendant Llewellyn’s permission prior to doing so. UMF 13, 14. Defendant

Llewellyn initially denied Plaintiff’s possession of the cross. UMF 14.

Plaintiff met with Defendant Llewellyn on December 6, 2022, where they

discussed the medallion and Defendant Llewellyn’s offer to assist Plaintiff if

Plaintiff desired to convert to Catholicism. UMF 15, 16. Plaintiff declined the latter.

UMF 16. Regarding the cross, Plaintiff testified that Defendant Llewellyn stated

that “everybody was wearing the chains for show…and he said that I would have

to attend his service for at least five months and then he’ll approve [the cross].”

Pl.’s Dep. 36:18-22. Plaintiff complied, and Defendant Llewellyn sent him written

approval for the chain and cross. UMF 17. Plaintiff never received the items. UMF

18.

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Prison staff eventually destroyed chain and cross. Id. A non-defendant

prison official approved Plaintiff’s possession of the cross and offered to reimburse

him for the one that was destroyed. UMF 19.

III

A

The Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act (“RLUIPA”)

prohibits governmental imposition of a “substantial burden on the religious

exercise” of a confined individual, even if the burden results from a rule of general

applicability, unless the burden “(1) is in furtherance of a compelling

governmental interest; and (2) is the least restrictive means of furthering that

compelling governmental interest.” 42 U.S.C. § 2000cc–1(a).

In establishing a claim under RLUIPA, the plaintiff bears the initial burden

of showing (1) that he seeks to engage in an exercise of religion; and (2) that the

challenged practice substantially burdens that exercise of religion. 42 U.S.C. §

2000cc–2(b). Once the plaintiff establishes this prima facie case, the burden shifts to

the government to show that the policy in question was the least restrictive means

to further a compelling government interest. Holt v. Hobbs, 574 U.S. 352, 135 S. Ct.

853, 863 (2015).

“Religious exercise” under RLUIPA includes “any exercise of religion,

whether or not compelled by, or central to, a system of religious belief.” 42 U.S.C.

§ 2000cc-5(7)(A). Governmental action substantially burdens religious exercise

when the inmate is forced to “engage in conduct that seriously violates his

religious beliefs,” regardless of whether other religious accommodations offset the

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burden imposed.2 Holt, 135 S. Ct. at 862 (quoting Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc.,

134 S. Ct. 2751, 2775 (2014)); Jones v. Carter, 915 F.3d 1147, 1150 (7th Cir. 2019).

Once the burden shifts, RLUIPA requires courts to examine the application

of the challenged practice “to the person.” Holt, 135 S. Ct. at 863. Officials must

explain why they denied the plaintiff an exemption and show that such a denial is

the least restrictive means in furtherance of a compelling government interest. Id.

at 364. The least-restrictive-means standard “requires the government to show that

it lacks other means of achieving its desired goal without imposing a substantial

burden on the exercise of religion by the objecting party.” Id. (citations omitted). If

less restrictive means are available, “the Government must use [them].” Id.

RLUIPA does not require prisoners to limit their religious exercise to items

traditionally associated with their designated faiths. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000cc-5(7)(A).

Plaintiff’s affiliation with the Baptist faith and his sworn statements that he

believed the medallion symbolized this faith are sufficient to permit a reasonable

inference that he sought to engage in a religious exercise and that his beliefs were

sincerely held. Schlemm, 784 F.3d at 365 (Plaintiff’s testimony that denial of game

meat for religious ceremony imposed substantial burden was sufficient where “the

record was not so lopsided as to permit that contention’s rejection on summary

judgment.”).

2 Holt and Hobby Lobby redefined “substantial burden” under RLUIPA. Prior to these decisions,

courts interpreted “substantial burden” for RLUIPA purposes as “one that necessarily bears

direct, primary, and fundamental responsibility for rendering religious exercise…effectively

impracticable,” which was consistent with the standard applied in First Amendment cases.

Schlemm v. Wall, 784 F.3d 362, 364 (7th Cir. 2015); see also Nelson v. Miller, 570 F.3d 868, 876 (7th

Cir. 2009) (RLUIPA has been “interpreted with reference to Supreme Court free exercise

jurisprudence.”). Holt and Hobby Lobby “articulated a standard much easier to satisfy” than the

“effectively impracticable” standard. Schlemm, 784 F.3d at 364; see also Jones, 915 F.3d at 1149.

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Defendant Llewellyn’s denial of the medallion, his apparent attempt to

condition receipt of the item upon Plaintiff’s conversion to Catholicism, and his

requirement that Plaintiff attend services3 for an extended period before

approving the necklace and cross permit a reasonable inference that Defendant

Llewellyn’s actions forced Plaintiff to choose between possession of the items and

practicing his faith. Viewed in the light most favorable to Plaintiff, the record

permits a reasonable inference that officials substantially burdened his religious

practice. Jones, 915 F.3d at 1150 (forcing a prisoner to choose between adequate

nutrition and religious practice imposed a substantial burden).

The existence of rules and prison officials’ desire to enforce them is not a

compelling government interest under RLUIPA. Schlemm, 784 F.3d at 365. The

statute requires prison officials to change the rules to accommodate sincerely held

religious beliefs, and Defendants’ argument that the rules prohibited Plaintiff’s

possession of the medallion and cross does not support a finding that they are

entitled to summary judgment. Id. Defendants have not offered any evidence

showing that the chain and medallion posed a safety and security risk, and the fact

that Defendant Llewellyn’s denials hinged on factors not associated with those

interests negates an inference to that effect. Defendants have not otherwise

presented any argument or evidence showing why they could not accommodate

the medallion. Defendants are not entitled to judgment as a matter of law on

Plaintiff’s RLUIPA claim.

B

The Court’s Merit Review Order also found that Plaintiff stated a First

Amendment Free Exercise claim against Defendant Llewellyn and a John Doe

3 The record does not disclose the religious affiliation of the services Defendant Llewellyn forced

Plaintiff to attend.

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prison official based on the alleged confiscation of the medallion. Plaintiff did not

identify the John Doe official within the deadlines set forth in the Court’s

Scheduling Order, and, therefore, this defendant is dismissed without prejudice.

See (Doc. 18 at 4, ¶ 9).

Federal courts must avoid making unnecessary constitutional decisions.

Koger v. Bryan, 523 F.3d 789, 801 (7th Cir. 2008); Miller v. Downey, 915 F.3d 460, 463

(7th Cir. 2019). Plaintiff’s First Amendment claim arises from the same conduct at

issue in his RLUIPA claim. Because the statute affords greater protection, the

Court finds that Plaintiff’s First Amendment claim is moot. See Koger, 523 F.3d at

801 (“Because the prison officials are liable under RLUIPA for the conduct

complained of in the constitutional claims, we decline to consider those latter

claims.”); Schlemm, 764 F.3d at 363 (bypassing prisoner’s constitutional claims

because RLUIPA provides greater protection); Borzych v. Frank, 439 F.3d 388, 390

(7th Cir. 2006) (declining to consider a prisoner’s constitutional claims, and

considering solely his RLUIPA claim after noting the heightened protection it

offers).

C

Defendants argue that they are entitled to qualified immunity. Qualified

immunity protects government officials “from liability for civil damages insofar

as their conduct does not violate clearly established statutory or constitutional

rights of which a reasonable person would have known.” Pearson v. Callahan, 555

U.S. 223, 231 (2009) (internal quotations and citations omitted). This defense is

moot as it relates to Plaintiff’s First Amendment claims.

RLUIPA does not authorize money damages against officials in their official

or individual capacities. Sossamon v. Texas, 563 U.S. 277, 292 (2011) (“States, in

accepting federal funding, do not consent to waive their sovereign immunity to

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private suits for money damages under RLUIPA because no statute expressly and

unequivocally includes such a waiver.”); Nelson, 570 F.3d at 889 (damages not

available under RLUIPA against defendants in their individual capacities).

Because injunctive relief is the only relief available, Defendants are not entitled to

qualified immunity on Plaintiff’s RLUIPA claim. Hannemann v. S. Door Cnty. Sch.

Dist., 673 F.3d 746, 758 (7th Cir. 2012) (“[T]he defense of qualified immunity does

not protect defendants from an action for injunctive relief.”).

THEREFORE:

1) Defendant John Doe is dismissed without prejudice. Clerk is directed

to terminate this defendant.

2) Defendants’ Motion for Summary Judgment [20] is GRANTED as to

Plaintiff’s First Amendment claim and DENIED as to any other relief

requested.

3) This matter is referred to Magistrate Judge Hanna for a settlement

conference. Clerk is directed to notify Judge Hanna’s chambers of this

referral. Judge Hanna’s chambers will contact the parties to schedule

the conference.

4) The Court will set a final pretrial conference, jury trial, and the

associated deadlines, if necessary, after the settlement conference has

occurred.

It is so ordered.

Entered: December 8, 2025

s/Jonathan E. Hawley

U.S. District Judge

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