Landers

Cite as 29 I&N Dec. 240 (BIA 2025) Interim Decision #4128

Matter of Beresford A. LANDERS, Jr., Attorney

Decided September 17, 2025

U.S. Department of Justice

Executive Office for Immigration Review

Board of Immigration Appeals

Circumstantial evidence of similarities in allegedly pro se filings and suspended

counsel’s involvement in the mailing of documents to the Immigration Courts and DHS

can constitute clear and convincing evidence that counsel practiced law in violation of a

disciplinary order of suspension.

FOR THE RESPONDENT: Pro se

FOR EXECUTIVE OFFICE FOR IMMIGRATION REVIEW, OFFICE OF GENERAL

COUNSEL: Catherine M. O’Connell, Disciplinary Counsel

FOR THE DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND SECURITY: Amy S. Paulick, Disciplinary

Counsel

BEFORE: Board Panel: MALPHRUS, Chief Appellate Immigration Judge; MULLANE

and CREPPY, Appellate Immigration Judges.

CREPPY, Appellate Immigration Judge:

The Disciplinary Counsels for the Executive Office for Immigration

Review (“EOIR”) and the Department of Homeland Security (“DHS”) filed

a Joint Notice of Intent to Discipline, requesting that the respondent 1 be

disbarred from practice before the Board of Immigration Appeals, the

Immigration Court, and DHS. The respondent has appealed the Adjudicating

Official’s August 15, 2024, decision ordering his disbarment. The appeal

will be dismissed.

I. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

On June 2, 2022, the Supreme Court of Florida suspended the respondent

from the practice of law in Florida for 90 days. Based on this suspension,

the Disciplinary Counsels for EOIR and DHS sought the respondent’s

suspension from practice before the Board, the Immigration Courts, and DHS

in disciplinary proceeding. See 8 C.F.R. §§ 1003.102(e), 1003.103(b)

(2025). On October 20, 2022, the Board issued a final order in the

1

The respondent in this case is an attorney in practitioner disciplinary proceedings.

Page

240

Cite as 29 I&N Dec. 240 (BIA 2025) Interim Decision #4128

proceedings suspending the respondent from practice before the Board, the

Immigration Courts, and DHS for 90 days, effective September 8, 2022.

At the end of the 90-day period, the respondent, who had been reinstated

to practice in Florida on October 3, 2022, moved the Board for reinstatement.

The Disciplinary Counsels opposed the respondent’s motion arguing that the

respondent had violated the terms of his suspension by practicing before

United States Citizenship and Immigration Services (“USCIS”) in two

different cases while suspended. Although the respondent denied practicing

before USCIS, the Board denied his reinstatement request based on evidence

presented by the Disciplinary Counsels. The respondent remains suspended

from practice before the Board, the Immigration Courts, and DHS.

From January 2023 through January 2024, the Disciplinary Counsels for

EOIR and DHS received numerous additional complaints that the respondent

was continuing to practice law before the Immigration Courts and DHS in

violation of his suspension. The Disciplinary Counsels sent the respondent

a preliminary inquiry letter asking him to explain alleged pro se filings that

were substantially similar to filings the respondent had submitted in other

cases prior to his suspension. The respondent denied violating the terms of

his suspension. On May 15, 2023, the Disciplinary Counsels filed a Joint

Notice of Intent to Discipline with the Board initiating the current

proceedings.

The Notice of Intent to Discipline contains 335 factual allegations

supporting 52 counts of alleged violations of the Board’s suspension order.

Based on these violations, the Disciplinary Counsels charged the respondent

with the unauthorized practice of law in violation of a disciplinary order of

suspension. The Disciplinary Counsels recommend disbarment as the

appropriate sanction given the extent of the respondent’s violations.

On July 12, 2023, we referred the respondent’s case to the Office of the

Chief Immigration Judge for the appointment of an Adjudicating Official.

The Adjudicating Official received additional evidence, conducted hearings,

and issued a decision sustaining the charge in the Notice of Intent to

Discipline. The Adjudicating Official found that the Disciplinary Counsels

had proven the allegations in the Notice of Intent to Discipline and had linked

the respondent to each of the motions and other legal filings described in the

allegations. The Adjudicating Official further concluded that the

Disciplinary Counsels had established, by clear and convincing evidence,

that the respondent had engaged in the unauthorized practice of law by

drafting and filing the motions and other legal documents described in the

allegations while suspended from practice before the Board, the Immigration

Page

241

Cite as 29 I&N Dec. 240 (BIA 2025) Interim Decision #4128

Courts, and DHS. Given the extent of the respondent’s violations, the

Adjudicating Official disbarred the respondent from practice before the

Board, the Immigration Courts, and DHS.

The respondent has appealed from the Adjudicating Official’s decision.

He argues that there is no direct evidence establishing that he engaged in the

unauthorized practice of law, and he contends that the circumstantial

evidence is not sufficient to establish that he performed acts that qualify as

practicing before the Board, the Immigration Courts, and DHS while

suspended. 2

II. ANALYSIS

In disciplinary proceedings, the Disciplinary Counsels “bear the burden

of proving the grounds for disciplinary sanctions enumerated in the Notice

of Intent to Discipline by clear and convincing evidence.” 8 C.F.R.

§ 1003.106(a)(2)(iv) (2025). A party presents clear and convincing evidence

when it “place[s] in the ultimate factfinder an abiding conviction that the

truth of its factual contentions are ‘highly probable.’” Colorado v.

New Mexico, 467 U.S. 310, 316 (1984). We review the Adjudicating

Official’s findings of fact for clear error, but review questions of law,

discretion, and judgment de novo. 8 C.F.R. § 1003.1(d)(3)(i)–(ii) (2025);

see also 8 C.F.R. § 1003.106(c).

A. Disciplinary Charge

The Disciplinary Counsels charged the respondent with the unauthorized

practice of law in violation of the Board’s October 20, 2022, order of

suspension. The regulations governing proceedings before the Immigration

Courts and the Board define “practice” as “exercising professional judgment

to provide legal advice or legal services related to any matter before EOIR.”

8 C.F.R. § 1001.1(i) (2025).

Practice includes, but is not limited to, determining available forms of relief from

removal or protection; providing advice regarding legal strategies; drafting or filing

any document on behalf of another person appearing before EOIR based on an

2

The respondent made additional arguments in his notice of appeal. However, because

the respondent did not renew or further develop these arguments in his brief, we deem them

waived. See Matter of W-Y-C- & H-O-B-, 27 I&N Dec. 189, 190 n.2 (BIA 2018), aff’d sub

nom. Cantareros-Lagos v. Barr, 924 F.3d 145 (5th Cir. 2019); see also Abebe v. Mukasey,

554 F.3d 1203, 1207–08 (9th Cir. 2009) (en banc) (holding that arguments raised in the

notice of appeal are waived unless raised in the appellate brief).

Page

242

Cite as 29 I&N Dec. 240 (BIA 2025) Interim Decision #4128

analysis of applicable facts and law; or appearing on behalf of another person in any

matter before EOIR.

Id. The regulations distinguish “practice” from “preparation,” which

“consist[s] solely of filling in blank spaces on printed forms with information

provided by the applicant or petitioner that are to be filed with or submitted

to EOIR, where such acts do not include the exercise of professional

judgment to provide legal advice or legal services.” 8 C.F.R. § 1001.1(k).

The regulations governing proceedings before DHS similarly define

“practice” as “the act or acts of any person appearing in any case, either in

person or through the preparation or filing of any brief or other document,

paper, application, or petition on behalf of another person or client before or

with DHS.” 8 C.F.R. § 1.2 (2025). The DHS regulations define “preparation,

constituting practice,” as

the study of the facts of a case and the applicable laws, coupled with the giving of

advice and auxiliary activities, including the incidental preparation of papers, but

does not include the lawful functions of a notary public or service consisting solely

of assistance in the completion of blank spaces on printed DHS forms, by one whose

remuneration, if any, is nominal and who does not hold himself or herself out as

qualified in legal matters or in immigration and naturalization procedure.

Id. (emphasis omitted).

To sustain the disciplinary charge in this case, the Disciplinary Counsels

must present clear and convincing evidence that the respondent engaged in

acts that qualify as practicing before the Immigration Courts and DHS while

suspended. 3 Upon de novo review, we agree with the Adjudicating Official

that the Disciplinary Counsels have met their burden of proof. See 8 C.F.R.

§ 1003.1(d)(3)(ii).

The respondent does not dispute the Adjudicating Official’s factual

findings regarding the allegations in the Notice of Intent to Discipline and

we discern no clear error. See 8 C.F.R. § 1003.1(d)(3)(i). In particular, the

Adjudicating Official did not clearly err in finding that the evidence the

Disciplinary Counsels provided was sufficient to establish the facts set forth

in allegations 1 to 335.

3

Our October 20, 2022, order was effective as of September 8, 2022, the date we granted

the Disciplinary Counsels’ petition for immediate suspension. The respondent,

accordingly, violated our suspension orders if he practiced before the Immigration Courts

or DHS on or after September 8, 2022.

Page

243

Cite as 29 I&N Dec. 240 (BIA 2025) Interim Decision #4128

Agreeing with the respondent, the Adjudicating Official also found that

the allegations do not specifically state that the respondent prepared or filed

the motions and other filings identified by the Disciplinary Counsels in

counts 1 to 52. 4 The Adjudicating Official, however, concluded that the

Disciplinary Counsels’ evidence was sufficient to link the respondent to the

filings and to provide clear and convincing evidence that the respondent

continued to practice before the Immigration Courts and DHS despite his

suspension from practice before these entities. We affirm the Adjudicating

Official’s decision.

The Adjudicating Official did not clearly err in finding a link between the

respondent and the filings discussed in the Notice of Intent to Discipline

based on: (1) the pattern of similarities among the legal filings discussed in

counts 1 to 52 and between the pre-suspension legal filings from the

respondent and the legal filings identified in the Notice of Intent to

Discipline; (2) the testimony of the Government’s witnesses; and (3) the

evidence from the Miami and El Paso Immigration Courts. The Adjudicating

Official also did not clearly err in finding that the respondent’s statements in

response to the preliminary inquiry letter and the Notice of Intent to

Discipline corroborated rather than weakened this link.

In assessing the evidence submitted by the Disciplinary Counsels, the

Adjudicating Official found the similarities between the allegedly pro se

filings striking. Specifically, the Adjudicating Official found that the filings

used identical font and language and that several contained the same

typographical and grammatical errors. The Adjudicating Official also found

that several of the filings were submitted by aliens the respondent represented

prior to his suspension. He further found that some of the filings were

identical to motions the respondent filed in cases prior to his suspension.

Moreover, the Adjudicating Official pointed out that the respondent signed

one of the pro se asylum applications included with these filings as preparer

even though he was suspended. The Adjudicating Official also observed that

several of the aliens signed their asylum applications on the same day. The

Adjudicating Official did not clearly err in finding that these similarities were

sufficient to establish that the respondent prepared the allegedly pro se legal

filings.

The respondent asserts that legal arguments and case law are in the public

domain and available for anyone to use in legal filings. This fact, however,

4

It would have been better practice for the Disciplinary Counsels to have included

specific allegations in the Notice of Intent to Discipline stating that the respondent had

drafted and filed the motions and other legal documents discussed.

Page

244

Cite as 29 I&N Dec. 240 (BIA 2025) Interim Decision #4128

does not adequately explain how so many different individuals independently

obtained the respondent’s work product, adapted it for themselves, and then

prepared motions and filings in the same font, same format, and with the

same typographical errors. Further, as the Adjudicating Official pointed out,

many of the individuals using his work product were his former clients prior

to his suspension. This fact makes it even less likely that the allegedly pro se

aliens found the respondent’s work product without the respondent’s

assistance and then adapted it to their individual cases without the

respondent’s advice and assistance.

The Adjudicating Official additionally did not clearly err in finding that

the manner in which many of the documents were mailed provided further

proof of the respondent’s involvement. Many of the allegedly pro se motions

were sent to the Miami Immigration Court in large boxes with multiple other

motions from unrelated cases. The boxes bore the respondent’s name as

sender. Even one of the filings sent individually to DHS had links to the

respondent. The mailing label for the response to a DHS request for

additional evidence, which is discussed in count 52 of the Notice of Intent to

Discipline, listed the respondent as sender. The response also included an

address used by the respondent as the alien’s return address.

Finally, the Adjudicating Official did not clearly err in finding that the

respondent tacitly admitted he was drafting legal documents despite his

suspension. When the Disciplinary Counsels sent a preliminary inquiry

asking the respondent about allegedly pro se filings that closely resembled

filings he had made before his suspension, the respondent did not deny his

involvement with the filings. Rather, he argued, incorrectly, that the Board’s

suspension order was narrowly tailored and only prevented him from

physically appearing before the Board, the Immigration Courts, and DHS.

The respondent claimed, again incorrectly, that the Board’s order did not

prevent him from providing document assistance. The respondent reiterated

these arguments in his response to the Notice of Intent to Discipline and

chose not to testify during the hearing held by the Adjudicating Official. The

Adjudicating Official did not clearly err in interpreting this as an admission

that the respondent engaged with clients in a manner that qualified as

“practice” under 8 C.F.R. § 1.2 and 8 C.F.R. § 1001.1(i). See Cooper v.

Harris, 581 U.S. 285, 309 (2017) (stating that under clear error review,

reversal is appropriate only when “left with the definite and firm conviction

that a mistake has been committed” (quoting Anderson v. City of Bessemer

City, 470 U.S. 564, 573 (1985))); see also Matter of D-R-, 25 I&N Dec. 445,

454–55 (BIA 2011) (explaining that an Immigration Judge may make

“reasonable inferences from direct and circumstantial evidence of the record

as a whole” and “is not required to accept a respondent’s assertions, even if

Page

245

Cite as 29 I&N Dec. 240 (BIA 2025) Interim Decision #4128

plausible, where there are other permissible views of the evidence based on

the record”), remanded sub nom. Radojkovic v. Holder, 599 F. App’x 646

(9th Cir. 2015).

We disagree with the respondent’s claim that the Adjudicating Official

did not distinguish practice from preparation in finding that he violated his

suspension order. The respondent did more than “fill[] in blank spaces on

printed forms with information provided by the applicant or petitioner” or act

as a courier service for former and new clients. 8 C.F.R. § 1001.1(k). The

record provides clear and convincing evidence that the respondent drafted

motions requiring legal analysis and citation to cases and provided legal

advice on strategy. This conduct clearly falls within the definition of

“practice” contained in 8 C.F.R. § 1001.1(i) and 8 C.F.R. § 1.2.

The respondent further argues that there is no direct evidence that he

prepared or filed the documents discussed in counts 1 to 52. He asserts that

the circumstantial evidence in the record is not sufficient to meet the

Disciplinary Counsels’ burden of showing a disciplinary violation by clear

and convincing evidence.

“Depending on its probative value, circumstantial evidence alone may be

sufficient to prove a charge in [disciplinary] cases.” Matter of Koden,

15 I&N Dec. 739, 760 (BIA 1974). 5 In fact, the Supreme Court of the

United States has recognized that circumstantial evidence can be sufficient

even to prove a charge beyond a reasonable doubt. See Desert Palace, Inc.

v. Costa, 539 U.S. 90, 100 (2003) (stating, in the context of an employment

discrimination lawsuit, that the adequacy of circumstantial evidence extends

beyond civil cases and that the Court has “never questioned the sufficiency

of circumstantial evidence in support of a criminal conviction, even though

proof beyond a reasonable doubt is required”); Holland v. United States,

348 U.S. 121, 140 (1954) (stating that circumstantial evidence is

no different from testimonial evidence). “[T]he law makes no distinction

between the weight or value to be given to either direct or

5

It has long been held and accepted that charges of professional misconduct may be

established by circumstantial evidence. E.g., Utz v. State Bar, 130 P.2d 377, 379

(Cal. 1942). The regulations governing disciplinary proceedings before the Board further

state that disciplinary hearings “shall be conducted in the same manner as Immigration

Court proceedings as is appropriate.” 8 C.F.R. § 1003.106(a)(2)(v). Circumstantial

evidence is admissible in immigration proceedings conducted before Immigration Judges,

and Immigration Judges may rely on circumstantial evidence to determine if a party has

met its burden of proof. See, e.g., Matter of D-R-, 25 I&N Dec. at 454–56 (upholding an

Immigration Judge’s findings that were based on reasonable inferences drawn from direct

and circumstantial evidence of the record as a whole).

Page

246

Cite as 29 I&N Dec. 240 (BIA 2025) Interim Decision #4128

circumstantial evidence.” Desert Palace, 539 U.S. at 100 (citation omitted);

Kevin F. O’Malley et al., Federal Jury Practice & Instructions, Criminal

§ 12:04 (7th ed. 2025) (discussing direct and circumstantial evidence and

indicating that no greater degree of certainty is required of circumstantial

evidence than of direct evidence).

Circumstantial evidence of similarities in allegedly pro se filings and

suspended counsel’s involvement in the mailing of documents to the

Immigration Courts and DHS can constitute clear and convincing evidence

that counsel practiced law in violation of a disciplinary order of suspension.

As we explained above, the evidence in this case connects the respondent to

52 separate filings allegedly made by pro se aliens while the respondent was

suspended from practice before the Immigration Courts and DHS, and the

respondent did not deny his involvement in the preparation of these filings.

Based on these factual findings, we agree that the Disciplinary Counsels’

evidence, even though circumstantial, constitutes clear and convincing

evidence that the respondent violated his suspension by continuing to

practice before the Immigration Courts and DHS. See Colorado v.

New Mexico, 467 U.S. at 316 (defining clear and convincing evidence). We

accordingly sustain the disciplinary charge against the respondent.

B. Sanction

The respondent does not specifically challenge the Adjudicating

Official’s choice of sanction. The Adjudicating Official engaged in a

comprehensive analysis and considered all relevant factors in determining

the appropriate sanction for the respondent’s misconduct. We affirm the

Adjudicating Official’s conclusion that disbarment is the appropriate

sanction in this case. See Matter of K. Gupta, 28 I&N Dec. 653, 657

(BIA 2022) (finding that the attorney’s “knowing and repeated disregard” for

a prior order of suspension and his false “claim on notices of entry of

appearance that he was not subject to any order restricting his right to practice

law . . . [were] serious violations that undermine the integrity of the legal

system” and that disbarment was the appropriate sanction).

The respondent’s extensive and knowing violations of our October 20,

2022, order suspending him from practice before the Board, the Immigration

Courts, and DHS strike at the heart of the legal system. He continued to

violate our order for months after we denied his request for reinstatement

based on his conduct and after he received the Disciplinary Counsel’s

preliminary inquiry letter notifying him that his actions appeared to

constitute disciplinary violations. The respondent has not identified any

factors mitigating his serious misconduct. We therefore uphold the

Page

247

Cite as 29 I&N Dec. 240 (BIA 2025) Interim Decision #4128

Adjudicating Official’s determination that disbarment is the appropriate

sanction in this case.

ORDER: The respondent’s appeal is dismissed.

FURTHER ORDER: The Board hereby disbars the respondent from

practice before the Board of Immigration Appeals, the Immigration Courts,

and DHS, effective immediately.

FURTHER ORDER: The respondent must maintain compliance with

the directives set forth in our prior order. The respondent must notify the

Board of any further disciplinary action against him.

FURTHER ORDER: The contents of the order shall be made

available to the public, including at the Immigration Courts and appropriate

offices of DHS.

Page

248